Stephens

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FORT SMITH DIVISION

KARLA D. STEPHENS PLAINTIFF

vs. Civil No. 2:25-cv-02115

FRANK BISIGNANO DEFENDANT

Commissioner, Social Security Administration

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Karla D. Stephens (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the Social

Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying her application for Disability

Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Act.

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and (3), the Honorable Timothy L. Brooks,

Chief Judge, referred this case to this Court for the purpose of making a report and recommendation.

In accordance with that referral, and after reviewing the arguments in this case, this Court

recommends Plaintiff’s case be REVERSED AND REMANDED.

1. Background

Plaintiff filed her disability application on November 15, 2023. (Tr. 17).1 Plaintiff alleged

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disability due to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, asthma, anxiety, depressed mood,

chronic sleep impairment, impaired impulse control, near-continuous panic, total occupational and

social impairment, mild memory loss, and suspiciousness. (Tr. 271). Her application was denied

initially and again upon reconsideration. (Tr. 17).

1 The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “ECF No. __.” The transcript

pages for this case are referenced by the designation “Tr.” and refer to the document filed at ECF No.

7. These references are to the page number of the transcript itself and not the ECF page number.

Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing on her denied application, and this hearing

request was granted. (Tr. 103-194). A hearing was held on April 8, 2025. (Tr. 38-63). At this

hearing, Plaintiff was present and represented by counsel, Laura McKinnon. Id. Plaintiff and

Vocational Expert, (“VE”) Zachariah Langley testified at this hearing. Id.

On April 23, 2025, after the administrative hearing, the ALJ entered a fully unfavorable

decision denying Plaintiff’s disability application. (Tr. 17-32). In this decision, the ALJ determined

Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Act through December 31, 2027. (Tr. 19, Finding

1). The ALJ also determined Plaintiff had not engaged in Substantial Gainful Activity (“SGA”) since

October 22, 2022. (Tr. 19, Finding 2).

The ALJ determined Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: post-traumatic stress

disorder (PTSD), depression, anxiety, and back pain with mild degenerative changes. (Tr. 19, Finding

3). The ALJ then determined Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments

that met or medically equaled the requirements of any of the Listings of Impairments in Appendix 1

to Subpart P of Regulations No. 4 (“Listings”). (Tr. 20, Finding 4).

In this decision, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and determined her

Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”). (Tr. 22-30, Finding 5). First, the ALJ indicated he evaluated

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and found they were not entirely credible. Id. Second, the ALJ

determined Plaintiff had the RFC medium work, except could understand, remember, and carry out

simple instructions; could use judgment to make simple work-related decisions; could have

occasional interactions with supervisors, coworkers, and the public; and could deal with occasional

changes in a routine work setting. Id.

The ALJ then evaluated Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work (“PRW”). (Tr. 30, Finding 6). The

ALJ determined Plaintiff was not capable of performing her PRW. Id. However, the ALJ found there

were jobs in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. (Tr. 30,

Finding 10). With the help of the VE, the ALJ found Plaintiff could perform the representative

occupations of (1) dishwasher with approximately 129,000 jobs in the nation, (2) hospital cleaner

with approximately 37,000 jobs in the nation, and (3) warehouse worker with approximately 164,000

jobs in the nation. Id. Based upon this finding, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had not been disabled

from October 22, 2022, through the date of this decision. (Tr. 31, Finding 11).

Plaintiff sought review with the Appeals Council. (Tr. 1-6). The Appeals Council denied this

request. Id. On September 26, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this case. ECF No. 2. Both Parties

have filed appeal briefs. ECF Nos. 9, 11. This matter is now ripe for consideration.

2. Applicable Law

In reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s

findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)

(2010); Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than a

preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to

support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001). As

long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision, the

Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have

supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case differently. See

Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001).

If, after reviewing the record, it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the

evidence and one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must

be affirmed. See Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000). It is well-established that a

claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of proving his or her disability by

establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least one year and that prevents him or her

from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A);

Cox v. Apfel, 160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998). The Act defines a “physical or mental impairment”

as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which

are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C.

§§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that his or her disability, not simply his or her

impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses the

familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently engaged

in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that significantly

limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3) whether the

claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment listed in the

regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work experience);

(4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform his or her past

relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to the

Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can

perform. See Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only considers

the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the final stage of this

analysis is reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).

3. Discussion

In her appeal brief, Plaintiff claims the ALJ’s disability determination is not supported by

substantial evidence in the record. ECF No. 9 at 6-18. Specifically, Plaintiff raises the following

arguments for reversal: (1) the ALJ erred by failing to fully and fairly develop the record (2) the ALJ

erred at Step Two, and (3) the ALJ’s RFC assessment is not supported by substantial evidence in the

record. Because the undersigned finds the ALJ erred in finding her hearing loss was non-severe, this

case must be reversed and remanded.

A claimant suffers from a severe impairment if that impairment is more than slight and if that

impairment affects the claimant’s ability to do his or her basic work activities. See Householder v.

Bowen, 861 F.2d 191, 192 n.1 (8th Cir. 1988). The Supreme Court has also held that a claimant does

not suffer from a severe impairment where the claimant only suffers from “slight abnormalities that

do not significantly limit any ‘basic work activity.’” See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 155 (1987)

(O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see also Brown v. Bowen, 827 F.2d 311, 311-12 (8th

Cir. 1987) (adopting Justice O’Connor’s language from Bowen v. Yuckert). See also Kirby v. Astrue,

500 F.3d 705, 707-09 (8th Cir. 2007).

Furthermore, the standard for determining whether a claimant suffers from a severe

impairment is a low standard. See Nicola v. Astrue, 480 F.3d 885, 887 (8th Cir. 2007) (reversing the

decision of the ALJ and holding that a diagnosis of borderline intellectual functioning should have

been considered severe because that diagnosis was supported by sufficient medical evidence). If the

ALJ errs by finding a severe impairment is not severe, the ALJ’s disability determination must be

reversed and remanded. See Nicola, 480 F.3d at 887.

In this case, Plaintiff alleged being disabled due to, among other things, a hearing loss.

Although she did not allege hearing loss as an impairment in her application, she did testify at the

administrative hearing about the level of hearing loss in both ears, the issues with communication it

causes, and the difficulty with wearing hearing aids. (Tr. 54). The medical record shows Plaintiff

was diagnosed with bilateral sensorineural hearing loss. (Tr. 702-703). The record also found the

level of hearing loss could cause some communication problems which could be helped with hearing

aids. Id.

In the present case, the ALJ did not consider Plaintiff's hearing loss as an impairment at Step

Two or in the RFC. As recognized above, the standard for determining whether an impairment is

severe is a low standard—the impairment need only be slight and affects the claimant’s ability to do

work activities. Based upon the record, Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence demonstrating her

hearing loss impairment meets the standard of a severe impairment. Thus, this case must be reversed

and remanded for further consideration of this issue and a determination as to whether any of

Plaintiff’s other impairments meet this low standard.

4. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the decision of the ALJ, denying benefits

to Plaintiff, is not supported by substantial evidence and recommends it be REVERSED AND

REMANDED.

The Parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of this Report and Recommendation

in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely

objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The Parties are

reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the

district court. See Thompson v. Nix, 897 F.2d 356, 357 (8th Cir. 1990).

ENTERED this 1st day of May 2026.

Spencer G. Singleton

/s/

HONORABLE SPENCER G. SINGLETON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE