Mejia

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

AARON MEJIA,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 26-cv-370-NJR

JEREMIAH BROWN and

JOHN DOE #’s 1-6,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:

Plaintiff Aaron Mejia, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections who is

currently incarcerated at Lawrence Correctional Center, brings this action for

deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In the Complaint,

Mejia alleges that Defendants used excessive force and failed to obtain medical care for

him after the assault. He raises claims pursuant to the Eighth Amendment and Illinois

state law.

This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the Complaint

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen

prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any

portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is

immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

The Complaint

On February 19, 2025, Mejia alleges that six unknown tactical team members

(identified as John Doe #’s 1-6) approached his cell, R8-BL-21, to extract him from the cell

(Doc. 1, p. 5). All of the officers were wearing black uniforms, helmets, and protective

gear (Id. at p. 6). John Doe #1 repeatedly deployed pepper spray into Mejia’s cell (Id.).

John Doe #6 held a video camera and recorded the incident (Id.). Because Mejia was

subjected to pepper spray, he was unable to see the identities of the officers (Id.). After

deploying pepper spray, John Doe #’s 1-5 entered Mejia’s cell and placed him on the floor

(Id.). They restrained him by placing handcuffs and leg shackles (Id. at pp. 6-7). Mejia

maintains that at that point he was fully restrained (Id. at p. 7).

After restraining Mejia on the floor, one of the officers stated: “you’re about to get

yours.” (Doc. 1, p. 7). The officers began punching, kneeing, and kicking Mejia (Id.). Mejia

maintains that this was done maliciously and sadistically to injure him (Id.). The officers

then transported Mejia to the segregation unit (Id. at p. 8). Despite still being fully

restrained, the officers continued to beat Mejia (Id.). Mejia maintains that John Doe #6

was present and had an opportunity to intervene in the other officers’ use of force but

failed to do so. He also alleges that any of the officers could have stopped one another

but failed to do so (Id.).

As a result of the use of force, Mejia suffered a broken nose, concussion, lacerations

to his hands, ankles, and head, bruising, and chemical burns (Doc. 1, p. 9). At one point

he was rendered unconscious by the blows to his head (Id.). None of the officers sought

to obtain medical care for his injuries and left him covered in pepper spray (Id.). Staff in

segregation ignored his injuries and requests for help until February 20, 2025, when a

sergeant saw his injuries and contacted the nurse (Id. at p. 11). Mejia was transported to

a local hospital for treatment (Id.).

Discussion

Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court designates the following

counts:

Count 1: Eighth Amendment excessive force claim

against John Doe #’s 1-5 for their use of force

against Mejia on February 19, 2025.

Count 2: Eighth Amendment failure to intervene claim

against John Doe #6 for his failure to intervene

in the use of force against Mejia on February

19, 2025.

Count 3: Illinois state law claims for assault and battery

against John Doe #’s 1-5.

Count 4: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to

medical needs claim against John Doe #’s 1-6

for their failure to obtain medical care for

Mejia after the use of force incident.

Count 5: Illinois state law negligence claim against

John Doe #’s 1-6 for breaching their duty of

care to Mejia by failing to obtain medical care.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders,

unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any other claim that is

mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be considered

dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly pleading

standard.1

Counts 1 and 3

At this stage, Mejia states viable claims for excessive force and assault and battery

against John Doe #’s 1-5. Mejia alleges that the officers beat him after he was fully

restrained on the ground, suggesting that the force was used “maliciously and

sadistically” rather than in “a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline.”

Hendrickson v. Cooper, 589 F.3d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 2009). The same allegations also

adequately state an assault and battery claim under Illinois state law. Shea v. Winnebago

County Sheriff’s Department, No. 17-3078, 746 F. App’x 541, 548 (7th Cir. Aug. 16, 2018)

(discussing assault and battery under Illinois law). Because the allegations derive from

the same allegations as the federal claim, Count 3 also will proceed against the unknown

officers. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 512 F.3d 921, 936 (7th Cir.

2008).

Count 2

Mejia also states a claim against John Doe #6 for his failure to intervene in the use

of force. An official can be liable for failing to intervene in an assault if they “have a

realistic opportunity to step forward and prevent” another official from using “excessive

force but fail to do so.” Harper v. Albert, 400 F.3d 1052, 1064 (7th Cir. 2005). Here, Mejia

alleges that John Doe #6 was present during the entire incident and filmed the incident

1 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”).

with a video camera but failed to take any action to stop the use of force. Thus, Count 2

shall proceed against John Doe #6.2

Count 4

Mejia states a viable deliberate indifference claim against the unknown

correctional officers for their failure to provide him with medical care after the use of

force. He alleges that all six officers were present and saw the extensive injuries that he

suffered as a result of their use of force, but they failed to obtain medical care for him. See

Giles v. Godinez, 914 F. 3d 1040, 1049 (7th Cir. 2019). Thus, Count 4 shall proceed against

John Doe #’s 1-6.

Count 5

Finally, Mejia alleges that Defendants acted with negligence in failing to obtain

medical care after their use of force. Under Illinois law, to state a claim for negligence, a

complaint must allege facts to establish that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of

care, breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s

injury. Thompson v. Gordon, 948 N.E.2d 39, 45 (Ill. 2011). Mejia adequately alleges that the

officers had a duty to obtain medical care for him but breached that duty in violation of

Illinois law. Thus, Count 5 shall proceed against John Doe #’s 1-6.

Mejia indicates that he identified Warden Jeremiah Brown as a defendant for the

sole purpose of responding to discovery aimed at identifying the John Doe Defendants

2 Mejia also alleges that if John Doe #’s 1-5 did not directly participate in the use of force then each had the

opportunity to stop the others from using force (Doc. 1, pp. 13-14). But Mejia alleges that the five officers

actually used force during the incident and thus the excessive force claim shall proceed against John Doe

#’s 1-5. Any claim that they also failed to intervene is DISMISSED as duplicative.

(Doc. 1, p. 5). Thus, Jeremiah Brown shall remain in the case (in his official capacity only),

but any other claim against Brown is DISMISSED without prejudice.

Disposition

For the reasons stated above, Counts 1 and 3 shall proceed against John Doe #’s 1-

5. Count 2 shall proceed against John Doe #6. Counts 4 and 5 shall proceed against John

Doe #’s 1-6. Jeremiah Brown will remain in the case in his official capacity to help identify

the John Does.

The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Jeremiah Brown (official capacity only):

(1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons) and

(2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms,

a copy of the Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to Brown at Lawrence

Correctional Center. If Brown fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons

(Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall

take appropriate steps to effect formal service on him, and the Court will require Brown

to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure.

Because Warden Brown is only in the case to respond to discovery aimed at

identifying the John Doe correctional officers, he need not file an Answer. Once counsel

has entered an appearance for Brown, the Court will enter a scheduling order set forth

instructions and deadlines for John Doe discovery.

Because Mejia’s claims involve his medical care, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED

to enter the Court’s standard HIPAA Qualified Protective Order.

If judgment is rendered against Mejia, and the judgment includes the payment of

costs under Section 1915, he will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, regardless

of whether his application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(f)(2)(A).

Finally, Mejia is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the

Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court

will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not

later than 14 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply

with this order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result

in dismissal of this action for want of prosecution. See FED. R. Clv. P. 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 13, 2026 7 g (2

NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL

United States District Judge

Notice to Plaintiff

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the defendant of your lawsuit and

serve him with a copy of your Complaint. After service has been achieved, the defendant

will enter an appearance. The Court will then enter a Scheduling Order containing

important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to

wait until counsel has appeared for the defendant before filing any motions, to give the

defendant notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before

defendant’s counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature.

Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time, unless specifically

directed to do so.