Easter

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SHREVEPORT DIVISION

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GOLDA EASTER CIVIL ACTION NO. 24-1439

VERSUS JUDGE ALEXANDER C. VAN HOOK

LOWE’S HOME CENTERS, LLC MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

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MEMORANDUM RULING

Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”) filed by

Defendant Lowe’s Home Center, LLC (“Lowe’s”). Record Document 42. Plaintiff Golda

Easter (“Ms. Easter”) filed a Memorandum in Opposition. Record Document 45. For

the reasons assigned herein, Lowe’s motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

This lawsuit arises from an injury suffered during an accident that occurred

on July 22, 2024, at the Lowe’s Home Center located at 2710 Alkay Drive in

Shreveport, Louisiana. Record Document 1. On that date, Ms. Easter was shopping

at Lowe’s for a new kitchen sink faucet and was inspecting faucet displays to find one

with a hose extension. Record Document 45-3 at 12. Lowe’s in-store surveillance video

clearly shows Ms. Easter pulling on the displayed faucet ends to see if they would

extend. See Record Document 42-4 (Lowe’s Surveillance Video). As Ms. Easter pulled

on one faucet, a display board containing multiple faucets tipped forward and landed

on her shoulder. Id. (Lowe’s Surveillance Video at 0:08:55). Thereafter, Ms. Easter

slumps to the ground and appears to call for help. Id. (Lowe’s Surveillance Video at

0:09:11). Moments later, two male Lowe’s employees arrive and lift the faucet display

from Ms. Easter’s body. Id. (Lowe’s Surveillance Video at 0:09:48).

In her petition, Ms. Easter contends that Lowe’s, inter alia, failed to properly

secure and maintain the faucet display. Record Document 42-2 at 3. Lowe’s contends

that it is not liable for any injury suffered by Ms. Easter because she has presented

no evidence to show that Lowe’s had actual or constructive knowledge of the allegedly

defective faucet display. Record Document 42-1 at 1.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Summary Judgment Standard.

The law pertaining to summary judgment is well settled. Summary judgment

is proper pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when “there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.” Quality Infusion Care, Inc. v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 628 F.3d 725,

728 (5th Cir. 2010). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence would

affect the outcome of the lawsuit under applicable law in the case. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is “genuine” if

the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could render a verdict for the

nonmoving party. Id. “[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis of its motion, and identifying

those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact by pointing out that the record contains

no support for the non-moving party’s claim.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

323 (1986) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)). The moving party need not support its

motion with affidavits or other evidence, but to defeat a motion for summary

judgment the non-movant must present evidence sufficient to establish the existence

of each element of its claim as to which it will have the burden of proof at trial. Id. at

322.

B. Louisiana Merchant Liability Statute.

Subject matter jurisdiction in this case is based on diversity; thus, Louisiana

tort law applies. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that a federal

court sitting in diversity jurisdiction applies the substantive law of the forum state).

In Louisiana, merchant liability is governed by the Louisiana Merchant Liability Act

(“MLA”) which provides:

A. A merchant owes a duty to persons who use its premises to exercise

reasonable care to keep its aisles, passageways, and floors in a

reasonably safe condition. This duty includes a reasonable effort to keep

the premises free of any hazardous conditions which reasonably might

give rise to damage.

B. In a negligence claim brought against a merchant by a person

lawfully on the merchant’s premises for damages as a result of an injury,

death, or loss sustained because of a fall due to a condition existing in

or on a merchant’s premises, the claimant shall have the burden of

proving, in addition to all other elements of its cause of action, all of the

following:

(1) The condition presented an unreasonable risk of harm to the

claimant and that risk of harm was reasonably foreseeable.

(2) The merchant either created or had actual or constructive notice of

the condition which caused the damage, prior to the occurrence.

(3) The merchant failed to exercise reasonable care. In determining

reasonable care, the absence of a written or verbal uniform cleanup or

safety procedure is insufficient, alone, to prove failure to exercise

reasonable care.

LA. REV. STAT ANN. § 9:2800.6 (emphasis added).

C. Analysis.

Lowe’s primary contention in its motion is that Plaintiff has not fulfilled her

burden under Louisiana Revised Statute Section 9:2800.6(B)(2) concluding that

“[d]espite over a year of discovery, Plaintiff has provided no positive evidence to meet

her burden of proof for the actual or constructive requirement under the MLA.”

Record Document 42-1 at 3. The Defendant’s motion for summary judgment fails

because the heightened burden that Lowe’s seeks to impose on Ms. Easter is clearly

not applicable under the uncontested facts of this case.

The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that the burden shifting under Section

B of the MLA only applies when a customer falls on the merchant’s property. Davis

v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 774 So.2d 84, 90 (La. 2000) (“[T]he heightened burden under

R.S. 9:2800.6(B) is applicable only in situations where a customer ‘falls’ on a

merchant’s premises.”). As highlighted above, the plain wording of the statute limits

its application to cases where the customer’s injuries resulted “because of a fall.” LA.

REV. STAT ANN. § 9:2800.6(B). This case presents a falling merchandise claim which

is clearly governed by Section A of the MLA. See LA. REV. STAT ANN. § 9:2800.6(A);

see also Haley v. Wal-Mart, No. 24-00851, 2025 WL 2808501 (W.D.La. 2025) (citing

Smith v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 754 So.2d 209 (La. 1999)). In a falling merchandise case,

“the merchant must use reasonable care to keep its aisles, passageways and floors in

a reasonably safe condition and free of hazards which may cause injury.” Davis v.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 774 So.2d at 90. “This duty includes a reasonable effort to keep

the premises free of any hazardous conditions which reasonably might give rise to

damage.” LA. REV. STAT ANN. § 9:2800.6(A).

When a negligence claim is brought under Section A of the MLA, “the customer

must demonstrate that (1) he or she did not cause the merchandise to fall, (2) that

another customer in the aisle at that moment did not cause the merchandise to

fall, and (3) that the merchant's negligence was the cause of the accident.” Id.

(emphasis in original). Although these are the elements that must be proven at trial,

the Court need not address them here.

In support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, Lowe’s only cited two slip-

and-fall cases to improperly shift the burden to the plaintiff by concluding:

Although these case examples involve actual or constructive notice in

slip and fall claims, the same reasoning applies here. Plaintiff has

provided no witness testimony, written discovery, or any other evidence

required by Louisiana jurisprudence to establish her burden of proof

required to establish actual or constructive notice by Lowe’s.

Record Document 42-1 at 4. Under the facts presented to the Court, Ms. Easter is not

required to prove actual or constructive notice. Lowe’s simply misstates the

applicable law.1

1 Exercising its broad discretion to control its docket; the Court will not consider a successive motion

for summary judgment on this issue. See Hudson v. Cleco Corp., 539 F. App’x. 615, 617-618 (5th Cir.

2013).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that Lowe’s motion for summary

judgment, Record Document 42, is DENIED.

DONE AND SIGNED in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 24t» day of April, 2026.

ALEXANDER C. VAN HOOK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE