Hendricks

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

PEORIA DIVISION

MICHAEL HENDRICKS, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 1:26-cv-01138-SEM

)

LIVINGSTON COUNTY et al., )

Defendants. )

ORDER

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Michael Handricks, a detainee at the Livingston

County Jail (“Jail”), has filed a Motion for Leave to File an Amended

Complaint (Doc. 10), which is before the Court for screening.

Plaintiff’s motion is granted. The Court concludes that the

alleged facts Plaintiff provides in his amended pleading are

sufficient to state a Fourteenth Amendment claim for objectively

unreasonable medical care and an unconstitutional policy claim as

outlined in the Supreme Court’s decision in Monell v. N.Y. City Dep’t

of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

I. SCREENING STANDARD

The court must “screen” the complaint and dismiss any legally

insufficient claim or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C. §

1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious,

or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2)

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief.” Id. In reviewing the complaint, the court accepts the factual

allegations as true, liberally construing them in the plaintiff’s favor.

Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). However,

conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts

must be provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its

face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013)

(citation omitted).

II. FACTS

Plaintiff names Sheriff Ryan Bohm, Jail Superintendent Lisa

Draper, Lieutenant Scott Harmon, Physician Hughes Lochard,

Nurses Jailayia Frazier and Susanna Legner, Turn Key Medical

(“Turn Key”), and Livingston County (“County”) as Defendants.

Plaintiff asserts that before Defendant Turn Key became the

contracted provider of medical care at the Jail in September 2025,

he had been receiving fifty “units” of long-acting insulin twice daily

and a dose of “fast-acting” insulin after every meal. (Pl. Amend.

Compl., Doc. 10-1 at 2:10.) Thereafter, Defendant Lochard changed

Plaintiff’s insulin intake to twice daily at 5:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m.

Plaintiff asserts that he has had diabetes for twenty years and

has always received a dose of insulin after every meal. From

December 2025 to April 2026, Plaintiff’s glucose level fell to under

sixty on fifteen occasions, noting that the normal glucose level is

120 milligrams per deciliter.

Plaintiff requested glucose tablets to self-administer, but

Defendants Legner and Frazier told Plaintiff that Turn Key policy

would not permit the requested medication. Plaintiff claims that he

wrote over twenty grievances requesting assistance, which were

unanswered by Defendants Draper and Harmon.

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint

(Doc. 10) is granted.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a complaint need

only contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “This

requirement is satisfied if the complaint (1) describes the claim in

sufficient detail to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is

and the grounds upon which it rests and (2) plausibly suggests that

the plaintiff has a right to relief above a speculative level.” Bravo v.

Midland Credit Mgmt., 812 F.3d 599, 601–02 (7th Cir. 2016); see

also Charleston v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill. at Chi., 741 F.3d 769,

772 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Instead, a plausible claim must include

‘factual content’ sufficient to allow the court ‘to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’”)

(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

Despite naming Defendant Bohm, Plaintiff does not provide

any facts that establish or permit the inference that Bohm violated

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331,

334 (7th Cir. 1998) (“A plaintiff cannot state a claim against a

defendant by including the defendant’s name in the caption.”).

In Miranda v. County of Lake, 900 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2018),

the Seventh Circuit held that “the controlling inquiry for assessing a

due process challenge to a pretrial detainee’s medical care proceeds

in two steps.” McCann v. Ogle County, 909 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir.

2018). “The first step, which focuses on the intentionality of the

individual defendant’s conduct, remains unchanged and ‘asks

whether the medical defendants acted purposefully, knowingly, or

perhaps even recklessly when they considered the consequences of

their handling of [plaintiff’s] case.’” Id. (quoting Miranda, 900 F.3d

at 353); see also Pittman by and through Hamilton v. Madison Cnty.,

Illinois, 108 F.4th 561, 570 (7th Cir. 2024) (“This framing asks

strictly whether the defendant intended to commit the physical act

that caused the alleged injury.”).

“At the second step, . . . [courts] ask whether the challenged

conduct was objectively reasonable.” Id. “This standard requires

courts to focus on the totality of facts and circumstances faced by

the individual alleged to have provided inadequate medical care and

to gauge objectively—without regard to any subjective belief held by

the individual—whether the response was reasonable.” Id.; see also

Pittman, 108 F.4th at 570 (“[T]he proper inquiry turns on whether a

reasonable officer in the defendant’s shoes would have recognized

that the plaintiff was seriously ill or injured and thus needed

medical care.).

Plaintiff’s account is sufficient to state a Fourteenth

Amendment claim for objectively unreasonable medical care against

Defendants Draper, Frazier, Harmon, Legner, and Lochard. Thus,

the County will remain as a Defendant for indemnification

purposes. See Olson v. Champaign County, Ill., 784 F.3d 1093, 1104

(7th Cir. 2015) (noting that because Illinois law requires the county

to indemnify Sheriffs and their deputies for damages for torts

committed in the scope of their employment, the County is a

necessary party to a suit against a Sheriff under federal law) (citing

745 Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/9–102)).

Defendant Turn Key can be held liable under § 1983 if an

unconstitutional act is caused by: “(1) an official policy adopted and

promulgated by its officers; (2) a governmental practice or custom

that, although not officially authorized, is widespread and well

settled; or (3) an official with final policy-making authority.” Thomas

v. Cook Cty. Sheriff’s Dept., 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2010); see

also Woodward v. Corr. Med. Servs. of Ill., Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 927-

28 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that the standard for municipal liability

under Monell applies to corporations as well).

Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants Frazier and Legner informed

him that Defendant Turn Key had implemented a new policy that

prohibited Plaintiff from receiving glucose tablets is sufficient to

state a Monell claim.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint

(Doc. 10) is granted.

2) The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to docket Plaintiff’s

amended pleading (Doc. 10-1).

3) According to the Court’s merit review of Plaintiff’s

complaint [1] under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Plaintiff has

alleged enough facts to proceed with a Fourteenth

Amendment claim for objectively unreasonable medical

care against Defendants Draper, Frazier, Harmon, Legner,

and Lochard. Any additional claims shall not be included

in the case, except at the Court’s discretion on motion by

a party for good cause shown or under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 15. Plaintiff also states a Monell claim

against Turn Key Medical. Livingston County shall remain

as a party for indemnification purposes only.

4) The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to terminate Ryan

Bohm as a party.

5) This case is now in the process of service. The Court

advises Plaintiff to wait until counsel has appeared for

Defendants before filing any motions to give Defendants

notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions.

Motions filed before Defendants’ counsel has filed an

appearance will be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not

submit any evidence to the Court at this time unless

otherwise directed by the Court.

1) The Court will attempt service on Defendants by mailing a

waiver of service. Defendants have sixty days from service

to file an Answer. If Defendants have not filed Answers or

appeared through counsel within ninety days of the entry

of this order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the

status of service. After Defendants have been served, the

Court will enter an order setting discovery and dispositive

motion deadlines.

2) If a Defendant no longer works at the address provided by

Plaintiff, the entity where that Defendant worked while at

that address shall submit to the Clerk said Defendant’s

current work address, or, if not known, said Defendant’s

forwarding address. This information shall be used only for

effectuating service. Documentation of forwarding

addresses shall be retained only by the Clerk and shall not

be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the

Clerk.

3) Defendants shall file their respective Answers within sixty

days of the date the Clerk sends the waiver. A motion to

dismiss is not an answer. The answer should include all

defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer

and subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues and claims

stated in this order. In general, an answer sets forth

Defendant’s positions. The Court does not rule on the

merits of those positions unless and until Defendants file

a motion. Therefore, no response to the answer is

necessary or will be considered.

4) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after

Defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance, Defendants’

counsel will automatically receive electronic notice of any

motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk.

Plaintiff does not need to mail copies of motions and other

documents that Plaintiff has filed with the Clerk to

Defendants’ counsel. However, this does not apply to

discovery requests and responses. Discovery requests and

responses are not filed with the Clerk of the Court.

Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests and responses

directly to Defendants’ counsel. Discovery requests or

responses sent to the Clerk will be returned unfiled unless

they are attached to and the subject of a motion to

compel. Discovery does not begin until Defendants’

counsel files an appearance and the Court enters a

scheduling order, which will explain the discovery process

in more detail.

5) The Court grants Defendants’ counsel leave to depose

Plaintiff at his place of confinement. Defendants’ counsel

shall arrange the time for the deposition.

6) Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of

any change in his mailing address and telephone number.

Plaintiff’s failure to inform the Court of a change in

mailing address or phone number will result in dismissal

of this lawsuit with prejudice.

7) If a Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service

to the Clerk within thirty days after the waiver is sent, the

Court will take appropriate steps to effect formal service

through the U.S. Marshals Service on that Defendant and

will require that Defendant to pay the full costs of formal

service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).

8) The Court directs the Clerk to enter the standard qualified

protective order under the Health Insurance Portability

and Accountability Act.

9) The Court directs the Clerk to attempt service on

Defendant under the standard procedures.

ENTERED June 3, 2026.

s/ Sue E. Myerscough

_______________________________________

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE