Villavicencio-Serna

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

PEORIA DIVISION

LUIS VILLAVICENCIO-SERNA, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 1:25-cv-01457-SEM

)

RODNEY ALFORD et al., )

Defendants. )

MERIT REVIEW ORDER

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, United States District Judge:

Before the Court is a Complaint (Doc. 1) under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 filed by Plaintiff Luis Villavicencio-Serna, an inmate at Pontiac

Correctional Center (“Pontiac”). Plaintiff has also filed a Motion for

Counsel (Doc. 4.)

The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s pleading states an Eighth

Amendment deliberate indifference claim for relief. Plaintiff’s Motion

for Counsel is denied.

I. COMPLAINT

A. Screening Standard

The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s complaint and dismiss any

legally insufficient claim or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

immune from such relief.” Id. In reviewing the complaint, the Court

accepts the factual allegations as accurate, liberally construing

them in the plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649

(7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are

insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for

relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721

F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

B. Alleged Facts

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges constitutional violations at Pontiac

Correctional Center (“Pontiac”) against Defendants Rodney Alford,

former Warden Mindi Nurse, Healthcare Supervisor Nikki Rambo,

and John Does I and II.

On August 22, 2024, Plaintiff saw Defendant Alford for a

“broken metal rod” in his left leg that caused him excruciating pain.

Plaintiff claims Alford prescribed medication that was ineffective

and denied requests for X-rays and a referral to an orthopedic

specialist.

Plaintiff spoke and wrote to Defendant Rambo about his

medical condition to no avail, and Rambo documented Plaintiff’s

receipt of pain medication, which Plaintiff asserts was false. Plaintiff

further asserts that his letters and emergency grievances addressed

to Defendant Nurse failed to address his pain. Plaintiff names

Defendant Doe II, claiming that he has “seen him/her [a] couple of

times and they always denied me medical attention.” (Pl. Compl.,

Doc. 1 at 6.)

C. Analysis

“Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription

against cruel and unusual punishment when their conduct

demonstrates ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of

prisoners.’” Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1369 (7th Cir. 1997)

(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). To succeed on

a claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, a

plaintiff must satisfy a test that contains both an objective and

subjective component. Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir.

1996). Under the objective element, a plaintiff must demonstrate

that his medical condition is sufficiently severe. Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Under the subjective component, the

prison official must have acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of

mind.” Id. Thus, a plaintiff can establish deliberate indifference by

showing that a defendant “knew of a substantial risk of harm to the

inmate and disregarded the risk.” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645,

653 (7th Cir. 2005).

Plaintiff’s account is sufficient to state a plausible deliberate

indifference to medical need claim under the Eighth Amendment

against Defendants Alford, Doe II, Nurse, and Rambo. However,

Plaintiff does not state plausible claims against Defendant John

Doe I, whom Plaintiff identifies as Alford’s employer. See

Streckenbach v. Vandensen, 868 F.3d 594, 598 (7th Cir. 2017)

(concluding that a supervisor may not be personally liable even

where it is “foreseeable that subordinates [will] make operational

errors” because this would be vicarious liability, which is not

allowed under § 1983).

II. COUNSEL

Plaintiff has no constitutional right to counsel, and the Court

cannot require an attorney to accept pro bono appointments in civil

cases. The most the Court can do is ask for volunteer counsel. See

Jackson v. County of McLean, 953 F.2d 1070, 1071 (7th Cir. 1992)

(holding that although indigent civil litigants have no constitutional

right to counsel, a district court may, in its discretion, request

counsel to represent indigent civil litigants in certain

circumstances). In considering Plaintiff’s motion for counsel, the

Court must ask two questions: “(1) has the indigent plaintiff made a

reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively precluded

from doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case, does the

plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself?” Pruitt v. Mote, 503

F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007).

The Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion for Counsel (Doc. 4)

because he has not satisfied his threshold burden of demonstrating

that he has attempted to hire counsel, which typically requires

writing to several lawyers and attaching the responses received.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Counsel (Doc. 4) is DENIED.

2) According to the Court’s merit review of Plaintiff’s

complaint [1] under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Plaintiff has

alleged enough facts to proceed with an Eighth

Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs claim against Defendants Alford, Doe II, Nurse, and

Rambo. Any additional claims shall not be included in the

case, except at the Court’s discretion on motion by a

party for good cause shown or under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 15.

3) The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to terminate Doe I as

a party.

4) This case is now in the process of service. The Court

advises Plaintiff to wait until counsel has appeared for

Defendants before filing any motions to give Defendants

notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions.

Motions filed before Defendants’ counsel has filed an

appearance will be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not

submit any evidence to the Court at this time unless

otherwise directed by the Court.

5) The Court will attempt service on Defendants by mailing a

waiver of service. Defendants have sixty days from service

to file an Answer. If Defendants have not filed Answers or

appeared through counsel within ninety days of the entry

of this order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the

status of service. After Defendants have been served, the

Court will enter an order setting discovery and dispositive

motion deadlines.

6) If a Defendant no longer works at the address provided by

Plaintiff, the entity where that Defendant worked while at

that address shall submit to the Clerk said Defendant’s

current work address, or, if not known, said Defendant’s

forwarding address. This information shall be used only for

effectuating service. Documentation of forwarding

addresses shall be retained only by the Clerk and shall not

be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the

Clerk.

7) Defendants shall file their respective Answers within sixty

days of the date the Clerk sends the waiver. A motion to

dismiss is not an answer. The answer should include all

defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer

and subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues and claims

stated in this order. In general, an answer sets forth

Defendant’s positions. The Court does not rule on the

merits of those positions unless and until Defendants file

a motion. Therefore, no response to the answer is

necessary or will be considered.

8) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after

Defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance, Defendants’

counsel will automatically receive electronic notice of any

motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk.

Plaintiff does not need to mail copies of motions and other

documents that Plaintiff has filed with the Clerk to

Defendants’ counsel. However, this does not apply to

discovery requests and responses. Discovery requests and

responses are not filed with the Clerk of the Court.

Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests and responses

directly to Defendants’ counsel. Discovery requests or

responses sent to the Clerk will be returned unfiled unless

they are attached to and the subject of a motion to

compel. Discovery does not begin until Defendants’

counsel has filed an appearance, and the Court has

entered a scheduling order, which will explain the

discovery process in more detail.

9) The Court grants Defendants’ counsel leave to depose

Plaintiff at his place of confinement. Defendants’ counsel

shall arrange the time for the deposition.

10) Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of

any change in his mailing address and telephone number.

Plaintiff’s failure to inform the Court of a change in

mailing address or phone number will result in dismissal

of this lawsuit with prejudice.

11) If a Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service

to the Clerk within thirty days after the waiver is sent, the

Court will take appropriate steps to effect formal service

through the U.S. Marshals Service on that Defendant and

will require that Defendant to pay the full costs of formal

service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).

12) The Court directs the Clerk to enter the standard qualified

protective order under the Health Insurance Portability

and Accountability Act.

13) The Court directs the Clerk to attempt service on

Defendant under the standard procedures.

ENTERED June 2, 2026.

s/ Sue E. Myerscough

_______________________________________

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE