State of Tennessee ex rel. Kenneth Dale Davenport v. Frank Strada, ex officio as Commissioner

05/29/2026

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs November 4, 2025

STATE OF TENNESSEE EX REL. KENNETH DALE DAVENPORT v.

FRANK STRADA, EX OFFICIO AS COMMISSIONER ET AL.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County

No. 25-0118-I Patricia Head Moskal, Chancellor

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No. M2025-00570-COA-R3-CV

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An inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction petitioned for a writ

of mandamus. On its own motion, the trial court dismissed the petition for failure to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted. We affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed

and Remanded

W. NEAL MCBRAYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J. STEVEN STAFFORD,

P.J., W.S., and JOHN W. MCCLARTY, P.J., E.S., joined.

Kenneth Dale Davenport, Nashville, Tennessee, pro se appellant.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter, and Benjamin Owen, Assistant

Attorney General, for the appellees, Commissioner Frank Strada and the Tennessee

Department of Correction.

OPINION

I.

Kenneth Davenport is serving a life sentence for first-degree murder with the

Tennessee Department of Correction. He petitioned the chancery court for a writ of

mandamus, alleging that TDOC incorrectly calculated his sentence by not following the

sentencing statutes applicable at the time of his offense. He asked the court to order TDOC

to either “cause[] an expiration date to be issued to all inmates similarly situated or . . . to

hold TDOC in contempt of court, and cause [his] immediate release.”1 Mr. Davenport’s

affidavit only swore to the following “facts”:

1. My name is Kenneth Dale Davenport # 163265 and I am currently

incarcerated in the Tennessee Department of Corrections [sic] at Deberry

Special Needs Facility 7575 Cockrill Bend Blvd., Nashville, Tn. 37209.

2. Respondent Mr. Frank Strada, Commissioner of Tennessee

Department of Corrections [sic], et al., has a duty imposed by law, see TCA

§ 40-35-501(r) to cause a release date and expiration date to [be] imposed on

all determinate sentences.

See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-25-101 (2024) (requiring petitions for writs of mandamus to be

supported by affidavit).

On its own motion, the chancery court dismissed the petition. It described the “crux

of Davenport’s petition [as] appear[ing] to be that TDOC ha[d] not assigned him (and other

‘similarly situated’ inmates) a sentence expiration date and, possibly, a release eligibility

date.” The court first noted that mandamus was an extraordinary remedy to be applied

only where there is a clearly established right and no other available means of relief. It

then concluded that the petition and supporting affidavit had “not set forth any facts

establishing a ‘clear legal right’ to his requested relief.” And he had an “‘adequate means’

of challenging TDOC’s sentence calculation” under the Uniform Administrative

Procedures Act.

II.

On appeal, Mr. Davenport frames the issue as “did the trial court abuse its discretion

in denying mandamus relief,” but as we perceive his argument, Mr. Davenport is

challenging the propriety of the dismissal of his petition. Although the practice is not

encouraged, a trial court may dismiss a petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted on its own motion. Huckeby v. Spangler, 521 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Tenn.

1975). In doing so, “the court should construe the complaint liberally in favor of the

plaintiff, taking all of the allegations of fact therein as true.” Id. Just as with a Rule

12.02(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the complaint or petition should not

be dismissed unless it appears that the plaintiff or, as here, the petitioner can prove no set

of facts in support of his claim that would warrant relief. Doe v. Sundquist, 2 S.W.3d 919,

922 (Tenn. 1999) (citing Riggs v. Burson, 941 S.W.2d 44, 47 (Tenn. 1997)). Making such

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Mr. Davenport also requested appointment of counsel. The court’s denial of that request is not

an issue on appeal. See Hessmer v. Miranda, 138 S.W.3d 241, 245 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (observing that,

in most instances, “[i]ndigent civil litigants, unlike indigent criminal defendants, possess neither a

constitutional nor statutory right to court-appointed assistance”).

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a determination presents a question of law, which we review de novo. Id. (citing Stein v.

Davidson Hotel Co., 945 S.W.2d 714, 716 (Tenn. 1997)).

Here, Mr. Davenport’s claim was for a writ of mandamus. The writ “is an

extraordinary remedy that may be issued where a right has been clearly established and

‘there is no other plain, adequate, and complete method of obtaining the relief to which one

is entitled.’” Cherokee Country Club, Inc. v. City of Knoxville, 152 S.W.3d 466, 479 (Tenn.

2004) (quoting Meighan v. U.S. Sprint Commc’ns Co., 942 S.W.2d 476, 479 (Tenn. 1997)).

Despite often being “addressed to ministerial acts, rather than discretionary acts, the writ

may be addressed to discretionary acts when the act is done in an ‘arbitrary and oppressive

manner’ or where there has been a ‘plainly palpable’ abuse of discretion.” Meighan, 942

S.W.2d at 479 (first quoting State v. Bd. of Educ. of Blount Cnty., 121 S.W. 499, 500 (Tenn.

1909) and then quoting Peerless Const. Co. v. Bass, 14 S.W.2d 732, 733 (Tenn. 1929)).

The statutory authority referenced by Mr. Davenport in both his petition and

affidavit makes TDOC “responsible for calculating the sentence expiration date and the

release eligibility date of any felony offender sentenced to [TDOC] . . . for one (1) or more

years.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501(r) (2025). But, although TDOC has the

responsibility to make the calculations, the statute does not dictate how this responsibility

is to be accomplished. See Johnson v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., No. M2001-02424-COA-R3-

CV, 2003 WL 22794498, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2003) (interpreting identical

language appearing in the statutes governing the probation and paroles system).2 Instead,

the statute leaves the manner of calculation to TDOC’s discretion. See id.; see also Lamb

v. State ex rel. Kisabeth, 338 S.W.2d 584, 586 (Tenn. 1960) (distinguishing between

discretionary and ministerial duties).

We agree with the chancery court that Mr. Davenport did not have a clearly

established right to the relief he was seeking. TDOC has discretion in how it calculates

and communicates sentence expiration and release eligibility dates. See Johnson, 2003

WL 22794498, at *3. And the petition does not include factual allegations showing that

the calculations of which Mr. Davenport complains were conducted in an arbitrary and

oppressive manner or that there was an obvious abuse of discretion. See Peerless Const.

Co., 14 S.W.2d at 733.

We also agree that Mr. Davenport has another method for obtaining relief, at least

for the calculation of his own sentence expiration and release eligibility dates. If the

calculations are incorrect, he could challenge them under the Uniform Administrative

Procedures Act. Stewart v. Schofield, 368 S.W.3d 457, 464 (Tenn. 2012) (citing Bonner v.

Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., 84 S.W.3d 576, 583 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) and Watson v. Tenn. Dep’t

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Although Johnson v. Tennessee Department of Correction cites to Tennessee Code Annotated

§ 40-28-109 (2003), the context suggests that the citation should be to Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-28-

129 (2003). See 2003 WL 22794498, at *3 n.5.

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of Corr., 970 S.W.2d 494, 497 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998)); Ferrell v. State, No. 01CO1-9610-

CR-00454, 1997 WL 578999, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 19, 1997).

III.

Because there was no clear right to the relief sought and there was another adequate

remedy, the chancery court properly concluded that the petition for writ of mandamus

failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. So we affirm the dismissal of

the petition and remand the case to the chancery court for whatever further proceedings

may be required.

s/ W. Neal McBrayer

W. NEAL MCBRAYER, JUDGE

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