Coleman

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

FREDERICK COLEMAN, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

HYUNDAI MOTOR ) 2:25cv236-MHT

MANUFACTURING OF ALABAMA, ) (WO)

LLC., )

)

Defendant. )

AMENDED OPINION ON HYUNDAI’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT ON COLEMAN’S RETALIATION CLAIM“

Plaintiff Frederick Coleman’ brings this

employment-discrimination lawsuit against defendant

Hyundai Motor Manufacturing of Alabama, LLC, claiming

that it violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981 by retaliating against

* This amended opinion replaces the opinion entered

on April 13, 2026 (Doc. 76), Coleman v. Hyundai Motor

Manufacturing of Alabama, LLC., 2026 WL 999480 (M.D. Ala.

2026) (Thompson, J.).

1. There are two other plaintiffs in this case; the

summary-judgment motion against them will be addressed

separately and later.

him when he complained of race discrimination.?

Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal

question) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (civil rights). Before

the court is Hyundai’s motion for summary judgment. For

the reasons below, the motion will be granted in favor

of Hyundai and against Coleman.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment may be granted “if the movant shows

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In deciding a motion for

summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all

reasonable inferences from the facts in favor of that

party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). When “the record taken

as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to

2. Coleman initially also brought a

race-discrimination claim, but he has since abandoned it.

See -Pl.’s Br. Opp’n (Doc. 54) at 2 n.1.

find for the non-moving party,” summary judgment is

appropriate. Id.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts, taken in the light most favorable to

Coleman, are as follows.

A. Hyundai

Hyundai operates a car-manufacturing plant in

Montgomery, Alabama. As with many companies, it has a

corporate ladder that employees can climb to reach the

top. Opposite the promotion ladder sits the disciplinary

process designed to address employee-performance issues.

As to the promotion ladder, Hyundai has several

departments, and each department has the following

ladder. At the first rung are ‘team members,’ who are

assigned to work in teams of about six-to-eight ina

department. Each team is supervised by a ‘team leader,’

the position on the second rung of the ladder. There are

two positions on the third rung: ‘group leaders’ and

‘specialists.’ Group leaders oversee a group of teams,

including the leaders of those teams, that work in a

specific area, such as the chassis area. Specialists,

as their name implies, specialize in a particular

job--for example, purchasing or quality control. They

operate more independently, and, unlike many of Hyundai’s

other positions--which are often blue-collar assembly

line jobs with late hours or night shifts--specialist

positions are often white-collar jobs with a 9:00 a.m.

to 5:00 p.m. schedule.

The final three rungs on the corporate ladder involve

junior- and senior-management positions. First,

‘assistant managers’ oversee an entire area of a

department and directly supervise specialists and group

leaders. Second, ‘managers’ supervise the assistant

managers and oversee an area of a department. Third and

finally, the ‘Head of a Department’ oversees the managers

and supervises an entire department--for example, the

General Assembly Department.

Hyundai has formal multi-step processes for

employees seeking to climb the corporate ladder.

Relevant here is the following six-step process for

promotions to assistant manager or below. First, when a

position opens, the company creates an online post on its

Career Opportunity Program portal; eligible employees may

apply to that position through that post. Second, once

the application submission period ends, the Human

Resources Department, also known as HR, screens

applications and weeds out employees who are ineligible

for the posted position. Third, the remaining applicants

“are required to respond to a questionnaire about their

experience and skills or to take an assessment--depending

upon the position for which they are applying.” Fletcher

Decl. (Doc. 43-20) ¶ 4. Fourth, a group of applicants

with sufficiently high questionnaire scores is chosen to

be interviewed by a panel. The panel includes at least

one representative from HR and one from the Hiring

Department. After the interview, the panel fills out a

matrix that grades each candidate based on a combination

of factors including the applicant’s interview

performance, work history, work performance, and

qualifications. Fifth, that matrix is given to the

Hiring Department which then recommends an even smaller

list of applicants composed of those “whose final [matrix

score] is above an established threshold.” Id. ¶ 6.

Sixth and finally, the Hiring Department’s recommendation

is sent to HR for approval.

Opposite the promotion process is the disciplinary

process. Hyundai’s disciplinary process involves a

series of progressively increasing punishments; the

appropriate punishment is largely based on the nature of

the employee’s performance issue and his disciplinary

history. Ordinarily, a supervisor will first respond to

a performance issue by making a ‘discussion planner.’ A

discussion planner is used to investigate the issue and

start ‘a conversation’ between the employee and his

supervisor about why the issue is happening, as well as

how to fix it. Yet if the employee’s performance issue

is severe enough, or if he continues to have a milder

performance issue despite a discussion planner, his

supervisor may take ‘corrective action.’ There are four

escalating phases of corrective action ranging from Phase

I (informal discussion) to Phase IV (decision leave).

When a corrective action is issued, employees may appeal

the decision. The appeal first goes up the chain of

command, and, if upheld, Team Relations then collaterally

reviews the appeal. That said, corrective actions are

rarely reversed.

Internal complaints of discrimination (including

retaliation) are handled a bit differently, through a

five-step process. First, employees who wish to file a

complaint of discrimination or retaliation are encouraged

to inform Team Relations. Second, Team Relations then

notifies the General Counsel’s office of the complaint.

Third, the Counsel’s office then directs Team Relations

to conduct a formal investigation and create a report of

its findings. Fourth, the report is sent to the

Employment Review Committee, which determines whether the

complaint is valid. Fifth and finally, a senior HR

Manager will discipline an employee found to have

discriminated against another.

To keep track of its internal investigations, Hyundai

has a document that contains the details of complaints

of discrimination. While the Legal Department maintains

the list, most director-level employees may request

permission to access it.

B. Coleman

Coleman, who is African-American, was hired as a team

member in 2012 in Hyundai’s car manufacturing plant in

Montgomery, Alabama. In 2017, he was promoted to team

leader in the General Assembly Department.

1. The ‘Master Swann’ Incident

Three years later, in October 2020, Dan Smith, a

white assistant manager at Hyundai, made a racially

derogatory remark to a group of mostly African-American

employees, including Coleman.

While Coleman was on a break with a group of 30 to

40 other employees, Smith approached the group and stated

that “Master Swann wants y’all inside.” Coleman Dep.

(Doc. 43-18) at 20:6. Smith was referring to Jeff Swann,

a white manager in the General Assembly Department. Many

employees felt that the comment was inappropriate given

the racial implication of referring to a white man as the

‘master’ of a group, the majority of whom were African-

American. But, because they feared retaliation, nobody

in the group reported the remark.

About four months later, in February 2021, another

Hyundai employee heard about Smith’s remarks and reported

the incident. In response, Hyundai’s Team Relations

department investigated the incident. It interviewed

Coleman and a few other employees as part of its

investigation. ?

3. In the aftermath of the interview, Edward Daniels

testified that two Team Relations members--Ta’Lon Brown

and Michael Finley--warned him to “be careful because [he

has] got a dot on [his] back.” Daniels Dep. (Doc. 53-2)

at 43:16-44:3. Coleman testified that Daniels relayed

this warning to him. See Coleman Dep. (Doc. 43-18) at

82:6-84:23. Coleman maintains this is evidence of

“retaliatory bias.” Pl.’s Br. Opp’n (Doc. 54) at 38

Two days after Team Relations interviewed Coleman

about the incident, Swann issued Coleman a Phase III

corrective action for using his phone on the production

line. Coleman, however, was not using his phone, and the

phone, instead, fell out of his pocket while he was

rushing to cover an open station. Coleman appealed the

corrective action, and Team Relations eventually reversed

that disciplinary action.

About a month later, Swann and Smith were forced to

resign due to unrelated performance issues, but their

resignations did not end Coleman’s troubles.‘ In October

2021, Coleman received several corrective actions, often

at the behest of Bobbie Ford, an assistant manager, who

(“[T]he record contains a strong volume of other evidence

of retaliatory bias.”). However, this account is

inadmissible hearsay. Moreover, even if it were

admissible, this warning came after Daniels spoke to Team

Relations in response to the demand letter his attorney

sent to Hyundai. There is no evidence--outside of

Coleman’s deposition--that the warning had to do with the

investigation into the ‘Master Swann’ incident.

4. There is conflicting evidence in the record over

whether Smith’s resignation was because of unrelated

performance issues, his use of racially insensitive

language, or both.

10

was a friend of both Smith and Swann. And, five months

later, Coleman unsuccessfully applied to a specialist

position in the HR Department.

2. The Letter of Complaint

By July 2022, Coleman was so upset with his treatment

over the past year and a half, that he sent a letter to

Team Relations. The letter charged that he was being

“discriminated [against] and picked on by [his] group

leader [and] management team.” Coleman Letter

(Doc. 43-18) at 58. It also detailed several corrective

actions that he felt were unfairly issued. The letter

did not specifically mention ‘racial’ discrimination.

After sending the letter, Coleman met with then-Head

of the General Assembly Department, Phil Vessenmeyer.

Coleman told Vessenmeyer that he was concerned he was

being targeted by his management team. Vessenmeyer told

Coleman that if he wanted to be a group leader he should

“stop with all these complaints and [see] what [he] can

do to make [his] management team happy.” Coleman Depo.

(Doc. 53-1) at 62:11-13. Over the following months,

Coleman applied three more times for a promotion but was

never chosen.

3. This Litigation

On November 17, 2022, Coleman and other Hyundai

employees initiated litigation against Hyundai. Coleman

claimed that the company retaliated against him for

complaining of race discrimination. He continued seeking

a promotion after this suit was filed. Also, from June

to October 2023, he was temporarily assigned to be a

group leader to help fill in a vacancy. See id. at

99:5-10. Despite applying for a permanent promotion to

that position, the company promoted someone else from

another shift. See id. at 100:23-101:2.

III. COLEMAN’S RETALIATION CLAIM

A.Procedural Background

As stated, on November 17, 2022, Coleman and other

Hyundai employees filed a federal lawsuit in this court:

12

Coleman v. Hyundai Motor Manufacturing of Alabama,

2:22cv666-MHT (M.D. Ala.), which this court will refer

to as Coleman I. They asserted various claims of race

discrimination and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981:

On March 26, 2025, the court split Coleman I into

three lawsuits. See Coleman Vv. Ayundai Motor

Manufacturing of Alabama, LLC, 2:22cv666-MHT, 2025 WL

915037 (M.D. Ala. March 26, 2025) (Thompson, J.) (holding

that severance of the parties was proper). The three

cases are Ingram v. Hyundai, 2:22cv666-MHT (M.D. Ala.);

Trimble v. Hyundai, 2:22cv235-MHT (M.D. Ala.); and

Coleman v. Hyundai, 2:25cv236-MHT (M.D. Ala.), which the

court will refer to as Coleman II.°

Coleman II is the case now before the court. It has

three plaintiffs: Frederick Coleman, Edward Daniels, and

5. The court has resolved both the Ingram and Trimble

cases in Hyundai’s favor: Ingram v. Hyundai Motor

Manufacturing of Alabama, LLC., 792 F.Supp.3d 1268 (M.D.

Ala. 2025) (Thompson, J.), and Trimble v. Hyundai Motor

Manufacturing of Alabama, LLC., 792 F.Supp.3d 1275, 1278

(M.D. Ala. 2025) (Thompson, J.).

13

Jimmy Williams. Only Coleman’s aspect of the case is

before the court on summary judgment in this opinion.

Discussion

Coleman’s sole claim is that Hyundai violated 42

U.S.C. § 1981 by retaliating against him when he

complained of race discrimination. “Section 1981

prohibits intentional race discrimination in the making

and enforcement of public and private contracts,

including employment contracts.” Ferrill v. Parker Grp.,

168 F.3d 468, 472 (11th Cir. 1999). As part of that

prohibition, the statute forbids retaliation against

individuals who complain of race discrimination. See

CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 445 (2008).

For employment contracts, § 1981 borrows from

another statute the framework for analyzing retaliation

claims: the antiretaliation provision of Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (a). See

Gogel v. Kia Motors Mfg. of Ga., Inc., 967 F.3d 1121,

1134 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc). Under that framework,

14

a plaintiff must prove three elements. First, he must

show that he engaged in a “protected activity.” Id.

Second, he must establish that the alleged retaliation

he suffered was “materially adverse, which in this

context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable

worker from making or supporting a charge of

discrimination.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.

White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (quotation omitted) .®° Third

6. In his complaint and briefing, Coleman split his

Single retaliation claim into two counts. The first

count was for a ‘failure to promote’ and the second was

for a ‘retaliatory hostile-work environment.’ This

argument structure has caused confusion between the

parties; in particular, it has caused them to argue over

the elements required to prove a retaliatory hostile-work

environment claim. However, such a claim has the same

elements as all retaliation claims.

In Monaghan v. Worldpay US, Inc., 955 F.3d 855 (11th

Cir. 2020), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

explained when allegedly suffered conduct is actionable:

“First, some events are substantial enough

standing alone to be actionable. These have

sometimes been referred to as ‘tangible’ or

‘adverse’ employment actions.

“Tangible employment actions consist of things

that affect continued employment or pay--things

like terminations, demotions, suspensions

without pay, and pay raises or cuts ... . A

claim that an employee has suffered a tangible

15

employment action ... is sometimes referred to

as a disparate-treatment claim.

“Second, mistreatment ... is actionable even if

the mistreatment does not rise to the level of

a tangible employment action, but only if the

mistreatment is sufficiently severe or pervasive

that it can be said to alter the terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment. A claim

based on this kind of mistreatment is often

referred to as a hostile-environment claim. ...

“Third, mistreatment based on retaliation for

protected conduct--for example, making or

supporting a charge of discrimination--is

actionable whether or not the mistreatment rises

to the level of a tangible employment action,

but only if the mistreatment ‘well might have

dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or

supporting a charge of discrimination.’ ...

[T]his retaliation standard protects employees

more broadly--and is more easily satisfied--than

the standard applicable to claims of

discrimination.”

Monaghan, 955 F.3d at 860-61 (quoting Burlington N. &

Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. at 68) (other citations and

quotations omitted).

Therefore, there is no need to show a hostile

environment to prove a retaliation claim: the analyses

are distinct, and a retaliation claim is an easier

standard to meet than a hostile-environment claim. The

sole issue presented in determining whether the plaintiff

suffered an adverse action in a retaliation claim is

whether the mistreatment well might have dissuaded a

reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of

discrimination.

16

and finally, he “must demonstrate that ‘[his] protected

activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse

action by the employer.’” Gogel, 967 F.3d at 1135

(quoting Univ. of Tx. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S.

338, 362 (2013)).

Coleman asserts three theories of retaliation: that

he was retaliated against for his cooperation in the

investigation of the ‘Master Swann’ incident; for sending

the July 2022 letter of complaint; and for initiating

litigation back in 2022.

1. The ‘Master Swann’ Incident

To begin, Coleman claims that Hyundai employees

retaliated against him because he cooperated in Hyundai’s

internal investigation of Smith’s racially derogatory

remark. He states that in the days and months following

the investigation he received several disciplinary

actions from people connected to Swann and that he was

repeatedly denied a promotion. The problem is that

Coleman has not established that his interview with Team

Relations was protected activity--a necessary element to

establish a prima-facie case of retaliation.

For § 1981 employment claims, the Eleventh Circuit

Court of Appeals has looked to Title VII’s

antiretaliation provision to define protected activity.

That provision contains two clauses: a ‘participation’

clause and an ‘opposition’ clause. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-3.

The participation clause prohibits an employer from

retaliating against an employee “because he has made a

charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any

manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under

[Title VII].” Id. “This clause protects proceedings and

activities which occur in conjunction with or after the

filing of a formal charge with the [Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC)]; it does not include

participating in an employer’s internal, in-house

investigation, conducted apart from a formal charge with

the EEOC.” E.E.O.C. v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d

1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 2000). Coleman concedes that the

interview with Team Relations was not participation since

it was not conducted in connection with the EEOC.

The opposition clause prohibits an employer from

retaliating against an employee for his “opposition to

conduct reasonably believed to be violative

of ... § 1981.” Little v. United Techs., Carrier

Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956, 961 (11th Cir. 1997). To

prove that he engaged in opposition, Coleman must show

(1) “not only ... that he subjectively (that is, in good

faith) believed that his employer was engaged in unlawful

employment practices,” but (2) “also that his belief was

objectively reasonable in light of the facts and record

presented.” Id. at 960 (emphasis in original).

For starters, it is unclear what unlawful employment

practice Coleman asserts that he was opposing. His

brief, for the most part, engages in generalities and

conclusory comments. Under the heading “Coleman’s

retaliatory hostile environment claim,” Pl’s Br. Opp’n

(Doc. 54) at 30, the brief states: “The ‘Master Swann’

comment ... came from a managerial level figure and the

context of the observation, a vilely paternalistic

expression of racial privilege, could well indicate a

discriminatory mindset by certain leadership at

[Hyundai]: that is the essence of ‘objectively

reasonable’ ‘opposition to an unlawful employment

practice.’” Id. The brief then continues: “Given those

facts, Coleman engaged in protected activity within the

meaning of § 1981. Coleman has presented sufficient

evidence for his retaliatory hostile environment claim

to advance to a jury.” Id. at 31-32. While it is

unclear, the court will assume that Coleman is contending

that his interview with Team Relations was protected

activity. To the extent that one racially derogatory

comment followed by an investigation into it could create

a racially hostile-work environment, Coleman has provided

no evidence that he subjectively believed that he was

opposing a business practice that violated § 1981 when

he participated in the investigation of the ‘Master

Swann’ incident. And even if he did satisfy the

subjective prong, his belief would not be objectively

reasonable. The court will address the subjective and

objective elements in turn.

First, regarding his subjective belief, Coleman in

his brief is not clear as to exactly what he was opposing

with regard to his reliance on Smith’s ‘Master Swann’

comment and Hyundai’s later investigation into it, and

the court has no independent obligation to search the

record for evidence of Coleman’s subjective belief. See

Edwards v. Hyundai Motor Mfg. Alabama, LLC, No.

2:07cv908-MHT, 2009 WL 1257164, at *3 (M.D. Ala., 2009)

(Thompson, J.) (“The court, in considering a

summary-judgment motion, [is] under no obligation to comb

hundreds of pages of depositions in search of evidence

contradicting arguments made by the movants.” (citing

Jones v. Sheehan, Young & Culp, P.C., 82 F.3d 1334, 1338

(5th Cir. 1996) (“Rule 56 ... does not impose upon the

district court a duty to survey the entire record in

search of evidence to support a non-movant’s

opposition.”))); see also Chavez v. Sec’y Fla. Dept. of

Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1061 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[D]istrict

court judges are not required to ferret out delectable

facts buried in a massive record.”). Alternatively, as

a basis for finding that Coleman has not satisfied the

subjective-belief element, the court would note that

Coleman explicitly stated that he believed Smith’s

comment was “a joke.” Team Relations Report (Doc. 43-19)

at 8. And, in his depositions, when asked if he had

complained to somebody about the ‘Master Swann’ incident,

Coleman stated: “Actually we was called up [to Team

Relations]. At the time, when the situation happened,

when [Smith] first said it, I didn’t complain.” Coleman

Depo. (Doc. 53-1) at 22:10-17. Admittedly, the Team

Relations report includes other comments, but Coleman

does not point to those comments to support his

contentions, and, as stated, the court has no obligation

to do this work for him.’ See Edwards, 2009 WL 1257164,

at *3.

7. Even had Coleman pointed to this other evidence

in his brief, which he did not, he would still have needed

to demonstrate in his brief that the evidence reflected

that he subjectively believed he was opposing employment

practices proscribed by § 1981.

22

Second, even if Coleman believed that he was opposing

an unlawful business practice, his belief would have been

objectively unreasonable. “The objective reasonableness

of an employee’s belief that [his] employer has engaged

in an unlawful employment practice must be measured

against existing substantive law.” Clover v. Total Sys.

Servs., Inc., 176 F.3d 1346, 1351 (11th Cir. 1999). Here,

Coleman discussed only Smith’s comments and related

events during his interview, and not any tangible

employment policies, and, moreover, in the heading to his

brief framed his argument about the ‘Master Swann’

incident as “Coleman's retaliatory hostile environment

claim.” Pl’s Br. Opp’n (Doc. 54) at 30.

But a belief that Smith’s comments were enough to

show Hyundai violated § 1981 by creating a racially

hostile-work environment is objectively unreasonable.

“[T]o hold an employer responsible under [§ 1981] for a

hostile environment created by a supervisor or co-worker,

a plaintiff must show that the employer knew or should

have known of the harassment in question and failed to

take prompt remedial action.” Little, 103 F.3d at 959.

While Smith’s comments were racially derogatory, there

is no evidence that Hyundai “knew or should have known

of the [comments] in question and failed to take prompt

remedial action.” Id. The comments went unreported for

several months, and once they were reported, the company

quickly conducted the very investigation in which Coleman

took part. Therefore, the context of the situation in

which Coleman made the comments that he asserts reflects

his oppositional conduct--his participation in the Team

Relations investigation into the ‘Master Swann’

incident--manifests that the company took prompt action

to investigate the incident once it learned of Smith’s

comment.

Alternatively, to the extent Coleman believes that

he was opposing a racially hostile-work environment more

generally, this belief also fails to amount to protected

activity. While Coleman may have subjectively believed

that he was opposing an employment practice that violated

§ 1981, the belief would have been objectively

unreasonable on the facts presented. Again, he has

produced no evidence that Hyundai knew of any practices

that violated § 1981 and “failed to take prompt remedial

action.” Little, 103 F.3d at 959.

Accordingly, Coleman fails to show that he engaged

in protected activity regardless of the underlying facts

he relies on in asserting a racially hostile-work

environment that violates § 1981.

2. The Letter of Complaint

Next, Coleman submits that he was retaliated against

because of his July 2022 letter “alleging that he was

being targeted for unfair discipline.” Pl.’s Br. Opp’n

(Doc. 54) at 12. He contends that, after he submitted

that letter, Hyundai retaliated against him by denying

him a promotion. Once again, however, he has not produced

enough evidence to establish a claim of retaliation.

First, there is the question whether Coleman has

shown that his July 2022 letter was protected activity.

Section 1981 prohibits race discrimination solely, and

therefore, to be protected activity, any opposition must

indicate that the opposed conduct was racially motivated.

See Little, 103 F.3d at 961 (“It is well-established that

§ 1981 is concerned with racial discrimination in the

making and enforcement of contracts.” (emphasis in

original)). Coleman’s letter does not expressly mention

race; nor does it refer to the ‘Master Swann’ incident

or investigation. Coleman also did not give such an

indication during his meeting with Head of General

Assembly Vessenmeyer.

However, as is almost always true, context matters.

In his letter, Coleman charged that he was being

“discriminated [against] and picked on by [his] group

leader [and] management team.” Coleman Letter

(Doc. 43-18) at 58 (emphasis added). Whether one could

reasonably assume that a reader of the letter, knowing

that it had been written by an African-American within

the context of employment, would know that the writer

likely meant ‘discriminated against because of race’ is

a question this court need not reach. For, even if the

letter were protected activity, Coleman has not shown

that it was the but-for cause of his failure to be

promoted.

For starters, Coleman has produced no evidence that

Vessenmeyer, or anyone who knew of his letter, was

involved in the hiring process, let alone was a

decision-maker in that process. “To demonstrate a causal

connection, the plaintiff must show that (1) the

decision-maker knew of [his] protected activity, and (2)

the protected activity and adverse action were not wholly

unrelated. A plaintiff satisfies this first element by

showing that the decision-maker was aware of the

plaintiff’s formal complaint prior to the

adverse-employment action. When the protected activity

and the adverse action occur in close proximity, a

plaintiff can generally establish the second element

concerning relatedness.” Dixon v. DTA Sec. Servs., No.

20-12040, 2021 WL 5320987, at *3 (11th Cir. Nov. 16,

2021) (internal citations omitted). Coleman has produced

no evidence that the decision-maker who denied him a

promotion knew of his letter or his conversation with

Vessenmeyer. Nor is there evidence that the

decision-maker had access to Hyundai’s list of complaints

of discrimination or that Coleman’s letter was part of

that list.

Even further, Coleman has not rebutted the

nonretaliatory reasons that Hyundai gave for its

selections. An employer may refuse to promote an

employee “for a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based

on erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as long as

its action is not for a discriminatory reason.” Nix v.

WLCY Radio/Rahall Commc’ns, 738 F.2d 1181, 1187

(11th Cir. 1984), abrogated on other grounds by Lewis v.

City of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2019).

“[F]ederal courts do not sit to second-guess the business

judgment of employers.” Pennington v. City of

Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1267 (11th Cir. 2001)

(citation omitted). And, therefore, when an employer

gives a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for its

decision, “the employee must confront the employer’s

seemingly legitimate reason ... ‘head on and rebut it.’”

Kidd v. Mando Am. Corp., 731 F.3d 1196, 1206

(11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d

1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000)).

Coleman applied to two positions after he submitted

his letter in July 2022, and Hyundai gave reasons for its

selections of three individuals over Coleman. First, he

applied to a General Assembly group leader position in

August 2022; the company submits that it chose Monshikki

Bonner for that position because of her relevant

experience, “leadership skills, positive attitude, and

willingness to assist her team.” Davis Decl. (Doc.

43-25) ¶ 4. Another General Assembly group leader

position became available in October 2022, and those who

applied to the previous listing--including Coleman--were

considered for this opening. See R. Brown Decl.

(Doc. 43-23) at 17-19. The company submits that it chose

Latarence Brown for this position because of his relevant

experience, “attention to quality,” and “leadership

skills.” Id. ¶ 4. Second, Coleman applied to an Engine

Quality Control group leader position in October 2022.

The company asserts that he was ineligible for the

position because he scored a ‘D’ on the matrix. And the

company represents that it selected Marquetta Brown for

a litany of reasons related to her skills, personal

qualities, experience, and relationships with others.

While Coleman makes two arguments in response,

neither rebuts Hyundai’s reasons for its selections.

First, Coleman argues that Hyundai did not give

legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for its selections.

He asserts that it did not give reasons for

why he was not selected but that it only gave reasons for

why other employees were selected. He is mistaken; as

when the company gave its reasons for selecting the

chosen candidates, with those reasons it also gave

legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for why he was not

selected. See Alexander v. Fulton Cnty., 207 F.3d 1303,

1341-42 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding that an employer gave

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its selection

when it gave a reason for why another employee was

selected), overruled on other grounds by Manders v. Lee,

338 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2003); see also Trimble v.

Hyundai Motor Mfg. of Alabama, LLC, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1275,

1281 (M.D. Ala. 2025) (Thompson, J.) (“[W]when the

company gave its reasons for selecting the chosen

candidates, with those reasons it clearly also gave

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for why [the

plaintiff] was not selected.”).

Second, Coleman provides statistical evidence that

he believes shows the promotion decisions were part of a

coordinated practice of retaliation. He asserts that he

and three other Hyundai employees who filed suit against

the company alleging race discrimination collectively

submitted 72 applications for various promotions over

roughly four years. The company selected someone who did

not complain each time.

Coleman’s statistic is riddled with errors. For one,

many of the applications involved positions for which the

employees were ineligible or were submitted before they

complained of discrimination. Therefore, Coleman’s

assertion that he and three other employees who

complained were collectively denied promotions 72 times

is quite misleading. He also has not provided an analytic

foundation for his statistic, and therefore, it is

“virtually meaningless.” Brown v. Am. Honda Motor Co.,

939 F.2d 946, 952 (11th Cir. 1991). “To say that very

few [applicants who complained of race discrimination]

have been selected by [Hyundai] does not say a great deal

about [Hyundai’s] practices unless we know how many [of

those applicants] applied and failed and compare that to

the success rate of equally qualified [applicants who did

not complain].” Id.; see also Trimble v. Hyundai Motor

Manufacturing of Alabama, LLC, 792 F.Supp.3d 1275, 1280

(M.D. Ala. 2025) (Thompson, J.) (“The problem is that

Trimble offers no evidence to back up his allegations of

a pattern of racial discrimination. He has not provided

employee files, resumes, or job applications (outside of

those for which he and two other employees applied). Nor

has he produced demographic data about the employees in

Hyundai’s various departments or who applied to the

specialist or leadership positions. The only supporting

evidence is Trimble’s own beliefs. But ‘[a] mere belief

of the existence of a fact is not evidence of that fact.’”

(quoting Ingram v. Hyundai Motor Manufacturing of

Alabama, LLC., 792 F.Supp.3d 1268, 1274 (M.D. Ala. 2025)

(Thompson, J.))).

3. This Litigation

Coleman pursues a third and final theory: he

represents that he did not receive a promotion because

he sued Hyundai in 2022. While filing a § 1981 lawsuit

is a protected activity and being denied a promotion is

an adverse-employment action, Coleman’s last theory still

has a problem: he has not established but-for causation.

Coleman asserts that from the beginning of June 2023,

to the end of October 2023, he was filling in as a group

leader. He explains that during that time he did very

well, and several other group leaders were rooting for

him. However, Hyundai did not select him for the

full-time role for this position; instead, the company

selected a leader from another shift.

The problem here is that Coleman provides no evidence

that his lawsuit was the reason he was not promoted.

For starters, October 2023, when the selection was

presumably made, was nearly a year after Coleman filed

suit, and, therefore, it is too long for temporal

proximity alone to establish causation. See Thomas v.

Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir.

2007) (“But mere temporal proximity, without more, must

be ‘very close.’” (quoting Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v.

Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001))). The Eleventh

Circuit has held that “[a] three to four month disparity

between the statutorily protected expression and the

adverse employment action is not enough” to be considered

temporally proximate. Id. Therefore, Coleman cannot

rely on temporal proximity to meet the burden of

Moreover, there is no evidence regarding the

selection process that would allow the court to analyze

whether Coleman has otherwise met his causation burden.

Coleman has not shown who the decision-maker was for the

position, whether that person had knowledge of the

lawsuit, or what that person’s selection criteria were.

He has also failed to provide comparator evidence

regarding who was selected and what their relative

qualifications were. As a result, there is no way to

know why the chosen job applicant was selected over

Coleman. Indeed, it is an open issue as to whether the

chosen applicant had also filed a complaint or lawsuit.

Finally, Coleman has not even shown that he was eligible

for the promotion.

In essence, Coleman’s assertion that his being passed

over for the promotion was retaliatory is without any

back-up evidence other than that many of his supervisors

liked him. His final theory therefore fails too.

IV. CONCLUSION

Because Coleman has not produced enough evidence for

a jury to reasonably find that Hyundai retaliated against

him in violation of § 1981, the company’s

35

summary-judgment motion should be granted in its favor

on Coleman’s claim. However, because there are two other

plaintiffs with claims in this case, the court will not

enter a final judgment on Coleman’s claim at this time.

DONE, this the 20th day of April, 2026.

/s/ Myron H. Thompson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE