Sanguinetti

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

JORGE SANGUINETTI,

Plaintiff,

v.

Case No.: 2:21-cv-529-JLB-KCD

COLLIER COUNTY, KEVIN RAMBOSK,

ADAM DILLMAN, JOHN SCADUTO,

DAVID DRUCKS, MICHAEL PUKA,

and DAVID CRISP, JR.,

Defendants.

_______________________________________/

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on two motions for summary judgment (Docs.

179, 180). The first motion was filed by Defendants John Scaduto (“Deputy

Scaduto”), David Drucks (“Mr. Drucks”), Michael Puka (“Mr. Puka”), and David

Crisp, Jr. (“Mr. Crisp”). (Doc. 179). Plaintiff Jorge Sanguinetti (“Plaintiff” or “Mr.

Sanguinetti”) filed a response (Doc. 199), Defendants filed a reply (Doc. 201), and

Plaintiff filed a sur-reply (Doc. 211)1. The second summary judgment motion was

filed by defendants Collier County, Kevin Rambosk (“Mr. Rambosk”), and Adam

Dillman (“Mr. Dillman”). (Doc. 180). Plaintiff filed a response (Doc. 198), and

defendants filed a reply (Doc. 200).2

1 Mr. Sanguinetti filed a motion for leave to file this sur-reply, which the Court granted.

(Docs. 205, 210).

2 After Defendants filed their respective replies, Mr. Sanguinetti filed a Notice of

1

After careful review of the record and entire file, the Motion for Summary

Judgment filed by Deputy Scaduto, Mr. Drucks, Mr. Puka, and Mr. Crisp (Doc. 179)

is GRANTED, and the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Collier County, Mr.

Rambosk, and Mr. Dillman is (Doc. 180) GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

On the evening of Friday, July 14, 2017, Mr. Sanguinetti and three of his

friends embarked on a night out in Naples, Florida, to celebrate a birthday. (Doc.

173-1 at 40:12–42:12; Doc. 180 at ¶ 1; Doc. 198 at ¶ 1). The group began at a

restaurant called Dylan’s, where they ordered a pitcher of beer. (Doc. 173-1 at

55:13–16; Doc. 179 at ¶ 3; Doc. 180 at ¶ 1; Doc. 198 at ¶ 1; Doc. 199 at ¶ 3). The

group later moved to the Blue Martini, located in a Naples outdoor mall called

Mercato. (Doc. 173-1 at 52:8–15, 55:17–56:1; Doc. 179 at ¶ 3; Doc. 180 at ¶ 3; Doc.

198 at ¶ 3; Doc. 199 at ¶ 3). At Blue Martini, each of the friends ordered a Corona

beer. (Id.). The group eventually landed at the Cavo Lounge, which was also

located at Mercato. (Doc. 173-1 at 52:17–53:18; Doc. 179 at ¶ 4; Doc. 180 at ¶ 3;

Doc. 198 at ¶ 3; Doc. 199 at ¶ 4). The events leading to this litigation unfolded

Clarification (Doc. 202). Mr. Sanguinetti claims that this notice merely seeks to correct

scrivener’s errors in his responses (Docs. 198, 199). But in actuality, the notice is a sur-

reply that seeks to remediate the deficiencies alleged in defendants’ replies by citing to

additional record evidence. Mr. Sanguinetti may not evade this district’s local rules by

styling what is in its essence a sur-reply as a notice. The Middle District of Florida’s Local

Rules do not permit parties to file sur-replies without leave of court. See M.D. Fla. Loc. R.

3.01(c) (explaining that a party responding to a motion is permitted to file a single

memorandum of no longer than twenty pages inclusive of all parts); M.D. Fla. Loc. R.

3.01(e) (explaining that, absent narrow exceptions, no party may reply without leave of

court). As such, the Clerk of Court is hereby DIRECTED to STRIKE Mr. Sanguinetti’s

Notice of Clarification (Doc. 202).

2

when Mr. Sanguinetti and his friends attempted to enter the Cavo Lounge.

Defendants Mr. Drucks, Mr. Crisp, and Mr. Puka were road patrol officers

with the Collier County Sheriff’s Office. (Doc. 173-9 at 3:12–4:3). On the evening of

the events leading to this litigation, they were on assignment to patrol the Mercato

area. (Id.; Doc. 179 at ¶ 41; Doc. 199 at ¶ 41). Their assignment consisted of

patrolling and aiding bouncers within the area surrounding the Cavo Lounge. (Doc.

173-9 at 4:9–5:3). Defendant Deputies Scaduto and Dillman were detectives

working in the gang unit of the Collier County Sheriff’s Office. (Doc. 173-5 at 4:13–

5:7; Doc. 180 at ¶ 4; Doc. 198 at ¶ 4). Deputies Scaduto and Dillman were on patrol

in Mercato that evening to maintain a law enforcement presence following recent

violent events in the area. (Id.). They were not working on any special contract

detail between the Sheriff’s Office and Mercato establishments. (Doc. 180 at ¶ 4;

Doc. 180-1 at ¶ 6; Doc. 198 at ¶ 4). Defendant Sheriff Rambosk, the Sheriff of

Collier County, had no personal involvement in the events that occurred that

evening and was unaware of them until being served with the lawsuit. (Doc. 180 at

¶ 23; Doc. 180-4 at ¶ 3; Doc. 198 at ¶ 23). Defendant Collier County defines the

geographic limitations of the law enforcement function of the Collier County

Sheriff’s Office but otherwise exercises no control over the Sheriff’s law enforcement

function. (Doc. 180-5 at ¶ 4). Collier County plays no role in the selection or hiring

of deputies by the Sheriff, in the training of deputies, or in the development of the

Sheriff’s Office policies as they relate to training or discipline. (Id. at ¶ 5).

When Mr. Sanguinetti and his friends attempted to enter the Cavo Lounge,

3

they were denied entry because they did not comply with the lounge’s dress code.

(Doc. 179 at ¶ 9; Doc. 180 at ¶ 7; Doc. 198 at ¶ 7; Doc. 199 at ¶ 9). Additionally,

Cavo Lounge employees believed that Mr. Sanguinetti and his friends were

intoxicated (Doc. 179 at ¶ 10; Doc. 180 at ¶ 7; Doc. 198 at ¶ 7; Doc. 199 at ¶ 10),

though Mr. Sanguinetti denies that he was visibly intoxicated at this time (Doc.

173-1 at 56:5–6).

An unidentified employee at the lounge’s entrance said, “Why don’t you get

the fuck out of here?” (Doc. 179 at ¶¶ 5, 8; Doc. 180 at ¶ 5; Doc. 198 at ¶ 5; Doc. 199

at ¶¶ 5, 8). Mr. Sanguinetti then asked to speak to a manager. (Doc. 179 at ¶ 15;

Doc. 180 at ¶ 5; Doc. 198 at ¶ 5; Doc. 199 at ¶ 15). Deputy Scaduto approached and

asked if everything was okay, to which Mr. Sanguinetti responded affirmatively,

and Deputy Scaduto then left. (Doc. 179 at ¶ 16; Doc. 180 at ¶ 5; Doc. 198 at ¶ 5;

Doc. 199 at ¶ 16). Mr. Sanguinetti was aware that Deputy Scaduto was a police

officer at this time. (Doc. 179 at ¶ 17; Doc. 199 at ¶ 17).

The Cavo Lounge manager, Jason Buro (“Mr. Buro”), approached the group

and told them to “get the fuck out of here” because they were starting to cause a

scene. (Doc. 179 at ¶ 11; Doc. 180 at ¶ 6; Doc. 198 at ¶ 6; Doc. 199 at ¶ 11). Mr.

Sanguinetti was the only member of the group who spoke English. (Doc. 179 at ¶ 1;

Doc. 199 at ¶ 1). Anticipating a language barrier, Mr. Buro gestured to his shirt

collar in an attempt to communicate that there was a dress code issue. (Doc. 173-3

at 7:2–14; Doc. 179 at ¶ 24; Doc. 199 at ¶ 24). According to Mr. Buro, Mr.

Sanguinetti then reached out and grabbed Mr. Buro’s shirt collar. (Doc. 173-3 at

4

14:15–21; Doc. 180 at ¶ 8). Mr. Sanguinetti denies that he grabbed Mr. Buro’s shirt

collar at any point. (Doc. 198 at ¶ 8; Doc. 198-2 at 38:22–25).

Mr. Buro then asked the uniformed officers for help and to escort Mr.

Sanguinetti and his friends away from the front of the Cavo Lounge. (Doc. 179 at ¶

11; Doc. 199 at ¶ 11). Deputy Dillman escorted at least some members of the group

away to the valet area. (Doc. 179 at ¶ 12; Doc. 180 at ¶ 11; Doc. 198 at ¶ 11; Doc.

199 at ¶ 12).

Deputy Scaduto returned to the Cavo Lounge. (Doc. 179 at ¶ 28; Doc. 199 at

¶ 28). Upon his return, Deputy Scaduto gave Mr. Sanguinetti a soft touch with his

left hand to guide him to leave and verbally instructed Mr. Sanguinetti to leave.3

(Doc. 179 at ¶ 32; Doc. 179-1 at 0:00:20–22). According to Defendants, Mr.

Sanguinetti responded by shoving Deputy Scaduto’s upper left torso with one hand,

causing Deputy Scaduto to lose his balance slightly. (Doc. 179 at ¶ 34; Doc. 179-1 at

0:00:21–24; Doc. 180 at ¶ 14). Mr. Sanguinetti denies that he shoved Deputy

Scaduto. (Doc. 198 at ¶ 14; Doc. 199 at ¶ 34).

Deputy Scaduto then shoved Mr. Sanguinetti with both hands. (Doc. 179 at ¶

35; Doc. 179-1 at 0:00:23–25; Doc. 180 at ¶ 14; Doc. 198 at ¶ 14; Doc. 199 at ¶ 35).

3 In his response to Defendants’ summary judgment motions, Mr. Sanguinetti insists that

he was never asked to leave by any officer or employee, including Mr. Scaduto (Doc. 198 at

¶ 11; Doc. 199 at ¶ 32), but in his Fourth Amended Complaint, Mr. Sanguinetti specifically

alleges that “[u]pon arriving at the entrance of Cavo, [D]efendants [Mr.] Dillman and [Mr.]

Scaduto immediately . . . scream[ed] . . . orders at [Mr. Sanguinetti] to vacate the premises.”

(Doc. 149 at ¶ 38). The Court will not consider Mr. Sanguinetti’s attempt to amend his

complaint through responses to the motions for summary judgment. See Gilmour v. Gates,

McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004) (“A plaintiff may not amend her

complaint through argument in a brief opposing summary judgment.”).

5

While Mr. Sanguinetti staggered backwards, his hands were out to the sides of his

body. (Doc. 179-1 at 0:00:24–27). Deputy Dillman believed that Mr. Sanguinetti

was going to strike Deputy Scaduto. (Doc. 173-5 at 13:22–23).

Deputy Dillman quickly intervened by grabbing Mr. Sanguinetti and forcibly

removing him from the line to enter the Cavo Lounge. (Doc. 179 at ¶ 37; Doc. 179-1

at 0:00:27–29; Doc. 199 at ¶ 37). The parties dispute whether Mr. Sanguinetti

punched Deputy Dillman at this time, but video evidence demonstrates that, at a

minimum, Mr. Sanguinetti’s hands were raised while he was facing Deputy

Dillman. (Doc. 179-1 at 0:00:27–30; Doc. 180 at ¶ 15; Doc. 198 at ¶ 15). Deputy

Dillman then took Mr. Sanguinetti to the ground by punching him. (Doc. 179-1 at

0:00:29–31; Doc. 179 at ¶ 38; Doc. 199 at ¶ 38).

Deputies Drucks and Puka approached while this was occurring. (Doc. 179-1

at 0:00:26–0:00:37). By the time Deputy Crisp reached the altercation, Mr.

Sanguinetti was already on the ground. (Doc. 179-1 at 0:00:30–0:01:58). Because a

crowd was forming, Deputy Crisp took a perimeter position facing the crowd, which

significantly limited the extent to which he could observe the altercation. (Doc. 179

at ¶¶ 44–46; Doc. 179-1 at 0:00:30–0:01:58; Doc. 199 at ¶¶ 44–46).

Defendants allege that Mr. Sanguinetti was a large man and that he was

resisting and flailing on the ground. (Doc. 173-3 at 17:23–18:9; Doc. 173-8 at 6:1–

16; Doc. 179 at ¶¶ 47, 50; Doc. 180 at ¶ 16). Mr. Sanguinetti denies that he flailed

or resisted. (Doc. 198 at ¶ 16; Doc. 199 at ¶¶ 47, 50). Deputy Dillman delivered

strikes to Mr. Sanguinetti while the other officers attempted to get Mr.

6

Sanguinetti’s arms from underneath him. (Doc. 179 at ¶ 54). Deputy Scaduto then

delivered one burst of Oleoresin Capsicum spray (colloquially known as “pepper

spray”) to Mr. Sanguinetti’s face. (Doc. 179 at ¶ 55; Doc. 199 at ¶ 55). Deputy

Scaduto thereafter deployed a single taser shot in prong mode while Mr.

Sanguinetti was on the ground. (Doc. 179 at ¶ 59; Doc. 199 at ¶ 59).

Mr. Sanguinetti stood up from the ground before Deputy Drucks took him

back to the ground again. (Doc. 179 at ¶¶ 61–62; Doc. 199 at ¶¶ 61–62). Deputy

Dillman was then able to attach a handcuff to one of Mr. Sanguinetti’s wrists. (Doc.

179 at ¶ 64; Doc. 199 at ¶ 64). Deputy Dillman twisted the attached handcuff in an

effort to get Mr. Sanguinetti’s other hand out. (Doc. 179 at ¶ 65; Doc. 199 at ¶ 65).

Once Mr. Sanguinetti was handcuffed, he was placed inside Deputy Crisp’s vehicle.

(Doc. 179 at ¶¶ 66–67; Doc. 199 at ¶¶ 66–67).

Deputy Scaduto was the arresting officer. (Doc. 179 at ¶ 69; Doc. 199 at ¶

69). He arrested Mr. Sanguinetti for battery on a law enforcement officer, resisting

an officer with and without violence, disorderly intoxication, and trespass. (Id.;

Doc. 173-12 at 3).4

During Mr. Sanguinetti’s jail intake medical screening, no visible signs of

serious injury were noted. (Doc. 173-13 at 4; Doc. 179 at ¶ 71). Mr. Sanguinetti’s

jail intake medical screening notes state that he complained of discomfort in his

4 The State of Florida subsequently filed an Information only on the charges of battery of a

law enforcement officer and resisting an officer with and without violence. (Doc. 173-12 at

1; Doc. 179 at ¶ 70; Doc. 199 at ¶ 70).

7

right thumb and numbness. (Doc. 173-13 at 5; Doc. 179 at ¶ 72; Doc. 199 at ¶ 72).

They also noted that, when asked whether Mr. Sanguinetti had a head injury or

loss of consciousness in the past 72 hours, Mr. Sanguinetti answered, “No.” (Doc.

173-13 at 5; Doc. 179 at ¶ 73; Doc. 199 at ¶ 73). The screening notes evidence of

skin injury, including bruises and abrasions. (Doc. 173-13 at 5; Doc. 179 at ¶ 74;

Doc. 199 at ¶ 74). The photographic and videographic evidence of Mr. Sanguinetti

after the altercation does not depict any further injury. (Doc. 179 at ¶ 75; Doc. 199

at ¶ 75; see Doc. 173-14; Doc. 179-2).

Mr. Sanguinetti initially filed suit in this Court on July 15, 2021. (Doc. 1)

(the “Initial Complaint”). Certain Defendants filed timely motions to dismiss the

Initial Complaint (Docs. 7–8) (“Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the Initial

Complaint”), and Mr. Sanguinetti missed his response deadline. Because the

Eleventh Circuit has a “strong preference that cases be heard on the merits,” Wahl

v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1174 (11th Cir. 1985), and “strive[s] to afford a litigant his

or her day in court, if possible,” Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V MONADA, 432 F.3d

1333, 1339 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted); see Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A., 774

F.3d 1329, 1342 (11th Cir. 2014), the Court granted Mr. Sanguinetti an additional

twelve days to respond to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the Initial Complaint.

(Doc. 23). On the last day of Mr. Sanguinetti’s extended deadline, he filed an

Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to Respond. (Doc. 24). The Court granted

the motion and allowed Mr. Sanguinetti an additional two weeks to respond. (Doc.

25). Mr. Sanguinetti again missed his response deadline and filed his responses out

8

of time. (See Docs. 30, 31). The remaining Defendants then filed their own Motion

to Dismiss the Initial Complaint (Doc. 51). Mr. Sanguinetti again moved for an

extension of time to prepare his response (Doc. 52), which this Court granted (Doc.

53). The Court granted in part all of the motions to dismiss the Initial Complaint

(Docs. 7–8, 51) after finding that the Initial Complaint was an impermissible

shotgun pleading. (Doc. 67). The Court allowed Mr. Sanguinetti until October 3,

2022, to file an amended complaint. (Id.).

Mr. Sanguinetti filed his Amended Complaint on the last day of the deadline.

(Doc. 69). Three days later, Mr. Sanguinetti filed an Unopposed Motion to Amend

the Amended Complaint (Doc. 70), explaining that his counsel had accidentally filed

a working draft of the Amended Complaint rather than the final version. The Court

granted this motion. (Doc. 71).

Mr. Sanguinetti filed his Second Amended Complaint on October 6, 2022.

(Doc. 72). Defendants filed timely motions to dismiss the Second Amended

Complaint (Docs. 79, 81–82) (“Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the Second Amended

Complaint”). The Court entered an Order on Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the

Second Amended Complaint, and Mr. Sanguinetti was allowed to file a third

amended complaint curing deficiencies identified in the Order. (Doc. 122).

Mr. Sanguinetti filed his Third Amended Complaint on September 26, 2023.

(Doc. 126). Defendants filed timely answers to the Third Amended Complaint.

(Docs. 133–38, 140–43). Mr. Sanguinetti then filed an Unopposed Motion to Amend

the Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 147) for the purpose of dismissing certain

9

counts, which this Court granted (Doc. 148).

Mr. Sanguinetti filed his Fourth Amended Complaint, which is now the

operative complaint in this case, on October 30, 2023. (Doc. 149). Defendants filed

timely answers to the Fourth Amended Complaint. (Docs. 150–59).

Over the next few months, various claims were settled with certain

defendants. (Doc. 170). The remaining Defendants filed their respective motions

for summary judgment (Docs. 179, 180), which are now ripe for this Court’s review.5

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A material fact is one that “might affect the outcome of

the suit under the governing law.” Id. “[A] mere scintilla of evidence” does not

create a genuine issue of material fact, so a nonmoving party may not simply state

that “the jury might, and legally could, disbelieve the moving party’s evidence.”

Hinson v. Bias, 927 F.3d 1103, 1115–16 (11th Cir. 2019) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted).

Courts may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence when

reviewing the record. Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 601 F.3d 1224, 1237 (11th Cir.

5 This case was stayed after the filing of Defendants’ summary judgment motions to allow

the parties to proceed with settlement efforts. (See Doc. 222).

10

2010) (“On summary judgment . . . [n]either [the Eleventh Circuit] nor the district

court are to undertake credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.”). Instead,

courts view evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party’s

favor. Rojas v. Florida, 285 F.3d 1339, 1341–42 (11th Cir. 2002). But “an inference

is not reasonable if it is ‘only a guess or a possibility,’ for such an inference is not

based on the evidence but is pure conjecture and speculation.” Daniels v. Twin

Oaks Nursing Home, 692 F.2d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 1982). The ultimate question

for the Court on summary judgment is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient

disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one

party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52.

Both the Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit have addressed video

evidence in the context of this summary judgment standard. In Scott v. Harris, 550

U.S. 372, 378 (2007), the Supreme Court found error in the lower court’s reliance on

the plaintiff’s (there, the non-movant’s) version of events because the “videotape

quite clearly contradict[ed] the version of the story told by” the plaintiff. After

addressing what the videotape showed in that case, the Supreme Court returned to

the summary judgment standard and explained:

At the summary judgment stage, facts must be viewed in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a “genuine” dispute as

to those facts. As we have emphasized, “[w]hen the moving party has

carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than

simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material

facts....Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier

of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for

trial.’” “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the

parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for

summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue

11

of material fact.” When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of

which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury

could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for

purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.

That was the case here concerning the factual issue whether respondent

was driving in such fashion as to endanger human life. Respondent’s

version of events is so utterly discredited by the record that no

reasonable jury could have believed him. The Court of Appeals should

not have relied on such visible fiction; it should have viewed the facts in

the light depicted by the videotape.

Id. at 380–81 (citations omitted).

Following Scott, the Eleventh Circuit has explained that it views the facts in

light of video evidence “to the extent it squarely conflicts with [non-movant’s]

testimonial descriptions.” Baxter v. Roberts, 54 F.4th 1241, 1257 (11th Cir. 2022).

Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has stated that it has “repeatedly applied [a]

preferencing rule in affirming summary judgment based on objective evidence

notwithstanding the presence of some contradictory testimony from the nonmovant

elsewhere in the record.” Id. at 1258 n.12. That said, “where the videos do not

answer all the questions or resolve all the details of the encounter, we view the

evidence in the light most favorable to [the nonmoving party].” Johnson v. City of

Miami Beach, 18 F.4th 1267, 1269 (11th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

I. Mr. Sanguinetti’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims Against the County and

Sheriff in His Official Capacity Fail.

Mr. Sanguinetti brings counts IV, V, VII, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, and XVI against

the County and Sheriff in his official capacity. (See Doc. 149 ¶¶ 142–53, 166–86,

225–60). These are § 1983 claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, excessive

12

force, deprivation of rights and denial of equal protection, general “Monell” liability,

failure to train or supervise, supervisory liability for failure to correct, and

supervisory liability for failure to train.6 In § 1983 actions, “Florida sheriffs are

county officials as opposed to state officials.” Hutton v. Strickland, 919 F.2d 1531,

1542 (11th Cir. 1990). As a result, where a plaintiff sues the county sheriff in his

official capacity, “the suit is effectively an action against the governmental entity he

represents.” Cook ex rel. Est. of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe Cnty., Fla., 402 F.3d

1092, 1115 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). In this case, Sheriff Rambosk

represents Collier County.

Where a plaintiff sues a local entity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff

must show the injury occurred due to that entity’s “policy or custom.” Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Cook, 402 F.3d at

1116 (“[O]nly when a ‘policy or custom’ of the municipality inflicts the injury does §

1983 liability exist.” (citation omitted)). Under Monell, a plaintiff must establish

“(1) that his constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the municipality had a

custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right;

6 Mr. Sanguinetti brings counts XV and XVI, for supervisory liability for failure to correct

and failure to train, against Sheriff Rambosk without specifying whether the claims are

against the Sheriff in his individual or official capacity. (See Doc. 149 at 39–41).

Accordingly, the Court analyzes the counts as if they are brought against the Sheriff in both

his individual and official capacities. Because both counts XV and XVI allege failure to

correct and failure to train were a result of “policy or custom,” they are analyzed under

Monell. (Doc. 149 at ¶¶ 248, 256–57). In any case, such claims require evidence that

“without notice of a need to train or supervise in a particular area,” a plaintiff cannot

demonstrate liability for failure to do so. Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1351 (11th

Cir. 1998). Mr. Sanguinetti has presented no plausible argument or any record evidence of

such notice.

13

and (3) that the policy or custom caused the violation.” McDowell v. Brown, 392

F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004).

The Court’s “first inquiry in any case alleging municipal liability under §

1983 is . . . whether there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or

custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris,

489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). “[T]he custom or policy must be the ‘moving force’ behind

the constitutional deprivation for there to be sufficient causation.” Marantes v.

Miami-Dade Cnty., 649 F. App’x 665, 672 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S.

at 690–94).

Mr. Sanguinetti fails to demonstrate any of the Monell elements. As

discussed at length in this Order, Mr. Sanguinetti has not demonstrated that his

constitutional rights were violated and, therefore, cannot establish Monell liability.

Even if Mr. Sanguinetti had shown that his constitutional rights were violated, the

claims still fail because he has not presented a plausible argument or evidence of

any policies or customs for any of his § 1983 claims. Though the operative

Complaint includes allegations of customs and policies, Mr. Sanguinetti’s responses

are completely devoid of any mention of a custom or policy—let alone any

establishing evidence—despite the County and Sheriff’s summary judgment

argument on the issue. (See Doc. 149 at ¶¶ 65–66, 98–99, 225–44); (Docs. 180 at 21;

198; 200; 211). Because Mr. Sanguinetti failed to take up the argument at the

summary judgment stage, the claims are abandoned. See Resol. Tr. Corp. v.

Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995) (“In opposing a motion for

14

summary judgment, a party may not rely on his pleadings to avoid judgment

against him . . . . [T]he onus is upon the parties to formulate arguments; grounds

alleged in the complaint but not relied upon in summary judgment are deemed

abandoned.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). In any event, the

Court cannot analyze the existence of a custom or policy when Mr. Sanguinetti has

failed to present a supporting argument or evidence.7

Thus, Mr. Sanguinetti is left to establish a custom or policy only through a

single interaction. But “[a] single incident [is] not . . . so pervasive as to be a custom

. . . because a custom must be . . . ‘a longstanding and widespread practice. . . .’”

Craig v. Floyd Cnty., Ga., 643 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Brown v.

City of Fort Lauderdale, 923 F.2d 1474, 1481 (11th Cir. 1991)). “A pattern of

similar constitutional violations . . . is ordinarily necessary.” Id. (citation omitted).

Accordingly, the Court finds that summary judgment is due to be granted for

counts IV, V, VII, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, and XVI to the extent that they are brought

pursuant to § 1983 against the County or the Sheriff in his official capacity. Counts

XV and XVI are likewise due to be dismissed.

7 It is the responsibility of the party to point the Court to record evidence of its arguments.

Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 463 F.3d 1201, 1208 n.11 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he

district court . . . has [no] obligation to parse a summary judgment record to search out

facts or evidence not brought to the court’s attention.”); Chavez v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,

647 F.3d 1057, 1061 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[D]istrict court judges are not required to ferret out

delectable facts buried in a massive record[.]”). Notwithstanding, the Court has reviewed

the record and finds that Plaintiff has not presented evidence of any customs or policies.

15

II. Mr. Sanguinetti has Failed to Show Lack of Probable Cause as to

Counts II, III, IV, V, VIII, and IX.

Counts II, III, IV, V, VIII, and IX bring claims for false arrest, false

imprisonment, and malicious prosecution under state law and § 1983. Because

probable cause resolves these claims, the Court turns first to whether Deputy

Scaduto had probable cause to arrest Mr. Sanguinetti.

“[T]he correct legal standard to evaluate whether an officer had probable

cause to seize a suspect is to ‘ask whether a reasonable officer could conclude . . .

that there was a substantial chance of criminal activity.’”8 Washington v. Howard,

25 F.4th 891, 902 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S.

48, 61 (2018)). Moreover, “an officer’s subjective intent doesn’t matter for ‘ordinary,

probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” Crocker v. Beatty, 995 F.3d 1232,

1244 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)).

And “[w]hen an officer makes an arrest, which is properly supported by probable

cause to arrest for a certain offense, neither his subjective reliance on an offense for

which no probable cause exists nor his verbal announcement of the wrong offense

vitiates the arrest.” United States v. Saunders, 476 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir. 1973)

(citation omitted).

8 The Eleventh Circuit previously utilized a higher standard for finding probable cause. See

Washington, 25 F.4th at 899 (finding that “[t]he older standard is more demanding than the

Wesby standard” in that the older standard “requires facts and circumstances such that all

prudent people would affirmatively believe that the suspect has already engaged in or will

shortly engage in criminal behavior,” whereas the Wesby standard “requires only that it be

reasonable for any particular officer to conclude that there is a substantial chance of

criminal activity”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

16

Here, Mr. Scaduto possessed probable cause to arrest Mr. Sanguinetti for, at

a minimum, trespass. Under Florida law, a person commits the offense of trespass

in a structure or conveyance when he “willfully enters or remains in any structure

or conveyance” without having been “authorized, licensed, or invited,” or refuses to

leave after having been asked to do so by “a person authorized by the owner or

lessee.” Fla. Stat. § 810.08(1); Watkins v. Dubreuil, 820 F. App’x 940, 944 (11th Cir.

2020). Cavo Lounge employees asked Deputies Scaduto and Dillman to assist with

removing Mr. Sanguinetti from the Cavo Lounge premises, and both Deputies

observed Mr. Sanguinetti’s interactions with the Cavo Lounge employees. (Doc. 179

at ¶¶ 11, 12; Doc. 180 at ¶ 11; Doc. 198 at ¶ 11; Doc. 199 at ¶ 11, 12). Indeed,

Deputy Scaduto himself ordered Mr. Sanguinetti to vacate the premises of the Cavo

Lounge.9 (Doc. 179 at ¶ 32; Doc. 179-1 at 0:00:20–22). The Court therefore finds

that Mr. Scaduto possessed probable cause to arrest Mr. Sanguinetti for trespass

under Florida law.

Accordingly, Mr. Sanguinetti’s Florida state law claims for false

imprisonment and false arrest are defeated by probable cause. See Bolanos v.

Metro. Dade Cnty., 677 So. 2d 1005, 1005 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (probable cause bars a

state claim for false arrest or false imprisonment); DeMarie v. Jefferson Stores, Inc.,

442 So. 2d 1014, 1016 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (“[T]he existence of probable cause is

a part of the defense to a false arrest action which must be shown by the

9 See supra n.4.

17

defendant.” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, defendants carry the burden of

demonstrating the existence of probable cause as a defense to these claims. Rankin

v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1436 (11th Cir. 1998).10

Mr. Sanguinetti’s claims of false imprisonment and false arrest under § 1983

likewise fail. The sole difference in the analysis of Florida and federal claims for

false arrest or false imprisonment is which party bears the burden of proving

whether probable cause existed. Rankin, 133 F.3d at 1436. In § 1983 actions, it is

the plaintiff’s burden to show a lack of probable cause to succeed on claims for false

arrest or false imprisonment. Id.; Evans v. Hightower, 117 F.3d 1318, 1320 (11th

Cir. 1997) (“In order to establish a Fourth Amendment violation, [plaintiff] must

demonstrate that a seizure occurred and that it was unreasonable.” (citation

omitted)); see also Rivas v. Freeman, 940 F.2d 1491, 1496 (11th Cir. 1991) (“To

successfully litigate a lawsuit for deprivation of constitutional rights under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show violation of a constitutionally protected liberty

or property interest and deliberate indifference to constitutional rights.” (citation

omitted)). This Court has found that there was probable cause to arrest Mr.

Sanguinetti and, therefore, he cannot meet his burden of showing its absence.

Because there was probable cause to arrest Mr. Sanguinetti, his claims for

malicious prosecution under Florida law and § 1983 are unsuccessful. Under both

10 In any event, these claims are barred because the officers involved in Mr. Sanguinetti’s

arrest, including Deputies Scaduto and Dillman, are entitled to the immunity set forth in

section 768.28(9)(a), Florida Statutes.

18

state and federal law, a plaintiff bringing a malicious prosecution claim must

demonstrate lack of probable cause. See Burns v. GCC Beverages, Inc., 502 So. 2d

1217, 1218 (Fla. 1986) (explaining that the elements of malicious prosecution

include: “(1) The commencement or continuance of an original criminal or civil

judicial proceeding[;] (2) [i]ts legal causation by the present defendant against

plaintiff who was defendant in the original proceeding[;] (3) [i]ts bona fide

termination in favor of the present plaintiff[;] (4) [t]he absence of probable

cause for such proceeding[;] (5) [t]he presence of malice therein[; and] (6)

[d]amage conforming to legal standards resulting to plaintiff” (emphasis added)

(citations omitted)); Williams v. Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147, 1157 (11th Cir. 2020)

(holding that a federal malicious prosecution claim requires proof “that the officers

instituted or continued a criminal prosecution against him, with malice and

without probable cause, that terminated in his favor and caused damage to him”

(emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

III. Defendants are Entitled to Immunity on Counts VI and VII.

Counts VI and VII of Mr. Sanguinetti’s Fourth Amended Complaint bring

claims for battery under Florida law and excessive force pursuant to § 1983 against

Defendants Scaduto, Dillman, Drucks, Puka, Cavo, and Tallides in their individual

capacities. (Doc. 149 at 26–28). “A battery claim for excessive force is analyzed by

focusing upon whether the amount of force used was reasonable under the

circumstances.” City of Miami v. Sanders, 672 So. 2d 46, 47 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)

(citation omitted). This is a “similar standard” to that employed under the Fourth

19

Amendment. See Sullivan v. City of Pembroke Pines, 161 F. App’x 906, 911 (11th

Cir. 2006) (per curiam). Indeed, “the elements and defenses of a battery claim

against a law enforcement officer under Florida law are the same as those of an

excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment.” DaSilva v. Lamberti, No. 08-

62106, 2010 WL 680925, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 24, 2010). Accordingly, the Court

analyzes these claims together.

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that protects government

officials sued in their individual capacities from liability when: (1) they act within

the scope of their discretionary authority, and (2) their conduct “violates no clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known.” Jordan v. Mosley, 487 F.3d 1350, 1354 (11th Cir. 2007) (citations and

quotation marks omitted). Qualified immunity balances two public interests: “the

need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and

the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they

perform their duties reasonably.” Baker v. City of Madison, Ala., 67 F.4th 1268,

1278 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009))

(internal quotation marks omitted). “Entitlement to qualified immunity is for the

court to decide as a matter of law.” Simmons v. Bradshaw, 879 F.3d 1157, 1163

(11th Cir. 2018).

A “defendant asserting the qualified immunity defense bears the initial

burden of showing that he or she was acting within his or her discretionary

authority.” Myrick v. Fulton Cnty., Ga., 69 F.4th 1277, 1297 (11th Cir. 2023) (citing

20

Piazza v. Jefferson Cnty., 923 F.3d 947, 951 (11th Cir. 2019)); see also Storck v. City

of Coral Springs, 354 F.3d 1307, 1314 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Under qualified immunity

analysis, the public official must first prove that he was acting within the scope of

his discretionary authority when the allegedly unconstitutional acts took place.”).

Only after the defendant makes that showing does “the burden shift[ ] to the

plaintiff to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate.” Myrick, 69 F.4th at

1297 (citing Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002)).

To determine whether a defendant acted within his discretionary authority,

courts “assess whether [the actions] are of a type that fell within the employee’s job

responsibilities.” Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1265 (11th

Cir. 2004). Courts ask “whether the government employee was (a) performing a

legitimate job-related function (that is, pursuing a job-related goal), (b) through

means that were within his power to utilize.” Id. at 1265–66.

If a defendant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show

that qualified immunity is inapplicable by demonstrating that (1) the deputies’

conduct violated a constitutionally protected right and (2) that right was clearly

established at the time of the misconduct. Alcocer v. Mills, 906 F.3d 944, 951 (11th

Cir. 2018) (citations omitted). “[T]he standard for determining if [a deputy] violated

clearly established law is an objective one and does not include inquiry into the

officer’s subjective intent or beliefs.” Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156, 1165 (11th

Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

There is no question that Deputies Drucks, Crisp, Puka, Scaduto, and

21

Dillman were acting within their discretionary authority at the time of the

altercation. Deputies Drucks, Crisp, and Puka were road patrol officers with the

Collier County Sheriff’s Office. (Doc. 173-9 at 3:12–4:3). On the evening of the

events leading to this litigation, they were on assignment to patrol the Mercato

area. (Id.; Doc. 179 at ¶ 41; Doc. 199 at ¶ 41). Their assignment consisted of

patrolling and aiding bouncers within the area surrounding the Cavo Lounge. (Doc.

173-9 at 4:9–5:3). Deputies Drucks, Crisp, and Puka were all in uniform and on

patrol in their assigned area when the altercation occurred. Deputies Scaduto and

Dillman were detectives working in the gang unit of the Collier County Sheriff’s

Office. (Doc. 173-5 at 4:13–5:7; Doc. 180 at ¶ 4; Doc. 198 at ¶ 4). They were on

patrol at Mercato that evening to provide a law enforcement presence following

recent violent events in the area. (Id.). Similarly, Deputies Scaduto and Dillman

were also in uniform and on patrol in their assigned area when the altercation

occurred. Mr. Sanguinetti has failed to demonstrate that Sheriff Rambosk had any

personal involvement in the altercation, but to the extent Mr. Sanguinetti alleges

that Sheriff Rambosk was involved in his arrest, prosecution, or imprisonment, all

such allegations clearly relate to acts that would be taken within Sheriff Rambosk’s

discretionary authority.

Because the officers were acting within their discretionary authority, the

burden shifts to Mr. Sanguinetti to show that the officers are not entitled to

qualified immunity. See Gaines v. Wardynski, 871 F.3d 1203, 1208 (11th Cir. 2017)

(holding that, for purposes of qualified immunity, it is the plaintiff’s burden to show

22

that the defendant violated a constitutional right that was clearly established); see

also Jones v. Fransen, 857 F.3d 843, 851 (11th Cir. 2017) (“[T]o survive a qualified-

immunity defense, [the plaintiff] must satisfy both showings.” (emphasis added)).

“A determination that an officer used excessive force ‘requires careful

attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case’ while ‘recogniz[ing]

that the right to make an arrest . . . necessarily carries with it the right to use some

degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.’” Ingram v. Kubik, 30 F.4th

1241, 1251 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)).

“Under that framework, the force used by an officer is reasonable only if it is

‘reasonably proportionate to the need for that force, which is measured by the

severity of the crime, the danger to the officer [or others], and the risk of flight.’” Id.

(quoting Lee, 284 F.3d at 1198). The Court “also considers the need for application

of force, the relationship between the need and amount of force used, and the extent

of the injury inflicted by the arresting officer.” Id. (quoting Helm v. Rainbow City,

Alabama, 989 F.3d 1265, 1273 (11th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted)).

Here, Mr. Sanguinetti alleges Defendants used excessive force by

“punch[ing], kick[ing] and str[iking]” him and excessively tightening the handcuffs.

(Doc. 149 at ¶¶ 169–70). The force allegedly employed by Defendants in arresting

Mr. Sanguinetti was reasonable under the circumstances, even when drawing all

reasonable inferences in Mr. Sanguinetti’s favor. While it is unclear from the record

whether Mr. Sanguinetti indeed punched Deputy Dillman, the video evidence

clearly demonstrates that, at a minimum, Mr. Sanguinetti’s hands were raised

23

while facing officers at various points in time. (See, e.g., Doc. 179-1 at 0:00:27–30;

Doc. 180 at ¶ 15; Doc. 198 at ¶ 15). Mr. Sanguinetti is a large man who refused to

vacate the premises when ordered to do so. (Doc. 173-3 at 17:23–18:9; Doc. 173-8 at

6:1–16; Doc. 179 at ¶¶ 47, 50; Doc. 180 at ¶ 16). Only after Mr. Sanguinetti refused

to leave of his own accord did Deputy Dillman forcibly removed Mr. Sanguinetti

from the line (Doc. 179 at ¶ 37; Doc. 179-1 at 0:00:27–29; Doc. 199 at ¶ 37) and take

Mr. Sanguinetti to the ground (Doc. 179-1 at 0:00:29–31; Doc. 179 at ¶ 38; Doc. 199

at ¶ 38).

Once Mr. Sanguinetti was on the ground, he placed his hands under his body

rather than behind his back. (Doc. 173-1 at 92; Doc. 179 at ¶ 39; Doc. 191 at ¶ 39).

Deputy Dillman repeatedly warned Mr. Sanguinetti to stop resisting and informed

him that they were police. (Doc. 173-5 at 22). Mr. Sanguinetti alleges that he did

not hear these warnings. (Doc. 173-1 at 93).

Defendants employed the following measures of force in effectuating Mr.

Sanguinetti’s arrest: Deputy Dillman delivered strikes to Mr. Sanguinetti while the

other officers attempted to get Mr. Sanguinetti’s arms from underneath him (Doc.

179 at ¶ 54); Deputy Scaduto then delivered one burst of pepper spray to Mr.

Sanguinetti’s face (Doc. 179 at ¶ 55; Doc. 199 at ¶ 55); afterward, Deputy Scaduto

deployed a single taser shot in prong mode while Mr. Sanguinetti was on the ground

(Doc. 179 at ¶ 59; Doc. 199 at ¶ 59); when Mr. Sanguinetti stood up from the

ground, Deputy Drucks took him back to the ground again (Doc. 179 at ¶¶ 61–62;

Doc. 199 at ¶¶ 61–62); Deputy Dillman then attached a handcuff to one of Mr.

24

Sanguinetti’s wrists (Doc. 179 at ¶ 64; Doc. 199 at ¶ 64) and twisted the attached

handcuff in an effort to get Mr. Sanguinetti’s other hand out (Doc. 179 at ¶ 65; Doc.

199 at ¶ 65). Once Mr. Sanguinetti was handcuffed, he was placed inside Deputy

Crisp’s vehicle. (Doc. 179 at ¶¶ 66–67; Doc. 199 at ¶¶ 66–67).

Though Mr. Sanguinetti contends that he was not resisting, he admits that

he did not comply with the Defendants’ attempts to handcuff his hands behind his

back when he was on the ground, instead keeping his hands tucked underneath his

body. (Doc. 173-1 at 92–93; Doc. 173-5 at 22). Further, once Mr. Sanguinetti was

brought back down to the ground, the officers observed that his hands were again

underneath his body and again attempted to pull his arms from underneath him to

effectuate arrest. (See Doc. 173-4 at 25–26; Doc. 173-5 at 24–25). Mr. Sanguinetti

again disputes that he was resisting but cannot recall whether his hands were

underneath him or at his side at this point. (Doc. 173-1 at 101–02); Cordoba v.

Dillard’s, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[U]nsupported speculation . . .

does not meet a party’s burden of producing some defense to a summary judgment

motion. Speculation does not create a genuine issue of fact; instead, it creates a false

issue, the demolition of which is a primary goal of summary judgment.” (citation

omitted)).

Accepting as true Mr. Sanguinetti’s version of the facts—that he kept his

hands under him to protect himself from falling and did not hear the officers’

demands to stop resisting—it is reasonable for Defendants to perceive such non-

compliance as resistance. See Prevatt v. City of Gainesville, 657 F. App’x 905, 909

25

(11th Cir. 2016) (holding that the defendant officers were entitled to qualified

immunity where they tackled the plaintiff to the ground after perceiving his delayed

response to their commands to get on the ground as resistance even though the

plaintiff had an arthritic leg).

“[A]n officer is entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force claim

unless application of the excessive force standard would inevitably lead every

reasonable official in the officer’s position to conclude the force was unlawful.”

Jones v. City of Dothan, Ala., 121 F.3d 1456, 1460 (11th Cir. 1997) (cleaned up)

(emphasis added). Indeed, “force applied while the suspect has not given up and

stopped resisting and may still pose a danger to the arresting officers, even when

that force is severe, is not necessarily excessive.” Mobley v. Palm Beach Cnty.

Sheriff Dep’t, 783 F.3d 1347, 1356 (11th Cir. 2015); see Zivojinovich v. Barner, 525

F.3d 1059, 1073 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[I]n a difficult, tense and uncertain situation the

use of a taser gun to subdue a suspect who has repeatedly ignored police

instructions and continues to act belligerently toward police is not excessive force.”

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340,

1348 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Courts have consistently concluded that using pepper spray

is reasonable . . . where the plaintiff was . . . resisting arrest or refusing police

requests . . . . Furthermore, as a means of imposing force, pepper spray is generally

of limited intrusiveness, and it is designed to disable a suspect without causing

permanent physical injury.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted));

Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F.3d 1341, 1352 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Painful handcuffing,

26

without more, is not excessive force in cases where the resulting injuries are

minimal.”).

Notably, no visible signs of serious injury were documented during Mr.

Sanguinetti’s jail intake medical screening, (Doc. 173-13 at 4; Doc. 179 at ¶ 71), and

when asked whether Mr. Sanguinetti had a head injury or loss of consciousness in

the past 72 hours, Mr. Sanguinetti answered, “No.” (Doc. 173-13 at 5; Doc. 179 at ¶

73; Doc. 199 at ¶ 73). While it is true that Mr. Sanguinetti’s jail intake medical

screening documented skin injury in the form of bruises and abrasions (Doc. 173-13

at 5; Doc. 179 at ¶ 74; Doc. 199 at ¶ 74) and that Mr. Sanguinetti complained of

discomfort to his right thumb and numbness (Doc. 173-13 at 5; Doc. 179 at ¶ 72;

Doc. 199 at ¶ 72), the photographic and videographic evidence of Mr. Sanguinetti

after the altercation does not demonstrate any further injury (Doc. 179 at ¶ 75; Doc.

199 at ¶ 75; see Doc. 173-14). Mr. Sanguinetti does not allege that he subsequently

sought medical treatment for any alleged injury. (Doc. 173-1 at 111). On these

facts, the extent of Mr. Sanguinetti’s injuries after the altercation further evidences

that Defendants employed reasonable force under the circumstances. See Nolin v.

Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1258 n.4 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that the officer did not use

excessive force in handcuffing the appellee where he “had minor bruising which

quickly disappeared without treatment.”); Pinto v. Rambosk, No. 2:19-CV-551-JLB-

MRM, 2021 WL 3406253, at *13 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 4, 2021) (finding no excessive force

where the plaintiff “never sought medical treatment for his hands, and there [was]

no evidence . . . of a lasting injury”).

27

Even assuming, arguendo, that Mr. Sanguinetti successfully demonstrated a

violation of a constitutional right, he cannot show that the right was clearly

established. See Jones 857 F.3d at 851 (“[T]o survive a qualified-immunity defense,

[the plaintiff] must satisfy both showings.” (emphasis added)). “When we consider

whether the law clearly established the relevant conduct as a constitutional

violation at the time that Defendant Officers engaged in the challenged acts, we

look for ‘fair warning’ to officers that the conduct at issue violated a constitutional

right.” Id.

A plaintiff may establish that an officer had fair warning in one of three

ways. Id. at 852; Gaines, 871 F.3d at 1208. The plaintiff “may point to binding

precedent that is materially similar.” Jones, 857 F.3d at 852. While the Court

“do[es] not require a case directly on point, . . . existing precedent must have placed

the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S.

7, 12 (2015) (citation omitted). Thus, the Court must “consider ‘whether the factual

scenario that the official faced is fairly distinguishable from the circumstances

facing a government official in a previous case.’” Jones, 857 F.3d at 852 (quoting

Loftus v. Clark-Moore, 690 F.3d 1200, 1204 (11th Cir. 2012)). Next, the plaintiffs

may “point to a broader, clearly established principle that should control the novel

facts of the situation.” Gaines, 871 F.3d at 1208–09 (quoting Terrell v. Smith, 668

F.3d 1244, 1255 (11th Cir. 2012)). Last, a plaintiff may establish that “the conduct

involved . . . so obviously violate[s] the constitution that prior case law is

unnecessary.” Id. The second and third methods “are generally known as ‘obvious

28

clarity’ cases.” Gaines, 871 F.3d at 1209. “They exist where the words of the federal

statute or constitutional provision at issue are ‘so clear and the conduct so bad that

case law is not needed to establish that the conduct cannot be lawful.’” Id. (quoting

Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1350 (11th Cir. 2002)).

Here, Mr. Sanguinetti relies on several cases he contends clearly establish

that the officers’ conduct violated his constitutional right. (Doc. 199 at 30–31)

(citing Cendan v. Trujillo, 779 F. App’x 688, 690 (11th Cir. 2019) (“[T]his Court has

repeatedly found it clearly established under the Fourth Amendment that officers

may not use excessive force against a non-resisting suspect who has already been

subdued.” (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted));

Quinette v. Reed, 805 F. App’x 696, 704 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[A]pplying force on a non-

resisting pretrial detainee violate[d] clear federal law.” (emphasis added) (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted)); Hadley v. Gutierrez, 526 F.3d 1324, 1330

(11th Cir. 2008) (holding the defendant officer violated a clearly established right

where he “punched [the plaintiff] in the stomach while he was handcuffed and not

struggling or resisting” emphasis added)).

A crucial factor in each case is that the plaintiff was not resisting. Cendan,

779 F. App’x at 690; Quinette, 805 F. App’x at 704; Hadley, 526 F.3d at 1330. Thus,

the cases are significantly factually and legally distinguishable from this case. Nor

can Mr. Sanguinetti demonstrate a clearly established right through the obvious

clarity methods. Finding otherwise requires exceptionally rare circumstances that

do not exist here. See Santamorena v. Ga. Mil. Coll., 147 F.3d 1337, 1340 n.6 (11th

29

Cir. 1998) (“these exceptional cases rarely arise”); Coffin v. Brandau, 642 F.3d 999,

1015 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Our case law has made clear that ‘obvious clarity’ cases will

be rare.”).

IV. Defendants are Entitled to Qualified Immunity on Count XIX.

Mr. Sanguinetti brings a claim for failure to intervene pursuant to § 1983

against Defendant Deputies Scaduto, Dillman, Drucks, Puka, and Crisp in their

individual capacities. (Doc. 149 at 43–44). Specifically, Mr. Sanguinetti contends

that the officers were present but did not prevent the allegedly unlawful conduct.

(Id.).

This claim is barred by qualified immunity. Though “[a]n officer who is present

and in a position to intervene to prevent another officer from violating the

constitutional rights of an arrestee can be held liable for his inaction,” there is no

obligation to intervene where there was arguable probable cause for the arrest. Quick

v. Geddie, 763 F. App’x 909, 915 (11th Cir. 2019) (holding the defendant officer was

entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s failure to intervene claim where there

was arguable probable cause for the arrest). It is well established that there was

probable cause to arrest Mr. Sanguinetti and, further, that no excessive force was

used to effectuate that arrest. See Supra Parts II, III. Accordingly, the officers had

no obligation to intervene.

V. Plaintiff’s Equal Protection Claim Fails.

Count XII of the Fourth Amended Complaint is an equal protection claim

brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“Section 1981”) and Section 1983 against Sheriff

30

Rambosk and Deputies Scaduto and Dillman in their individual capacities, as well as

against Collier County and Sheriff Rambosk in their official capacities. (Doc. 149 at

34–35).

The elements of a cause of action for race discrimination under § 1981 are “(1)

that the plaintiff is a member of a racial minority; (2) that the defendant intended to

discriminate on the basis of race; and (3) that the discrimination concerned one or

more of the activities enumerated in the statute.” Kinnon v. Arcoub Gopman &

Assocs., 490 F.3d 886, 891 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms.,

372 F.3d 1250, 1270 (11th Cir. 2004)). Mr. Sanguinetti has not alleged that

Defendants intentionally discriminated against him, nor has he offered any evidence

of such intentional discrimination.

As such, the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Deputies Scaduto,

Drucks, Puka, and Crisp (Doc. 179) and the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by

Collier County, Sheriff Rambosk, and Deputy Dillman (Doc. 180) are therefore

GRANTED as to Count XII.

VI. Plaintiff’s Claims for Negligent Supervision and Training Under

Florida Law Fail.

Count XXI of the Fourth Amended Complaint is a claim for negligent

supervision brought under Florida law against Collier County and Sheriff Rambosk

in their official capacities. (Doc. 149 at 45–47). Count XXII of the Fourth Amended

Complaint is a claim for negligent training brought under Florida law against

Collier County and Sheriff Rambosk in their official capacities. (Doc. 149 at 47–48).

Regarding Mr. Sanguinetti’s negligent supervision claim, “under Florida law,

31

to state a claim for negligent supervision, the plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to

show that once an employer received actual or constructive notice of problems with

an employee’s fitness, it was unreasonable for the employer not to investigate and

take corrective action.” Inman v. Am. Paramount Fin., 517 F. App’x 744, 748 (11th

Cir. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Acts Ret.-Life

Cmtys. Inc. v. Est. of Zimmer, 206 So. 3d 112, 114 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (“[N]egligent

supervision exists when the defendant negligently placed [the plaintiff] under the

supervision of [an employee], when [the defendant] either knew or should have

known that [the employee] had the propensity to commit [the torts alleged].”

(cleaned up)). For the claim to survive, the employer must have “become[ ] aware or

should have become aware of problems with an employee that indicated his

unfitness,” and then “fail[ed] to take further actions such as investigation,

discharge, or reassignment.” Dep’t of Env’t Prot. v. Hardy, 907 So. 2d 655, 660 (Fla.

5th DCA 2005); see also Harrison v. Red Bull Distib. Co., 2019 WL 1117022, at *2

(M.D. Fla. Mar. 11, 2019) (Steele, J.) (“[L]iability attaches when an employer (1)

knows or should know about the offending employee’s unfitness and (2) fails to take

appropriate action.”). The plaintiff, then, must show both that the “employer

received actual or constructive notice of problems with an employee’s fitness” and

that “it was unreasonable for the employer not to investigate or take corrective

action.” Hardy, 907 So. 2d at 660. In other words, “[t]here must be a connection

and foreseeability between the employee’s employment history and the current tort

committed by the employee.” Id. at 661; see also Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 362

32

(Fla. 2002) (noting that allegations that “the Church Defendants either knew or

should have known that Malicki had the propensity to commit sexual assaults and

molestations . . . are the classic elements of negligent hiring and negligent

supervision claims”).

As for Mr. Sanguinetti’s negligent training claim, “[u]nder Florida law, an

employer is liable in tort for reasonably foreseeable damages resulting from the

negligent training of its employees and agents.” Lewis v. City of St. Petersburg, 260

F.3d 1260, 1265 (11th Cir. 2001). As with any negligence-based claim under Florida

law, “a plaintiff must allege a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff,

breach of that duty of care, and resulting damages.” Mosby v. Harrell, 909 So. 2d

323, 327 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); see also Adler v. WestJet Airlines, Ltd., 31 F. Supp. 3d

1381, 1388 (S.D. Fla. July 8, 2014) (Cohn, J.) (“A plaintiff asserting a negligent

training claim must allege that it was harmed as a result of an employer’s failure to

adequately train an employee, and that the nature of the employment put the

plaintiff in a ‘zone of risk’ such that the employer had a duty running to the

plaintiff.” (citation omitted)).

Implicit in all this is a requirement that the employee engage in some

tortious conduct. See Footstar Corp. v. Doe, 932 So. 2d 1272, 1278 (Fla. 2d DCA

2006) (Casanueva, J., concurring) (requiring the plaintiff to show that the employee

engaged in “a tort which is recognized under common law”); Gutman v. Quest

Diagnostics Clinical Lab’ys., Inc., 707 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1331–32 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 7,

2010) (“Defendants are correct that the underlying wrong for either claim [negligent

33

supervision or negligent training] must be a common law tort.”). And the

underlying tortious conduct must have “occurred outside the scope of the employee’s

employment.” Harrison, 2019 WL 1117022, at *2; see also Johnson v. Scott, 2013

WL 5928931, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 2013) (“A negligent hiring, retention, or

supervision claim is allowed against an employer for acts of an employee committed

outside the scope and course of employment.” (citation omitted)); Acts Ret.-Life, 206

So. 3d at 115 (“Furthermore, it is also necessary that the actions of the employee be

performed outside the scope of employment.” (citation omitted)). Mr. Sanguinetti

has failed to demonstrate that any of Sheriff Rambosk’s or Collier County’s

employees engaged in tortious conduct outside the scope of their employment. As a

result, these claims necessarily fail.

But Mr. Sanguinetti’s decision to sue the State of Florida “or its agencies or

subdivisions” for negligent training also implicates sovereign immunity issues.

See Gualtieri v. Bogle, 343 So. 3d 1267, 1274 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022). Although the

State of Florida has waived sovereign immunity “under circumstances in which the

state or agency or subdivision, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant,

in accordance with the general laws of the state,” there is an exception to this broad

waiver of sovereign immunity known as the “discretionary function exception.”

Mosby, 909 So. 2d at 326 (quoting Fla. Stat. § 768.28(1)); see also Henderson v.

Bowen, 737 So. 2d 532, 534–35 (Fla. 1999) (“The State of Florida has waived

sovereign immunity in tort actions for any act for which a private person under

similar circumstances would be held liable.”).

34

“Under the discretionary function exception, ‘basic judgmental or

discretionary governmental functions are immune from legal action, whereas

operational acts are not protected by sovereign immunity.’” Gualtieri, 343 So. 3d at

1275 (quoting Pollock v. Fla. Dep’t of Highway Patrol, 882 So. 2d 928, 933 (Fla.

2004)); see also Lewis, 260 F.3d at 1262–63 (“Accordingly, even if a plaintiff has

adequately alleged all of the elements of a negligence claim, including the breach of

a common law duty, immunity would still bar the claim if the challenged act were

deemed to be governmentally ‘discretionary’ in nature, and not merely

‘operational.’” (citing Kaisner v. Kolb, 543 So. 2d 732, 737 (Fla. 1989))).

A function is “discretionary” if it is an “exercise of executive or legislative

power” that concerns “fundamental questions of policy and planning.” Gualtieri,

343 So. 3d at 1275; see also Lewis, 260 F.3d at 1264–65 (same). In any event, Mr.

Rambosk and Collier County are immune from state lawsuits alleging that they

negligently trained police officers, as “decision[s] regarding how to train . . . officers

and what subject matter to include in the training [are] clearly an exercise of

government discretion regarding fundamental questions of policy and planning.”

See Lewis, 260 F.3d at 1266; see also Whitaker v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 126 F. Supp.

3d 1313, 1330 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 20, 2015) (Lenard, J.) (“[U]nder Florida law, the

County cannot be liable for failure to train and supervise because training and

supervision are ‘discretionary functions’ for which governmental liability does not

attach.”).

For all of these reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Collier

35

County, Sheriff Rambosk, and Deputy Dillman (Doc. 180) is therefore GRANTED

as to Counts XXI and XXII.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, it is ORDERED:

1. The Clerk of Court is hereby DIRECTED to STRIKE Mr. Sanguinetti’s

Notice of Clarification (Doc. 202).

2. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Scaduto, Drucks,

Puka, and Crisp (Doc. 179) is GRANTED.

3. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Collier County,

Sheriff Rambosk, and Deputy Dillman (Doc. 180) is GRANTED.

4. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly, terminate

all pending motions and deadlines, and close this case.

ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida, on February 20, 2026.

JOHN L. BADALAMENTI

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

36