State of Tennessee v. Howard Jefferson Atkins

06/04/2026

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs June 2, 2026

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. HOWARD JEFFERSON ATKINS

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Tipton County

No. 3956 A. Blake Neill, Judge

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No. W2025-01501-CCA-R3-CD

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The Appellant, Howard Jefferson Atkins, acting pro se, appeals from the Tipton County

Circuit Court’s summary denial of his Rule 36 motion to correct an alleged clerical error

in a juvenile transfer order entered in 2000. Having thoroughly reviewed the record, the

briefs of the parties, and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Tenn R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JILL BARTEE

AYERS and JOHN W. CAMPBELL, SR., JJ., joined.

Howard Jefferson Atkins, Hartsville, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Ronald L. Coleman, Senior Assistant

Attorney General; Joshua R. Gilbert, Assistant Attorney General (pro hac vice); and Mark

Edward Davidson, District Attorney General.

OPINION

In 2000, at age sixteen, the Appellant was charged with the murder of his step-father.

The Appellant had returned to his mother’s and step-father’s home after spending a

weekend with his father. Atkins v. Holloway, 792 F.3d 654, 655 (6th Cir. 2015) (reversing

and remanding in part the Appellant’s federal habeas corpus claim). The Appellant’s step-

father was outside the house and his mother was inside crying. The step-father directed

the Appellant to “[g]o in there and take care of your mother like you always do.” Id.

According to the Appellant, his step-father regularly abused him and his mother. Inside

the home, the Appellant’s mother told him that she planned to divorce the step-father and

wanted to leave the house soon. She then took a pain pill and went to sleep in the

Appellant’s room.

At some point, the Appellant went into the step-father’s bedroom, where he was

sleeping. Atkins, 792 F.3d at 655. The Appellant carried a baseball bat and intended to

ask the step-father if he would leave the house for a few days so that the Appellant and his

mother could leave peacefully. He pleaded with his step-father to no avail, and the step-

father threatened to kill him. The step-father then reached for what the Appellant believed

to be a gun in the nightstand. Id. at 656. The Appellant swung the baseball bat several

times at his step-father, killing the step-father by smashing his skull. The Appellant later

called 911 and told the police that he had feared for his life. However, the police never

located a gun inside the home. Id.

After a transfer hearing, the juvenile court issued a written order, signed by the

juvenile court judge, finding each of the statutory criteria required for transfer under

Tennessee Code Annotated section 37‑1‑134(a)(4) and transferring the Appellant to circuit

court for prosecution as an adult. A Tipton County jury later convicted him of first-degree

premeditated murder, and he received a life sentence. This Court affirmed the conviction

on direct appeal. See State v. Atkins, No. W2001-02427-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL

21339263, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16, 2003) perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 6, 2003).

The Appellant then filed several unsuccessful challenges to his conviction and sentence.

See Atkins v. State, No. W2006-02221-CCA-R3-PC, 2008 WL 4071833, at *1 (Tenn.

Crim. App. Aug. 29, 2008) (rejecting inter alia Appellant’s ineffective assistance of

counsel claim alleging appellate counsel failed to challenge the Appellant’s transfer from

juvenile court on appeal); Atkins v. State, No. W2010-00092-CCA-R3-CO, 2010 WL

4274737 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 26, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 16, 2011), cert.

denied, 563 U.S. 1026 (2011) (denial of error coram nobis petition); Atkins v. State, No.

W2013-01502-CCA-R28-PC (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 29, 2013), perm. app. denied (Tenn.

Jan. 6, 2014), cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1023 (2014) (denial of motion to reopen post-

conviction proceeding); Atkins v. State, No. W2021-00359-CCA-R28-PC (Tenn. Crim.

App. Jul. 1, 2021), perm. app. voluntarily dismissed (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2023) (same); Atkins

v. Eller, No. E2024-00665-CCA-R3-HC, 2024 WL 4556308 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 23,

2024), perm. app. filed (Tenn. Dec. 9, 2024) (denial of state habeas corpus petition); Atkins

v. Crowell, 945 F.3d 476 (6th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2786 (2020) (affirming

denial of federal habeas corpus petition).

On February 15, 2024, the Petitioner filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus.

In this filing, the Petitioner alleged that the juvenile court failed to make required statutory

findings before transferring his case to the circuit court. As such, the Petitioner alleged

that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over his case and, therefore, his conviction was void.

The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the application by written order, and this

court affirmed. Atkins v. Eller, No. E2024-00665-CCA-R3-HC, 2024 WL 4556308, at *1

(Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 23, 2024), appeal denied (Mar. 12, 2025), cert. denied sub nom.

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Atkins v. Bousch, 145 S. Ct. 2859, 222 L. Ed. 2d 1136 (2025). In denying relief, this court

reasoned “that a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction is not affected by the absence of,

or deficiencies in, a juvenile court’s transfer order.” Id. at 2; see also Lee v. State, No.

M2004-02809-CCA-R3-HC, 2005 WL 1692952, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 20, 2005)

(rejecting the argument that “because the juvenile court failed to consider all of the factors

for transfer to criminal court, the transfer order is void, and hence, the criminal court lacked

jurisdiction to adjudicate the case”), no perm. app. filed.

On September 9, 2025, the Appellant filed the present Rule 36 motion, requesting

the court “to correct a clerical error on the ‘Order of Transfer from Juvenile Court to Adult

Circuit Court[.]’” In this motion, the Appellant asserted that the juvenile judge’s oral

statements from the transcript of the 2000 transfer hearing conflicted with the written

transfer order. He argued that the juvenile court “enunciated findings directly contra to

two of the three statutory elements necessary for transfer under T.C.A. §37-1-134(a)(4),

yet transferred anyway.”1 The Appellant insisted that the juvenile court never determined

probable cause for premeditation or first‑degree murder and incorrectly construed the

“interests of the community” factor. Nevertheless, the written transfer order—prepared by

the clerk—erroneously stated that all statutory criteria had been found. The Appellant

contended that this inconsistency constituted a “clerical error” subject to correction under

Rule 36. The Appellant additionally claimed that the juvenile court’s “misunderstanding

of the statutes” violated his Fourteenth Amendment constitutional right to due process.

On September 12, 2025, the trial court denied the motion by written order and

rejected the Appellant’s claim that the juvenile court order contradicted the statements of

the juvenile court judge at the transfer hearing based on Williams v. City of Burns, 465

S.W.3d 96, 119 (Tenn. 2015) (a trial court speaks through its written orders-not through

oral statements contained in the transcripts). The trial court additionally concluded that the

1

At the time of the offense, Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-134(a)(1)-(4) provided the

circumstances in which a juvenile court shall transfer a juvenile accused of conduct that constitutes a

criminal offense to the criminal court to be tried as an adult. The juvenile must be at least sixteen years old

at the time of the offense and be provided with notice and a hearing. Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-134(a)(1)-

(3). During the hearing, the juvenile court must find “reasonable grounds to believe” that the juvenile

committed the delinquent act as alleged, that the juvenile “is not committable to an institution for the

mentally retarded or mentally ill,” and that the community’s interests require legal restraint or discipline of

the juvenile. Id. at (a)(4)(A)-(C). When making the determination of whether or not to transfer the juvenile

to be dealt with as an adult, the juvenile court shall consider the following factors: “(1) [t]he extent and

nature of the child’s prior delinquency records; (2)[t]he nature of past treatment efforts and the nature of

the child’s response thereto; (3)[w]hether the offense was against person or property, with greater weight

in favor of transfer given to offenses against the person; (4)[w]hether the offense was committed in an

aggressive and premeditated manner; and (5)[t]he possible rehabilitation of the child by use of procedures,

services and facilities currently available to the court in this state....” Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-134(b)(1)-

(5).

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Appellant failed to demonstrate the existence of a clerical error in the juvenile transfer

order. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

The sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court abused its

discretion in denying the Appellant’s Rule 36 motion to correct an alleged clerical error in

the juvenile court’s 2000 transfer order.

A trial court’s decision on a Rule 36 motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion. A

court abuses its discretion when it applies an incorrect legal standard, reaches an illogical

conclusion, or bases its ruling on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence. Rule 36

authorizes a court to “correct clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the

record, and errors arising from oversight or omission.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36. A “clerical

error” occurs when the written judgment fails to accurately reflect the court’s actual

decision. See State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 213 (Tenn. 2015).

Rule 36 does not expressly provide that a court may correct the clerical mistakes of

a different court, and the Appellant does not provide us with any authority interpreting the

Rule in this way. At most, the Appellant reasons the circuit court had authority to correct

the alleged clerical error in the juvenile court transfer order based on “concurrent

jurisdiction[.]” We disagree and conclude that a trial court’s Rule 36 authority is limited

to correcting ministerial errors in a court’s own orders and does not extend to substantive

amendments or corrections to judgments entered by a different court. This makes sense

particularly where each court system maintains authority over its own clerical corrections.

Here, Rule 213 and Rule 310 of the Tennessee Rules of Juvenile Practice and Procedure

provide the mechanism for correcting clerical mistakes in the juvenile court system.

Additionally, when a party seeks to challenge or modify a juvenile court transfer order,

appellate procedures apply, see e.g., In re Isaiah L., 340 S.W.3d 692, 707-708 (Tenn. Ct.

App. 2010) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-159(d)-(f), rather than permitting a trial court to

amend or modify the juvenile court order. Accordingly, while the Appellant correctly notes

that Rule 36 permits a court to correct its own clerical errors, in this case, the transfer order

was entered by the juvenile court—not the circuit court reviewing the Rule 36 motion.

Thus, as a threshold matter, the trial court lacked authority to amend or revise the juvenile

court’s order. This jurisdictional bar alone supports affirmance.

Even assuming arguendo that Rule 36 could reach the juvenile court’s order, the

Appellant has not shown a clerical error. The Appellant argues that the juvenile judge’s

oral comments did not include a finding of probable cause as required by Section

37‑1‑134(a)(4)(A) (requiring the juvenile court to find that the juvenile committed the

delinquent act as alleged). He emphasizes the judge’s statement that the degree of murder

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was “not this court’s decision to make today.” He also points to ambiguous phrasing

suggesting the community‑interest factor may not have been found. However, our review

of the transcript also reflects that the juvenile court repeatedly acknowledged the statutory

criteria and expressly stated that “the State has met the requirements on the transfer.” The

court ultimately concluded that transfer was appropriate and entered a signed written order

reflecting the statutory findings. This court affirmed the determination of the juvenile court

in denying the Appellant’s ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim based on

counsel’s failure to challenge the juvenile court’s transfer decision on appeal. See Atkins

v. State, No. W2006-02221-CCA-R3-PC, 2008 WL 4071833, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App.

Aug. 29, 2008) (observing that the juvenile court carefully considered all the evidence and

determined that the State demonstrated probable cause to believe that the Appellant

committed the delinquent act of murder, that it was done in an aggressive manner, that

despite the favorable mitigating evidence presented by the defense, the community’s

interests required legal restraint or discipline of the Appellant, and that the Appellant would

not have prevailed on direct appeal of this issue).

Thus, even if certain oral statements were imprecise, the record does not show that

the juvenile court transfer order failed to memorialize the court’s intended findings.

Ambiguous or incomplete oral remarks do not transform a judicial determination into a

clerical error. In our view, rather than showing an alleged clerical error, as required for

Rule 36 relief, the bulk of the Appellant’s brief focuses on the substantive consequences

that would follow if the transfer order were rewritten to reflect his interpretation of the

transcript. He argues that correcting the alleged clerical error would reveal an underlying

appealable error—specifically, that the juvenile court lacked statutory authority to transfer

him—and that due‑process principles should require reopening the transfer question

entirely. But Rule 36 is not a mechanism to obtain substantive relief or to relitigate the

validity of a decades‑old transfer order. See State v. Allen, 593 S.W.3d 145, 154 (Tenn.

2020) (cautioning that Rule 36 “is not to allow a court to invalidate or vacate a prior order

through the guise of correcting a clerical mistake”). The Appellant is in effect challenging

the judicial determination of the juvenile court which involved the exercise of discretion

and the evaluation of evidence, not clerical mistakes subject to Rule 36 correction.

Accordingly, based on Rule 36’s narrow scope, the lack of authority to alter another court’s

judgment; and the absence of any demonstrated clerical mistake, the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in denying the Appellant’s motion. Its decision was consistent with

established Rule 36 jurisprudence and supported by the record.

CONCLUSION

The Appellant has not shown a clerical error in the juvenile court’s 2000 transfer

order, nor has he established that the trial court had authority under Rule 36 to revise that

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order. The trial court properly denied the motion. The judgment of the trial court is

affirmed.

S/ Camille R. McMullen____________

CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, JUDGE

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