Opinion

Angela Lea v. Department of Defense

Court: Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed: May 29, 2026
Status: Unpublished
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 40.8%

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

ANGELA LEA, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, PH-0752-24-0303-I-1

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DATE: May 29, 2026

Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Kyle Gibson Ingram , Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the appellant.

Amy L. Griffin , Esquire, and Joseph Guerra , Esquire,

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for the agency.

BEFORE

Henry J. Kerner, Vice Chairman

James J. Woodruff II, Member

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

dismissed her involuntary resignation appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally,

we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the

initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is

based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous

application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent

with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting

error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal

argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not

available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations,

section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this

appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section

1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition

for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to consider the appellant’s challenge

to the validity of the settlement agreement pursuant to which she resigned and to

FIND that the agreement does not lack consideration, we AFFIRM the initial

decision.

BACKGROUND

The appellant was employed by the agency’s Defense Logistics Agency

(DLA) as a GS-11 Tailored Vendor Logistics Specialist with an assigned duty

station in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 9 at 31, 144.

She and the agency entered into a telework agreement with a designated telework

location in Elkins Park, Pennsylvania. Id. at 144. According to the appellant, she

traveled to Houston, Texas, in March 2020 and did not return to Pennsylvania due

to the COVID-19 pandemic. Id. at 141-42.

In June 2020, the appellant told an agency Lead Labor and Employee

Relations Specialist (LLERS) that she was temporarily working from Texas and

no longer had a permanent address in Pennsylvania. Id. at 141. The LLERS

advised the appellant that because she was no longer teleworking from the

agreed-upon location in Elkins Park, Pennsylvania, her telework agreement with

the agency was no longer valid. Id. at 140. She also told the appellant that her

alternative worksite “must be located within what is considered a recallable

distance which is defined in DLA policy as approximately two hours” from her

Philadelphia duty station. Id. (emphasis in original).

In July 2020, the appellant submitted a request to telework remotely from

Texas due to non-health-related pandemic concerns, which the agency denied. Id.

at 134-38. In June 2021, the appellant submitted medical documentation which

stated, in relevant part, that she had “been advised to not travel or fly for the next

six months” for medical reasons. Id. at 123. On that basis, the agency approved

the appellant’s request for temporary, full-time telework from Texas as a

reasonable accommodation beginning in June 2021 until December 25, 2021, and

later extended the accommodation through July 14, 2022. Id. at 81, 108, 122.

In the interim, on July 5, 2022, the appellant requested to work remotely

from Texas on a permanent basis as a reasonable accommodation. Id. at 81. The

agency requested supporting medical documentation and provided a form for the

appellant’s medical provider to complete. Id. at 81, 97. On July 7, 2022, her

doctor completed the form, noting that the appellant suffered from “blurred vision

& double vision” and “fatigue.” Id. at 97, 100. No restriction on flying was

listed, and the documentation did not prohibit travel. Id. at 97-100. According to

the appellant’s doctor, the appellant’s vision impairment impacted her ability to

work on a computer and made it difficult to drive to work. Id. at 98, 100.

On July 14, 2022, the agency approved the alternative accommodation of

allowing the appellant 60 days to relocate back to within 2 hours of her worksite

in Philadelphia, and permission to telework once she relocated. Id. at 81. The

agency ultimately extended the relocation period through October 2, 2023, and

included the accommodation of limiting the appellant’s work-related travel once

she relocated to travel that was mission-critical and “within the essential

functions of her position.” Id. at 75, 77. The appellant continued to provide the

agency with medical documentation that recommended that she “work from home

and avoid any work related travel” because of her impaired vision. Id. at 80,

82-92. However, the medical documentation did not list restrictions on traveling

in general or on relocating. Id.

After the 60-day relocation period ended, the appellant began using leave.

Id. at 46-47. On October 27, 2023, the agency and the appellant, who was

represented by an attorney, executed the settlement agreement that is at issue in

the instant appeal. Id. at 36-41. Per the terms of the agreement, the appellant

was permitted to “temporarily telework remotely from her residence in

Houston . . . through March 15, 2024” and would relocate to a permanent

residence within a recallable distance to her Philadelphia duty station no later

than that date. Id. at 37. If the appellant failed to do so, she “agree[d] to resign

from the [a]gency and/or the [a]gency may process . . . any paperwork necessary

to effectuate [her] resignation.” Id. at 37-38.

On March 14, 2024, the appellant sent an email to the agency with the

subject line “disability resignation.” IAF, Tab 13 at 23-24. She attached an

unsigned Standard Form 52 (SF-52), Request for Personnel Action, asking the

agency to process her resignation effective March 18, 2024. Id. at 23-26. The

agency did so. 2 IAF, Tab 10 at 36. The appellant then filed the instant appeal

arguing that her resignation was involuntary. IAF, Tab 1 at 2. The

administrative judge notified the parties of an appellant’s jurisdictional burden in

an alleged involuntary resignation appeal and instructed her to submit evidence

and argument establishing Board jurisdiction over her appeal. IAF, Tab 3 at 2-4.

The administrative judge advised the agency that it could also respond on the

jurisdictional issue. Id. at 4.

Although the appellant initially submitted an SF-52 stating that she was “resigning

under disability retirement,” she later corrected her SF-52 at the agency’s request to

remove that remark and reflect that her resignation was for “personal reasons.” IAF,

Tab 13 at 23, 26. The appellant has not alleged that she applied for a disability

retirement annuity, and the agency processed her separation as a resignation. IAF,

Tab 10 at 36.

After the parties submitted their jurisdictional pleadings, IAF, Tab 9 at 5,

16-23, Tab 10, Tab 13 at 10-19, Tab 14 at 4, 6-13, the administrative judge issued

an initial decision dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, IAF, Tab 18,

Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 7-8. She found that the Boad lacks jurisdiction to

invalidate or enforce the settlement agreement because it was not submitted into

the record in a Board matter. ID at 5-6. She reviewed the agreement for the

limited purpose of determining its impact on the appellant’s resignation, but

found that the appellant did not nonfrivolously allege that the agreement rendered

her resignation involuntary. ID at 6-7. The administrative judge reasoned that

the appellant made the decision to resign rather than relocate under the

unambiguous terms of the agreement. ID at 7.

The appellant has timely filed a petition for review of the initial decision.

Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The agency has filed a response to the

petition for review. PFR File, Tab 3.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

We modify the initial decision to find that the settlement agreement does not lack

consideration.

Although the appellant argued below that the settlement agreement lacked

consideration, the administrative judge declined to address this argument because

the agreement had not been submitted into the record for enforcement. ID at 5-7;

IAF Tab 10 at 4, 11-13. We modify the initial decision to consider the validity of

the settlement agreement to the extent that it impacts the Board’s jurisdiction

over the appellant’s alleged involuntary resignation. As explained below, we find

that the appellant has not nonfrivolously alleged that the agreement lacked

consideration.

An involuntary resignation is tantamount to a removal and is subject to the

Board’s jurisdiction. Sullivan v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 79 M.S.P.R. 81,

84 (1998). The Board has the authority to review an agreement to resign when

the agreement was reached outside of a Board proceeding to determine its effect

on the Board’s jurisdiction over an alleged involuntary resignation. Id. at 84-85;

see Wade v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 61 M.S.P.R. 580, 582-83 (1994)

(concluding that a party may challenge the validity of a settlement agreement that

resulted in the withdrawal of his appeal even if the agreement was not entered

into the record for enforcement purposes). Therefore, to the extent that the

administrative judge failed to consider the validity of the agreement at issue here,

we modify the initial decision to do so. See King v. U.S. Postal Service,

52 M.S.P.R. 60, 64-65 (1991) (disagreeing with an administrative judge’s

statement suggesting that the Board may only set aside a settlement agreement if

it was entered into the record in a Board appeal).

Here, the parties entered into the agreement in October 2023, almost

5 months before the agency separated the appellant on March 18, 2024. IAF,

Tab 9 at 31, 41. The waiver in the agreement included “any claim and/or dispute

arising from or related to” the appellant’s reasonable accommodation requests,

and “any additional matters” arising prior to the signing of the agreement. Id.

at 39. However, it did not purport to waive the appellant’s right to file an appeal

for her as-yet unrealized resignation. Id. Because the agreement is relevant to a

determination of the voluntariness of the appellant’s resignation, we consider its

validity in that context.

According to the appellant, the agreement lacked consideration because the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973 already required the agency to allow her to telework

as a reasonable accommodation. PFR File, Tab 1 at 12-14; IAF, Tab 10 at 4,

11-15. Consideration is a performance or a return promise that must be bargained

for and that does not involve the performance of a preexisting duty. See Black v.

Department of Transportation, 116 M.S.P.R. 87, ¶ 17 (2011). A party’s

agreement to fulfill a legal obligation is not valid consideration. Bogley’s Estate

v. United States, 514 F.2d 1027, 1033 (Ct. Cl. 1975). 3 Thus, the question before

us is whether the agency’s promise under the settlement agreement related to

accommodating the appellant’s medical condition constituted a commitment to do

what the law already required.

The Rehabilitation Act requires an agency to provide reasonable

accommodations to an otherwise qualified individual with a disability. Haas v.

Department of Homeland Security, 2022 MSPB 26, ¶ 28. Similarly, an agency’s

denial of a reasonable accommodation to an eligible employee is a factor to be

considered in determining whether the agency coerced the appellant’s resignation

or retirement. Brown v. U.S. Postal Service, 115 M.S.P.R. 609, ¶ 16 (2011). As

relevant here, a reasonable accommodation includes “[m]odifications or

adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under

which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable an

individual with a disability who is qualified to perform the essential functions of

that position.” 5 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii). An agency has discretion to choose

between effective accommodations, and an employee is not entitled to the

accommodation of her choice. Miller v. Department of the Army, 121 M.S.P.R.

189, ¶ 21 (2014); Henry v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 108 M.S.P.R. 458,

¶ 22 (2008); Simonne J. v. Department of Housing and Urban Development,

EEOC Appeal No. 2023005110, 2025 WL 1823986, at *3 (May 22, 2025).

The agency agreed not only to permit the appellant to telework from

Philadelphia. It also agreed to allow the appellant to telework from Houston

between October 27 and March 18, 2023. IAF, Tab 9 at 37, 41. The appellant

has not alleged, and her own medical documentation does not support a

conclusion, that it was medically necessary for her to remain in Houston, or that

she was unable to relocate to Philadelphia when the parties signed the agreement.

The holdings of the U.S. Court of Claims announced before close of business

September 30, 1982, are binding precedent on the Board. Luna v. Department of

Homeland Security, 2024 MSPB 2, ¶ 8 n.4.

Rather, as of July 2022, her only restriction on mobility was to avoid driving.

IAF, Tab 9 at 80, 84, 98-99. Accordingly, because the appellant has not asserted

that the agency had a preexisting duty to permit her to telework from Houston at

the time of settlement, she has not nonfrivolously alleged that the agreement was

invalid due to lack of consideration. 4

The appellant’s separation pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement was

not involuntary.

The appellant reiterates on review that because she did not sign the SF-52

that she provided to the agency on March 14, 2024, her separation amounted to a

removal. PFR File, Tab 1 at 18-19; IAF, Tab 10 at 10, 18, Tab 11 at 11, Tab 14

at 12. The administrative judge did not directly address this argument. However,

she noted that the agency’s processing of the resignation was consistent with the

terms of the agreement. ID at 6-7. We agree.

A signed and executed settlement agreement that evidences the appellant’s

voluntary decision to resign constitutes her resignation. Harman v. Department

of Defense, 80 M.S.P.R. 522, 527 (1999). Here, the settlement agreement was

signed and executed. IAF, Tab 9 at 41. It provided that if the appellant failed to

relocate to the Philadelphia area by March 15, 2024, she would “complete and

submit her request for resignation (SF-52) no later than [that date].” Id. at 36.

The agreement further contemplated that she might “fail[] to submit her

resignation SF-52,” in which event, “she explicitly authorize[d] the [a]gency to

process . . . [her] resignation.” Id. Regardless of whether the appellant signed

The appellant also claims that the agency had a preexisting duty to complete disability

retirement in a timely manner and thus this provision of the settlement agreement does

not constitute valid consideration. PFR File, Tab 1 at 16-17; IAF, Tab 9 at 38. Due to

our finding here that the agreement contains consideration, we need not address this

issue. See Pappas v. Office of Personnel Management, 76 M.S.P.R. 152, 158 (1997)

(reasoning that a very small amount of consideration, the proverbial “peppercorn,” may

support an enforceable contract), aff’d per curiam, 155 F.3d 565 (Fed. Cir. 1998)

(Table).

her SF-52, she has failed to demonstrate that the agency’s processing of her

resignation pursuant to the terms of the agreement was involuntary.

To the extent that the appellant is asserting that the agency committed

harmful error or violated her due process rights by effectuating her resignation

without a signed SF-52, we lack independent jurisdiction to adjudicate those

claims. PFR File, Tab 1 at 18-19; see Penna v. U.S. Postal Service, 118 M.S.P.R.

355, ¶ 13 (2012) (finding that the Board lacked jurisdiction over an appellant’s

harmful error, discrimination, and other claims absent an appealable underlying

action); Burnett v. U.S. Postal Service, 104 M.S.P.R. 308, ¶¶ 5, 15 (2006)

(agreeing with an administrative judge that because an appellant did not

established jurisdiction over her claims that the agency violated her restoration

rights, removed her, and denied her a within grade increase, she also failed to

establish jurisdiction over her claims of discrimination and violations of her due

process rights and of the merit system principles). We therefore affirm the

administrative judge’s determination that the Board lacks jurisdiction over this

appeal, as modified above.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5

The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the

Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain

review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of

your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate

forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following

summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not

provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and

the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule

regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of

Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated

the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the

Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.

this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your

claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file

within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your

chosen forum.

Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review

below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you

should contact that forum for more information.

(1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking

judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the following

address:

U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that

any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of

discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action

was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination

claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you

receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems

Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative

receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on

race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be

entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any

requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.

Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective

websites, which can be accessed through the link below:

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .

Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding

all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive

this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives

this decision.

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the

address of the EEOC is:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, D.C. 20013

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or

by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

131 M Street, N.E.

Suite 5SW12G

Washington, D.C. 20507

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection

Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised

claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).

If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section

2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),

(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of

competent jurisdiction. 6 The court of appeals must receive your petition for

The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain

whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on

December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on

July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of

MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.

The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,

132 Stat. 1510.

review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(B).

If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the following