Opinion

Perkins

Court
District Court, S.D. Illinois
Filed
May 15, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 40.9%

In order to state a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege that he engaged in protected activity, “suffered a deprivation likely to deter such activity,” and the “First Amendment activity was at least a motivating factor in the decision to impose the deprivation.”

How later courts described this case

  • In order to state a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege that he engaged in protected activity, “suffered a deprivation likely to deter such activity,” and the “First Amendment activity was at least a motivating factor in the decision to impose the deprivation.”
  • an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”
  • noting that high-ranking officials including the governor and superintendent of prisons are allowed to delegate management of the prison to those below them
  • dismissing Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment claims based on the same allegations as the First Amendment claim because the claim “gains nothing by attracting additional constitutional labels”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

DARRAN PERKINS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 26-cv-228-NJR

JOHN BARWICK, LATOYA HUGHES,

KWAME RAOUL, LT. LITTLE,

SERGEANT AGNEW, MAJOR BAKER,

SGT BEBOUT, SERGEANT ROGERS,

SERGEANT MCKINSTRY, JOHN DOE

INTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICERS, JANE

DOE NURSES, CHRISTINE BROWN,

T. HILL, M. LIVELY, and LT. TUTHILL,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:

Plaintiff Darran Perkins, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections who

is currently incarcerated at Pontiac Correctional Center, brings this action pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivations of his constitutional rights while he was housed at

Pinckneyville Correctional Center. In the Complaint, Perkins alleges that he was

subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement and other constitutional

violations while at Pinckneyville.

This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the Complaint

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen

prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any

portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is

immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

The Complaint

On February 13, 2025, Perkins wrote a grievance about the ongoing denial of

medical attention and cruel and unusual punishment he faced due to the use of synthetic

cannabinoids and accompanying smoke in his housing unit (Doc. 1, p. 6). Perkins alleged

that Sergeant Agnew was aware that inmates in the housing unit were smoking synthetic

cannabinoids sprayed on paper and that the smoke was filling the unit and endangering

inmates like Perkins (Id.). Perkins begged Sergeant Agnew to call an emergency code

because he could not breathe from all of the smoke, and Agnew denied his request stating

that he didn’t care (Id. at pp. 5-6). Perkins’s grievance was deemed a non-emergency by

Warden John Barwick (Id. at p. 6).

Perkins continued to write grievances against Sergeant Agnew (Doc. 1, p. 6).

Agnew retaliated against Perkins by referring to him as a “rat” in front of a group of

inmates, informing them that Perkins was going to “bring the heat down on all of you

who smoke or sell” drugs in the unit (Id.). At one point Agnew told all of the individuals

in his unit that Perkins was a snitch, and Perkins was going to get them all in trouble for

smoking (Id. at p. 9). Perkins alleges these statements put him at risk of danger from other

inmates (Id.). His fellow inmates were suspicious of him, and he received a reputation as

an informant (Id.). On April 26, 2025, Agnew threatened Perkins in response to his

numerous grievances, stating “we’re going to fuck with you.” (Id. at p. 7). At one point,

Sergeant Agnew stated that the unit smelt like smoke and he hoped Perkins died (Id. at

p. 11). Perkins alleges that the retaliation and cruel and unusual punishment slowly

escalated with every grievance he wrote, although Perkins fails to describe the additional

acts of retaliation that he faced (Id. at p. 7). He merely refers to several grievances that he

wrote documenting the retaliation (Id.).

Perkins alleges that he failed to receive any relief from his grievances (Doc. 1, p. 7).

Instead, he decided to write letters to Warden Barwick and Director Latoya Hughes

because they were responsible for supervising the employees at Pinckneyville (Id.).

Perkins alleges that neither official remedied the situation nor sought to protect him (Id.).

On May 14, 2025, he also wrote to Illinois Attorney General Kwame Raoul about the drug

problem at Pinckneyville because it was his job to investigate and prosecute drug offenses

(Id. at p. 8).

Perkins alleges that the presence of smoke in the unit was so strong, it hit him in

the face the moment he entered the unit. The smoking led to fights among the inmates

over drug debts or due to mental episodes caused by the drugs (Doc. 1, p. 9). Perkins

suffered from medical issues due to the secondhand smoke (Id. at p. 10). His small cell

and filthy ventilation exasperated the situation. On February 13, 2025, he suffered from

nausea, dizziness, and shortness of breath (Id.). He developed sharp pains in his chest

and felt like he was in a daze (Id.). He later learned he was suffering from an overdose

due to exposure to the smoke from the drugs (Id.). He faced the conditions for months.

In April 2025, he submitted requests to the medical unit for medical care and drug tests

for his nausea and shortness of breath (Id.). He also started having panic attacks (Id.).

When Perkins finally saw Dr. Gordon on May 5, he sympathized with Perkins’s

symptoms and agreed that there were health risks from being exposed to secondhand

smoke (Id. at p. 11). But the doctor was unable to provide him with any relief (Id.). On

May 22, 2025, he submitted a grievance because he was disoriented, and his heart was

beating rapidly (Id. at p. 15). He was on the verge of a panic attack due to his exposure to

secondhand smoke (Id.).

After leaving the doctor’s appointment, Perkins saw Warden Barwick and tried to

speak with him about the conditions in his unit (Doc. 1, p. 11). He complained about the

secondhand smoke and the overdoses that inmates were experiencing (Id.). He noted that

Barwick had deemed his grievance a non-emergency (Id.). Barwick merely stated “I did

huh” and kept walking. Perkins tried to complain about Sergeant Agnew and the lack of

apathy from staff about the situation, but Barwick kept walking (Id. at p. 12). Perkins

alleges that Major Baker witnessed the conversation and looked at Perkins with

contempt, threatening Perkins with an investigation and referring to him by derogatory

terms (Id.).

On May 13, 2025, Perkins fell from his top bunk due to nausea, dizziness, and

possible seizure from secondhand smoke, causing a gash in his left pinky finger (Doc. 1,

p. 12). Perkins alleges that the wound became infected, and he submitted numerous sick

call request slips (Id.). When he finally saw a male nurse, the nurse told him it was not

infected and to keep it dry (Id.). Perkins believes it was infected because the wound

smelled and had “yellow boogers” inside (Id.). Perkins alleges the finger is now

disfigured (Id.). He claims Christine Brown is also responsible for his injury because she

supervises the nurses (Id. at p. 19).

On May 21, 2025, Major Baker, Sergeant Bebout, and a John Doe correctional

officer retaliated against Perkins for the letters he wrote to the Attorney General and

IDOC Director (Doc. 1, p. 13). The officers made him go through the metal detector four

times even though the detector did not go off (Id.). They then checked his folders,

searching for contraband. Afterwards, Bebout told him to get out of their sight and

referred to him as a snitch (Id.). Previously, on May 13, Perkins had approached Baker

and asked if he could smell the smoke and questioned whether he cared about the

inmates overdosing (Id. at p. 14). Baker merely directed Perkins to get back to his cell (Id.).

Baker, Bebout, C/O Derby, C/O Williamson and many other unknown officers harassed

him on his way to the prison school. Every day in May and June they would identify

inmates talking with Perkins and send them back to the housing unit. They would harass

Perkins about his compliance with the rules and send him back to the housing unit (Id. at

p. 15). For instance, they would instruct him that hats were not allowed in the building

while he was in the motion of taking off his hat (Id.). Sergeant McKinstry once dared

Perkins to say his statements louder when Perkins muttered that their actions at the metal

detector were “bullshit.” (Id.).

Perkins asked in his grievances for internal affairs to look at video footage that

would prove his statements, but internal affairs officers never investigated and would

respond that the camera footage was no longer available (Doc. 1, p. 14). Perkins argues

that internal affairs officers violated his due process rights by failing to preserve camera

footage (Id.).

On December 25, 2025, Perkins was the subject of a targeted shakedown of his cell

(Doc. 1, p. 17). A pen stuffed with paper was found in his cell, and he received a

disciplinary ticket for dangerous contraband and drug paraphernalia (Id.). Perkins

admitted the pen was his but directed the adjustment committee to test the paper because

it would have exonerated him (Id.). Perkins alleges that adjustment committee chair

Lieutenant Little refused. Perkins notes that Little had a reputation for refusing to follow

proper procedures in investigations and routinely finding inmates guilty of disciplinary

charges (Id.). Internal Affairs Officer Heck interviewed Perkins (Id.). Perkins explained

the harassment and retaliation he faced, but Heck just grinned through the interview (Id.).

Perkins believes that Heck was working with the other officers because Heck later

testified in another disciplinary ticket that Perkins had confessed to making a shank (Id.).

Perkins alleges that Lieutenant Tuthill, Lieutenant Little, Internal Affairs Officer Heck,

Grievance Officers A. Hill and M. Lively, John Doe Internal Affairs Officer, and Warden

Barwick were all liable for deeming his grievances non-emergency and failing to uphold

Perkins’s right to remedy and justice (Id. at p. 18). He alleges that grievances are routinely

denied and not properly investigated (Id.).

Preliminary Dismissals

Perkins alleges that numerous high-ranking prison and government officials failed

to remedy the issue with inmates smoking synthetic drugs at Pinckneyville. He alleges

that he wrote letters to Attorney General Kwame Raoul and Director Latoya Hughes, but

they failed to investigate his claims or, in the Attorney General’s case, to prosecute crimes

taking place at Pinckneyville. But there is no “free-floating obligation to put things to

rights” under Section 1983 and the law does not impart a general duty to rescue. Burks v.

Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595-96 (7th Cir. 2009). Although Perkins alleges that he wrote to

both of these officials, these high-ranking officials did not create the conditions at

Pinckneyville nor were they personally involved in enforcing the conditions at the prison.

Id. at 595 (noting that high-ranking officials including the governor and superintendent

of prisons are allowed to delegate management of the prison to those below them).

Perkins also alleges that Latoya Hughes and John Barwick supervised all of the

employees at the prison and Christine Brown supervised the nurse who treated Perkins’s

injured finger. But these official cannot be liable simply in their role as supervisors

because there is no respondeat superior (or supervisory) liability under Section 1983.

Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001); Kinslow v. Pullara, 538 F.3d 687,

692 (7th Cir. 2008).

Perkins also alleges that several officials denied his grievances or deemed them

not an emergency. He alleges that Barwick specifically deemed his grievance not an

emergency and notes that grievance officers T. Hill and M. Lively denied his grievances,

but the simple denial or mishandling of a grievance does not state a claim. Owens v.

Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011). Thus, any claim that grievance officials denied

his grievances is DISMISSED without prejudice. To the extent Perkins has also alleged

that Barwick was personally involved in subjecting him to unconstitutional conditions of

confinement, those claims are discussed below.

Perkins identifies several individuals in his statement of claim that he failed to

identify as defendants in the case caption. He alleges that Dr. Gordon failed to provide

him with treatment for his exposure to secondhand smoke, John Doe Nurse failed to

adequately treat the injury to his pinky finger, and a John Doe correctional officer,

C/O Derby, and C/O Williamson participated in the harassment and retaliation Perkins

experienced after filing grievances. These individuals, however, are not identified in the

case caption as defendants. In order to be a party in the case, a plaintiff must identify

them in the case caption. See FED. R. CIV. P. 10(a); Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d 551, 551–

52 (7th Cir. 2005). Because Perkins failed to identify these individuals as defendants, any

potential claim against them is DISMISSED without prejudice.

Perkins does identify Jane Doe Nurses and C/O Roberts as defendants in the case

caption, but he fails to include any allegations against them in his statement of claim.

Thus, any claim against these individuals is also DISMISSED without prejudice.

Finally, Perkins alleges that Sergeant McKinstry dared him to speak louder when

Perkins stated that their actions at the metal detector were “bullshit.” Perkins fails to

allege that Sergeant McKinstry’s statements amounted to a constitutional violation.

Verbal harassment alone does not state an Eighth Amendment claim. DeWalt v. Carter,

224 F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. 2000). Nor does Perkins allege that Sergeant McKinstry’s

statements were accompanied by any physical acts that would rise to the level of a

constitutional violation. It also does not appear that Sergeant McKinstry’s statements

amount to retaliation as Perkins fails to allege that McKinstry was aware of Perkins’s

grievances and acted in response to those grievances. Hawkins v. Mitchell, 756 F.3d 983,

996 (7th Cir. 2014) (In order to state a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege that he

engaged in protected activity, “suffered a deprivation likely to deter such activity,” and

the “First Amendment activity was at least a motivating factor in the decision to impose

the deprivation.”). Thus, the claim against McKinstry is also DISMISSED without

prejudice.

Discussion

Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court designates the following

counts:

Count 1: Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim

against Sergeant Agnew, Warden John Barwick, and Major

Baker for allowing inmates to smoke in Perkins’s unit and

subjecting him to secondhand smoke and synthetic drugs.

Count 2: First Amendment retaliation claim against Sergeant Agnew

for threatening Perkins and labeling him a snitch in front of

other inmates.

Count 3: First Amendment retaliation claim against Baker and

Sergeant Bebout for harassing Perkins in response to his

numerous grievances.

Count 4: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to medical

needs claim against Sergeant Agnew for failing to provide

medical care for his secondhand smoke and synthetic drug

exposure.

Count 5: Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against Internal

Affairs Officer Heck, Lt. Little, Lt. Tuthill, and John Doe

Internal Affairs Officer for finding Perkins guilty on two

disciplinary tickets.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders,

unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any other claim that is

mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be considered

dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly pleading

standard.1

Count 1

At this stage, Perkins alleges a viable conditions of confinement claim against

Sergeant Agnew, John Barwick, and Major Baker. He alleges that he informed each

official about the conditions he experienced in the housing unit, including the use of

synthetic drugs. Despite each official’s knowledge of the heavy secondhand smoke in the

unit, they each refused to remedy the conditions or stop the spread of drugs. Sain v. Wood,

512 F.3d 886, 894 (7th Cir. 2008). Thus, Count 1 shall proceed against Agnew, Barwick,

and Baker.

Count 2

Perkins also states a viable retaliation claim against Sergeant Agnew in Count 2.

Perkins alleges that in response to his numerous grievances, Sergeant Agnew threatened

him on several occasions, stated that he hoped he died, labeled him a snitch, and

informed inmates in his unit that he was a snitch, placing his life in danger. The

allegations suggest much more than mere verbal threats. See Dobbey v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr.,

574 F.3d 443, 445 (7th Cir. 2009); Irving v. Dormire, 519 F.3d 442, 445, 449-50 (8th Cir. 2008)

(repeated death threats, labeling plaintiff a snitch, and offering to pay inmates to attack

plaintiff); Beal v. Foster, 803 F.3d 356, 358 (7th Cir. 2015) (verbal sexual comments and

1 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face”).

suggestive actions to imply the plaintiff was gay put the plaintiff at risk from other

inmates); Hughes v. Farris, 809 F.3d 330, 334 (7th Cir. 2015). Thus, Count 2 shall proceed

against Sergeant Agnew.2

Count 3

Perkins also states a claim against Bebout and Baker for their campaign of

harassment against Perkins. They threatened him, punished inmates who spoke to him,

and made him return to his cell on numerous occasions, prohibiting him from attending

prison school. Count 3 shall proceed.

Count 4

Perkins also adequately alleges a deliberate indifference to medical needs claim

against Sergeant Agnew. He alleges that he begged Sergeant Agnew to call an emergency

code because Perkins could not breathe but Agnew refused. Thus, Count 4 shall proceed

against Agnew.

Count 5

Perkins fails, however, to state a claim for violation of his due process rights

regarding his disciplinary tickets. In order to state a due process claim, an inmate must

allege “(1) a constitutionally protected liberty interest and (2) deficient procedures

2 Perkins also alleges that Sergeant Agnew’s actions placed him at risk of harm from other inmates

and constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Although the same allegations also may state an

Eighth Amendment claim, the claim is redundant to his First Amendment claim. See Conyers v.

Abitz, 416 F.3d 580, 586 (7th Cir. 2005) (dismissing Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment claims

based on the same allegations as the First Amendment claim because the claim “gains nothing by

attracting additional constitutional labels”).

attendant to the deprivation of that interest.” Ealy v. Watson, 109 F.4th 958, 964 (7th Cir.

2024). An inmate’s liberty interests are protected by the Due Process Clause only insofar

as a deprivation of the interest at issue would impose an “atypical and significant

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v.

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). In situations where an inmate complains about discipline

in which he received segregation constituting an atypical and significant hardship (but

not the loss of good-time credit), the disciplinary proceedings are subject to an informal

due process inquiry. Ealy, 109 F.4th at 965 (citing Adams v. Reagle, 91 F.4th 880, 895 (7th

Cir. 2024)). Informal due process requires only that an inmate is provided (1) notice of

the reasons for his placement in segregation, and (2) an opportunity to present his views

in either a written statement or hearing. Ealy, 109 F.4th at 966.

In this case, Perkins fails to allege that the discipline he received amounted to an

atypical and significant hardship. He merely alleges that he was placed in segregation

but fails to indicate the length of his placement and the conditions he faced there. Further,

Perkins alleges that he was denied due process because officials failed to review video

tape evidence, test the paper for drugs, or further investigate his claims. But there are no

allegations to suggest that he was denied the requirements for informal due process,

including notice of the disciplinary reports and an opportunity to present his views. As

such, the due process claim in Count 5 is DISMISSED without prejudice.

Disposition

For the reasons stated above, Count 1 shall proceed against Sergeant Agnew,

Major Baker, and Warden John Barwick. Counts 2 and 4 shall proceed against Sergeant

Agnew. And Count 3 shall proceed against Baker and Bebout. All other claims and

defendants are DISMISSED without prejudice.

The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Sergeant Agnew, Major Baker, Sergeant

Bebout, and Warden John Barwick: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive

Service of a Summons) and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is

DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint, and this Memorandum and

Order to each defendant’s place of employment as identified by Perkins. If a defendant

fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within

30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect

formal service on that defendant, and the Court will require that defendant to pay the

full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.

If a defendant can no longer be found at the work address provided by Perkins,

the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the defendant’s current work address, or, if not

known, defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending

the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the

address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained

in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to

the Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1997e(g).

Pursuant to Local Rule 8.2, Defendants need only respond to the issues stated in this

Merit Review Order.

If judgment is rendered against Perkins, and the judgment includes the payment

of costs under Section 1915, he will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,

regardless of whether his application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. See 28 U.S.C.

Finally, Perkins is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the

Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court

will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not

later than 14 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply

with this order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result

in dismissal of this action for want of prosecution. See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 15, 2026 TN g 2

NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL

United States District Judge

Notice to Plaintiff

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of

your lawsuit and serve them with a copy of your Complaint. After service has been

achieved, the defendants will enter their appearance and file an Answer to your

Complaint. It will likely take at least 60 days from the date of this Order to receive the

defendants’ Answer, but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days or more. When all

the defendants have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order containing

important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to

wait until counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the

defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before

defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature.

Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time, unless specifically

directed to do so.

14

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