Villarreal

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

TEXARKANA DIVISION

JUSTIN AARON VILLARREAL PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 4:23-cv-04099-JTS-SGS

SERGEANT JOSHUA WATSON; and

SERGEANT JAIMOND JOHNSON DEFENDANTS

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This is a civil rights action originally filed pro se by Plaintiff, Justin Aaron Villarreal, under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff was appointed counsel on September 19, 2025 to represent him in this

matter. (ECF No. 69). Currently before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

(ECF No. 73). Plaintiff responded. (ECF No. 80). Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1) and (3) (2011) the Honorable Susan O. Hickey, United States District Judge, referred

this case to the undersigned for the purpose of making a Report and Recommendation.1 The Court

finds the matter ripe for consideration and recommendation.

As an initial matter, Plaintiff clarifies, in his Response, that he is only pursuing the claim

of excessive force against Defendants in their individual capacities. Therefore, the Court will not

enumerate Plaintiff’s additional claims made in his Complaint or address facts and arguments

asserted by Defendants in their Motion related to any additional claims. (ECF No. 80, p. 1). The

Court considers Plaintiff’s Response to voluntarily dismiss all such claims.

1 Effective April 29, 2026, this matter has been reassigned to the Honorable John Thomas

Shepherd, United States District Judge.

I. FACTUAL BACKROUND

At all times relevant, Plaintiff was incarcerated in the Southwest Arkansas Community

Corrections Center in Texarkana, Arkansas (hereinafter “SWACC”) as a convicted inmate.2 (ECF

No. 1, p. 2). Defendants were both employed as officers at SWACC, during this time, which is

operated by the Arkansas Division of Corrections. (ECF No. 73-1, p. 1).

The parties’ versions of events vary widely on this summary judgment record. The Court

will enumerate all material facts below with indications as to relevant disputes when necessary.

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendants used excessive force against him on July 3,

2023. (ECF No. 1, p. 4). Specifically, Plaintiff states:

On July 3rd 2023 at approx.. 11:15 pm Joshua Watson and Jiamond Johnson

approached me in the dayroom on 4th floor they told me to go to my room, room

436. I did in the room Jaimond Johnson was talking to me while Joshua Watson

was behind me. As I was speaking to Jaimond Johnson Joshua Watson began

punching me. Jaimond Johnson put a handcuff on my left wrist and pulled my arm

back he grabbed my other arm and held me in a restraint while Joshua Watson

continued to punch me. I was placed on the ground and then the handcuff was put

on my right wrist. I was then escorted to Intake 104 afterward so I had an black

eye and bloody nose and a busted lip. I also had a migraine that lasted six days. I

was knocked unconscious.

(ECF No. 1, pp. 4-5) (errors in original).

It is undisputed that on the night of July 3, 2023, nonparty Cathy Barden, a corporal at

SWACC, oversaw monitoring the fourth-floor residents, one of which was Plaintiff. (ECF Nos.

73-1, pp. 1-2; 81, p. 2). Plaintiff was housed in room 431. Id. Room 431 was the designated

“noncompliance” room for the fourth floor of SWACC. Id. Noncompliance is the status given to

residents when they break rules of the facility, or their assignment after a term in solitary

confinement but prior to their release to the general population. (ECF Nos. 73-1, pp. 2; 73-3, p.

2 Plaintiff is currently incarcerated in the Harris County Jail in Houston, Texas. (ECF No. 81, p.

1).

11; 81, p. 2). During a noncompliance assignment, a resident is required to stay in their room and

may only leave their room for work or a class. Id. Plaintiff was housed in room 431 alone during

the time in issue. (ECF Nos. 73-1, p. 2; 73-3, p. 18; 81, p. 2).

Corporal Barden testifies in her Declaration that when she arrived for her shift on July 3,

2023, the officer she was relieving informed her that Plaintiff was impermissibly leaving his room

during that officer’s shift. (ECF No. 73-1, p. 2). Plaintiff disputes this fact as he testified in his

deposition that nonparty Mr. Franklin removed him from noncompliance status earlier that same

day. (ECF No. 73-3, p. 15). Plaintiff does admit it is correct that he was in the day room watching

television when Corporal Barden arrived on the fourth floor. (ECF Nos. 73-1, p. 2; 81, p. 3). If,

still on noncompliance, Plaintiff was required to remain at least three squares inside his room,

meaning at least three floor tiles inside the room. (ECF No. 73-1, p. 2).

It is also undisputed that Corporal Barden confronted Plaintiff when she arrived on the

floor, and Plaintiff explained to her that Mr. Franklin had released him from noncompliance. (ECF

Nos. 73-1, p. 3; 81, p. 3). Mr. Franklin is a member of the staff over discipline at SWACC. (ECF

No. 73-1, p. 3; 81, p. 3). Corporal Barden testified, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that there was

no paperwork to prove Mr. Franklin removed Plaintiff from noncompliance status and Plaintiff

was still listed on the noncompliance marker board on the floor. (ECF No. 73-1, p. 3, 81, p. 3).

Corporal Barden then testifies she asked Plaintiff to return to his room several times.

According to Corporal Barden, Plaintiff approached his doorway but did not enter it. Instead,

Plaintiff began cussing and acting aggressively. (ECF Nos. 73-1, p. 3). Plaintiff disputes Corporal

Barden’s rendition of this interaction. Plaintiff points to the witness statements of Wayne

Honeycutt and David Berry which both state Plaintiff did enter his room. (ECF Nos. 73-11; 73-

12). Plaintiff also states he went into his room in his verified Complaint. (ECF No. 1, p. 4).

Plaintiff also disputes that he initiated the cursing between himself and Corporal Barden again

citing the witness statement of David Berry which states: “they had more words which

escalated . . . .” (ECF No. 73-12).3

It is undisputed that Corporal Barden then called Defendant Johnson to help her with

Plaintiff. Defendant Johnson arrived on scene with Defendant Watson. (ECF No. 73-1, p. 3).

Plaintiff does not dispute that he participated in cursing and yelling with Defendants once they

arrived, but disputes that he called anyone a racial slur. (ECF Nos. 73-1, p. 3; 73-3, pp. 8, 20).

Plaintiff also testified he showed Defendant the paperwork indicating he was released from

noncompliance status. (ECF No. 73-3, p. 23).

Defendant Watson testified in his Declaration that once he and Defendant Johnson arrived

on the fourth floor:

[Plaintiff] was given three orders to return to his room and he went to the doorway

before he began yelling and cussing at staff. At this time [Defendant] Johnson gave

[Plaintiff] four verbal orders to stop yelling at staff and get 3 squares back into his

room.”

(ECF No. 73-2, p. 2). Plaintiff disputes Defendant Watson’s testimony. Specifically, Plaintiff

alleges he was inside his room either in his bed or climbing into his bed by the time the altercation

between himself and Defendants began. (ECF No. 73-3, pp. 8, 21-22).

Corporal Barden testified that both Defendants Watson and Johnson told Plaintiff to “cuff

up” but he refused to submit to hand restraints. Plaintiff appeared to stiffen up and would not

allow the Defendants to handcuff him. One of the Defendants was then able to get one wrist

cuffed, but Plaintiff jerked back and took the handcuffs. At this point Corporal Barden called for

3 Plaintiff also cited his Complaint for his dispute regarding the cussing; however, the Court does

not read any statements about cussing in Plaintiff’s Claim One on excessive force. (ECF No. 1,

pp. 4-5).

back-up because Plaintiff is a “big, tall man and [she] was worried about the safety of the

[Defendants].” (ECF No. 73-1, p.3). Plaintiff disputes that he was ordered to “cuff up.” (ECF

No. 73-3, p. 22-23). Specifically, Plaintiff testified that if Defendants ordered him to cuff up, he

would have put the cuffs on to keep himself out of trouble. Id.

Defendant Watson’s testimony does not include any reference to Plaintiff stiffening up to

avoid the cuffs as Corporal Barden’s does, but he does state additional details as follows:

[Plaintiff] ignored all orders to enter his room. Therefore, I placed his left hand in hand

restraints. Before I could secure his right hand, [Plaintiff] pulled away and took the

restraints away from me. [Defendant] Johnson and I attempted to place [Plaintiff on the

floor but [Plaintiff elbowed [Defendant] Johnson in the eye and broke his glasses. [Plaintiff

then struck me in the head several times with a closed fist. In order to regain control, I

delivered four strikes to his brachial plexus origin.

After I delivered blows to the brachial plexus origin, [Plaintiff] kicked and kneed me in my

left thigh until we were finally able to restrain him with the help of Cpl. Zachary Mauldin,

Cpl. Tara Clements, and CO1 William Wilson.4

(ECF No. 73-2, p. 3). Plaintiff denies that he resisted or hit, kicked, or kneed either Defendant.

(ECF Nos. 73-3, p. 8-; 81, p. 5).

Corporal Barden testified that the officers “mostly” tried to grab Plaintiff’s arms and torso

when trying to restrain him, but it was difficult to get Plaintiff to the floor because he was inside

his room with his back against the bed. Additionally, Corporal Barden testified that no officer

punched Plaintiff in his face. (ECF No. 73-1, pp. 3-4). Plaintiff disputes Corporal Barden’s

terminology of “mostly.” Further, Plaintiff disputes Corporal Barden’s testimony regarding the

punching. Plaintiff testified in his deposition that he was punched ten times, and both Defendants

punched him in the face. (ECF No. 73-3, p. 44, 29). Finally, Corporal Barden testified that

4 It is undisputed that the brachial plexus origin is the collarbone area between the neck and

shoulder and that Defendant Watson was trained to strike this area if needed to gain compliance

of an inmate. (ECF Nos. 73-2, p. 3; 81, p. 5).

Plaintiff was the aggressor in the incident on July 3, 2026, and that she did not witness either

Defendant do anything improper during the incident. (ECF No. 73-1, p. 4). Plaintiff disputes this

testimony. (ECF No. 81, p. 6).

It is undisputed that Defendants, along with the other officers that were called for back-up,

were eventually able to restrain Plaintiff when nonparty Corporal Mauldin grabbed his leg and

took him to the ground. (ECF Nos. 73-1, p. 3; 81, p. 3).

In his deposition Plaintiff testified his version of events:

Q . . . Why did you file this lawsuit?

. . .

A. Well, . . . July 3rd . . . the staff over discipline, SOD Mr. James Franklin, . . .I

was placed on noncompliance a couple of weeks before, and for the Fourth of July

he took me off, done all the paperwork . . ..

Well, I had went back to the floor. I presented the paperwork to the officer

beforehand, I can’t remember his name exactly. . . .they didn’t do a room change,

which is normally what they would do . . .

So around 11:25 or so, [Defendant] Joshua Watson and [Defendant] Jiamond

Johnson had approached me in the day room on the fourth floor, right, and I was

watching TV. They was, like, hey, you’re on – or we’re placing you, this is exactly

what they said: We’re placing you on noncompliance. I said Mr. Franklin took me

off today. He said something about . . . Corporal Barden, didn’t feel comfortable

with you being on the floor for off of noncompliance if you didn’t go through the

correct procedures as everybody else did. I told him, well, y’all aren’t SOD, you

know, so how can you just sanction me that sanction that SOD didn’t sanction me

with, right?

He's like well, you can either go to your room right now or you can go to the hole.

I was like oh, I’ll go ahead and go the room . . . I was standing there by my bed,

and they came back in there. They’re like, don’t come out anymore for the rest of

the night, don’t come out tomorrow . . . That’s when I showed him the paperwork

because I was given it back. They’re like, we don’t care about this. We’re going

to talk to Mr. Franklin . . . so I said, all right, cool. . . .

I’m surprised y’all don’t have the video of them exiting the room and then coming

back again . . . I don’t remember exactly what all was said in this process. I know

for a fact they started to get mad over something, and I’m just kind of like I have

no control over this, you know. I think they were saying something along the lines

it isn’t right that SOD just does whatever without following the procedures, or

something like that.

Well, in this process I did say some cuss words. . . Both parties were cussing and

getting mad, and at that point I just said man, fuck it, I’m going to bed.

As I was climbing up in my bed, Watson was like, where do you think you’re going?

You know, just kind of like I’m through talking about this, right? At this point

there’s a crowd of people just at the door. Corporal Barden, a bunch of other

people, like residents and stuff and Watson, I guess that was the last point for him,

the final straw, I don’t know. He seems to really have bad anger problems anyways,

so as I turn, dude, boom, hits me.

Q. This is Watson, you’re saying?

A. Yeah. So I turned around kind of like what the, you know? Then Johnson

grabbed me, right, and Watson continued to hit, right? So I’m just like, this is crazy.

So Ms. Barden called, I guess, the use of force or whatever, and Mauldin came in,

Montiel came, Clements came in, Wilson came in, and a couple of other people . . .

I wasn’t fighting back or none of that stuff.

(ECF No. 73-3, pp. 6-9).

Defendant Watson testified in his Declaration:

At no point did I use any force that was disproportionate to what the situation called

for. I only deployed enough force to gain control over [Plaintiff]. I had no previous

personal disputes with [Plaintiff]. I had no desire to cause him any type of harm.

[Defendant] Johnson did not strike [Plaintiff’s] face during this incident. I never

used excessive force against [Plaintiff]. I have never used physical force to retaliate

against [Plaintiff] for any past behavior.

(ECF No. 73-2, p. 3). To the contrary, Plaintiff testified that he and Defendant Watson had

previously dated the same woman at different times so there was “no love loss” between them.

(ECF No. 73-3, p. 23).

It is undisputed that after the incident Plaintiff was taken to Intake Cell 104 and seen by

medical personnel. Plaintiff’s medical record note he had abrasions to his right eyebrow and

underneath his right eyeball. Additionally, Plaintiff’s right wrist was slightly swollen with no

bruising or discoloration. Plaintiff was given an ice pack. (ECF Nos. 73-4, p. 3; 81, p. 6). Plaintiff

also fell off his bed on the morning of July 3, 2023 (prior to the use of force incident) and was seen

by medical personnel. During that visit it was noted Plaintiff suffered superficial wounds to his

right forehead and right check. (ECF Nos. 73-5, p. 3; 81, p. 7).

In connection with the use of force incident on July 3, 2023, Plaintiff was charged with a

Cardinal Rule violation. (ECF No. 73-7).

Defendant Johnson completed a signed statement on July 3, 2023 describing the use of

force incident which is consistent with Defendant Watson’s Declaration testimony. (ECF No. 73-

4, p. 1). However, Defendant Johnson did not submit a declaration or any other sworn testimony

on this summary judgment record.

The summary judgment record also includes signed statements from: (1) Plaintiff; (2) the

other nonparty officers that participated in the incident; and (3) other inmates who witnessed

portions of the incident. Plaintiff did not dispute any of these witness statements. (ECF No. 81,

pp. 8-10). Those statements that the Court finds material are included herein.

Plaintiff completed his Incident Statement on July 3, 2026 at 2300 hours:

Sgt Johnson & Sgt Watson were talking to me in my room. I had my hands in my

pockets talking to Sgt. Johnson. Sgt. Watson then assaulted me twice I then started

defending myself. Sgt. Johnson told Sgt. Watson to quit but he didn’t. Sgt Watson

grabbed my middle area (testicles). I hit him again out of self-defense. Then

Mauldin, Montiel and Clements came in. Sgt. Watson was separated and I let them

put me in cuffs. I was taken to the hole. I have sustained injuries and want to file

assault charges PREA and a restraining order on Sgt. Watson.

(ECF No. 73-6) (cleaned up).

Corporals Mauldin, Clements, and Wilson’s statements all indicate they were called in to

assist but the incident was already in progress when they arrived. They all state they helped

Defendants get Plaintiff cuffed and on the ground. There is no mention of any party punching,

hitting, or kneeing at any other party in any of the officers’ statements. (ECF Nos. 73-8; 73-9; 73-

10).

Fellow inmate, Wayne Honeycutt, wrote the following statement on July 3, 2023 at 11:30

p.m.:

I Honeycutt was in the dayroom when Villarreal was asked to go back to his room.

Villarreal did not want to go back. After being asked more than two or three times

and after the CO said, go back to your room or go to the hole he went to his room.

After he went to his room I didn’t see what happened in the room of 431. All I saw

was about 5 or 6 CO’s go in the room and took Villarreal out.

(ECF No. 73-11) (cleaned up).

Fellow inmate, David Berry, wrote the following statement on July 3, 2023 at 11:20 p.m.:

On the above date and time, while watching TV in the day room Villarreal was

asked to return to the noncompliance room and he refused saying he was no longer

on noncompliance but they had no movement or release sheet so he went to the

room where they had more words which escalated to them asking him if he wanted

to go to the hole and to cuff up then they went into a commotion and other officers

arrived and he was lead out of the floor.

(ECF No. 73-12) (errors in original).

Fellow inmate, Moises Robles, wrote the following statement on July 3, 2023 at 11:15

p.m.:

I was on my bed after the 11:00 pm count and I heard yelling so I got out of my bed

and walked to the gray and was hearing Ms. Barton telling Villarreal to let go of

him and to stop.

(ECF No. 73-13) (errors in original).

Fellow inmate, Roberto Ugalde, wrote the following statement on July 3, 2023 at 11:15

p.m.:

Villarreal was having a verbal dispute with Sgt. Johnson, Ms. Barten and another

C.O. over his status of non-compliance Villarreal insisted he was off non-

compliance and the C.O.s said there was no paperwork or evidence of his release

from non-compliance. The C.O.s directed Villarreal to return to this room which

eventually he did. Villarreal continued to argue his case from his doorway. Sgt.

Johnson warned Villarreal that if he continued to be disrespectful he’d be going to

the hole. Sgt. Johnson then told Villarreal to cuff up. From there I only heard

arguments as they were inside room 431. After a few minutes I heard the sounds

of a physical scuffle. At one point Villarreal exclaimed “You’re gonna hit me” and

“on my momma” and “come in here.” More C.O.s then appeared and took

Villarreal off the floor.

(ECF No. 73-14) (errors in original).5

The video footage submitted on this summary judgment record is not of the incident in

question. Instead, it is Plaintiff being escorted through the intake area of SWACC after the incident

occurred. (ECF No. 73-3, pp. 47-52). The video is 17 seconds long and offers no evidence of the

use of force itself. However, the video does show that Plaintiff is not resisting and is walking

willingly with the officers. Further, Plaintiff’s face does not appear bloody, and there is no blood

on his shirt.

The Plaintiff testified in his deposition that he was unsure why the video from the day room

outside his room was not produced. Id. at 47-48. Defendants offer no explanation for this in their

briefing.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the record “shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). “Once

a party moving for summary judgment has made a sufficient showing, the burden rests with the

non-moving party to set forth specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a genuine

5 Fellow inmate, Martinez, also wrote a statement but it started with “I did not see anything.”

Martinez did describe what he heard but he also does not identify any offices by name in his

statement. (ECF No. 73-15). The Court does not find this statement adds any new information to

the summary judgment record.

issue of material fact exists.” Nat’l Bank of Comm. v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602, 607 (8th Cir.

1999).

The non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. “They must show there is sufficient

evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor.” Nat’l Bank, 165 F.3d at 607. “A case founded

on speculation or suspicion is insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 610.

“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the

record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts

for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380

(2007).

III. DISCUSSION

In their Motion, Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity against Plaintiff’s

excessive force claim. (ECF No. 75). Specifically, Defendants assert Plaintiff cannot establish

any of the elements of excessive force—unnecessary, excessive or cruel, or that Defendants

“delighted” in using the force. Defendants rely on Plaintiff’s inconsistencies in his Complaint,

incident statement, and deposition in support of this argument. Defendants argue they have met

their summary judgment burden, but Plaintiff has failed to meet proof with proof. Finally,

Defendants argue the only reliable account of the force used was offered by Defendant Watson

and that account shows the force was justified as a good faith effort to maintain or restore

discipline. Id.

In his Response, Plaintiff argues Defendants mischaracterize his statements as starkly

different and mischaracterize the other witness statements as consistent. (ECF No. 80). Moreover,

Plaintiff argues without video evidence of the use of force, an inmate’s allegations or testimony

that contradicts a guard’s statement creates genuine issues of material fact precluding summary

judgment. Finally, Plaintiff argues that Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity because

it is well settled that repeatedly striking a fully restrained inmate violates the Eighth Amendment.

Id.

As an initial matter, the Court finds there are genuine issues of material facts on this

summary judgment record as is obvious from the factual section above: (1) whether Plaintiff was

in fact released from noncompliance and showed the papers proving such release to Defendants;

(2) whether Plaintiff eventually complied with the Defendants orders and returned to his room;

(3) whether Plaintiff was resisting and refusing orders when the first use of force occurred;

(4) whether the use of force was four hits to the brachial plexus origin or ten punches to the face;

(5) whether Defendants followed Plaintiff into his room escalating the interaction after Plaintiff

complied with the order to return to his room; and (6) whether Plaintiff’s injuries were caused by

the use of force.

While Defendants argue that the only reliable description of the use of force is from

Defendants, they have claimed qualified immunity. Such an analysis on summary judgment

requires the Court to view any factual disputes in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. See

Nance v. Sammis, 586 F.3d 604, 609 (8th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff’s version of events is not blatantly

contradicted by the record here. Cf. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (a video on the

record blatantly contradicted the plaintiff’s version of events). Furthermore, the Court will not

weigh Plaintiff’s credibility against Defendants’ credibility on summary judgment. See Reeves v.

Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000) (explaining the court must draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party and may not make credibility

determinations or weigh the evidence as those are jury functions). Accordingly, the Court will

proceed in analyzing Defendants’ claim of qualified immunity using the undisputed facts

enumerated above along with those facts as alleged or testified to by Plaintiff.

Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity “shields [a] government official[] from liability in a § 1983 action

unless the official’s conduct violates a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which

a reasonable person would have known.” Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 495 (8th

Cir. 2009). Qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly

violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). “At summary judgment, qualified

immunity shields a law enforcement officer from liability in a § 1983 action unless: (1) the facts,

viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate the deprivation of a constitutional

or statutory right; and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the deprivation.” Watson

v. Boyd, 2 F.4th 1106, 1109 (8th Cir. 2021) (internal citation and quotations omitted). The Court

may use its discretion in determining which of these two prongs to address first. Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). If a constitutional right was not clearly established at the

time of deprivation, then the Court need not determine whether the particular plaintiff’s

constitutional rights were violated based on the facts before it because the defendant is entitled to

qualified immunity regardless. See Dimock, v. City of Brooklyn, et. al, 124 F.4th 544, (8th Cir.

2024).

For this analysis, the Court looks to the law at the time of the incident in July 2023. The

Supreme Court has cautioned that “clearly established law should not be defined at a high level of

generality.” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017) (internal citation and quotation omitted). A

right is clearly established if it is sufficiently clear for every reasonable official to understand the

actions would violate a constitutional right. Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (per curiam)

(internal quotations omitted). The case precedent must not be directly on point, but it must place

the constitutional question beyond debate. White, 580 U.S. at 79 (internal citation and quotation

omitted). The Eighth Circuit recently expounded on this standard by explaining “[a] clearly

established right is dictated either by controlling authority or a robust consensus of cases of

persuasive authority.” Dimock, 124 F.4th at 550 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The

Dimcok Court went on to explain the legal principle must “clearly prohibit the officer’s conduct in

the particular circumstances before him.” Id.

When analyzing qualified immunity on summary judgment the Court must view the facts

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in the

nonmoving party’s favor. Nance, 586 F.3d at 609.

Use of Force – Eighth Amendment Violation

Defendants do not deny they used force against Plaintiff on July 3, 2023. Instead,

Defendants argue the force used does not qualify as excessive because Defendants did not apply

such force maliciously or sadistically to cause harm. (ECF No. 75, pp. 5-6).

“After incarceration, only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel

and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.” Burns v. Eaton, 752 F.3d 1136,

1138 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)). In evaluating an

excessive force claim under the Eighth Amendment, the relevant inquiry is whether the force used

was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or was used to maliciously and

sadistically to cause harm. See U.S. v. Miller, 477 F.3d 644, 647 (8th Cir. 2007). The infliction

of pain during a prison security measure does not amount to cruel and usual punishment simply

because it may appear, in hindsight, that the degree of force applied for security purposes was

unreasonable or unnecessary in the strict sense. Burns, 752 F.3d at 1138-9 (8th Cir. 2014). This

standard is different and less protective than the standard applied to arrestees or pretrial detainees

under the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment standard does not consider the officer’s

underlying intent, “whereas the subjective motivations of the individual officers are of central

importance in deciding whether force was used maliciously and sadistically to cause harm in

violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 1139 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

In determining whether a prison guard acted maliciously and sadistically the Court may

consider factors such as: (1) “whether there was an objective need for force;” (2) “the relationship

between any such need and the amount of force used;” (3) “the threat reasonably perceived by the

correctional officers;” (4) “any efforts by the officers to temper the severity of their forceful

response;” and (5) “the extent of the inmate’s injury.” Ward v. Smith, 844 F.3d 717, 721-22 (8th

Cir. 2016) (citations omitted).

1. An objective need for force

There are clearly issues of fact regarding the events leading up to the Defendants’ use of

force here, namely: (1) whether Plaintiff followed the orders to go back inside his room;

(2) whether Plaintiff was acting aggressively towards the officers (nonparties or Defendants);

(3) whether Plaintiff was given and followed orders to “cuff up;” and (4) whether plaintiff

punched, hit, or kneed Defendant Watson.

The facts as alleged by Plaintiff show he eventually followed orders and went back to his

room where he was getting in the bed when Defendants followed him and escalated the altercation

into physical force. (ECF No. 73-3, pp. 6-9).

While the Court disagrees with Defendants’ characterization of Plaintiff’s statements being

widely inconsistent, it does recognize the credibility issues in some inconsistencies presented by

Plaintiff. However, his claims are not blatantly contradicted by the record here. Cf. Scott v. Harris,

550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (a video on the record blatantly contradicted the plaintiff’s version of

events). Here, there is no video evidence of the use of force,6 and a jury may choses to believe

Plaintiff’s claims and testimony over the contradicting evidence. At this stage, it is not the Court’s

role to weigh evidence or determine credibility. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530

U.S. 133, 150 (2000) (explaining the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the

nonmoving party and may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence as those are

jury functions).

An appropriate use of force to regain control over a recalcitrant inmate that is intentionally

disobeying orders, using profanity, or threatening officers is objectively reasonable. See Jones v.

Shields, 207 F.3d 491, 496 (8th Cir. 2000). However, a use of force on an inmate who initially

disobeyed an order but was complying before the force is exercised is not objectively reasonable.

See Fisherman v. Launderville, 100 F.4th 978, 981 (8th Cir. 2024) (a guard who kneed and kicked

an inmate while fully handcuffed and kneeling on the floor of his cell was not entitled to qualified

immunity even though the inmate had a history of threatening staff, was housed in the unit’s most

restrictive unit, was being transferred for a security violation, and initially refused a strip search);

see also Estate of Davis by Ostenfeld v. Delo, 115 F.3d 1388, 1394-5 (8th Cir. 1997) (a guard who

punched an inmate multiple times while other guards held the inmates limbs even though the

inmate had stopped resisting orders was denied qualified immunity).

6 The Court recognizes the video produced showing Plaintiff walking for 17 seconds after the

incident occurred, but this evidence does nothing to dispel the contradictory testimony from

Plaintiff, Defendant Watson, and the witnesses.

Considering the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, as it must at this stage, the

Court concludes a jury may find the Defendants’ use of force was completely unnecessary as

Plaintiff was already complying with the order and going to bed. Id.

2. Relationship between the need for force and amount used

As with the need for force, there are genuine material issues of fact as to the amount of

force used, specifically: (1) whether Defendant Watson punched Plaintiff ten times in the head or

only hit him four times in the brachial plexus origin; and (2) whether Defendant Johnon held

Plaintiff’s arms behind him in restraint while Defendant Watson hit him. Taking Plaintiff’s version

of the facts that he was in his room, and getting in his bed, when Defendant Watson struck him for

the first time, a jury may likely find there was no need for force. Plaintiff had complied with the

order to return to his room prior to any use of force, thus rendering any use of force after the fact

maliciously applied. See Fisherman, 100 F.4th at 981 (citing Dean v. Jones, 984 F.3d 295, 310

(4th Cir. 2021) (“[A] correctional officer uses excessive force if he maliciously uses force against

an inmate who has been subdued, even if force might have been justified to control the inmate

only moments before.”)); see also Estate of Davis, 115 F.3d at 1394-5.

3. The threat reasonably perceived

It is well established that an inmate’s refusal to lock down in his cell poses a risk to the

security of the SWACCC facility as a whole and may warrant the use of force to secure the inmate

and restore discipline to the facility. See Burns, 752 F.3d at 1139 (the Eighth Circuit found an

inmate’s refusal of a direct order to “catch the cuffs” and return to his cell from the shower posed

a threat and the ordering officer’s use of pepper spray to restore discipline did not violate the

inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights). There is also testimony on the summary judgment record

from Corporal Barden that Plaintiff is a big and tall man that is consistently on noncompliance for

rule violations and misbehavior. (ECF No. 73-1, pp. 2-3). Finally, Plaintiff conceded in his

deposition that he participated in the cursing and yelling with the Defendants and other officers

and could be “wild” sometimes. (ECF No. 73-3, pp. 8, 24, 31).

However, this summary judgment evidence is in direct contradiction to Plaintiff’s

allegations and testimony that he eventually conceded and returned to his room for bed. (ECF

Nos. 1, pp. 4-5; 73-3, p. 6-9). Additionally, multiple witnesses also wrote in their statements that

Plaintiff returned to his room prior to any use of force. (ECF Nos. 73-11; 73-12; 73-14; 73-15).

Taking the facts as alleged by Plaintiff, Defendants used force against him after he complied with

the order to return to his room. As explained by the Eighth Circuit in Fisherman, it does not matter

that an inmate was combative prior to the use of force if when the force was used the Plaintiff was

subdued. See Fisherman, 100 F.4th at 981; see also Estate of Davis, 115 F.3d at 1394-5.

Accordingly, a jury may determine by the time the force was used, the threat had dissipated

and would not be reasonable perceived.

4. Defendants’ efforts to temper his response

The only evidence related to Defendants’ efforts to temper their response is Defendant

Watson’s testimony in his Declaration:

I have never used excessive force against an inmate. I have only ever used the least amount

of force necessary for compliance, when the situation calls for it and in accordance with

training from ADC . . . At no point did I use any force that was disproportionate to what

the situation called for. I only deployed enough force to gain control of Mr. Villarreal . . .

I had no desire to cause him any type of harm.

(ECF No. 73-2, p. 1, 3).

However, as explained, Plaintiff alleges Defendants followed him into his room and

escalated the interaction rather than tempering their response. (ECF No. 73-3, pp. 6-9). The

inmate witness statements also support this version of events as well. (ECF Nos. 73-11; 73-12;

73-14; 73-15).

5. The extent of Plaintiff’s injury

The extent of Plaintiff’s injuries is the final factor the Court must consider. Here, Plaintiff

claims injuries of loss of consciousness, a black eye, bloody noses, and facial abrasions, and a

severe migraine for days. (ECF Nos. 1, p. 9; 73-3, p. 45). While the video evidence dispels the

claim of a bloody nose (as noted above no blood is present immediately following the incident

while Plaintiff is escorted to lockdown), see Scott, 550 U.S. at 380, there is summary judgment

evidence, in Plaintiff’s medical records, indicating Plaintiff had facial abrasions and complained

of a migraine after the incident. (ECF Nos. 73-4, p. 3; 81, p. 6). The Court recognizes Defendants’

theory that these abrasions were caused by Plaintiff’s fall from his bunk earlier in the day on July

3, 2023, instead of the incident. However, this is yet another issue of fact for a jury to decide. It

is not the Court’s place, on summary judgment, to determine Plaintiff’s credibility and whether his

abrasions and headache were caused by the fall or by Defendants’ fists. A jury may determine

Plaintiff credible and find he was injured during the use of force incident with Defendants Watson

and Johnson rather than the fall.

Furthermore, the minor nature of Plaintiff’s injuries does not foreclose a claim of excessive

force. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 38 (2010) (explaining the extent of the plaintiff’s injury is

only one factor to consider in analyzing excessive force, and “[a]n inmate who is gratuitously

beaten by guards does not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim merely because he

has the good fortune to escape without serious injury.”). If those injuries claimed by Plaintiff are

found by a jury to have resulted from Defendants use of force, then he has satisfied the Eighth

Amendment injury requirement. See Munz v. Michael, 28 F.3d 795, 800 (plaintiff suffered

soreness to his ribs or a rib contusion after guard beat him while restrained).

After considering all the factors, the Court finds, if a jury believes Plaintiff’s version of

events, it may find Defendants followed him into his room after he was, albeit begrudgingly,

complying with their orders, to maliciously and sadistically restrain and beat him thus violating

his Eighth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. See Estate of Davis by Ostenfeld v.

Delo, 115 F.3d 1388, 1394-5 (8th Cir. 1997); see also Ward, 844 F.3d 721-22.

Clearly Established Right

As the Court finds a jury may determine Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights were violated

through Defendants’ use of force, it must next determine whether Plaintiff’s rights to be free from

excessive force in his particular circumstances were clearly established at the time the incident

occurred. See Watson, 2 F.4th at 1109.

Plaintiff argues that the law has been settled for at least three decades that repeatedly

striking a fully restrained inmate violates the Eighth Amendment. The Court agrees. See

Fisherman v. Launderville, 100 F.4th 978, 981 (8th Cir. 2024) (explaining the defendant guard

was not entitled to qualified immunity because an inmate’s right to be free from kneeing and hitting

while handcuffed and kneeling on the floor of his cell was clearly established for at least three

decades). However, the facts alleged by Plaintiff here do not establish he was already handcuffed,

as the plaintiff in Fisherman, when Defendant Watson repeatedly struck him. Instead, Plaintiff

claims Defendant Watson hit him while he talking to Defendant Johnson in his room, and while

Defendant Johson “restrained” his arms behind his back. However, all of this occurred before

Plaintiff was taken to the floor and handcuffed. (ECF No. 1, pp. 4-5). Given these facts, as alleged

by Plaintiff, the Court finds Fisherman distinguishable from the instant circumstances for the

purpose of determining “clearly established” rights for qualified immunity purposes. Plaintiff does

not make any allegations that he was hit after being fully handcuffed. (ECF Nos. 1; 73-3; 73-6).

While the case law must not be directly on point, it must place the constitutional question

beyond debate. White, 580 U.S. at 79. The Fisherman case discusses and reiterates that beating a

handcuffed inmate violates said inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights against cruel and unusual

punishment, but it does not address facts similar to the instant case where the inmate was not yet

handcuffed but was otherwise restrained by additional guards. However, the Eighth Circuit has

previously addressed analogous circumstances more consistent with the ones presented here. In

Estate of Davis by Ostenfeld v. Delo, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding of

excessive force and determined the law was clearly established in October 1992 that striking an

unresisting inmate 20-25 times in the head, while four other officers were restraining his limbs

was a violation of the inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights against cruel and unusual punishment.

115 F.3d 1388, 1394-5 (8th Cir. 1997). The Davis Court went on to explain it was also clearly

established that those officers that restrained Mr. Davis’s limbs during the beating violated his

Eighth Amendment rights. Id. at 1395. While the inmate in Davis suffered more extreme injuries

than Plaintiff here, the facts of the use of force are analogous. Mr. Davis initially refused orders

to be handcuffed so that his cell could be searched. Id. at 1391-2. In response to this refusal a

“movement team” was assembled and sent into Mr. Davis cell. Id. Upon the arrival of the

movement team, Mr. Davis attempted to explain his refusal to cuff up but was immediately ordered

to lie face down on the cell floor. Plaintiff complied and a guard lunged on top of Mr. Davis and

repeatedly struck him about the head and face. Id. at 1391-2. Four other guards held Mr. Davis’s

limbs while the beating occurred. Id.

Here, Plaintiff, like Mr. Davis, initially refused orders to return to his room but then

complied. He returned to his room and was getting into bed when Defendant Watson entered his

room and began punching him. (ECF No. 73-3, pp. 6-9). Then, Defendant Johnson restrained

Plaintiff’s arms behind his back so that Defendant Watson could continue to punch him. (ECF

No. 1, pp. 4-5). The Court finds that every reasonable official would understand such actions by

both Defendants violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment against

excessive force. See Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 11.

In conclusion, considering the undisputed facts along with those disputed facts in the light

most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court holds Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity at

this time, and summary judgment should be denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, I recommend the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

(ECF No. 73) be DENIED. However, Plaintiff’s Claim Two for denial of medical care; Claim

Three for falsifying documents; and all official capacity claims against both Defendants Watson

and Johnson should be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as Plaintiff has stated in his

Response (ECF No. 80) that he wishes to voluntarily dismiss such claims. This leaves for further

litigation only Plaintiff’s Claim One for excessive force against Defendants Watson and Johnson

in their individual capacities only.

Referral Status: The referral in this matter should be terminated.

The parties have fourteen days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation in

which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely

objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are

reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the

district court.

DATED this 1st day of May 2026.

Spencer G. Singleton

/s/

HON. SPENCER G. SINGLETON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE