Von Derhaar v. Watson

Case: 25-30399 Document: 94-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/02/2026

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

____________

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

No. 25-30399

____________ FILED

June 2, 2026

Karl Von Derhaar, Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Darryl Watson, in both his individual and official capacity,

Defendant—Appellant.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:21-CV-1653

______________________________

Before Smith, Willett, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges.

Jerry E. Smith, Circuit Judge:

New Orleans Police Department (“NOPD”) officers visited the

home of Karl Von Derhaar, a civilian employee of the NOPD. Fearing for

Von Derhaar’s safety, officers requested Von Derhaar accompany them to

the Public Integrity Bureau (“PIB”) to take a drug test. When Von Derhaar

asked to go back into his home, officers called Lt. Darryl Watson, a supervisor

in the PIB. Watson commanded the officers to “tell [Von Derhaar] he’s

being put back on the clock, he’s being ordered to come into work to take this

test.” Von Derhaar went to the PIB with the officers but ultimately resigned

instead of taking the drug test.

Case: 25-30399 Document: 94-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/02/2026

No. 25-30399

Von Derhaar sued Watson, among others, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

violations of his Fourth Amendment rights. Because Watson’s commands

constitute a clearly established Fourth Amendment violation, we affirm the

district court’s denial of qualified immunity (“QI”).

I.

Von Derhaar worked as a civilian employee in the NOPD’s crime lab.

Von Derhaar requested leave without pay when his concerns over certain

NOPD practices went unanswered. Officers subsequently went to Von

Derhaar’s home to conduct a wellness check.

Officers informed Von Derhaar that they were concerned about his

well-being and asked him to accompany them to the PIB to take a drug test.

Officers stated numerous times that he was not under arrest. When Von

Derhaar asked if he could stay at his house, officers called Watson. Officers

relayed to Watson that Von Derhaar “said that if he’s not under arrest he

wants to go back into his house.” Watson ordered officers to “tell [Von Der-

haar] he’s being put back on the clock, he’s being ordered to come into work

to take this test.” The call ended. Von Derhaar asked “if I quit right, now,

do I have to come with you, sir?” Officers told Von Derhaar he needed “to

go up and sign the paperwork.” He was subsequently transported to the PIB.

Von Derhaar ultimately resigned rather than submitting to a drug test.

Von Derhaar sued Watson, among others, under § 1983, alleging that

he was subjected to unlawful arrest, search, and seizure in violation of the

Fourth Amendment. Watson filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings

and, in the alternative, a motion summary judgment, in which he invoked QI.

The district court granted Watson’s motion in part and denied it in part. The

court dismissed Von Derhaar’s claims against Watson relating to the alleged

unlawful entry into Von Derhaar’s home. The court denied QI for the

unlawful-seizure claim, holding that “[a]ny reasonable official under the

2

Case: 25-30399 Document: 94-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/02/2026

No. 25-30399

totality of circumstances here or in Darryl Watson’s position should have

known that ordering the seizure of a private citizen from their home for the

purpose of completing a drug test, without a warrant, probable cause, or exi-

gent circumstances is objectively unreasonable.” Watson appeals.

II.

“Because [the] claims arise under § 1983, and the denial of QI is a

‘final decision’ under § 1291, this court has jurisdiction over [the] appeal.”

Lewis v. Walley, 168 F.4th 327, 330 (5th Cir. 2026) (footnote omitted).

Appellate courts review a denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo.

Joseph ex rel. Est. of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 331 (5th Cir. 2020).

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Courts must view the evidence

in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Newman v. Guedry, 703 F.3d

757, 761 (5th Cir. 2012).

“The doctrine of [QI] protects public officials from liability for civil

damages ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statu-

tory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.’” Jennings v. Patton, 644 F.3d 297, 300 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). Where a defendant asserts

QI, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the defense is not availa-

ble.” Trent v. Wade, 776 F.3d 368, 376 (5th Cir. 2015).

“[A] plaintiff seeking to overcome [QI] must show: (1) that the official

violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly

established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Carmona v. City of

Brownsville, 126 F.4th 1091, 1096 (5th Cir. 2025) (quoting Converse v. City of

Kemah, 961 F.3d 771, 774 (5th Cir. 2020)).

A government official “violates clearly established law when, at the

3

Case: 25-30399 Document: 94-1 Page: 4 Date Filed: 06/02/2026

No. 25-30399

time of the challenged conduct, the contours of the right are sufficiently clear

that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing

violates that right.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (citation

modified). Although a case does not have to be “directly on point for a right

to be clearly established, existing precedent must have placed the statutory

or constitutional question beyond debate.” Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100,

104 (2018).

III.

“Supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the actions of

subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability.” Turner v. Lieutenant

Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 695 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Thompson v. Upshur Cnty.,

245 F.3d 447, 459 (5th Cir. 2001)). To be liable under § 1983, a supervisor

“must have been personally involved in the alleged constitutional depriva-

tion or have engaged in wrongful conduct that is causally connected to the

constitutional violation. Personal involvement of supervising personnel gen-

erally includes giving a command, signal, or any other form of direction to the

officers that prompted the detention or arrest.” Id. (citation modified).

Watson directed officers to “tell [Von Derhaar] he’s being put back

on the clock, he’s being ordered to come into work to take this test.” Watson

made that statement immediately after officers informed Watson that Von

Derhaar wished to remain at his home. Acting on Watson’s order, officers

compelled Von Derhaar to leave his home and transported him to the PIB.

We already held that the actions ordered by Watson, when viewed in the light

most favorable to Von Derhaar, constituted an unlawful seizure in violation

of the Fourth Amendment. See Von Derhaar v. Watson, 109 F.4th 817, 829–

30 (5th Cir. 2024).

But because Watson invoked QI, that is not enough. His conduct must

have been objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law. See al-

4

Case: 25-30399 Document: 94-1 Page: 5 Date Filed: 06/02/2026

No. 25-30399

Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741. It is clearly established that a seizure occurs where,

“in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable

person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” United States v.

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). Watson was aware that Von Derhaar

wished to remain in his house, yet Watson ordered officers, without a warrant

or exigent circumstances, to order Von Derhaar to go to the PIB to take a

drug test. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Von Derhaar, Wat-

son’s statements are objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established

Fourth Amendment law.

*****

At this early, summary judgment stage, Von Derhaar has established

a genuine dispute of material fact on the unlawful-seizure claim. The facts,

when viewed in the light most favorable to him, constitute a clearly estab-

lished Fourth Amendment violation. We express no view, however, as to the

ultimate merits of any claim, which will be determined beyond the summary

judgment stage. The order denying summary judgment is AFFIRMED.

5