The opinion
Filed 6/1/26 Conjunction Junction v. Leon CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
CONJUNCTION JUNCTION LLC, B340128
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 23TRCV03160)
GORDON LEON et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Ronald F. Frank, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Office of Richard Jacobs and Richard B. Jacobs for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Atkinson, Andelson, Loya, Ruud & Romo, Stephen J. Tully
and Brian W. Ludeke for Defendants and Respondents.
_______________________________________
In 1981, the City of Rancho Palos Verdes (City) formed the
Abalone Cove Landslide Abatement District (ACLAD). Decades
later, appellant Conjunction Junction LLC challenged ACLAD’s
existence. The trial court sustained demurrers to appellant’s
second amended complaint (SAC) without leave to amend. On
de novo review, we conclude that appellant’s claims are barred by
the statute of limitations and by its failure to comply with the
Government Claims Act. Any lapses in the formation of ACLAD
were cured by the First Validating Act of 1992. We affirm.
FACTS
City formed ACLAD in 1981 as a Geologic Hazard
Abatement District (GHAD) under Division 17 of the Public
Resources Code. ACLAD assesses landowners to fund landslide
abatement work. Appellant is a local landowner. Respondents
are ACLAD’s board members Gordon Leon, Michael Barth, Jim
Knight, and Colleen Miller.
While searching public records for ACLAD’s formation
documents, appellant learned that in 1981 City apparently failed
to send the State Controller a resolution declaring it is subject to
the Public Resources Code; however, the Controller produced a
1990 resolution from City to that effect. In 2023, appellant sued
for relief based on ACLAD’s alleged nonexistence; it seeks to
impose a constructive trust on assessments ACLAD has collected
for over 40 years.
Respondents demurred and requested judicial notice of (1)
City’s Resolution No. 81-4 creating ACLAD under the Public
Resources Code, dated January 6, 1981; (2) ACLAD’s Resolution
No. 81-7, stating its intent to abate a landslide pursuant to a plan
of control, dated March 30, 1981; (3) ACLAD’s Resolution No. 81-
12 to impose assessments, dated June 9, 1981; (4) ACLAD
meeting minutes of March 30, 1981; and (5) a state website
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recognizing ACLAD as the state’s first GHAD. Respondents
submitted certified copies of the resolutions.
Appellant filed an amended complaint. On demurrer, the
court overruled appellant’s objections to the legislative
resolutions. It gave “a warning shot across the bow” that
appellant “cannot validly, properly, lawfully over the bar of the
statute of limitations assert a claim that challenges the validity
of the formation of ACLAD. You had to do that 40 years ago.
That didn’t happen; the statute of limitations is a bar to that.”
The court gave appellant leave to amend to assert “causes of
action that are not predicated on the validity of the formation of
ACLAD.”
Despite the trial court’s warning, the SAC alleged that City
never properly formed ACLAD, making it a legal nullity and
voiding its actions. Apart from challenging ACLAD’s existence,
the SAC added causes of action for violations of (a) election laws;
(b) Brown Act requirements for public meetings; (c) prevailing
wage laws; (d) state ballot propositions; (e) fiduciary duty; and (f)
the Public Records Act. Respondents demurred.
The Trial Court’s Ruling
The court ruled that appellant’s challenge to the formation
of ACLAD is untimely. Moreover, appellant did not comply with
the Government Claims Act. Though appellant claimed it could
not serve ACLAD, personal service is unnecessary for a
government claim. The court sustained demurrers for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies.
The court sustained demurrers to all causes of action on the
basis of statutory immunity. Appellant conceded the immunity
issue by failing to address it. Likewise, appellant did not address
the timeliness of its cause of action for election law violations,
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conceding the point. Appellant had to bring an election law claim
within the 60-day period specified by law and failed to do so.
A claim for Brown Act violations requires a timely demand
on the legislative body to cure or correct its action. The SAC does
not allege that appellant made a demand. Appellant is not an
ACLAD employee and lacks standing to claim ACLAD failed to
pay minimum wage. Finally, the SAC does not properly allege
that ACLAD withheld records from appellant. After considering
appellant’s ability to correct deficiencies in the SAC, the court
sustained demurrers without leave to amend.
DISCUSSION
1. Appeal and Review
Appellant appealed the order sustaining demurrers without
leave to amend. “It is settled that an order sustaining a
demurrer is not appealable.” (Evans v. Dabney (1951) 37 Cal.2d
758, 759.) At our request, appellant submitted a judgment of
dismissal signed by the court. We treat the premature notice of
appeal as having been taken from the judgment. (Turpin v.
Sortini (1982) 31 Cal.3d 220, 224, fn. 2; Nguyen v. Ford (2020) 49
Cal.App.5th 1, 10, fn. 4.)
“A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter
of law. [Citation.] The allegations of fact contained in the
complaint must normally be accepted as true. [Citations.]
However, a reviewing court may also consider judicially
noticeable facts which the trial court did notice or properly could
have noticed, such as government resolutions and other official
acts.” (City of Chula Vista v. County of San Diego (1994) 23
Cal.App.4th 1713, 1718–1719.) The resolutions may supersede
inconsistent allegations in the pleading. (Id. at p. 1719.)
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2. Appellant’s Challenge to ACLAD’s Formation
Demurrers were properly sustained to claims arising from
City’s formation of ACLAD. The claims are untimely. Further,
the Legislature has declared that existing GHAD’s such as
ACLAD were legally organized and function as a public body.
State law authorizes the formation of GHAD’s for the
“[p]revention, mitigation, abatement, or control of a geologic
hazard,” which includes landslides and land subsidence. (Pub.
Resources Code, §§ 26525, subd. (a), 26507.) It is common
knowledge that City has ongoing landslides. This prompted City
to sponsor state legislation creating GHAD’s. (Las Tunas Beach
Geologic Hazard Abatement Dist. v. Superior Court (1995) 38
Cal.App.4th 1002, 1010, fn. 3 (Las Tunas).) “A GHAD is purely a
creature of statute, unknown at common law.” (Id. at p. 1012.)
Under the statutory scheme, GHAD’s are formed either by
petition signed by local landowners or resolution of a legislative
body. (Pub. Resources Code, § 26550.5.) When (as here) a GHAD
is formed by resolution, the legislative body must declare it is
subject to the Public Resources Code and send it to the State
Controller. (Id., § 26550.) A resolution must state that the
legislative body has reviewed a plan of control from an
engineering geologist describing the hazard and a plan for its
prevention, mitigation, abatement, or control. (Id., §§ 26509,
26558.) There is no requirement that a plan of control be
attached to the resolution or sent to the state government.
The trial court took judicial notice of local legislation.
(Evid. Code, § 452.) One resolution shows City formed ACLAD in
1981 pursuant to the Public Resources Code and appointed a
board of directors. Soon after, ACLAD’s board cited a plan of
control at a public meeting. Appellant does not challenge—or
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even acknowledge—the resolutions. In this case, judicially
noticeable facts contradict the allegations in the SAC. (Evans v.
City of Berkeley (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1, 20.)
The SAC alleges that City and ACLAD admitted, in 2023,
that they had no plan of control, or failed to submit it to the state.
City did not give the State Controller a resolution invoking the
Public Resources Code until 1990. Appellant quotes the
speculative musings in 2023 of ACLAD board members—who had
nothing to do with the formation of ACLAD—that “ ‘[m]aybe’ ”
ACLAD lacked “ ‘the breath of life.’ ”
Appellant’s reliance on statements made in 2023 is
misplaced. Even if City failed to fully comply with procedures for
forming a GHAD, those failures are irrelevant. Any challenge to
formation of a GHAD had to be made within six months after
City created ACLAD in 1981.1 (Las Tunas, supra, 38
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1014–1015 & fn. 9 [challenges to the formation
of a GHAD must begin within six months, under Code of Civil
Procedure section 349.1 and a 1992 Validating Act].) Absent a
timely challenge, all acts to form ACLAD “shall be held valid and
in every respect legal and incontestable.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 349.1.) Consequently, there is no merit to appellant’s theory
that ACLAD is “void.”
1 “The validity of any acts or proceedings taken under color
of law for the formation . . . [of] any . . . special district . . . shall
not be contested in any action unless such action shall have been
brought within six months from the date of completion of said acts
or proceedings. Unless an action is commenced within said
period all said acts or proceedings shall be held valid and in every
respect legal and incontestable.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 349.1, italics
added.)
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Appellant asserts that ACLAD’s “concealment” of its
improper formation tolled the six-month statute of limitations for
42 years, reasoning that its claims accrued when it discovered or
had inquiry notice of deficiencies in ACLAD’s formation.
Fraudulent concealment and the discovery rule do not apply. In
Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (1999) 20
Cal.4th 509, our Supreme Court interpreted a 30-day statute of
limitations applicable to the acts of a public entity. (Id. at pp.
532–534.) The court rejected a fraudulent concealment theory:
“For us judicially to read the doctrine of fraudulent concealment
into [the statute’s] 30-day statute of limitations would upset the
legislative balance.” (Id. at p. 534.)
City’s 1981 resolution creating ACLAD was made at a
public meeting. ACLAD’s meetings and minutes were open to the
public. Everything related to ACLAD is a public record. The
formation of a public entity was not concealed from the public.
Any procedural deficiencies, such as failure to notify the State
Controller, could readily have been discovered in 1981.
Finally, the Legislature has retroactively confirmed the
legitimacy of existing GHAD’s. The First Validating Act of 1992
(Act) states: “All public bodies heretofore organized or existing
under, or under color of, any law are hereby declared to have
been legally organized and to be legally functioning as such
public body. Every such public body shall have all the rights,
powers, and privileges . . . of such a public body regularly formed
pursuant to law.” (Stats. 1992, ch. 62, § 3.) GHAD’s are public
bodies. (Id., § 2(a).)
Appellant denies that the Act applies, terming ACLAD’s
formation “void” because City did not follow proper procedures.
This court rejected a similar claim under an identical validating
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act in Fix v. Board v. Supervisors (1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 524
(Fix). In Fix, appellants argued that a waterworks district was
improperly formed. This court applied a validating act (Stats.
1961, ch. 985) that “by its terms validated the formation of the
district.” (Fix, at p. 525.)
The appellants in Fix claimed validating acts cannot cure
“ ‘jurisdictional’ ” defects. This court declined to discuss “which of
the various procedural steps involved . . . are so fundamental that
a faulty compliance may not be cured or validated without
violating the requirements of due process of law.” (Fix, supra,
213 Cal.App.2d at pp. 525–526.) Even “ ‘fatally defective’ ”
procedural lapses are subject to a curative statute, precluding all
challenges “ ‘except “the single inquiry whether . . . the effect of
applying the statute is to deprive the party of his property
without due process of law.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 526; Chase v. Trout
(1905) 146 Cal. 350, 359; People ex rel. Desert Hot Springs County
Water Dist. v. Coachella Valley County Water Dist. (1965) 232
Cal.App.2d 685, 696–697.) Appellant did not allege or argue that
it was deprived of due process of law when City failed to send its
resolution forming ACLAD to the State Controller in 1981.
Under the Act, an existing GHAD like ACLAD was legally
formed and functioning since 1981. The Act has its own statute
of limitations: An action contesting the validity of a public
entity’s formation “shall be commenced within six months of the
effective date of this act.” (Stats. 1992, ch. 62, § 8.) The six-
month contest period ended decades ago. The Act forecloses
appellant’s effort to invalidate ACLAD’s existence.
3. Failure to Comply with the Government Claims Act
The only other issue raised in appellant’s brief is
compliance with the Government Claims Act. The SAC alleges
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that no claim was required because ACLAD was never formed as
a government entity. We rejected appellant’s improper formation
argument in part 2, ante.
Appellant argues it was “impossible to serve” ACLAD with
a government claim, thereby excusing the need to make one.
ACLAD’s address is a post office box in Palos Verdes. Relying on
Code of Civil Procedure section 415.20, appellant claims service
at a post office box “is legally ineffective.” The statute lists
requirements for service of a summons and complaint.2 It does
not apply to government claims.
The manner of presenting a government claim is set forth
in the Government Code. A claim may be (1) delivered to a public
entity; (2) deposited in the mail; or (3) submitted electronically, if
allowed by ordinance or resolution. (Gov. Code, §§ 915, subd. (a),
915.2.) Mailing a claim to a post office box is not prohibited.
Appellant’s failure to comply with the Government Claims Act
bars its action.3
2 Summons and complaint may be served at a person’s
office, home, or usual mailing address, other than a United States
Postal Service post office box. (Code Civ. Proc., § 415.20.)
3 Appellant does not address the trial court’s other grounds
for sustaining demurrers without leave to amend, including
immunity. Points not argued on appeal are forfeited. (Browne v.
County of Tehama (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 704, 725–726.)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment of dismissal is affirmed. Respondents are
entitled to recover their costs on appeal from appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.
We concur:
RICHARDSON, J.
GOORVITCH, J.
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