United States v. Shelitha Robertson

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-12557

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

SHELITHA RENEE ROBERTSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cr-00432-SDG-JEM-1

____________________

Before ROSENBAUM, BRANCH, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

After a trial, Shelitha Robertson was convicted of wire fraud,

conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and money laundering. She and

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2 Opinion of the Court 24-12557

her co-conspirator, Chandra Norton, submitted fraudulent applica-

tions for loans for the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”), a

COVID-era relief program designed to make it possible for busi-

nesses to keep employees on payroll. Robertson and Norton sub-

mitted applications for relief claiming that their businesses em-

ployed hundreds of people. But in fact, most of the businesses were

non-functioning and employed no one. In total, they secured over

$14 million in funding before the banks who administered the pro-

gram on behalf of the Small Business Administration (“SBA”) de-

tected the scheme and froze their accounts.

Norton, who was Robertson’s attorney and best friend, ac-

cepted a plea deal with prosecutors and was sentenced to 18

months in prison and 3 years of supervised release. At Robertson’s

trial, Norton testified that Robertson directed her and encouraged

her to submit the applications. A jury found Robertson guilty on

all counts, and the judge sentenced her to 87 months in federal

prison and three years of supervised release. Robertson now ap-

peals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, several of the dis-

trict court’s evidentiary rulings, and the district court’s sentencing

and restitution order.

After careful review, we conclude that the evidence to sup-

port Robertson’s conviction was sufficient, and the district court

did not err in its challenged rulings. Accordingly, we affirm.

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24-12557 Opinion of the Court 3

I. Facts and Procedural History1

A grand jury indicted Shelitha Robertson for conspiring with

her associate, Chandra Norton, to fraudulently obtain millions of

dollars in PPP loans from lending banks, which were guaranteed

by the SBA, during the COVID-19 pandemic. 2 The indictment al-

leged that Robertson and Norton submitted fraudulent PPP appli-

cations for several businesses that Robertson owned, including At-

lanta Custom Motors, LLC (“ACM”), the Renee Group, MO Griggs

Contracting, Inc. (“Mo Griggs”), and Tritan, Inc.

A. Background of the Scheme

At the time the scheme began, Norton was an attorney and

close associate of Robertson. Robertson, in turn, was the president

of the Renee Group, a state- and local-government-contracting

business.

Robertson and Norton learned about the government’s PPP

on a call with a representative from SunTrust Bank in March 2020.

Congress authorized this program at the height of the COVID-19

pandemic to provide loan assistance to businesses to encourage

them to keep employees on the payrolls and permit them to deduct

certain business expenses like rent, mortgages, and utilities.

1 We recite the evidence from the trial in the light most favorable to the verdict. See

United States v. Godwin, 765 F.3d 1306, 1319 (11th Cir. 2014).

2 Norton waived her right to prosecution by indictment and consented to pro-

ceeding by information, so she was separately charged. ECF Nos. 1, 2, United

States v. Norton, Case No. 1:20-cr-00297-SDG (N.D. Ga. Aug. 14, 2020).

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4 Opinion of the Court 24-12557

The SunTrust Bank representative explained to Robertson

and Norton how to obtain the necessary documentation to apply

for these loans, including the IRS filings and payroll documentation

they would need to submit in support of their loan applications.

After the call, Robertson suggested to Norton that obtaining

money fraudulently through this program could be easy. She told

Norton that there “was no way in the world [the banks] can pull all

of that information and review it fast.”

Then Robertson and Norton began preparing applications

for PPP loans for Robertson’s businesses, even though none of

them had employees except the Renee Group. In support of these

applications, Robertson and Norton created false documentation

purporting to substantiate the monthly payroll and expenses at

Robertson’s entities. This included false financial documents pur-

porting to be from the IRS and other banks. They did this by cre-

ating false IRS form 941Xs for several quarters in 2019 to make it

look like each company had dozens of employees.

For example, the PPP loan applications claimed that ACM

had 118 employees, when in fact it had none. Mo Griggs claimed

to have 133 employees. And Tritan claimed to have eighty-three.

The only semi-legitimate business was the Renee Group, which

had between eight and thirteen employees. But Renee Group’s

PPP loan claimed it had ninety-three employees. Each of the loan

applications contained Robertson’s initials certifying that the busi-

ness was in operation as of February 15, 2020, and had the stated

number of employees on payroll.

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24-12557 Opinion of the Court 5

Between April and May 2020, Norton and Robertson sub-

mitted four PPP applications for Robertson’s companies. At trial,

Norton testified that she prepared and submitted all these applica-

tions except for the Renee Group application, with Robertson’s

knowledge. Robertson edited, signed, and submitted the Renee

Group application herself. Norton also said that Robertson di-

rected her to create fake email addresses for the companies to make

them look legitimate.

During the same period, Norton also filed five fraudulent

PPP applications for companies she controlled. Robertson knew

Norton submitted those false applications.

Several of those applications reused the same documents

Robertson had provided, or contained identical information to

those submitted, for Robertson’s companies.

In May 2020, four of Robertson’s PPP applications were ap-

proved and more than $7 million was deposited into accounts she

controlled. Around the same time, Norton’s applications for her

separate set of companies were approved, and Norton also received

around $7 million. In total, Robertson and Norton secured nearly

$15 million in fraudulent loans.

Robertson then spent the funds on personal goods, includ-

ing a diamond ring worth over $128,000. Norton also loaned Rob-

ertson $400,000 in PPP proceeds to pay down luxury-car debt.

Robertson later used Mo Griggs Contracting PPP funds to send

$50,000 to her daughter and repay Norton’s $400,000 loan.

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In late May 2020, the banks noticed the scheme. On May 28,

Robertson realized that her Bank of America account with ACM

funds had a balance of negative $888,888. Later that day, Robertson

got a voicemail explaining that her account had been flagged for

fraud.

The next day, two of Norton’s accounts were frozen. Rob-

ertson texted Norton to delete her texts and emails about the

scheme.

On June 9, Robertson told Norton that they “don’t both

need to go down for this” and promised to protect Norton’s family

if the authorities came after her.

Norton learned that Robertson had told another person that

Norton was solely responsible for the scheme. After that point,

Norton began recording calls with Robertson.

As investigators closed in on Norton, Robertson tried to

cover her tracks. In late June, she called her banker, Sylvia Shiver-

decker, saying she had done nothing wrong but still wanted to re-

pay her loans.

By June and July 2020, Robertson had repaid the banks all

PPP funds she had received. For her part, Norton couldn’t refund

all the money that she received in PPP funds. In sum, the two re-

funded most of the $14 million they had received but were unable

to refund approximately $4 million to the SBA.

B. Indictment and Trial

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In August 2020, Norton was charged with conspiracy to

commit wire fraud. She ultimately accepted a plea deal and was

sentenced to eighteen months in prison with three years of super-

vised release.

A couple years later, in December 2022, a grand jury indicted

Robertson on one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud under

18 U.S.C. § 1349 (Count One), three substantive wire-fraud counts

under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 2(a) (Counts Two through Four), and

one count of money laundering under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1957 and 2

(Count Five).

Robertson pled not guilty, and the case proceeded to trial.

Norton was the government’s primary witness.

1. The Government’s Case

During Norton’s testimony, the government introduced cer-

tain recordings that Norton had made of Robertson after the banks

had flagged the pair’s accounts as potentially fraudulent. The gov-

ernment played the recording of a June 10, 2020, phone call be-

tween Norton and Robertson.

During this call, Norton and Robertson spoke in ambiguous

terms. According to Norton, they did so because they were para-

noid that government investigators were secretly listening to their

phone conversations (Norton was, indeed, secretly recording her

conversations with Robertson). The government asked Norton,

“[W]hy didn’t you just say explicitly what you were talking about?”

And Norton replied, “[A]t this time we know full well that we have

both been detected. Both of our accounts, three of our accounts

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8 Opinion of the Court 24-12557

had been frozen, one of hers and two of mine. So there was no

denying what was happening. And so we are not being forward in

our conversations. . . . I guess we were kind of thinking about what

happens in the movies. We don’t know if we’re being recorded . .

. [s]o we’re trying to have a conversation . . . without being specific

about what we are talking about.”

In another recorded phone call from June 22, 2020, Norton

told Robertson she was panicking because the banks were investi-

gating her for fraud. Robertson responded by repeatedly encour-

aging Norton to “take the Fifth.” Robertson directed Norton not

to “get into detail.” She continued, “I don’t want them to take an-

ything you say—anything you say and try to build a bigger picture.

A bigger—a deeper case. That’s the reason I’m saying, say very lit-

tle and take the Fifth.”

Besides the recordings, the government presented witness

testimony from the banks and the SBA. Kandace Zelaya, a long-

time employee of the SBA, gave lay opinion testimony about the

nature and purpose of the PPP.

The banks’ representatives corroborated Norton’s testi-

mony. And the government presented testimony from the sales

representative who sold Robertson the diamond ring, which also

corroborated Norton’s statements.

2. The Defense Case

Robertson testified in her defense at trial. She explained that

she was a former police officer with the Atlanta Police Department

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24-12557 Opinion of the Court 9

and later served as a public defender and member of the Law De-

partment for the City of Atlanta.

Robertson also testified that she was the founder of the

Renee Group, a company that performed water- and sewer-infra-

structure repair. As Robertson admitted, Norton acted as an attor-

ney for the Renee Group and performed accounting and legal ser-

vices for the business. Besides that, Robertson also admitted that

her other companies, ACM, Mo Griggs, and Tritan, had no em-

ployees.

According to Robertson, she never filled out any PPP appli-

cations. Rather, Robertson claimed, Norton prepared them on

Robertson’s behalf. Robertson added, “I didn’t even know [the

companies] could apply for PPP loans. All of that stuff was handled

by Ms. Norton. I didn’t have a clue. I never saw any applications

for any of those companies. I never filled anything for any of those

companies. I never knew that they were getting anything until the

money actually showed up.” Indeed, Robertson testified, Norton

set up email addresses for Robertson’s companies without Robert-

son’s knowledge.

In May 2020, Robertson said, she began to receive loan funds

in her accounts. She said that when the money came in, she called

Norton to ask why she was getting so much money. Norton as-

sured her that the money was legitimate, Robertson said. Robert-

son then admitted to using the money for personal purposes like

the diamond ring and the cars.

C. Jury Verdict and Sentence

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The jury found Robertson guilty on all counts. At sentenc-

ing, the district court determined that the loss amount for Robert-

son’s crimes included PPP funds that both Robertson and Norton

obtained as part of the conspiracy—a total of approximately 14.9

million dollars.

1. Sentence

In preparation for sentencing, a probation officer prepared a

Presentence Investigation Report. The officer applied the sentenc-

ing guidelines to determine that Robertson’s base offense level

should be increased by 18 levels, based on a finding that the loss

amount fell between $3.5 million and $9.5 million. See U.S.S.G.

§ 2B1.1(b)(1). In so doing, the officer counted only the loss from

the loans in Robertson’s name—not Norton’s. The government

objected, arguing that the loss amount should be increased to $14.9

million, which reflected the combined amount that Norton and

Robertson received in loans.

Robertson, for her part, argued that the loss amount should

be zero because she had paid back all the money, and that she

should not be held liable for the portion of funds that Norton ob-

tained.

The court sided with the government. It determined that

Robertson should be held liable for the full loss amount of $14.9

million. In overruling the defense’s objection, the court said that

on its view of the evidence, “this was jointly undertaken criminal

activity.”

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24-12557 Opinion of the Court 11

The court explained, “There’s no question in my mind that

this was jointly undertaken criminal activity. I can’t think of a sit-

uation—a scenario where there would be more jointly criminal un-

dertaken activity than this one. The testimony was clear that De-

fendant Norton and Robertson were hand in hand in this criminal

activity from day one. They coordinated. They had constant com-

munication with each other about the loan applications. As the

government noted, they each benefited from the loans that were

being undertaken on behalf of one another.”

Based on the total loss amount of $14,955,841, the court cal-

culated a 20-level increase from Robertson’s base offense level un-

der the sentencing guidelines. It imposed a sentence of eighty-

seven months in prison and three years of supervised release.

2. Restitution

During the restitution hearing, a representative from the

SBA testified that the SBA incurred a loss of $4,425,002.23 as a result

of the nine applications that Norton and Robertson submitted.

This figure included the money that Norton could not return, plus

processing fees for all the transactions.

The court held Robertson jointly and severally liable with

Norton for restitution equal for the full amount of the SBA’s loss.

D. Appeal

Robertson raises several issues on appeal. First, she chal-

lenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her conviction.

Second, she argues that the district court clearly erred in calculating

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12 Opinion of the Court 24-12557

the loss determination and the restitution amount. Third, Robert-

son asserts that the district court committed a harmful error when

it instructed the jury on deliberate ignorance.

Fourth, she challenges several of the district court’s eviden-

tiary rulings. In particular, Robertson contends that the district

court abused its discretion in (1) admitting testimony from one of

the witnesses for the SBA as lay testimony; (2) allowing Norton to

provide explanatory testimony about the recordings; and (3) per-

mitting the government to use summary exhibits.

For the reasons we explain, we conclude that the evidence

sufficiently supports Robertson’s conviction and that the district

court committed no reversible error.

II. Discussion

A. The record sufficiently supports the jury’s verdict.

1. Standard of Review

When we review a ruling for sufficiency of the evidence, we

“view[] the evidence in the light most favorable to the government,

with all reasonable inferences and credibility choices made in the

government’s favor.” United States v. Sosa, 777 F.3d 1279, 1289 (11th

Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). Our Court “will not over-

turn a conviction” on sufficiency grounds “unless no rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond

a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Wright, 392 F.3d 1269, 1273

(11th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks omitted).

2. Analysis

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Robertson cannot meet the high standard for setting aside a

jury verdict.

To recap, the jury convicted Robertson of conspiracy to

commit wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (Count One); wire fraud

under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and § 2(a) (Counts Two through Four); and

money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1957 and § 2.

a. Wire Fraud and Conspiracy to

Commit Wire Fraud

A conviction for wire fraud requires proof of two elements:

the defendant (1) intentionally participated in a scheme or artifice

to defraud another of money or property; and (2) used or caused

the use of interstate wires for the purpose of executing the scheme

or artifice. United States v. Rodriguez, 732 F.3d 1299, 1303 (11th Cir.

2013).

To establish a qualifying scheme, the government must

prove the defendant made a material misrepresentation or omis-

sion—that is, the kind of false statement or omission that has the

tendency to influence a decisionmaker. See United States v. Maxwell,

579 F.3d 1282, 1299 (11th Cir. 2009). Besides this, to satisfy the first

element, the government must show that the defendant intended

to defraud. United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1239 (11th Cir.

2011).

As for the elements of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, the

government must show that (1) two or more persons agreed to a

common and unlawful plan to commit wire fraud as alleged in the

indictment; (2) the defendant knew of the unlawful plan; and (3)

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14 Opinion of the Court 24-12557

the defendant knowingly and voluntarily joined the plan. United

States v. Feldman, 931 F.3d 1245, 1257 (11th Cir. 2019).

Ample evidence in the record supports each element of Rob-

ertson’s convictions for wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire

fraud.

Before we recount it, we pause to note that, as to the wire-

fraud counts, the indictment charged 18 U.S.C. § 1343 and § 2(a).

As a result, the jury could have convicted under either or both of

two theories: that Robertson personally committed the wire fraud

or that Norton committed the wire fraud and Robertson intention-

ally aided and abetted it. See 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (providing that some-

one who aids and abets a federal offense is punishable as a princi-

pal).

With that in mind, we turn to the offenses of wire fraud and

conspiracy to commit wire fraud. We begin with the first element

of wire fraud—the defendant intentionally participated in a

scheme or artifice to defraud another of money or property. The

record amply shows that Robertson made material misrepresenta-

tions of fact or aided and abetted in such material misrepresenta-

tions of fact in connection with the PPP applications. For starters,

Robertson herself admitted that the applications contained false in-

formation and that all but one of her companies had zero employ-

ees. Plus, she signed a fraudulent application on behalf of the

Renee Group and transmitted it to the banks.

This information was materially misleading to the adminis-

trators of the PPP program, including representatives from the

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banks. Specifically, the applications induced the banks to deposit

nearly 15 million dollars into Norton and Robertson’s accounts.

For these same reasons, this evidence also supports the inference

that Robertson intended to defraud the PPP program.

As for the second element of wire fraud, Robertson stipu-

lated that the disbursements involved the use of interstate wires.

When it comes to the wire-fraud and conspiracy counts, the

only real question at trial was whether Robertson knew what Nor-

ton was doing and encouraged it. But the evidence adduced at trial

supports the jury’s conclusion that she did.

The jury saw and heard lots of evidence that Robertson not

only knew about the scheme but was in fact its architect. Norton

herself testified to that. Norton recalled that she frequently

worked for Robertson as an attorney—Robertson was essentially

her boss. And at trial, the government presented emails that Rob-

ertson sent to Norton, providing her with documents Norton

could use to create false supporting materials for the PPP applica-

tions.

Robertson herself testified, too. She claimed that when mil-

lions of dollars landed in her bank accounts, she took Norton’s

word for it that the money was legitimate—even though she had

no reasonable basis to do so. The jury was free to disbelieve her

and “conclude the opposite of [her] testimony [was] true.” United

States v. Brown, 53 F.3d 312, 314 (11th Cir. 1995) (quotation marks

omitted). And other parts of Robertson’s testimony supported the

jury’s finding that Robertson intentionally stole money from the

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16 Opinion of the Court 24-12557

government through the PPP applications—including that she

spent the money on jewelry and luxury cars. See United States v.

Maurya, 25 F.4th 829, 841 (11th Cir. 2022) (evidence suggesting that

a defendant “knowingly received far more money than he could

have expected from ordinary distributions” supported his wire-

fraud-conspiracy conviction).

Beyond that, when the banks and government investigators

began asking questions, Norton, in a panic, called Robertson. The

jury listened to a recording of the call and heard Robertson repeat-

edly order Norton to “take the Fifth” because she didn’t want the

government to be able to build a “bigger case.” A reasonable jury

could conclude that Robertson tried to convince Norton not to dis-

close her role in the scheme.

Robertson points us to a case, United States v. McCarrick, 294

F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2002), which she asserts requires us to conclude

that the evidence here was insufficient. She’s incorrect.

There, McCarrick requested SBA loan funds to buy (among

other things) a spray-paint booth for his business. 242 F.3d at 1288.

Ultimately, though, because of events that occurred after he ap-

plied, McCarrick used the funds for other parts of his business and

did not purchase the spray-paint booth. Id. at 1288–89. We held

that no rational jury could find that McCarrick intended to defraud

the government at the time that he applied for the SBA loans. Id.

at 1291. That was so, we said, because the only evidence in the case

probative of McCarrick’s intent to defraud related to events that

occurred after McCarrick submitted the applications, meaning that

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no reasonable juror could find intent to defraud at the time of ap-

plication. Id.

This case is nothing like McCarrick. Here, the evidence re-

flects a fraudulent intent before Norton filed the applications. Rob-

ertson and Norton learned about the program from a call with a

bank representative, and Norton testified that Robertson was the

one who recognized that the PPP was vulnerable to fraud. Rob-

ertson and Norton discussed plans to prepare fraudulent applica-

tions, and Robertson forwarded her materials that Norton needed

to create false supporting documents.

In this case, the government may have asked the jury to

make inferences, but it also produced a “pile of documents and fig-

ures” that “gave the jury ample evidence” to support Robertson’s

conviction. Maurya, 25 F.4th at 841.

b. Money Laundering

To prove the money laundering charge against Robertson,

the government must establish five elements: “(a) the defendant

knowingly engaged or attempted to engage in a monetary transac-

tion; (b) the defendant knew the transaction involved property or

funds that were the proceeds of some criminal activity; (c) the

property had a value of more than $10,000; (d) the property was in

fact proceeds of [in this case, wire fraud]; and (e) the transaction

took place in the United States.” United States v. Iriele, 977 F.3d 1155,

1183–84 (11th Cir. 2020).

The record sufficiently supports Robertson’s money-laun-

dering conviction. Norton testified and Robertson confirmed that,

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18 Opinion of the Court 24-12557

before returning the PPP money, Robertson spent $128,000 on a

diamond ring from Guven Fine Jewelers in Buford, Georgia. This

evidence allowed the jury to find that transaction was worth more

than $10,000 and occurred in the United States. Norton also testi-

fied that Robertson told her she used the ACM PPP loan funds to

purchase the diamond ring, and Norton was there when Robertson

wrote the check from the ACM account. Plus, as we’ve explained,

a reasonable jury could find from the evidence that PPP proceeds

derived from Robertson’s wire-fraud scheme. This is enough to

support the money-laundering conviction.

B. The district court’s jury instruction on deliberate ig-

norance did not result in harmful error.

Next, Robertson argues that the district court erred in in-

structing the jury that the knowledge element of her offenses could

be established through proof of deliberate ignorance.

1. Standard of Review

We review de novo the legal correctness of a decision to give

a deliberate-ignorance instruction. See Maurya, 25 F.4th at 842

(“Challenges to jury instructions present questions of law, so we

apply de novo review.”).

2. Analysis

An instruction on deliberate ignorance is appropriate if the

evidence would allow a reasonable jury to infer that “the defendant

was aware of a high probability of the existence of the fact in ques-

tion and purposely contrived to avoid learning all of the facts in

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order to have a defense in the event of a subsequent prosecution.”

United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1571 (11th Cir. 1991) (quota-

tion marks omitted). We’ve also said that “where the evidence sup-

ports both actual knowledge and deliberate ignorance, the instruc-

tion is properly given.” United States v. Arias, 984 F.2d 1139, 1143

(11th Cir. 1993) (quotation marks omitted).

Robertson claimed not to know what Norton had done. Yet

Robertson admitted that she had concerns about why she was re-

ceiving so much money for companies that were non-operational,

but said she simply took Norton’s word that everything was fine.

A reasonable jury could have concluded that when Robertson re-

ceived seven million dollars from the government to support the

payroll of non-operational businesses with no employees, she

should have realized that something was amiss. Even if she some-

how wasn’t aware of the scheme, a reasonable jury could conclude

that the bank account deposits “put her on notice of the fraudulent

activity.” United States v. Arias, 431 F.3d 1327, 1335 (11th Cir. 2005).

That is, based on this record, a reasonable jury could have deter-

mined that if Robertson did not have actual knowledge of the

crimes that was so only because she deliberately tried to avoid that

knowledge. Under these circumstances, the court did not err in

giving the deliberate-ignorance instruction.

But even if we assumed error in giving the instruction, any

error would have been harmless. “[I]nstructing the jury on delib-

erate ignorance is harmless error where the jury was also in-

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20 Opinion of the Court 24-12557

structed and could have convicted on” an alternative theory of ac-

tual knowledge. Steed, 548 F.3d at 977; see also United States v. Hill,

643 F.3d 807, 855 (11th Cir. 2011). That’s true here—the jury re-

ceived both instructions and could have reasonably concluded that

Robertson had actual knowledge.

C. The district court’s evidentiary rulings did not result

in reversible error.

Robertson challenges several of the district court’s eviden-

tiary rulings. She argues that the district court erred by admitting

as lay testimony the testimony of an SBA employee; by allowing

Norton to interpret statements that she and Robertson made dur-

ing a recorded phone call; and by allowing the government to use

several summary charts.

1. Standard of Review

Generally, we review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discre-

tion. See United States v. Perez-Oliveros, 479 F.3d 779, 783 (11th Cir.

2007). The decision to admit lay opinion testimony falls within that

general rule. 3 See United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085, 1102 (11th

Cir. 2011). So does a decision to permit the use of summary charts.

See United States v. Norton, 867 F.2d 1354, 1362 (11th Cir. 1989).

3 The government argues that because the defense, at trial, did not object to the full

portion of Norton’s testimony that it now seeks to challenge on appeal, we should

review this ruling under a plain-error standard. We decline to review the ruling for

plain error because we interpret defense counsel’s objection at trial to have ade-

quately addressed all of Norton’s testimony explaining the recordings.

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24-12557 Opinion of the Court 21

2. Norton’s Explanation of the Recording

First, Robertson challenges the district court’s decision to al-

low Norton to explain to the jury the recording of a conversation

between herself and Robertson. During Norton’s testimony, the

government introduced certain recordings that Norton had made

of Robertson, after the banks had flagged the pair’s accounts as po-

tentially fraudulent. One such recording the government played

was of a June 10, 2020, phone call between Norton and Robertson.

At the beginning of the call, Norton said that she received a

fraud alert from Chase and was panicking. Robertson encouraged

her to calm down. Then they discussed a voicemail that Robertson

received from Bank of America about a fraud alert. Robertson

said, “I don’t think they’re going to do anything once they get theirs

back.” She continued, “It shouldn’t have been done” and that she

was in the process of giving “it” back.

Norton admitted, “My problem is I can’t even return it all.”

Robertson replied, “What’s the shortfall?” Norton responded,

“Five.”

After the recording played, Norton offered context for the

recording. She explained what she and Robertson were talking

about (the PPP fraud scheme) and why they were not referring di-

rectly to the applications or the disbursements.

Robertson now argues that it was improper to permit Nor-

ton to testify as to her “interpretation or opinions concerning what

the parties were saying.”

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22 Opinion of the Court 24-12557

The Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of

witness testimony, including lay opinion testimony. Rule 701 pro-

vides, “If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the

form of an opinion is limited to one that is: (a) rationally based on

the witness’s perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the

witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not

based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge

within the scope of Rule 702.”

In support of her argument that the court abused its discre-

tion in allowing Norton’s explanations of the recording, Robertson

cites United States v. Hawkins, 934 F.3d 1251, 1262 (11th Cir. 2019).

In Hawkins, we held that the district court abused its discretion in

permitting a DEA agent to interpret “coded language” used in

wiretap recordings of two individuals accused of drug trafficking.

Id. at 1262. We held that “[m]uch of [the DEA agent’s] trial testi-

mony ‘was not specific to his interpretation of drug codes and jar-

gon’ and went ‘beyond interpreting code words to interpret con-

versations as a whole.’” Id. at 1261 (quoting United States v. Emman-

uel, 565 F.3d 1324, 1336 (11th Cir. 2009)).

Hawkins has no application here. In Hawkins, the DEA agent

testified far beyond the scope of his own personal and firsthand

knowledge. He testified to the meaning of conversations that he

did not personally participate in. Id. at 1263–64. Here, by contrast,

Norton had direct, first-hand knowledge of the conversation and

did not rely on any kind of technical expertise. The district court

properly admitted her testimony under Rule 701. See United States

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24-12557 Opinion of the Court 23

v. Awan, 966 F.2d 1415, 1430 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that a wit-

ness’s testimony was based on his personal perception and admis-

sible as lay testimony because he “was actually present and partici-

pating in the conversation and observing what was happening at

the time[.]”).

3. Admission of SBA Agent Zelaya’s Testi-

mony as Lay Opinion

Robertson next argues that the district court erred in admitting

the testimony of Kandace Zelaya, a trial attorney for the Small

Business Administration, as lay testimony under Federal Rule of

Evidence 701 rather than as expert testimony under Federal Rule

of Evidence 702.

At the beginning of its case in chief, the government called

Zelaya, who had worked as a trial attorney in the SBA’s Office of

General Counsel for the Office of Litigation for thirty-two years.

Zelaya testified that she was part of a team at SBA that helped draft

all the guidance and application forms for the PPP. She also testi-

fied to the eligibility requirements for the program. Defense coun-

sel objected that Zelaya was testifying as an expert witness and that

the defense did not receive notice of her testimony or an expert

disclosure. The district court overruled the objection.

On appeal, Robertson argues that admission of Zelaya’s tes-

timony as a lay witness prejudiced her because Zelaya effectively

testified as an expert without providing the required notice under

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(G). Under that rule,

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24 Opinion of the Court 24-12557

the government must provide the defendant with a written sum-

mary of “any testimony that the government intends to use under”

Rule 702 in advance.

Rule 702 defines expert testimony as occurring when the

witness is qualified and their specialized knowledge will help the

jury. See Fed. R. Evid. 702. The opinion must also be based on

sufficient facts, reliable methods, and a reliable application of those

methods to the case. Id.

When a witness with professional experience at an institu-

tion like the SBA testifies about the procedures and operations of

that institution, we generally don’t consider that testimony to be

expert testimony. For example, in United States v. Hill, 643 F.3d at

841–43, a defendant argued that the district court abused its discre-

tion in allowing several representatives from financial institutions

to answer questions about what their banks would have done in

different hypothetical situations, based on their knowledge of pro-

cesses and procedures at their banks. We explained that a witness

does not have to draw on specialized or expert knowledge to testify

about processes and procedures of an institution at which she

works. Id. at 842.

Similarly, the record here reflects that most of Zelaya’s testi-

mony concerned information about the background, origin, and

processes of the PPP. Her testimony in these respects provided in-

formation that is widely known and publicly available. As for the

testimony she gave about the specific processes the PPP uses to vet

and approve loans, that came from her own personal experience as

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24-12557 Opinion of the Court 25

a long-time employee of the SBA. In short, Zelaya’s testimony did

not involve “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.”

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

4. The Government’s Use of Summary

Charts

Robertson next challenges the court’s decision to permit the

government to use summary charts while certain witnesses were

testifying at trial.

As the government explained, SBA Agents Sara Oliver and

Elizabeth Gass created these charts to summarize and illustrate the

voluminous phone and bank records related to Robertson and Nor-

ton’s case. The government sought to introduce them as exhibits,

but defense counsel objected under Federal Rule of Evidence 1006.

The district court sustained the objection but permitted the gov-

ernment to use the charts as demonstrative aids. At the close of its

case-in-chief, the government withdrew its request to admit the

charts into evidence and relied on them solely as demonstrative ex-

hibits. The government again clarified that it did not want to intro-

duce the charts into evidence after both sides rested. 4

Robertson now asserts the district court admitted the sum-

mary charts into evidence in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence

4 In her brief on appeal, Robertson appears to suggest that the court admitted

the summary charts into evidence. The record reflects that the district court

did not admit the charts into evidence as exhibits.

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26 Opinion of the Court 24-12557

1006(a), which governs the use of summary charts that are admit-

ted into evidence. But the record reflects that the district court did

not admit them into evidence, so Rule 1006 does not apply. 5

As demonstrative aids, the summary charts were “pedagog-

ical device[s]” used to “clarify and simplify complex testimony or

other information and evidence[.]” United States v. Milkiewicz, 470

F.3d 390, 397 (1st Cir. 2006) (citation omitted) (interpreting Rule

611(a), which governed demonstrative charts before 2024).

The district court did not err in permitting their use.

* * * *

In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion.

D. The district court did not err in its sentencing and res-

titution orders.

Finally, Robertson challenges the district court’s sentencing

and restitution orders. She asserts that she should not be liable for

loss attributable to Norton’s loan applications. Standard of Review

We review the district court’s determination of loss amount

for clear error. See United States v. Whitman, 887 F.3d 1240, 1246

(11th Cir. 2018). We review the determination of restitution value

for abuse of discretion. United States v. Robertson, 493 F.3d 1322,

1330 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted).

5 Robertson concedes that many of the documents underlying the summary

charts were admissible and does not put forth any argument for why the re-

maining documents were inadmissible.

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24-12557 Opinion of the Court 27

2. Loss Amount

Robertson argues that the district court should have ad-

justed the loss amount to zero for purposes of her sentencing, urg-

ing that she repaid all the loans and was not responsible for Nor-

ton’s fraud.

Robertson maintains that because she returned the money

before the government detected her fraud, the loss amount should

be credited accordingly. She bases her argument on United States v.

Foster, 878 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2018). There, we held that “if the

defendant returned any money to the victims . . . before the fraud

was detected, the loss amount must be reduced by the fair market

value of the returned money[.]” Id. at 1306 (cleaned up). We disa-

gree that Foster applies here.

The Sentencing Guidelines define the time of detection as

the earlier of the time that the victim or government agency dis-

covered the offense, or the time the defendant knew or reasonably

should have known that the offense had been detected. U.S.S.G. §

2B1.1 cmt. n.3(D)(i). Here, Robertson returned the money only

after the banks froze her accounts and began investigating her for

fraud.

As the district court explained, the banks are statutorily ob-

ligated to detect and report fraud to the government, so they act as

agents of the government for purposes of wire-fraud investiga-

tions. On the district court’s view, for purposes of the sentencing

guidelines, the date on which the banks discovered the scheme was

the date on which the government agency discovered the scheme.

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28 Opinion of the Court 24-12557

So, the court concluded, Robertson failed to return the money be-

fore the offense was detected.

The district court also rejected Robertson’s arguments that

she was not responsible for Norton’s crimes because the record am-

ply supported a finding that Robertson and Norton were engaged

in a joint conspiracy.

We find no clear error in either of these determinations.

Robertson was not entitled to credit for repayment of the funds.

Several of our sister circuits have likewise concluded that a defend-

ant fails to repay funds when she does so only after a bank or other

victim discovers the loss. See, e.g., United States v. Kirchner, 161 F.4th

266, 281 (5th Cir. 2025) (no credit for returning money after inves-

tors detected fraud); United States v. Dullum, 560 F.3d 133, 138 (3d

Cir. 2009) (no credit for returning money repaid after bank froze

accounts). And as we have explained, the record soundly supported

the district court’s individualized findings about the scope of the

conspiracy. Norton worked for Robertson as her attorney; Robert-

son and Norton discussed the PPP’s vulnerability; they discussed

the loans and made plans for submitting applications together; and

they even wired the proceeds to each other.

The district court reasonably concluded that Robertson,

who was a participant in the conspiracy, was responsible for the

losses resulting from reasonably foreseeable acts of her co-con-

spirator, Norton, in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States

v. Baldwin, 774 F.3d 711, 727 (11th Cir. 2014); Whitman, 887 F.3d at

1248–50.

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24-12557 Opinion of the Court 29

3. Restitution

The Mandatory Victim Restitution Act of 1996 requires a de-

fendant convicted of fraud to pay restitution to the victims of her

offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1), (c)(1)(A)(ii). The government

bears the burden of proving the amount of a loss by a preponder-

ance of the evidence. Id. § 3664(e).

“[A] district court does not exceed its authority by ordering

a defendant to pay restitution for losses which result from acts done

in furtherance of the conspiracy of which the defendant is con-

victed.” United States v. Obasohan, 73 F.3d 309, 311 (11th Cir. 1996)

(per curiam).

As to restitution, Robertson argues that the district court

failed to make specific findings about her liability for the conspiracy

with Norton. But again, she is incorrect. The record supports the

district court’s determination. As we’ve noted, the record shows

that Robertson and Norton coordinated extensively, through texts,

emails, and phone calls in furtherance of the scheme. Robertson

does not contest the district court’s finding that the SBA lost

$4,425,002.23 from the conspiracy. And Special Agent Sara Oliver

of the Small Business Administration testified to the loan-pro-

cessing fees that the lenders charged the SBA, along with other

costs the SBA incurred because of the conspiracy, resulting in the

total restitution finding. The district court had authority to hold

Robertson jointly and severally liable for the full amount of resti-

tution resulting from the conspiracy. United States v. Grady, 18 F.4th

1275, 1289 (11th Cir. 2021).

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30 Opinion of the Court 24-12557

* * * *

We find that the district court did not err in its loss amount

or restitution calculations.

III. Conclusion

We affirm the district court’s ruling in full.

AFFIRMED.