The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOHNSTOWN DIVISION
CHRISTA JENKINS, )
)
) Civil Action No.:
Plaintiff,
) 3:23-CV-00180-CBB
)
vs.
)
Christopher B. Brown
)
PENNSYLVANIA LIQUOR CONTROL United States Magistrate Judge
)
BOARD, DEANNA BILLINGS-
)
COTTON, CARMEN BANNER,
)
BRYNN MCGARVEY, JENNIFER
)
HAAS,
)
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER1
ON ECF No. 72
This action was removed from the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield
County on August 9, 2023. Plaintiff Christa Jenkins alleges discrimination and
retaliation in connection with her employment with Defendant, the Pennsylvania
Liquor Control Board (“PLCB”).2
On June 30, 2025, Defendants filed a partial motion for summary judgment
for Plaintiff’s claims made under the ADA, FMLA, PHRA and the CARES Act. ECF
No. 50. In response, Plaintiff conceded several claims. ECF No. 64 at 8. This was
1 All parties have consented to jurisdiction before a United States Magistrate Judge; therefore
the Court has the authority to decide dispositive motions, and to eventually enter final judgment.
See 28 U.S.C. § 636, et seq.
2 The Court writes primarily for the parties and incorporates the Court’s March 11, 2026
decision for a full account of the facts and issues in this case. ECF No. 64.
the first instance where Plaintiff withdrew claims during summary judgment
litigation.
Thereafter, the Court issued a decision on the summary judgment motion. In
it, the Court noted that Plaintiff had not clearly articulated the legal basis for “her
[remaining] claims under the ADA (Counts I & II), the FMLA (Count III), or the
CARES Act (Count V).” Id. at 6. The Court then ordered Plaintiff to submit a notice
“outlining the statutory authority and elements of her remaining causes of action
for her ADA, FMLA, and CARES Act claims, or [could] instead withdraw any of
these claims.” Id. at 7. Depending on Plaintiff’s response, the Court also permitted
Defendants to renew their motion for summary judgment. Id. at 11.
Then, on April 1, 2026, Plaintiff filed a notice with the Court indicating she
intended to assert a failure to accommodate claim pursuant to Title I of the ADA, a
retaliation claim pursuant to Title I of the ADA, a retaliation claim pursuant to the
FMLA, and “respectfully withdr[ew] her claim under the CARES Act, without
prejudice.” ECF. No. 71. This was the second instance where Plaintiff withdrew
claims during summary judgment litigation.
After Plaintiff’s Notice, and in accordance with this Court’s Order,
Defendants then renewed their partial motion for summary judgment, which is
presently pending for decision. ECF No. 72. Defendants move for partial summary
judgment for Plaintiff’s ADA claims at Counts I and II against all Defendants.
On May 6, 2026, Plaintiff then filed a one-sentence response to Defendant’s
motion indicating she “concedes withdraw of her ADA claims, without prejudice.”
ECF No. 74. This was the third instance where Plaintiff withdrew claims during
summary judgment litigation.
While it is not entirely clear how it came to pass that Plaintiff determined
claims should be withdrawn not once, not twice, but three times, it is clear that
Plaintiff was put on notice from this Court that her ADA and CARES Act claims
were likely not viable. ECF No. 64 at 6-7. While she conceded her CARES Act
claims lacked merit, she nevertheless informed the Court she intended to proceed
with her ADA claims. As a result, this required Defendants to expend time and
resources to file the now second (present) motion for summary judgment for claims
Plaintiff thereafter conceded.
Perhaps, after reasonable inquiry, Plaintiff’s claims appeared in the first
instance to be meritorious only then to be convinced otherwise by opposing counsel’s
briefing. It is, however, hard to imagine under the circumstances of this case, given
the repeated withdrawal of claims following two motions for summary judgment
filed by Defendant and a Memorandum Opinion issued by this Court. Instead, it
appears more likely that the litigation approach taken by Plaintiff is akin to writing
the test after seeing the answers.
As a reminder, any pleading, written motion or other paper submitted an
attorney certifies to the Court that to the best of his or her “knowledge, information,
and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances” that:
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to
harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of
litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or
reversing existing law or for establishing new law;
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically
so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or,
if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of
information.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
If a court determines this rule has been violated, it may impose an
appropriate sanction on the responsible party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11’s purpose is to
“deter the initiation of frivolous lawsuits and to streamline the administration of
federal courts.” Martin v. Farmers First Bank, 151 F.R.D. 44, 47 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393, 110 S. Ct. 2447, 110 L.
Ed. 2d 359 (1990)).
In other words, counsel must “stop, think, investigate and research” before
including causes of action or filing any paper with the court. Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp.,
835 F.2d 479, 482 (3d Cir. 1987) (cleaned up). Failure to do so risks inclusion of
meritless claims. Counsel owes a duty of candor to the Court that the claims
presented are well-grounded in both law and fact. Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor
Prod., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 289 (3d Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). The court’s time
and resources are scarce and valuable: neither it nor opposing counsel should be
subjected to an “everything but the kitchen sink” pleading style.
See e.g. Malladi v. Brown, 987 F. Supp. 893, 900 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (“It is apparent
that what [Plaintiff] and her attorneys have done is to take a kitchen sink
approach—that is, to put before the court all conceivable claims, with the hope that
the court would sort and sift through them in search of a colorable one. This trial
strategy is grossly unfair to the court and all other litigants who come before it”).
See accord. Pelphrey-Weigand v. Res. for Hum. Dev., Inc., 818 F. Supp. 3d 685, 694
(E.D. Pa. 2026).
While the Court will not impose sanctions, counsel is cautioned from taking a
similar approach in the future.
An appropriate Order follows:
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 26th day of May, 2026, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
Defendants’ renewed partial motion for summary judgment ECF No. 72 is
GRANTED as unopposed.
The following claims remain for trial:
(1) An FMLA retaliation claim against Defendants Banner and Billings-
Cotton;
(2) A PHRA discrimination claim against all Defendants;
(3) A Title VII gender discrimination and sexual harassment claim against all
Defendants.
A video pretrial conference is scheduled for June 25, 2026 at 2:00PM.
Counsel shall be prepared to discuss returning to mediation or scheduling this case
for trial.
BY THE COURT:
s/Christopher B. Brown
United States Magistrate Judge