Kennon

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SHREVEPORT DIVISION

DEKIITRICIAS C KENNON CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-cv-1746

VERSUS JUDGE VAN HOOK

CHARLES EDGELL ET AL MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Introduction

Dekiitricias C. Kennon (“Plaintiff”), who is self-represented, filed this civil rights

action against Springhill Police Officer Charles Edgell, the City of Springhill, and the

Springhill Police Department. Plaintiff alleged that his Fourth Amendment right to be free

of an unreasonable search was violated. Before the court is a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 8)

filed by all three defendants that challenges the merits and, as to Officer Edgell, asserts

qualified immunity. The motion was noticed for briefing, but Plaintiff did not file any

response. For the reasons that follow, it is recommended that the motion to dismiss be

granted.

Rule 12(b)(6) and Qualified Immunity

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Phillips v. City of

Dall., 781 F.3d 772, 775–76 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937,

1949 (2009).). In reviewing, “[w]e accept all well pleaded facts as true and view them in

the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Heaney v. U.S. Veterans Admin., 756 F.2d 1215,

1217 (5th Cir. 1985). A plaintiff must plead facts that reasonably support his or her legal

conclusions. Shaw v. Villanueva, 918 F.3d 414, 416 (5th Cir. 2019).

When a defendant asserts qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden of

pleading facts that demonstrate liability and defeat immunity. Zapata v. Melson, 750 F.3d

481, 485 (5th Cir. 2014). The plaintiff must show (1) that the official violated a statutory

or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the

challenged conduct. Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 638 (5th Cir. 2013).

At the motion to dismiss stage, “a plaintiff seeking to overcome qualified immunity

must plead specific facts that both allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the harm he has alleged and that defeat a qualified immunity defense

with equal specificity.” Arnold v. Williams, 979 F.3d 262, 267 (5th Cir. 2020). In other

words, a “plaintiff must plead facts which, if proved, would defeat [the] claim of

immunity.” Allen v. Hayes, 65 F.4th 736, 745 (5th Cir. 2023).

The Complaint

Plaintiff filed his complaint on a form provided by the court for the assertion of civil

rights claims. He checked a box to indicate that he relied on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The form

asked that he identify the constitutional right at issue. Plaintiff wrote, “My 4th amendment,

subject to unreasonable search.” Plaintiff wrote that the events at issue occurred at Taylors

store in Springhill on November 8, 2024 around 11:00. The form asked Plaintiff to describe

the facts underlying his claim. He wrote only as follows:

I was approach very aggressively by office Charles Edgell, opening my car

door demanding I had a warrant. After showing him my i.d. he still put

handcuffs on me. Now im afraid. So I ask a lady would she record this. He

reopen my door grab my phone, put it to my face to unlock and went through

it and my vehicle.

Plaintiff alleged that he suffered anxiety, depression, and arm pain as a result. He prayed

for $500,000 in damages.

Officer Edgell

Officer Edgell is entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiff has not alleged

specific facts from which an inference can be drawn that he necessarily violated a clearly

established constitutional right. Plaintiff alleged that Edgell opened his car door

“demanding I had a warrant.” Plaintiff does not allege that Edgell lacked a warrant or that

the warrant was not for Plaintiff or was otherwise invalid. If Officer Edgell had an arrest

warrant for Plaintiff, he was authorized to place handcuffs on Plaintiff.

Plaintiff also alleged that Edgell grabbed Plaintiff’s phone, put it to Plaintiff’s face

to unlock, and went through the phone and vehicle. A police officer who makes an arrest

may be able to physically seize a phone under the search-incident-to-arrest exception, but

the officer may not make a first-hand search of the digital contents of the phone without a

search warrant. Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473 (2014). And police may search the

passenger area of an automobile incident to a recent occupant’s arrest if it is reasonable to

believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S.Ct.

1710 (2009).

Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts to set forth a plausible and clearly

established constitutional violation under those rules. It is not alleged whether the officer

actually had a warrant and, if so, whether it was a search warrant or an arrest warrant.

Perhaps Officer Edgell had an arrest warrant and lacked the authority to search the digital

contents of the cell phone. Or perhaps he had a search warrant for the cell phone and the

automobile and merely detained Plaintiff while completing the search. The complaint lacks

specific facts to assess these issues and make out a plausible claim.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss pointed out these shortcomings and urged the court

to dismiss the claims or, in the alternative, require Plaintiff to amend his complaint and

provide a more definite statement. The motion was noticed for briefing. Plaintiff had the

right under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 15(a)(1)(B) to amend his complaint without leave of court

within 21 days after the motion was filed. Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint, a

memorandum in opposition, or anything else. He has not met his burden under the

circumstances, so all claims against Officer Edgell should be dismissed based on qualified

immunity.

City of Springhill

A municipality such as the City of Springhill may be liable even if the claims against

its police officer are dismissed based on qualified immunity. Brown v. Lyford, 243 F.3d

185, 191 n. 18 (5th Cir. 2001). But the city may not be liable under Section 1983 unless

its employee violated the constitution while acting in accordance with an official policy or

custom of the municipality. To establish municipal liability under Section 1983, a plaintiff

must show that (1) an official policy (2) promulgated by the municipal policy maker (3)

was the moving force behind the violation of the constitutional right. Cambric v. City of

Corpus Christi, ___ F.4th ___, 2026 WL 709200, *2 (5th Cir. 2026). “The description of

a policy or custom and its relationship to the underlying constitutional violation … cannot

be conclusory; it must contain specific facts.” Spiller v. City of Texas City, 130 F.3d 162,

167 (5th Cir. 1997).

Plaintiff’s complaint does not include any allegations of a municipal policy or that

it was a moving force behind any alleged constitutional violation committed by Officer

Edgell. Accordingly, the complaint fails to state a claim for municipal liability on which

relief may be granted. All claims against the City of Springhill should be dismissed.

Springhill Police Department

Plaintiff has named as a defendant the Springhill Police Department. The capacity

of an entity to be sued is determined by the law of the state in which the district court is

held. F.R.C.P. 17(b). For a plaintiff to be able to sue a city department, the department

must enjoy a separate legal existence. The true political entity, in this case the City of

Springhill, must have taken explicit steps to grant the servient agency with authority to

engage in litigation. Darby v. Pasadena Police Dept., 939 F.2d 311, 313 (5th Cir. 1991).

It is doubtful that the Springhill Police Department has such authority, so it is likely

not a proper defendant that may be sued in federal court. See Johnson v. Bossier City

Police Dep’t, 2009 WL 2461520, *3 (W.D. La. 2009)

(“the Bossier City Police Department is not a separate legal entity from the City

of Bossier and does not have the capacity to be sued”); Martin v. Davis, 2007 WL 763653

(E.D. La. 2007) (“Under Louisiana law, police departments are not juridical entities

capable of suing or being sued.”); Hicks v. Page, 2010 WL 2243584, *2 (W.D. La. 2010)

(Shreveport Police Department is not a legal entity capable of being sued in federal court).

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that suggest the Springhill Police Department has

a separate legal existence status that would make it a proper defendant. Moreover, Plaintiff

has not alleged facts that present a plausible basis for liability of the agency even if it

enjoyed such status. All claims against the Springhill Police Department, the third and

final defendant, should be dismissed.

Accordingly,

It is recommended that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 8) be granted and that

all claims against all defendants be dismissed with prejudice.

Objections

Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), parties

aggrieved by this recommendation have fourteen (14) days from service of this report and

recommendation to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court, unless an

extension of time is granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b). A party may respond to another

party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof.

Counsel are directed to furnish a courtesy copy of any objections or responses to the

District Judge at the time of filing.

A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and

recommendation set forth above, within 14 days after being served with a copy, shall bar

that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to

proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court. See

Douglass v. U.S.A.A., 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 25" day of March,

2026.

Mark L. Hornsby

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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