Opinion

Jackson v. Charter Commc'ns, Inc.

Court
Court of Appeals of North Carolina
Filed
Jun 3, 2026
Status
Unpublished
Author
Judge Fred Gore
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 40.8%

explaining that arbitration “is a matter of contract” and that courts determine whether the “parties agreed to arbitrate”

How later courts described this case

  • explaining that arbitration “is a matter of contract” and that courts determine whether the “parties agreed to arbitrate”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with

the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA25-606

Filed 3 June 2026

Mecklenburg County, No. 24CV039096-590

DOMINIQUE R. JACKSON, Plaintiff,

v.

CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC., Defendant.

Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 30 January 2025 by Judge Karen Eady

Williams in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 19

November 2025.

Dominique R. Jackson, pro se plaintiff-appellant.

Cranfill Sumner LLP, by Steven A. Bader and Kayla N. McDaniel, for

defendant-appellee.

GORE, Judge.

Plaintiff Dominique R. Jackson appeals from an order confirming the

arbitration award and dismissing his motion to vacate. Plaintiff also filed a petition

for writ of certiorari, and defendant moved to dismiss the appeal. Upon review of the

briefs and record, we affirm the trial court’s order, deny the petition as moot, and

deny defendant’s motion.

JACKSON V. CHARTER COMMC’NS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

I.

In December 2022, plaintiff initiated arbitration with the American

Arbitration Association and attached a contract (“Contract 2”) containing an

arbitration provision. Following a hearing in December 2023, the arbitrator issued

an award on 11 January 2024, awarding plaintiff $5,000.00 on his negligent infliction

of emotional distress claim but no economic damages.

Plaintiff moved to modify the award on 30 January 2024, and the arbitrator

denied the motion on 22 February 2024. According to defendant, the parties received

the denial on 26 February 2024.

On 14 June 2024, plaintiff sent defendant a document styled as a motion to

vacate the award that was not signed, filed, or served in accordance with applicable

rules. Defendant moved to dismiss and to confirm the award.

The trial court entered an order confirming the arbitration award and

dismissing plaintiff’s motion to vacate. Plaintiff filed notice of appeal on 16 March

2025. The record contains no certificate of service showing when plaintiff was served

with the order.

II.

At the outset, the parties acknowledge the notice of appeal was filed more than

thirty days after the trial court entered the order. Defendant has moved to dismiss

the appeal based on this procedural error. Plaintiff responded by filing a petition for

writ of certiorari requesting this Court invoke Rule 2 to review the appeal. This

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JACKSON V. CHARTER COMMC’NS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

presents a jurisdictional question for this Court. See Dogwood Dev. & Mgmt. Co. v.

White Oak Transp. Co., 362 N.C. 191, 197–98 (2008) (cleaned up). Although the notice

of appeal was filed more than thirty days after entry of judgment, because the record

contains no certificate of service showing when plaintiff was served with the

judgment, the notice is presumed timely. See Brown v. Swarn, 257 N.C. App. 417,

422 (2018). Therefore, the petition for writ of certiorari is moot and we deny

defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff argues the trial court erred by confirming the arbitration award

because the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, plaintiff

contends the contract he attached to his arbitration demand (Contract 2), on which

the arbitrator relied, was invalid because the parties had entered into a different

contract (“Contract 1”). We disagree.

When parties agree to arbitrate, “a strong policy supports upholding

arbitration awards.” Advantage Assets, Inc. II v. Howell, 190 N.C. App. 443, 445

(2008) (cleaned up). Because the contracts at issue provide that the Federal

Arbitration Act governs and involve interstate commerce, the FAA controls. WMC,

Inc. v. Weaver, 166 N.C. App. 352, 358 (2004).

“Under the FAA, an arbitration award is presumed valid,” and vacatur is

limited to the grounds set forth in 9 U.S.C. § 10. Snipes v. TitleMax of Virginia, Inc.,

285 N.C. App. 176, 180 (2022) (cleaned up). A party seeking to vacate an award must

also comply with the procedural requirements of 9 U.S.C. § 12, which requires service

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JACKSON V. CHARTER COMMC’NS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

of notice within three months after the award is filed or delivered. See Portfolio

Recovery Assocs., LLC v. Freeman, 216 N.C. App. 397, 399–400 (2011); 9 U.S.C. § 12.

Similar to Freeman, plaintiff did not serve notice of a motion to vacate or

modify the arbitration award within three months of delivery of the award. 216 N.C.

App. at 401. Nor did plaintiff challenge the existence of the arbitration agreement

through the procedural mechanisms provided in section 4 of the FAA. See 9 U.S.C. §

4. In fact, plaintiff initiated arbitration and later sought to partially vacate the award

under § 10(a)(3) and § 10(a)(4) in the trial court. Only now, for the first time on

appeal, does he challenge the award based on the validity of the underlying contract,

while conceding in his brief that “the parties entered into a valid contract and

arbitration agreement.”

Plaintiff acknowledges a contractual relationship with defendant that included

an arbitration provision; but now seeks to invalidate the award by arguing the

contract he attached to his arbitration demand (Contract 2) was not the governing

agreement and that a different contract (Contract 1) controlled. This is not a case in

which plaintiff contends there was no agreement to arbitrate; rather, he disputes

which contract governed. Accordingly, the FAA limits the court’s ability to vacate the

award to the grounds set forth in section 10. See 9 U.S.C. § 10; but see AT & T Techs.,

Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648–49 (1986) (explaining that

arbitration “is a matter of contract” and that courts determine whether the “parties

agreed to arbitrate”).

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JACKSON V. CHARTER COMMC’NS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

In the present case, plaintiff initiated arbitration and submitted the contract

supporting his demand. The arbitrator awarded plaintiff $5,000.00, rather than the

eleven million dollars he sought. Plaintiff then sought to vacate the award and re-

arbitrate the matter. Plaintiff raises for the first time on appeal the argument that

the contract used in arbitration differed from Contract 1.

Because plaintiff failed to timely and properly challenge the arbitration award

under the procedural requirements of the FAA, including sections 4 and 12, that

challenge is not properly before this Court. See Freeman, 216 N.C. App. at 400–01;

see also Howell, 190 N.C. App. at 447.

Given our resolution of this issue, we do not address plaintiff’s judicial estoppel

argument.

III.

Because plaintiff failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the FAA

to challenge the arbitration award, we affirm the trial court’s order.

AFFIRMED.

Judges CARPENTER and WOOD concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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