The opinion
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as
Disciplinary Counsel v. Skelton, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-1991.]
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2026-OHIO-1991
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. SKELTON.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Skelton, Slip Opinion No.
2026-Ohio-1991.]
Judges—Misconduct—Violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Rules of
Professional Conduct, including ex parte communications, investigation of
facts outside the record, abuse of prestige of judicial office by granting a
motion for judicial release while disregarding the statutory requirements
for such release, and refusal to self-report—One-year suspension with six
months conditionally stayed.
(No. 2025-1324—Submitted December 10, 2025—Decided June 2, 2026.)
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme
Court, No. 2024-021.
__________________
The per curiam opinion below was joined by DEWINE, HESS, DETERS,
HAWKINS, and SHANAHAN, JJ. FISCHER, J., concurred in part and dissented in part,
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
with an opinion joined by KENNEDY, C.J. MICHAEL D. HESS, J., of the Fourth
District Court of Appeals, sat for BRUNNER, J.
Per Curiam.
{¶ 1} Respondent, Richard Steven Skelton, of Centerville, Ohio, Attorney
Registration No. 0040694, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1988.
Skelton served as a judge in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas from
January 3, 2015, until he resigned on December 31, 2024.
{¶ 2} In a March 2025 amended complaint, relator, disciplinary counsel,
alleged that while serving as a judge, Skelton violated six rules of the Code of
Judicial Conduct and committed three violations of the Rules of Professional
Conduct by, among other things, seeking the improper transfer of a criminal case
from another judge to himself, engaging in multiple improper ex parte
communications with the defendant in that case and the defendant’s mother,
facilitating the early release of the defendant from prison, and failing to self-report.
{¶ 3} The parties entered into stipulations of fact and misconduct. They
also stipulated to aggravating and mitigating factors, submitted 49 stipulated
exhibits, and jointly recommended that Skelton be suspended from the practice of
law for one year with the entire suspension stayed on the condition that he engage
in no further misconduct.
{¶ 4} Skelton was the sole witness to testify at a hearing before a three-
member panel of the Board of Professional Conduct. After the hearing, the panel
issued a report in which it found by clear and convincing evidence that Skelton
committed the charged misconduct with the exception of one of the three alleged
violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which the panel unanimously
dismissed on the recommendation of the parties. The panel recommended that
Skelton be suspended from the practice of law for one year with the entire
suspension stayed on the condition that he engage in no further misconduct. The
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board adopted the panel’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended
sanction. No objections have been filed.
{¶ 5} After independently reviewing the board’s report and
recommendation, the record, and our applicable precedent, we adopt the board’s
findings of misconduct. However, we find that the nature and scope of Skelton’s
misconduct requires a harsher sanction. For the reasons that follow, we suspend
Skelton from the practice of law in Ohio for one year with six months stayed on the
condition that he engage in no further misconduct.
MISCONDUCT
{¶ 6} On August 11, 2020, Aaron Cox, pleaded guilty to the following
crimes in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas: aggravated robbery, a
first-degree felony; felonious assault, a first-degree felony; escape, a third-degree
felony; and possession of a fentanyl-related compound, a fifth-degree felony. The
aggravated-robbery charge arose from an August 2019 incident in which Cox
robbed a person at knifepoint. See State v. Cox, 2022-Ohio-4623, ¶ 2 (2d Dist.).
The felonious-assault and escape charges arose from a June 2020 incident that
began when Cox showed a sheriff’s deputy that he was not properly handcuffed
while being transported from a hospital to the county jail. When the deputy stopped
his cruiser to properly secure Cox, Cox pushed the deputy to the ground, jumped
into the driver’s seat of the cruiser, and drove over the deputy’s arm while fleeing
the scene. See id. at ¶ 3.
{¶ 7} On September 21, 2020, Judge Michael W. Krumholtz sentenced Cox
to four to six years in prison for the aggravated-robbery conviction, four to six years
for the felonious-assault conviction, 12 months for the escape conviction, and 12
months for the possession conviction. Judge Krumholtz ordered that the sentences
be run concurrently to each other with the exception of the 12-month sentence for
the escape conviction, which he ordered be run consecutively to the other sentences,
resulting in an aggregate indefinite prison sentence of five to six years.
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{¶ 8} Skelton was a patient in a medical practice that employed Cox’s
mother, Shelly Overton. As early as the day after Cox’s sentencing hearing,
Overton began communicating with Skelton by email, phone, and text message to
discuss Cox’s cases and the potential for his early release from prison.
{¶ 9} In late 2021, Judge Krumholtz announced his intention to retire from
the bench, effective February 28, 2022. After learning of Judge Krumholtz’s
impending retirement, Overton spoke with Skelton during one of his medical
appointments. At that time, Skelton told Overton that he would talk to Judge
Krumholtz about taking over Cox’s cases. Although Skelton spoke to Judge
Krumholtz and his bailiff about transferring Cox’s cases to Skelton’s docket, Cox’s
cases were not transferred at that time.
{¶ 10} In January 2022, Cox filed a motion for judicial release, but Judge
Krumholtz did not rule on the motion before retiring. Upon Judge Krumholtz’s
retirement, all of his cases were initially assigned to Judge Stephen Wolaver, a
visiting judge. Judge Wolaver denied Cox’s motion for judicial release on March
3. Following that ruling, Overton texted Skelton on his personal cellphone,
providing a list of Cox’s case numbers and informing him that she did not believe
that Judge Wolaver’s ruling was “with prejudice.” Skelton did not respond to that
message.
{¶ 11} On March 9, Overton texted Skelton again, asking whether he had
received her earlier message. Skelton replied, stating that he had received it and
that because Judge Wolaver’s entry did not state whether the motion was denied
with or without prejudice, it had to have been without prejudice. Skelton informed
Overton that Cox would be able to “file again” and that he wanted to meet with her
at her place of employment during a medical appointment scheduled for the
following week. On March 11, they exchanged additional text messages and
arranged to meet to discuss Cox’s cases in Skelton’s chambers instead of at his
doctor’s office. The following week, Overton sent Skelton a text to confirm that
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he had received an email from her “with the requested information [he had] asked
for concerning [her] son,” but Skelton did not reply to the message.
{¶ 12} On April 8, Judge Kimberly Melnick was appointed to the bench as
Judge Krumholtz’s successor. Under former Montgomery C.P., Gen.Div., Loc.R.
1.19(F)(1) (now Loc.R. 5.06(A)), Cox’s cases should have been assigned to Judge
Melnick. Furthermore, Sup.R. 36.016(C) requires that any cases transferred from
a judge’s docket for administrative reasons be reassigned by lot. Before Judge
Melnick’s appointment, however, an order directing that Cox’s cases be transferred
to Skelton was submitted to Judge Timothy N. O’Connell, who at that time was the
administrative judge of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas. Judge
O’Connell signed the order on April 1. When testifying at his disciplinary hearing,
Skelton denied that he was personally involved in the transfer of Cox’s cases.
Given the evidence in the record, the board was unable—and we are unable—to
determine who submitted the transfer order to Judge O’Connell.
{¶ 13} In mid-April, Overton texted Skelton to request an update on Cox’s
cases. A few days later, Overton and Skelton exchanged multiple text messages
and scheduled a time to talk by phone. On May 18, Cox filed a second motion for
judicial release and Overton texted Skelton to alert him of the filing. Skelton
replied, stating that he was aware of the filing and that he would let Overton know
when he had scheduled a hearing on the motion. The next day, Overton texted
Skelton to let him know that the motion was “the exact same” motion that had
previously been denied by Judge Wolaver. Skelton replied, “[G]ot it covered.”
Later that day, Skelton issued a warrant for removal directing the Montgomery
County Sheriff’s Office to transport Cox from the Chillicothe Correctional
Institution to his courtroom for a judicial-release hearing on June 9, 2022.
{¶ 14} On May 20, Skelton sent Overton the following text message:
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[S]et the judicial release hearing for June 9—that is my
criminal docket time, every [T]hursday. [H]e will be brought back
a day or two prior. [I] probably will not do the hearing during my
docket—will call u later and let u know my plan. [R]emember, do
not tell him he is getting released! [T]alk soon, judge dick.
{¶ 15} Overton responded, “Perfect thank you!! I promise I will not tell
him you are releasing him!! Like I said I can’t thank you enough!!”
{¶ 16} Later that day, a manager in the Montgomery County Pretrial and
Investigative Services Department contacted Skelton after seeing the warrant for
removal. Skelton told the manager that he intended to grant Cox’s motion for
judicial release and that he did not need anything from the department. Later in
May, Skelton ran into the assistant prosecutor assigned to Cox’s cases. Skelton told
her that he had taken over Cox’s cases and that after speaking with Overton, he was
thinking about releasing Cox early.
{¶ 17} Skelton and Overton resumed their text exchange in June 2022. On
June 8, Skelton ordered Cox to his courtroom without inviting the prosecution or
Cox’s attorney. There, Skelton and Cox engaged in an ex parte conversation,
during which Skelton questioned Cox about his drug use and told Cox that he
intended to release him from prison with conditions. The assistant prosecutor
learned of the meeting and filed a memorandum opposing judicial release later that
day. On the same day, Cox and Overton spoke on a recorded jail phone line. Cox
recounted his private meeting with Skelton, and Overton told Cox that she had
known about his impending release for more than two weeks but kept it a secret on
Skelton’s instruction. Overton also told Cox that Skelton believed that Cox was
“done with drugs.”
{¶ 18} The version of R.C. 2929.20 in effect in June 2022 prohibited a court
from granting a motion for judicial release for an eligible offender without
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January Term, 2026
conducting a hearing on the motion. See former R.C. 2929.20(D), 2018
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 201. The statute also prohibited a court from granting judicial
release to an eligible offender imprisoned for a first-degree felony without making
certain findings on the record. See former R.C. 2929.20(J), 2018 Am.Sub.S.B. No.
201.
{¶ 19} On June 10, 2022, all the parties to Cox’s cases were present in court.
However, Skelton failed to conduct a hearing on Cox’s motion for judicial release
or make any findings on the record. Instead, he announced that he was granting the
motion over the State’s objection. During the proceeding, Skelton stated, “The
matter is before the court pursuant to [a] request for judicial release. It was filed
on behalf of the defendant. Report indicating he’s eligible.” However, the report
prepared by the court’s senior investigative probation officer stated that Cox was
not eligible for judicial release and that he would not be eligible until he had served
four years of his nonmandatory stated prison term. Skelton later executed and filed
an affidavit stating that he had not received the report and that he mistakenly stated
that he had reviewed it before granting Cox’s motion.
{¶ 20} Shortly after granting Cox’s motion for judicial release, Skelton
exchanged a series of text messages with Overton. He informed Overton that he
had granted Cox’s motion and told her that he would “monitor [Cox] [him]self.”
Later that afternoon, Skelton personally escorted Cox out of the courthouse, where
Overton and Cox’s children were waiting for him. Over the next several weeks,
Skelton and Overton exchanged several text messages, with Overton sharing family
photos and updates about Cox’s time at home.
{¶ 21} On July 6, the State appealed Skelton’s judicial-release order to the
Second District Court of Appeals, arguing that Cox was ineligible for judicial
release and that Skelton had granted Cox’s motion without first holding a hearing
on it and making findings of fact, as required by former R.C. 2929.20(D) and (J),
respectively. Upon learning of the circumstances surrounding the transfer of Cox’s
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cases to Skelton, Judge O’Connell randomly reassigned the cases to Judge Mary
Montgomery. Thereafter, Judges O’Connell and Mary Wiseman spoke to Skelton
about their concerns regarding his conduct. They encouraged Skelton to self-report
his misconduct, but he refused to do so. Consequently, Judges Wiseman and
O’Connell filed a grievance against Skelton with relator.
{¶ 22} In September 2022, while the State’s appeal remained pending, the
county probation department filed a notice of a probation-revocation hearing in
which it alleged that Cox had failed to keep his probation officer apprised of his
employment status, failed to abstain from the use of illicit drugs, and left the State
without the permission of the court or the probation department. In October 2022,
Judge Montgomery conducted a hearing at which she found that Cox had violated
the terms of his judicial release and ordered him to be imprisoned for the remainder
of his sentence. The court of appeals later dismissed the State’s appeal as moot
because Cox’s judicial release had been revoked. See Cox, 2022-Ohio-4623, at
¶ 14-15 (2nd Dist.).
{¶ 23} The parties stipulated and the board found that Skelton’s conduct
violated Jud.Cond.R. 1.2 (requiring that a judge act at all times in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the
judiciary), 1.3 (prohibiting a judge from abusing the prestige of judicial office to
advance the personal or economic interests of the judge or others), 2.2 (requiring a
judge to uphold and apply the law and to perform all duties of judicial office fairly
and impartially), 2.9(A) (prohibiting a judge from initiating, receiving, permitting,
or considering ex parte communications), 2.9(C) (prohibiting a judge from
investigating facts in a matter independently and requiring a judge to consider only
the evidence presented and any facts that may properly be judicially noticed), and
2.11(A) (requiring a judge to disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in
which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned).
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{¶ 24} In addition, the parties stipulated and the board found that Skelton’s
conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.3(b) (requiring a lawyer who possesses
unprivileged knowledge that a judge has violated applicable rules of professional
or judicial conduct to inform the appropriate authority) and 8.4(d) (prohibiting a
lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice).
The parties stipulated to the dismissal of an alleged violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c)
(prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit,
or misrepresentation). Finding that there was no clear and convincing evidence
indicating that Skelton had engaged in such conduct, the panel unanimously
dismissed the alleged violation of that rule.
{¶ 25} Clear and convincing evidence shows that Skelton engaged in brazen
and persistent ex parte communications with Overton and Cox about Cox’s criminal
cases, in violation of Jud.Cond.R. 2.9(A). Skelton violated Jud.Cond.R. 2.9(C) by
using those communications to further his own private investigation, gathering
information outside the record to help Overton secure her son’s judicial release.
{¶ 26} Skelton not only failed to recuse himself from Cox’s cases, in
violation of Jud.Cond.R. 2.11(A), but also disregarded the procedures for the
random assignment of judges in multijudge courts established by the Rules of
Superintendence for the Courts of Ohio, see Sup.R. 36.011(A) and (C)(2)(c)
(requiring each multijudge court to adopt the individual assignment system in
which the judicial assignment of all cases is random). “The purpose of random
assignment or reassignment of cases is not only to avoid judge-shopping and to
distribute cases equitably among judges, see Sup.R. 36.011 commentary, but also
to maintain public confidence in the judicial system by ensuring that cases are
assigned impartially and not deliberately to a certain judge.” In re Disqualification
of Celebrezze, 2023-Ohio-4383, ¶ 99. Those procedures “‘promot[e] fairness and
impartiality and . . . reduc[e] the dangers of favoritism and bias.’” Id., quoting
United States v. Phillips, 59 F.Supp.2d 1178, 1180 (D.Utah 1999).
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{¶ 27} Shortly before Judge Krumholtz’s retirement, despite the rules
requiring the random assignment of cases, Skelton sought to have Cox’s cases—in
which he had a personal bias and personal knowledge of facts that were in dispute—
assigned to himself. Then, Skelton violated Jud.Cond.R. 2.2 by failing to perform
the duties of his office fairly and impartially and violated Jud.Cond.R. 1.3 by
abusing the prestige of his judicial office to advance Overton’s interests and grant
Cox’s motion for judicial release without determining his eligibility for such
release, conducting a statutorily required hearing, or making statutorily required
findings.
{¶ 28} Clear and convincing evidence supports the board’s finding that
Skelton violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.3(b) by “fail[ing] to report the litany of violations”
discussed above, “even after being confronted by his fellow judges.” Although
Skelton testified that the concerns Judges Wiseman and O’Connell raised with him
involved only Skelton’s manipulation of the process used to randomly reassign
cases, the board found that “it is plain from the grievance filed by Judges Wiseman
and O’Connell that the basis [for the confrontation] also rested squarely on the ex
parte communication issue.” Finding that “a Prof.Cond.R. 8.3(b) violation does
not turn on whether [Skelton] was asked to self-report and did not,” the board
concluded that Skelton’s awareness of his regular and frequent ex parte
communications with Overton and Cox was enough to support a finding that
Skelton violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.3(b).
{¶ 29} Lastly, the board found that Skelton’s engaging in multiple ex parte
communications, investigating facts outside the record, and abusing the prestige of
his office to advance Cox’s interests—which we note resulted in the judicial release
of an ineligible offender—have prejudiced the administration of justice, in violation
of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d).
{¶ 30} We adopt the board’s findings of misconduct.
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RECOMMENDED SANCTION
{¶ 31} When imposing sanctions for judicial misconduct, we consider all
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions
imposed in similar cases.
{¶ 32} The parties stipulated and the board found that two aggravating
factors are present in this case: Skelton engaged in a pattern of misconduct and
committed multiple offenses. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(3) and (4). His blatant and
persistent ex parte communications over nearly two years and his expansive pattern
of misconduct violated multiple rules of judicial and professional conduct.
{¶ 33} As for mitigating factors, the parties stipulated and the board found
that Skelton had had a clean disciplinary record, had not acted with a dishonest or
selfish motive, had made full and free disclosure to the board or exhibited a
cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings, and had submitted
evidence of his good character or reputation. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1), (2), (4),
and (5). The board also “t[ook] notice” that Skelton is no longer on the bench,
having resigned prior to his disciplinary hearing, about three years before the
expiration of his term. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(9).
{¶ 34} “We hold judges to the highest standards of professional behavior
because they are invested with the public trust.” Disciplinary Counsel v. Carr,
2022-Ohio-3633, ¶ 86, citing Disciplinary Counsel v. O'Neill, 2004-Ohio-4704,
¶ 57. “The primary purpose of judicial discipline is to protect the public, guarantee
the evenhanded administration of justice, and maintain and enhance public
confidence in the integrity of [the judiciary].” O’Neill at ¶ 33.
{¶ 35} In deciding the appropriate sanction to recommend for Skelton’s
misconduct, the board found Disciplinary Counsel v. Kegley, 2025-Ohio-910, and
Disciplinary Counsel v. Winters, 2021-Ohio-2753 to be instructive.
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{¶ 36} In Kegley, a municipal-court judge violated four judicial-conduct
rules by acting to secure his son’s release from law-enforcement custody before his
son’s initial court appearance on charges of domestic violence and resisting arrest.
Kegley at ¶ 20-21. Specifically, after Kegley’s son called him from jail, Kegley
contacted the jail, identified himself as “Judge Kegley,” and asked to speak with
his son. Id. at ¶ 9. After speaking with his son, Kegley engaged in an ex parte
communication with the corrections officer who had answered the call and
instructed the officer to release him. Id. at ¶ 10-11. Kegley’s order violated the
bond schedule that he himself had adopted, which required that defendants charged
with domestic violence be held without bond until their initial appearance in court.
Id. at ¶ 11. It also violated the court’s standard operating procedure of issuing a
temporary protection order to preclude a defendant charged with domestic violence
from returning to the victim’s residence. Id. at ¶ 8.
{¶ 37} Following his release, Kegley’s son returned home, where his wife,
the victim of his offense, was present. He failed to appear for his arraignment the
following morning and was arrested at his home later that day. Id. at ¶ 12-15. At
that point, recognizing that he had “‘overstepped his bounds,’” Kegley refused to
afford his son any further assistance. Id. at ¶ 17.
{¶ 38} We found that Kegley committed a single incident of misconduct
that violated three of the eight ethics rules at issue in this case—namely,
Jud.Cond.R. 1.2, 1.3, and 2.9(A)—and that he also violated Jud.Cond.R. 2.9(B)
(requiring a judge who receives an unauthorized ex parte communication bearing
on the substance of a matter to promptly notify the parties of the substance of the
communication and provide them with an opportunity to respond). See id. at ¶ 21-
22, 25. The only aggravating factor was the harm Kegley’s conduct had caused to
a vulnerable victim—namely, his son’s wife. Id. at ¶ 24-25. Mitigating factors
consisted of Kegley’s clean disciplinary record, his full and free disclosure to the
board and cooperative attitude toward the proceedings, and his submission of
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evidence of his good character. Id. at ¶ 26. We suspended Kegley from the practice
of law for six months with the entire suspension stayed on the condition that he
engage in no further misconduct. Id. at ¶ 43.
{¶ 39} Winters, 2021-Ohio-2753, also involved misconduct similar to
Skelton’s. Shortly after Winters, a common-pleas-court judge, sentenced a man for
several criminal convictions, the judge became Facebook “friends” with him. Over
the next five months, Winters engaged in inappropriate ex parte communications
with the man regarding multiple other cases over which Winters was presiding and
in which the man either was a party or otherwise had an interest. We found that
Winters committed four violations each of Jud.Cond.R. 1.2, 2.9(A), and 2.9(B). Id.
at ¶ 28. We also found that he committed three violations of Jud.Cond.R. 2.11(A)
and one violation of Jud.Cond.R. 2.2. Id. at ¶ 29-30.
{¶ 40} Although Winters committed 16 rule violations—compared to the
eight rule violations at issue in this case—he was not found to have either abused
the prestige of his judicial office, to have conducted an independent investigation
of cases pending before him, or to have engaged in conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice, as Skelton has been here. The aggravating and mitigating
factors present in Winters are very similar to those present in this case, except that
Winters also expressed genuine remorse for his misconduct and terminated his
social-media accounts—though he did not resign his judicial position, as Skelton
has. See id. at ¶ 32. We suspended Winters from the practice of law for six months
with the entire suspension stayed on the conditions that he complete three hours of
judicial-ethics education, engage in no further misconduct, and pay the costs of his
disciplinary proceedings. Id. at ¶ 40.
{¶ 41} The board found that Skelton’s misconduct is more serious than
Winters’s and Kegley’s and that Skelton therefore deserves a longer suspension.
The board also found, however, that Skelton’s misconduct was tempered by the
mitigating factors identified above, and it noted that his resignation from the bench
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made it unlikely that his misconduct would be repeated. The board therefore
recommends that Skelton be suspended from the practice of law for one year with
the entire suspension stayed on the condition that he commit no further misconduct.
{¶ 42} While Kegley and Winters involved some of the same violations that
are at issue in this case, we find that neither of those cases encompasses the full
measure of Skelton’s misconduct. In addition to engaging in improper ex parte
communications for nearly two years, Skelton engaged in conduct that was
prejudicial to the administration of justice—due in part to his deliberate efforts to
evade the random assignment of cases to achieve a goal that was contrary to law.
On those issues, we find our decisions in Disciplinary Counsel v. Hale, 2014-Ohio-
5053, Disciplinary Counsel v. Marshall, 2019-Ohio-670, and Disciplinary Counsel
v. Celebrezze, 2026-Ohio-45, to be instructive.
{¶ 43} Hale engaged in dishonest conduct while serving in a rotation as a
municipal court’s duty judge. He unilaterally dismissed a speeding ticket for his
personal attorney in a journal entry that falsely stated that the dismissal was at the
prosecutor’s request. Hale at ¶ 10-13. After the media discovered the dismissal,
Hale created a second false entry and engaged in ex parte communications in an
effort to conceal his misdeeds. Id. at ¶ 26. In addition, Hale gave false testimony
during his disciplinary hearing. Id. at ¶ 28. Hale’s conduct violated four of the six
judicial-conduct rules at issue in this case—Jud.Cond.R. 1.2, 1.3, 2.2, and 2.9—and
like Skelton, Hale engaged in conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of
justice, in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d). See id. at ¶ 17. In contrast to Skelton,
Hale was also found to have engaged in dishonesty and conduct that adversely
reflected on his fitness to practice law, in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) and
8.4(h). See id. at ¶ 17, 27.
{¶ 44} Two aggravating factors were present in Hale: he acted with a
dishonest or selfish motive and gave false and misleading testimony about his
practice of law following his resignation from the bench. Id. at ¶ 29. Hale, like
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Skelton, had a lengthy, otherwise unblemished career, made full and free disclosure
of his misconduct and exhibited a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary
proceedings, enjoyed a good reputation in his community, and took responsibility
for his actions by resigning from the bench. See id. at ¶ 30, 39. We also attributed
mitigating effect to the facts that Hale’s misconduct was limited to a single case to
which he had a personal connection, justice was ultimately served in that matter,
and no litigants had suffered permanent harm as a result of his misconduct. Id. at
¶ 39. Under those circumstances, we suspended Hale for six months with no stay.
Id. at ¶ 38-40.
{¶ 45} In Marshall, we imposed the same sanction on a common-pleas-
court judge who repeatedly and inappropriately injected himself into his daughter’s
juvenile speeding case and made disparaging remarks about the state trooper
involved in the case. 2019-Ohio-670 at ¶ 6-13, 19-21, 34. Marshall also allowed
his personal animosity to affect his treatment of an assistant prosecuting attorney
and another trooper when they appeared in his courtroom in unrelated cases. Id. at
¶ 6-16. Marshall’s daughter’s case went to trial, which Marshall attended and twice
interrupted with inappropriate outbursts. Id. at ¶ 20.
{¶ 46} Marshall’s conduct violated five of the eight ethics rules at issue in
this case—Jud.Cond.R. 1.2, 1.3, 2.2, and 2.9(A) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d)—and also
violated Jud.Cond.R. 2.3(A) (requiring a judge to perform the duties of judicial
office without bias or prejudice). Id. at ¶ 26. Aggravating factors consisted of
Marshall’s prior discipline, which arose from his conviction for operating a motor
vehicle while intoxicated, and his multiple offenses. Id. at ¶ 2, 28. As for
mitigation, Marshall exhibited a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary
proceedings, presented evidence of his good character and community
involvement, and resigned from his judicial position after acknowledging that his
conduct in his daughter’s case was inappropriate. Id. at ¶ 28.
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{¶ 47} More recently, in Celebrezze, we recognized that “‘attempts to
manipulate the random case assignment process are subject to universal
condemnation’ in part because of the ‘role that random assignment procedures play
in promoting fairness and impartiality and in reducing the dangers of favoritism
and bias.’” 2026-Ohio-45 at ¶ 53, quoting Phillips, 59 F.Supp.2d at 1180.
Celebrezze, a domestic-relations judge, violated superintendence rules and local
court rules requiring the random assignment of cases as Skelton did in this case, but
she did so on multiple occasions. See, e.g., Sup.R. 36.019(A) (requiring the random
reassignment of a case following recusal of a judge. Celebrezze reassigned two
divorce cases to herself, id. at ¶ 14, 22, and abused her position as the court’s
administrative judge by asking colleagues to transfer other divorce cases directly to
her, in violation of the rules, id. at ¶ 9, 21.
{¶ 48} In addition, for nearly two years, Celebrezze often appointed or
recommended the appointment of her long-term friend and love interest as a
receiver or mediator in pending cases without disclosing that personal relationship
to the parties. Id. at ¶ 3. In one instance, she authorized or approved the payment
of almost $242,000 in receiver fees to her friend and nearly $172,000 in legal fees
to his counsel. Id. at ¶ 11. During the investigatory phase of the resulting
disciplinary proceeding, Celebrezze made false statements about her relationship
with her friend. Id. at ¶ 24. Celebrezze resigned from the bench while her
disciplinary case was pending before this court. Id. at ¶ 1.
{¶ 49} We found that Celebrezze committed 15 ethical violations involving
four of the eight rules that Skelton violated in this case—namely, Jud.Cond.R. 1.2,
2.9(A), and 2.9(C) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d). See id. at ¶ 28-29. But Celebrezze
committed three violations each of Jud.Cond.R. 1.2 and 2.11(A) and Prof.Cond.R.
8.4(d) and a single violation of Jud.Cond.R. 2.9(A). Id. at ¶ 29. She also committed
three violations of Jud.Cond.R. 2.5 (requiring a judge to perform judicial and
administrative duties competently and diligently and to comply with guidelines set
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forth in the Superintendence Rules) and single violations of Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(a)
and 8.4(c). Id. at ¶ 29.
{¶ 50} Four aggravating factors were present in Celebrezze, compared to
just two in this case. Specifically, Celebrezze acted with a dishonest or selfish
motive, engaged in a pattern of misconduct that involved multiple cases, committed
multiple offenses, and submitted false statements during the disciplinary
investigation. Id., 2026-Ohio-45, at ¶ 32. Mitigating factors consisted of
Celebrezze’s clean disciplinary record, evidence of her good character or
reputation, and her cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings, id. at
¶ 33—whereas Skelton’s case includes the additional mitigating factor of the
absence of a dishonest or selfish motive.
{¶ 51} We found that Celebrezze’s misconduct had caused “‘incalculable
harm to the public perception of the legal system.’” Id. at ¶ 55, quoting Disciplinary
Counsel v. Dann, 2012-Ohio-5337, ¶ 22. In an effort to repair that damage and
“‘enhance public confidence in the integrity of [the judiciary],’” id., quoting
O’Neill, 2004-Ohio-4704, at ¶ 33, we suspended Celebrezze from the practice of
law for two years, with one year stayed on the condition that she commit no further
misconduct, id. at ¶ 56.
{¶ 52} After reviewing our applicable precedent, we find that Skelton’s
misconduct—which includes multiple ex parte communications, investigation of
facts outside the record, abuse of the prestige of the judicial office by granting a
motion for judicial release while blatantly disregarding the statutory requirements
for such release, and a refusal to self-report the misconduct—is more serious than
the misconduct at issue in Hale, 2014-Ohio-5053, and Marshall, 2019-Ohio-670,
but less egregious than the misconduct at issue in Celebrezze. Therefore, we
conclude that the appropriate sanction in this case is a one-year suspension with six
months stayed on the condition that Skelton commit no further misconduct.
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CONCLUSION
{¶ 53} Accordingly, Richard Steven Skelton is hereby suspended from the
practice of law in Ohio for one year with six months stayed on the condition that
he engage in no further misconduct. If Skelton fails to comply with the condition
of the stay, the stay will be revoked and he will serve the entire one-year suspension.
Costs are taxed to Skelton.
Judgment accordingly.
__________________
FISCHER, J., joined by KENNEDY, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part.
{¶ 54} I agree with the majority that respondent, former common-pleas-
court judge Richard S. Skelton, violated six rules of the Code of Judicial Conduct
and three professional-conduct rules. Those violations include manipulating the
random assignment of cases to secure the early release of Aaron Cox, a convicted
felon who was ineligible for early release, over the State’s objection. I disagree,
however, with the sanction the majority imposes. The majority states that it
“‘hold[s] judges to the highest standards of professional behavior’” yet imposes
only a one-year suspension, with six months conditionally stayed, for behavior that
undermines the judiciary and the rule of law. Majority opinion, ¶ 34, quoting
Disciplinary Counsel v. Carr, 2022-Ohio-3633, ¶ 86. This court should suspend
Skelton from the practice of law for 18 months with six months conditionally
stayed. Thus, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.
Celebrezze Is the Most Analogous Case
{¶ 55} “[J]udges are held to the highest possible standard of ethical
conduct.” Ohio State Bar Assn. v. McCafferty, 2014-Ohio-3075, ¶ 16. “The
primary purposes of judicial discipline are to protect the public, to guarantee the
evenhanded administration of justice, and to bolster public confidence in the
institution.” Id. at ¶ 20. By suspending Skelton for only one year with six months
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conditionally stayed, the majority imposes a sanction that does not adequately
reflect those principles.
{¶ 56} Although disciplinary matters are decided on a case-by-case basis,
this court looks to similar cases to determine the appropriate sanction. See
Disciplinary Counsel v. Gallagher, 1998-Ohio-592, ¶ 5. I agree with the majority
that while Disciplinary Counsel v. Kegley, 2025-Ohio-910, and Disciplinary
Counsel v. Winters, 2021-Ohio-2753, involve some of the same violations that are
at issue in this case, specifically with respect to ex parte communications, neither
of these precedents is truly instructive because they do not involve manipulation of
the random assignment of cases, Skelton’s most egregious violation. Rather, these
precedents inform us merely that a stayed six-month suspension, as this court
imposed in Kegley and Winters, is not an adequate sanction to protect the public
and bolster public confidence in our legal system. See Kegley at ¶ 43; Winters at
¶ 40.
{¶ 57} The majority instead finds Disciplinary Counsel v. Hale, 2014-Ohio-
5053, Disciplinary Counsel v. Marshall, 2019-Ohio-670, and Disciplinary Counsel
v. Celebrezze, 2026-Ohio-45, instructive. However, like Kegley and Winters,
neither Hale nor Marshall is entirely on point.
{¶ 58} In Hale, a municipal-court judge dismissed a speeding ticket for his
personal attorney and falsely claimed that the prosecutor had requested the
dismissal. He also engaged in ex parte communications and lied a second time after
the media discovered the dismissal. However, Hale was the duty judge on the day
of the dismissal and acted after his attorney failed to attend the arraignment and
requested to be arraigned in absentia. We suspended Hale from the practice of law
for six months with no time stayed. Hale at ¶ 40. While his conduct violated seven
ethics rules, Hale did not attempt to manipulate the random assignment of cases.
See id. at ¶ 27. Thus, Hale is not entirely on point and demonstrates only that
Skelton deserves to be suspended from the practice of law for more than six months.
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{¶ 59} Likewise, Marshall does not involve a judge who manipulated the
random assignment of cases. Marshall, a common-pleas-court judge, abused his
position by interfering with his daughter’s speeding ticket, including engaging in
ex parte communications and pressuring both an assistant prosecutor and a highway
patrolman. We suspended Marshall from the practice of law for six months with
no time stayed. Id. at ¶ 33. Although Marshall abused his power, he never
attempted to alter its assignment. Thus, like Hale, Marshall is not entirely on point
and demonstrates only that Skelton deserves to be suspended from the practice of
law for more than six months.
{¶ 60} Celebrezze, 2026-Ohio-45, is the only case cited by the majority in
which a judge manipulated the random assignment of cases. Celebrezze, a
domestic-relations-court judge, had three divorce cases—and attempted to have a
fourth—reassigned to herself. She did so in part to refer cases to her longtime
friend and love interest as a receiver or mediator, then approved payment of over
$400,000 in fees to him and his counsel over a two-year period. Celebrezze
systematically used her position, enhanced by her role as an administrative judge,
to manipulate the random assignment of cases, committing 15 ethics violations. Id.
at ¶ 29. We suspended Celebrezze from the practice of law for two years with one
year conditionally stayed. Id. at ¶ 56. Because Celebrezze is the only case
involving manipulation of the random assignment of cases that is cited by the
majority, it is the most instructive in determining the appropriate sanction here.
{¶ 61} Because Celebrezze is the most instructive case—whereas Hale,
2014-Ohio-5053, and Marshall, 2019-Ohio-670, are not wholly instructive and
plainly demonstrate that Skelton deserves an actual suspension of more than six
months—we should begin the sanction analysis by presuming that the sanction we
imposed in Celebrezze—a two-year suspension with one year conditionally
stayed—is warranted and reduce it if appropriate after comparing the nature of the
misconduct and the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors in each case.
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January Term, 2026
Skelton’s Conduct Warrants a Harsher Sanction than a One-Year
Suspension with Six Months Conditionally Stayed
{¶ 62} The majority finds that Skelton’s conduct is less egregious than
Celebrezze’s and therefore warrants only a one-year suspension with six months
stayed on the condition that Skelton engage in no further misconduct. Compared
to Celebrezze’s misconduct, Skelton’s may be less egregious—but not by much.
Skelton and Celebrezze both committed grave misconduct by manipulating the
random assignment of cases
{¶ 63} Skelton’s gravest misconduct was his deliberate manipulation of the
random assignment of cases. The Rules of Superintendence require multijudge
divisions of common-pleas courts to adopt policies that ensure the “[r]andom
assignment of cases to judges of the division through an objective and impartial
system that ensures the equitable distribution of cases between or among the judges
of the division.” Sup.R. 36.011(C)(2)(c). This court takes the same approach by
randomly assigning opinions—a fundamental structural feature that distinguishes
it from the United States Supreme Court.1
{¶ 64} Random assignment is not a matter of convenience. Indeed, it is
intended “not only to avoid judge-shopping and to distribute cases equitably among
judges, but also to maintain public confidence in the judicial system by ensuring
that cases are assigned impartially and not deliberately to a certain judge.” (Citation
omitted.) In re Disqualification of Celebrezze, 2023-Ohio-4383, ¶ 99. When a
1. In the United States Supreme Court, “the Chief Justice, or the most senior Justice in the
majority . . . , assigns a Justice in the majority to write the opinion of the Court.” United States
Courts, Supreme Court Procedures, https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/educational-
resources/about-educational-outreach/activity-resources/supreme-court-procedures (accessed Apr.
23, 2026) [https://perma.cc/E4DE-SQ2B]. In the Supreme Court of Ohio, “[t]he writing of the
opinions is done by random selection.” Supreme Court of Ohio, The Supreme Court of Ohio & the
Ohio Judicial System, 5, available at https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/docs/Publications
/OJSbrochure.pdf (accessed Apr. 23, 2026) [https://perma.cc/46UU-2DKS].
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judge manipulates the assignment process, the harm extends beyond a single
proceeding and strikes at the integrity of the court itself.
{¶ 65} Skelton deliberately interfered with the random assignment of Cox’s
cases. In doing so, he also engaged in frequent ex parte communication with Cox’s
mother, telling her he would ask to take over Cox’s cases. And indeed, Skelton
later spoke with Judge Krumholtz about transferring Cox’s cases to himself. After
Judge Krumholtz retired and the cases were transferred to another judge, who then
denied Cox’s motion for judicial release, Skelton continued to scheme with Cox’s
mother to secure her son’s release from prison, informing her that Cox could file
another motion for judicial release and meeting with her to discuss Cox’s cases.
While Skelton denies submitting the transfer order, the cases were miraculously
transferred to his docket. Skelton then continued to communicate ex parte with
both Cox and Cox’s mother while arranging for Cox’s early release, deciding by
May 20 that he would release Cox from prison, well before the State filed its
memorandum in opposition to judicial release. And over the State’s objection and
against the law, given that Cox was not eligible for early release, Skelton still
decided to release Cox, a violent offender, from prison. Thus, Skelton’s
misconduct included not just his failure to recuse himself or the appearance of
partiality but also his manipulation of the judicial system to do an unlawful favor
for an acquaintance.
{¶ 66} By doing that unlawful favor for an acquaintance, Skelton usurped
the power of the General Assembly for his own purposes. The separation of powers
is one of the fundamental principles of a free constitution. See Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 380-381 (1989). And “[t]he power to prescribe the
punishment for a crime belongs to the legislature.” State v. Daniel, 2023-Ohio-
4035, ¶ 16. The trial court merely has the powers to sentence and to grant judicial
release as authorized by law. See id. While a judge should not be subject to
disciplinary proceedings for making a “mere mistake in the exercise of judicial
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discretion,” like accidentally sentencing an offender outside the sentencing
guidelines, we may appropriately discipline a judge for conduct that demonstrates
a willful failure to follow the law. (Cleaned up.) Disciplinary Counsel v. Hoover,
2024-Ohio-4608, ¶ 65, 76; Disciplinary Counsel v. Grendell, 2025-Ohio-5239,
¶ 157-159. That is plainly what happened here.
{¶ 67} Skelton manipulated the random assignment of cases to proceed with
his own agenda to release Cox—contrary to R.C. 2929.20, the judicial-release
statute—as clearly demonstrated by his ex parte communications with Cox’s
mother. While Skelton maintains that he had not received the probation
department’s report declaring Cox ineligible for early release, Skelton said on the
record that he had read the report. So either Skelton had read the report and ignored
it, or he lied on the record about having read it. While both possibilities are
plausible, it is clear from the record that no matter what the report said, Skelton was
going to release Cox that day. Thus, when Skelton manipulated the case-
assignment system with the intention to release a violent felon from prison contrary
to the judicial-release statute, he went rogue—ignoring the General Assembly’s
power to prescribe punishment—and imposed his own will. The people did not
elect Skelton to write the laws but, rather, to interpret and apply them. See Arbino
v. Johnson & Johnson, 2007-Ohio-6948, ¶ 71. His actions undermined the
separation-of-powers doctrine, further depriving the people of an impartial judicial
system.
{¶ 68} Moreover, by releasing a violent felon from prison prior to his
eligibility, Skelton jeopardized public safety. Cox was in prison for convictions for
four serious felonies: aggravated robbery, felonious assault, escape, and possession
of a fentanyl-related compound. These convictions arose from one incident in
which Cox robbed someone at knifepoint, another incident in which Cox had
overdosed and was found unresponsive with drugs on his person, and another
during which Cox knocked a law-enforcement officer to the ground during a
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transfer to jail, jumped into the driver’s seat of the officer’s cruiser, and drove over
the officer’s arm while fleeing the scene.
{¶ 69} Soon after Skelton unlawfully released Cox from prison, Cox
violated the terms of his probation when he failed to abstain from drugs and left the
State without permission. While Cox was apprehended and returned to prison soon
thereafter and did not commit further harm to the public, there is no doubt that the
risk of recidivism was great. The record shows that Cox was under community
control for six other cases when he was convicted of the four serious felony
offenses. Even Cox admitted in his motion for judicial release that he had an
extensive history with the court and had been given “numerous opportunities to
find the right path.” In that motion, Cox merely requested the opportunity to
“demonstrate that he could walk the walk”; there was certainly no justification for
his release before he had served most of his sentence for the four serious felony
offenses. Thus, by granting Cox early release contrary to the judicial-release
statute, Skelton jeopardized public safety—which this court should not take lightly.
{¶ 70} Given the gravity of Skelton’s misconduct, a significant sanction is
necessary to “help mend the ‘incalculable harm [that Skelton’s misconduct caused]
to the public perception of the legal system,’” Celebrezze, 2026-Ohio-45, at ¶ 55,
quoting Disciplinary Counsel v. Dann, 2012-Ohio-5337, ¶ 22.
Some—but not all—of the aggravating and mitigating factors that applied in
Celebrezze apply here
{¶ 71} In comparing this case to Celebrezze, it could be argued that
Celebrezze engaged in more egregious conduct because she repeatedly manipulated
the case-assignment system for a friend’s financial gain whereas Skelton
manipulated it on only one occasion to do a favor for an acquaintance. And
Celebrezze included the aggravating factor of a dishonest or selfish motive, which
is absent here. Id. at ¶ 32, citing Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(2). But we cannot ignore
that like Celebrezze, Skelton engaged in a pattern of misconduct and committed
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January Term, 2026
multiple offenses, as Skelton’s scheme to release Cox, a violent felon, from prison
continued for almost two years and violated multiple ethics rules. See id. at ¶ 32;
Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(3) and (4).
{¶ 72} It could also be argued that the financial harm that Celebrezze likely
caused once she had manipulated the case-assignment system2 makes her conduct
more egregious than Skelton’s. But Celebrezze’s misconduct did not involve
criminal cases; unlike Skelton, she did not jeopardize public safety by letting a
violent felon out of prison before he had served his sentence, in contravention of
the judicial-release statute. Therefore, although egregious in a different manner
than Celebrezze’s misconduct, Skelton’s misconduct arguably warrants the same
sanction.
{¶ 73} Importantly, though, this case involves two mitigating factors not
present in Celebrezze: the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive and the judge’s
resignation prior to the disciplinary hearing. In my view, these factors justify a
slight reduction from the two-year suspension, with one year conditionally stayed,
2. There is little doubt that Celebrezze’s misconduct caused financial harm in Jardine v. Jardine,
Cuyahoga C.P. No. DR-20-383667, one of the cases she had assigned to herself. Jason Jardine, the
plaintiff in that case, alleged that Dottore’s fees and expenses were excessive and that Celebrezze
had engaged “in a pattern of rubber-stamping [Dottore’s] requests without holding a hearing or
giving Jardine an opportunity to be heard.” In re Disqualification of Celebrezze, 2023-Ohio-4383,
¶ 17, 20. Indeed, Celebrezze approved $241,935 in receiver fees to Dottore and $171,859.31 in
legal fees to Dottore’s attorney. Disciplinary Counsel v. Celebrezze at ¶ 11. While Jardine’s
allegations alone do not demonstrate that these fees were not earned, Celebrezze’s relationship with
Dottore certainly placed them in question. And in fact, the newly assigned judge in Jardine
determined that there had been a $79,422.60 overpayment in receiver fees and that there should have
been no payment of legal fees to Dottore’s attorney. Cuyahoga C.P. No. DR-20-38366 (Dec. 18,
2025), available at https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/26456454/jardine-judgment-entry.pdf
(accessed Apr. 29, 2026) [https://perma.cc/X42X-ZZ4K]. Because of Celebrezze’s actions, Jardine
felt the need to hire a private investigator, unlikely an inexpensive endeavor, to investigate
Celebrezze’s blatant favoritism toward Dottore, ultimately uncovering the improper connection
between them. See Disciplinary Counsel v. Celebrezze at ¶ 12; In re Disqualification of Celebrezze
at ¶ 38. And Jardine likely accumulated additional legal fees when seeking, with counsel, to
disqualify Celebrezze from presiding over his divorce case due to the blatant appearance of
impropriety and her failure to recuse herself. See In re Disqualification of Celebrezze at ¶ 1. All
that is to say that although we did not attribute aggravating weight to it in Celebrezze’s disciplinary
case, financial harm likely resulted from her misconduct.
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that we imposed in Celebrezze. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(2) and (9); id. at ¶ 1
(noting that Celebrezze resigned less than a month before release of our decision).
On the other hand, the grave nature of the most egregious misconduct in both
cases—manipulation of the case-assignment process—justifies prohibiting Skelton
from practicing law for the same amount of time. Therefore, this court should
suspend Skelton from the practice of law for 18 months with six months stayed on
the condition of no further misconduct.
Conclusion
{¶ 74} The majority correctly finds that in addition to manipulating the
case-assignment process, Skelton engaged in multiple ex parte communications,
investigated facts outside the record, abused the prestige of the judicial office,
released a violent felon from prison in contravention of the judicial release-statute,
and refused to self-report the misconduct. But by treating Skelton’s manipulation
of the random assignment of cases as merely one violation among many, the
majority understates its significance.
{¶ 75} Whereas a failure to recuse or an abuse of power calls into question
a judge’s impartiality, manipulation of the case-assignment process is categorically
different. It corrupts the judicial system at its foundation. This behavior is ethically
and morally wrong, and the sanction imposed for such misconduct must reflect the
gravity of the harm it causes. Moreover, a harsh sanction is warranted when a judge
violates the separation-of-powers doctrine that is fundamental to our free
Constitution and jeopardizes public safety by blatantly disregarding the judicial-
release statute to allow a violent offender to be released from prison before the
offender becomes eligible to be released.
{¶ 76} Accordingly, Skelton should be suspended for 18 months with six
months stayed on the condition of no further misconduct. I therefore dissent from
the court’s imposition of a less severe sanction.
__________________
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January Term, 2026
Joseph M. Caligiuri, Disciplinary Counsel, and Paige A. Melton, for relator.
Bieser, Greer & Landis, L.L.P., and David C. Greer, for respondent.
__________________
27