In order to state a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege that he engaged in protected activity, “suffered a deprivation likely to deter such activity,” and the “First Amendment activity was at least a motivating factor in the decision to impose the deprivation.”
How later courts described this case
- In order to state a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege that he engaged in protected activity, “suffered a deprivation likely to deter such activity,” and the “First Amendment activity was at least a motivating factor in the decision to impose the deprivation.”
- an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”
- noting that high-ranking officials including the governor and superintendent of prisons are allowed to delegate management of the prison to those below them
- dismissing Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment claims based on the same allegations as the First Amendment claim because the claim “gains nothing by attracting additional constitutional labels”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DARRAN PERKINS,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 26-cv-228-NJR
JOHN BARWICK, LATOYA HUGHES,
KWAME RAOUL, LT. LITTLE,
SERGEANT AGNEW, MAJOR BAKER,
SGT BEBOUT, SERGEANT ROGERS,
SERGEANT MCKINSTRY, JOHN DOE
INTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICERS, JANE
DOE NURSES, CHRISTINE BROWN,
T. HILL, M. LIVELY, and LT. TUTHILL,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Plaintiff Darran Perkins, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections who
is currently incarcerated at Pontiac Correctional Center, brings this action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivations of his constitutional rights while he was housed at
Pinckneyville Correctional Center. In the Complaint, Perkins alleges that he was
subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement and other constitutional
violations while at Pinckneyville.
This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the Complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen
prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any
portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is
immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
The Complaint
On February 13, 2025, Perkins wrote a grievance about the ongoing denial of
medical attention and cruel and unusual punishment he faced due to the use of synthetic
cannabinoids and accompanying smoke in his housing unit (Doc. 1, p. 6). Perkins alleged
that Sergeant Agnew was aware that inmates in the housing unit were smoking synthetic
cannabinoids sprayed on paper and that the smoke was filling the unit and endangering
inmates like Perkins (Id.). Perkins begged Sergeant Agnew to call an emergency code
because he could not breathe from all of the smoke, and Agnew denied his request stating
that he didn’t care (Id. at pp. 5-6). Perkins’s grievance was deemed a non-emergency by
Warden John Barwick (Id. at p. 6).
Perkins continued to write grievances against Sergeant Agnew (Doc. 1, p. 6).
Agnew retaliated against Perkins by referring to him as a “rat” in front of a group of
inmates, informing them that Perkins was going to “bring the heat down on all of you
who smoke or sell” drugs in the unit (Id.). At one point Agnew told all of the individuals
in his unit that Perkins was a snitch, and Perkins was going to get them all in trouble for
smoking (Id. at p. 9). Perkins alleges these statements put him at risk of danger from other
inmates (Id.). His fellow inmates were suspicious of him, and he received a reputation as
an informant (Id.). On April 26, 2025, Agnew threatened Perkins in response to his
numerous grievances, stating “we’re going to fuck with you.” (Id. at p. 7). At one point,
Sergeant Agnew stated that the unit smelt like smoke and he hoped Perkins died (Id. at
p. 11). Perkins alleges that the retaliation and cruel and unusual punishment slowly
escalated with every grievance he wrote, although Perkins fails to describe the additional
acts of retaliation that he faced (Id. at p. 7). He merely refers to several grievances that he
wrote documenting the retaliation (Id.).
Perkins alleges that he failed to receive any relief from his grievances (Doc. 1, p. 7).
Instead, he decided to write letters to Warden Barwick and Director Latoya Hughes
because they were responsible for supervising the employees at Pinckneyville (Id.).
Perkins alleges that neither official remedied the situation nor sought to protect him (Id.).
On May 14, 2025, he also wrote to Illinois Attorney General Kwame Raoul about the drug
problem at Pinckneyville because it was his job to investigate and prosecute drug offenses
(Id. at p. 8).
Perkins alleges that the presence of smoke in the unit was so strong, it hit him in
the face the moment he entered the unit. The smoking led to fights among the inmates
over drug debts or due to mental episodes caused by the drugs (Doc. 1, p. 9). Perkins
suffered from medical issues due to the secondhand smoke (Id. at p. 10). His small cell
and filthy ventilation exasperated the situation. On February 13, 2025, he suffered from
nausea, dizziness, and shortness of breath (Id.). He developed sharp pains in his chest
and felt like he was in a daze (Id.). He later learned he was suffering from an overdose
due to exposure to the smoke from the drugs (Id.). He faced the conditions for months.
In April 2025, he submitted requests to the medical unit for medical care and drug tests
for his nausea and shortness of breath (Id.). He also started having panic attacks (Id.).
When Perkins finally saw Dr. Gordon on May 5, he sympathized with Perkins’s
symptoms and agreed that there were health risks from being exposed to secondhand
smoke (Id. at p. 11). But the doctor was unable to provide him with any relief (Id.). On
May 22, 2025, he submitted a grievance because he was disoriented, and his heart was
beating rapidly (Id. at p. 15). He was on the verge of a panic attack due to his exposure to
secondhand smoke (Id.).
After leaving the doctor’s appointment, Perkins saw Warden Barwick and tried to
speak with him about the conditions in his unit (Doc. 1, p. 11). He complained about the
secondhand smoke and the overdoses that inmates were experiencing (Id.). He noted that
Barwick had deemed his grievance a non-emergency (Id.). Barwick merely stated “I did
huh” and kept walking. Perkins tried to complain about Sergeant Agnew and the lack of
apathy from staff about the situation, but Barwick kept walking (Id. at p. 12). Perkins
alleges that Major Baker witnessed the conversation and looked at Perkins with
contempt, threatening Perkins with an investigation and referring to him by derogatory
terms (Id.).
On May 13, 2025, Perkins fell from his top bunk due to nausea, dizziness, and
possible seizure from secondhand smoke, causing a gash in his left pinky finger (Doc. 1,
p. 12). Perkins alleges that the wound became infected, and he submitted numerous sick
call request slips (Id.). When he finally saw a male nurse, the nurse told him it was not
infected and to keep it dry (Id.). Perkins believes it was infected because the wound
smelled and had “yellow boogers” inside (Id.). Perkins alleges the finger is now
disfigured (Id.). He claims Christine Brown is also responsible for his injury because she
supervises the nurses (Id. at p. 19).
On May 21, 2025, Major Baker, Sergeant Bebout, and a John Doe correctional
officer retaliated against Perkins for the letters he wrote to the Attorney General and
IDOC Director (Doc. 1, p. 13). The officers made him go through the metal detector four
times even though the detector did not go off (Id.). They then checked his folders,
searching for contraband. Afterwards, Bebout told him to get out of their sight and
referred to him as a snitch (Id.). Previously, on May 13, Perkins had approached Baker
and asked if he could smell the smoke and questioned whether he cared about the
inmates overdosing (Id. at p. 14). Baker merely directed Perkins to get back to his cell (Id.).
Baker, Bebout, C/O Derby, C/O Williamson and many other unknown officers harassed
him on his way to the prison school. Every day in May and June they would identify
inmates talking with Perkins and send them back to the housing unit. They would harass
Perkins about his compliance with the rules and send him back to the housing unit (Id. at
p. 15). For instance, they would instruct him that hats were not allowed in the building
while he was in the motion of taking off his hat (Id.). Sergeant McKinstry once dared
Perkins to say his statements louder when Perkins muttered that their actions at the metal
detector were “bullshit.” (Id.).
Perkins asked in his grievances for internal affairs to look at video footage that
would prove his statements, but internal affairs officers never investigated and would
respond that the camera footage was no longer available (Doc. 1, p. 14). Perkins argues
that internal affairs officers violated his due process rights by failing to preserve camera
footage (Id.).
On December 25, 2025, Perkins was the subject of a targeted shakedown of his cell
(Doc. 1, p. 17). A pen stuffed with paper was found in his cell, and he received a
disciplinary ticket for dangerous contraband and drug paraphernalia (Id.). Perkins
admitted the pen was his but directed the adjustment committee to test the paper because
it would have exonerated him (Id.). Perkins alleges that adjustment committee chair
Lieutenant Little refused. Perkins notes that Little had a reputation for refusing to follow
proper procedures in investigations and routinely finding inmates guilty of disciplinary
charges (Id.). Internal Affairs Officer Heck interviewed Perkins (Id.). Perkins explained
the harassment and retaliation he faced, but Heck just grinned through the interview (Id.).
Perkins believes that Heck was working with the other officers because Heck later
testified in another disciplinary ticket that Perkins had confessed to making a shank (Id.).
Perkins alleges that Lieutenant Tuthill, Lieutenant Little, Internal Affairs Officer Heck,
Grievance Officers A. Hill and M. Lively, John Doe Internal Affairs Officer, and Warden
Barwick were all liable for deeming his grievances non-emergency and failing to uphold
Perkins’s right to remedy and justice (Id. at p. 18). He alleges that grievances are routinely
denied and not properly investigated (Id.).
Preliminary Dismissals
Perkins alleges that numerous high-ranking prison and government officials failed
to remedy the issue with inmates smoking synthetic drugs at Pinckneyville. He alleges
that he wrote letters to Attorney General Kwame Raoul and Director Latoya Hughes, but
they failed to investigate his claims or, in the Attorney General’s case, to prosecute crimes
taking place at Pinckneyville. But there is no “free-floating obligation to put things to
rights” under Section 1983 and the law does not impart a general duty to rescue. Burks v.
Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595-96 (7th Cir. 2009). Although Perkins alleges that he wrote to
both of these officials, these high-ranking officials did not create the conditions at
Pinckneyville nor were they personally involved in enforcing the conditions at the prison.
Id. at 595 (noting that high-ranking officials including the governor and superintendent
of prisons are allowed to delegate management of the prison to those below them).
Perkins also alleges that Latoya Hughes and John Barwick supervised all of the
employees at the prison and Christine Brown supervised the nurse who treated Perkins’s
injured finger. But these official cannot be liable simply in their role as supervisors
because there is no respondeat superior (or supervisory) liability under Section 1983.
Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001); Kinslow v. Pullara, 538 F.3d 687,
692 (7th Cir. 2008).
Perkins also alleges that several officials denied his grievances or deemed them
not an emergency. He alleges that Barwick specifically deemed his grievance not an
emergency and notes that grievance officers T. Hill and M. Lively denied his grievances,
but the simple denial or mishandling of a grievance does not state a claim. Owens v.
Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011). Thus, any claim that grievance officials denied
his grievances is DISMISSED without prejudice. To the extent Perkins has also alleged
that Barwick was personally involved in subjecting him to unconstitutional conditions of
confinement, those claims are discussed below.
Perkins identifies several individuals in his statement of claim that he failed to
identify as defendants in the case caption. He alleges that Dr. Gordon failed to provide
him with treatment for his exposure to secondhand smoke, John Doe Nurse failed to
adequately treat the injury to his pinky finger, and a John Doe correctional officer,
C/O Derby, and C/O Williamson participated in the harassment and retaliation Perkins
experienced after filing grievances. These individuals, however, are not identified in the
case caption as defendants. In order to be a party in the case, a plaintiff must identify
them in the case caption. See FED. R. CIV. P. 10(a); Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d 551, 551–
52 (7th Cir. 2005). Because Perkins failed to identify these individuals as defendants, any
potential claim against them is DISMISSED without prejudice.
Perkins does identify Jane Doe Nurses and C/O Roberts as defendants in the case
caption, but he fails to include any allegations against them in his statement of claim.
Thus, any claim against these individuals is also DISMISSED without prejudice.
Finally, Perkins alleges that Sergeant McKinstry dared him to speak louder when
Perkins stated that their actions at the metal detector were “bullshit.” Perkins fails to
allege that Sergeant McKinstry’s statements amounted to a constitutional violation.
Verbal harassment alone does not state an Eighth Amendment claim. DeWalt v. Carter,
224 F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. 2000). Nor does Perkins allege that Sergeant McKinstry’s
statements were accompanied by any physical acts that would rise to the level of a
constitutional violation. It also does not appear that Sergeant McKinstry’s statements
amount to retaliation as Perkins fails to allege that McKinstry was aware of Perkins’s
grievances and acted in response to those grievances. Hawkins v. Mitchell, 756 F.3d 983,
996 (7th Cir. 2014) (In order to state a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege that he
engaged in protected activity, “suffered a deprivation likely to deter such activity,” and
the “First Amendment activity was at least a motivating factor in the decision to impose
the deprivation.”). Thus, the claim against McKinstry is also DISMISSED without
prejudice.
Discussion
Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court designates the following
counts:
Count 1: Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim
against Sergeant Agnew, Warden John Barwick, and Major
Baker for allowing inmates to smoke in Perkins’s unit and
subjecting him to secondhand smoke and synthetic drugs.
Count 2: First Amendment retaliation claim against Sergeant Agnew
for threatening Perkins and labeling him a snitch in front of
other inmates.
Count 3: First Amendment retaliation claim against Baker and
Sergeant Bebout for harassing Perkins in response to his
numerous grievances.
Count 4: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to medical
needs claim against Sergeant Agnew for failing to provide
medical care for his secondhand smoke and synthetic drug
exposure.
Count 5: Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against Internal
Affairs Officer Heck, Lt. Little, Lt. Tuthill, and John Doe
Internal Affairs Officer for finding Perkins guilty on two
disciplinary tickets.
The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders,
unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any other claim that is
mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be considered
dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly pleading
standard.1
Count 1
At this stage, Perkins alleges a viable conditions of confinement claim against
Sergeant Agnew, John Barwick, and Major Baker. He alleges that he informed each
official about the conditions he experienced in the housing unit, including the use of
synthetic drugs. Despite each official’s knowledge of the heavy secondhand smoke in the
unit, they each refused to remedy the conditions or stop the spread of drugs. Sain v. Wood,
512 F.3d 886, 894 (7th Cir. 2008). Thus, Count 1 shall proceed against Agnew, Barwick,
and Baker.
Count 2
Perkins also states a viable retaliation claim against Sergeant Agnew in Count 2.
Perkins alleges that in response to his numerous grievances, Sergeant Agnew threatened
him on several occasions, stated that he hoped he died, labeled him a snitch, and
informed inmates in his unit that he was a snitch, placing his life in danger. The
allegations suggest much more than mere verbal threats. See Dobbey v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr.,
574 F.3d 443, 445 (7th Cir. 2009); Irving v. Dormire, 519 F.3d 442, 445, 449-50 (8th Cir. 2008)
(repeated death threats, labeling plaintiff a snitch, and offering to pay inmates to attack
plaintiff); Beal v. Foster, 803 F.3d 356, 358 (7th Cir. 2015) (verbal sexual comments and
1 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face”).
suggestive actions to imply the plaintiff was gay put the plaintiff at risk from other
inmates); Hughes v. Farris, 809 F.3d 330, 334 (7th Cir. 2015). Thus, Count 2 shall proceed
against Sergeant Agnew.2
Count 3
Perkins also states a claim against Bebout and Baker for their campaign of
harassment against Perkins. They threatened him, punished inmates who spoke to him,
and made him return to his cell on numerous occasions, prohibiting him from attending
prison school. Count 3 shall proceed.
Count 4
Perkins also adequately alleges a deliberate indifference to medical needs claim
against Sergeant Agnew. He alleges that he begged Sergeant Agnew to call an emergency
code because Perkins could not breathe but Agnew refused. Thus, Count 4 shall proceed
against Agnew.
Count 5
Perkins fails, however, to state a claim for violation of his due process rights
regarding his disciplinary tickets. In order to state a due process claim, an inmate must
allege “(1) a constitutionally protected liberty interest and (2) deficient procedures
2 Perkins also alleges that Sergeant Agnew’s actions placed him at risk of harm from other inmates
and constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Although the same allegations also may state an
Eighth Amendment claim, the claim is redundant to his First Amendment claim. See Conyers v.
Abitz, 416 F.3d 580, 586 (7th Cir. 2005) (dismissing Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment claims
based on the same allegations as the First Amendment claim because the claim “gains nothing by
attracting additional constitutional labels”).
attendant to the deprivation of that interest.” Ealy v. Watson, 109 F.4th 958, 964 (7th Cir.
2024). An inmate’s liberty interests are protected by the Due Process Clause only insofar
as a deprivation of the interest at issue would impose an “atypical and significant
hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v.
Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). In situations where an inmate complains about discipline
in which he received segregation constituting an atypical and significant hardship (but
not the loss of good-time credit), the disciplinary proceedings are subject to an informal
due process inquiry. Ealy, 109 F.4th at 965 (citing Adams v. Reagle, 91 F.4th 880, 895 (7th
Cir. 2024)). Informal due process requires only that an inmate is provided (1) notice of
the reasons for his placement in segregation, and (2) an opportunity to present his views
in either a written statement or hearing. Ealy, 109 F.4th at 966.
In this case, Perkins fails to allege that the discipline he received amounted to an
atypical and significant hardship. He merely alleges that he was placed in segregation
but fails to indicate the length of his placement and the conditions he faced there. Further,
Perkins alleges that he was denied due process because officials failed to review video
tape evidence, test the paper for drugs, or further investigate his claims. But there are no
allegations to suggest that he was denied the requirements for informal due process,
including notice of the disciplinary reports and an opportunity to present his views. As
such, the due process claim in Count 5 is DISMISSED without prejudice.
Disposition
For the reasons stated above, Count 1 shall proceed against Sergeant Agnew,
Major Baker, and Warden John Barwick. Counts 2 and 4 shall proceed against Sergeant
Agnew. And Count 3 shall proceed against Baker and Bebout. All other claims and
defendants are DISMISSED without prejudice.
The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Sergeant Agnew, Major Baker, Sergeant
Bebout, and Warden John Barwick: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive
Service of a Summons) and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is
DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint, and this Memorandum and
Order to each defendant’s place of employment as identified by Perkins. If a defendant
fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within
30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect
formal service on that defendant, and the Court will require that defendant to pay the
full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
If a defendant can no longer be found at the work address provided by Perkins,
the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the defendant’s current work address, or, if not
known, defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending
the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the
address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained
in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to
the Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 8.2, Defendants need only respond to the issues stated in this
Merit Review Order.
If judgment is rendered against Perkins, and the judgment includes the payment
of costs under Section 1915, he will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,
regardless of whether his application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. See 28 U.S.C.
Finally, Perkins is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the
Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court
will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not
later than 14 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply
with this order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result
in dismissal of this action for want of prosecution. See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 15, 2026 TN g 2
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge
Notice to Plaintiff
The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of
your lawsuit and serve them with a copy of your Complaint. After service has been
achieved, the defendants will enter their appearance and file an Answer to your
Complaint. It will likely take at least 60 days from the date of this Order to receive the
defendants’ Answer, but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days or more. When all
the defendants have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order containing
important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to
wait until counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the
defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before
defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature.
Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time, unless specifically
directed to do so.
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