Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

GEORGE PAYNE JR,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:23-CV-909-CCB-SJF

INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Indiana Department of Corrections’ (“IDOC”)

Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF 60). Plaintiff George Payne, Jr., opposes this

motion. (ECF 68). IDOC’s motion is denied for the following reasons.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

This is an employment discrimination case. Mr. Payne alleges in his operative

complaint that he was demoted by his employer, IDOC, as a result of race and sex

discrimination. (ECF 12 at 5). IDOC now moves for summary judgment, arguing that (1)

Mr. Payne cannot show that he was meeting IDOC’s legitimate expectations, (2) he

cannot point to a more-favorably-treated comparator, (3) there is no evidence that Mr.

Payne’s race or sex caused the demotion, and (4) IDOC’s decision to demote Mr. Payne

was legitimate and nondiscriminatory. (ECF 61 at 1–2).

The undisputed facts are these:

Mr. Payne began his employment with IDOC as a correctional officer in 1991.

(ECF 62-1 at 10:2–7). Between 1991 and 2015, Mr. Payne worked at Indiana State Prison,

Maximum Control Complex, and Westville Correctional Facility, where he held the

titles of Correctional Officer, Sergeant, Lieutenant, Captain, Lead Captain, and Major.

(Id. at 10:2–18:18). In 2015, he was promoted to Deputy Warden at Westville

Correctional Facility. (Id. at 18:14–23).

Typically, two Deputy Wardens are assigned to each IDOC facility. (Id. at 18:24–

19:2). Their job description is the same, but they are assigned to different duties. (Id. at

19:3–15). The Deputy Warden of Operations focuses on custody staff, food service

schedules, recreation schedules, and day-to-day operations. (ECF 62-6 at 9). In contrast,

the Deputy Warden of Re-Entry focuses on programs, case planning, offender services,

and rehabilitation. (Id.)

Mr. Payne initially served as the Deputy Warden of Operations at Westville.

(ECF 62-1 at 32:11–14). In 2016, about a year later, he transitioned into the Deputy

Warden of Re-Entry role. (Id. at 19:16–20). In 2017, he was transferred to Indiana State

Prison as Deputy Warden of Operations, (id. at 26:4–13), and in 2019 he was transferred

to Miami Correctional Facility (“MCF”) as Deputy Warden of Operations, (id. at 30:1–7).

MCF was known as a violent prison, with a reputation for stabbings and assaults

on staff. (ECF 67-1 at 25:20–26:12). It housed particularly difficult offenders. (ECF 67-2 at

103:17–21, 105:3–24). At the time of Mr. Payne’s transfer, the Warden of MCF was

William Hyatte. (ECF 62-1 at 33:3–15). Mr. Payne’s counterpart, the Deputy Warden of

Re-Entry, was initially Sharon Hawk. (Id. at 32:11–14). Ms. Hawk was replaced by

Jacqueline Scaife no later than March 2021, though the parties dispute exactly when that

transition occurred. (Id. at 32:11–23). Ms. Scaife is a Black woman who began her career

with IDOC in 2007. (ECF 62-6 at 9).

Beginning on May 8, 2022, Warden Hyatte took leave from MCF due to a

personal family matter. (ECF 62-5 at 60:6–61:20). During part of the time that Warden

Hyatte was on leave, Mr. Payne also took leave for personal reasons. (ECF 62-1 at 68:22–

69:13). While Warden Hyatte and Mr. Payne were on leave, Ms. Scaife became Acting

Warden of MCF. (Id.) During this time, she was the lone administrator at the facility.

(ECF 62-3 ¶ 9). Warden Hyatte began to return to MCF “on and off” in June or July

2022. (ECF 62-5 60:6– 61:20).

In the summer of 2022, while Warden Hyatte was on leave, multiple inmate

deaths occurred in quick succession at MCF. (ECF 62-2 at 11:5–9). Two inmates were

stabbed to death, and another inmate death was linked to drugs. (Id. at 11:10–17). At the

time of the deaths, Mr. Payne was the Deputy Warden of Re-Entry at MCF, and Ms.

Scaife was the Deputy Warden of Operations. (Id. at 13:4–14:9). Shortly before the

deaths, Mr. Payne and Ms. Scaife had switched roles, with Ms. Scaife transitioning from

Deputy Warden of Re-Entry to Operations, and Mr. Payne transitioning from Deputy

Warden of Operations to Re-Entry. (Id. at 13:4–12).

After the deaths, IDOC and the Indiana State Police both began investigating

MCF. (Id. at 15:2–8). The IDOC investigative team interviewed MCF staff and took a

culture survey. (Id. at 20:24–21:9). Additionally, the team looked into the general

operations of MCF. (Id.) Following the departure of the investigative team, Richard

Curry and Richard Brown were assigned to MCF as temporary administrators. (Id. at

23:17–22). Mr. Curry is Black, and Mr. Brown is white. (ECF 62-1 at 162:7–15).

The IDOC investigative team prepared an assessment of MCF (“the

Assessment”) based on their interviews and analysis. (ECF 62-2 at 23:17–22).1 After the

investigations, IDOC administration and other staff met and discussed MCF’s future

administration. (ECF 62-3 ¶ 5). In August 2022, Mr. Payne was demoted from Deputy

Warden of Re-Entry to Correctional Officer. (ECF 62-2 at 19:6–14). Ms. Scaife was placed

on a Work Improvement Plan and transferred to Pendleton Correctional Facility, then

subsequently transferred to the Correctional Industrial Facility. (ECF 62-2 at 27:6–19).

Brian English was appointed Warden of MCF, (ECF 62-1 at 162:16–20), and Chris Ertel,

a white man, was appointed Deputy Warden at MCF, (id. at 162:21–163:8).

During Mr. Payne’s time as Deputy Warden at MCF, the parties agree that

Warden Hyatte received oral complaints about Mr. Payne, (see, e.g., ECF 72 ¶¶ 77, 81,

83), but never received any official complaints, (ECF 67-4 at 28:16–29:5). Warden Hyatte

never initiated any disciplinary actions against Mr. Payne. (ECF 67-4 at 19:17–22). He

dismissed complaints against Mr. Payne as “low-grade bellyaching” resulting from his

and Mr. Payne’s attempts to get MCF staff to change their habits. (ECF 67-4 at 29:6–

30:24, 70:6–21). Warden Hyatte believed that staff complaints against Mr. Payne

stemmed from Mr. Payne’s efforts to hold the staff accountable. (Id. at 70:6–21).

1 The parties dispute the admissibility of the Assessment for summary judgment purposes. The Court

addresses that dispute below.

Warden Hyatte retired on August 21, 2022. (Id. at 5:3–6). After the deaths and

subsequent media attention, and before Warden Hyatte’s retirement, IDOC Acting

Deputy Commissioner Richard Curry, Jr., visited MCF to speak with Warden Hyatte

and attempt to figure out what was going wrong at the facility. (ECF 67-3 at 8:24–9:7,

18:7–13). Mr. Curry was told that the Warden and Deputy Wardens needed to be

moved to another facility, (id. at 33:6–9), but he was not involved in the decision to

demote Mr. Payne, (id. at 34:7–16). Mr. Curry disagreed with the decision to demote Mr.

Payne, characterizing it as “egregious” and “over-the-top.” (Id. at 28:16–19, 29:15–19).

The former Commissioner of IDOC, Robert Carter, testified that he could not

recall another case in which a Deputy Warden was demoted down to Correctional

Officer. (ECF 62-4 at 33:10–17). He also testified that he had no reason to believe Mr.

Payne’s performance was deficient. (ECF 62-4 at 35:8–11). Along with his demotion, Mr.

Payne was transferred to a new facility and placed in construction services, IDOC’s

maintenance and general construction division. (ECF 67-3 at 19:16–20). This new

position in construction services does not offer any opportunities for promotion. (Id. at

20:11–13). Ms. Scaife was also transferred to a new facility, selected based on its

proximity to her home. (Id. at 33:9–11). She maintained her position as Deputy Warden.

(ECF 67-4 at 23:15–20).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists when “the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.

v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

To determine whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, the Court must

review the record, construing all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party and drawing all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Heft v. Moore, 351 F.3d

278, 282 (7th Cir. 2003). But the Court will not “sift through the evidence, pondering the

nuances and inconsistencies, and decide whom to believe.” Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst

Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994). Nor will the Court conduct research or develop

arguments for the parties. Nelson v. Napolitano, 657 F.3d 586, 590 (7th Cir. 2011); see also

United States v. Beavers, 756 F.3d 1044, 1059 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Perfunctory, undeveloped

arguments without discussion or citation to pertinent legal authority are waived.”).

To survive summary judgment, the nonmovant “cannot rest on the mere

allegations or denials contained in his pleadings, but must present sufficient evidence to

show the existence of each element of its case on which it will bear the burden at trial.”

Robin v. Espo Eng’g Corp., 200 F.3d 1081, 1088 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations

omitted), overruled on other grounds by Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir.

2016). Summary judgment “is the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit, when a party

must show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version

of the events.” Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 852, 859 (7th Cir. 2005)

(quotations omitted); see also Goodman v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th

Cir. 2010).

III. ANALYSIS

Mr. Payne alleges that IDOC illegally discriminated against him based on his

race and sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”). IDOC

moves for summary judgment on both aspects of Mr. Payne’s Title VII claim. In

support, it argues that (1) Mr. Payne cannot make out a prima facie case of race or sex

discrimination, (2) Mr. Payne cannot show that his race or sex caused IDOC to take

adverse employment action against him, and (3) IDOC had a legitimate, non-

discriminatory reason for taking that action.

One way to establish employment discrimination under Title VII is by satisfying

the McDonnell Douglas “three-step burden-shifting framework.” Ames v. Ohio Dep’t of

Youth Svcs., 605 U.S. 303, 308 (2025). At the first step, the plaintiff must establish a prima

facie case of discrimination by producing sufficient evidence to support an inference of

discriminatory motive. Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802

(1973)). If they are able to make out the prima facie case, the burden “shift[s] to the

employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the adverse

employment action.” Id. If the employer is able to do so, then the burden shifts back to

the plaintiff to show that the “stated justification was in fact pretext for discrimination.”

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The McDonnell Douglas framework offers two

paths for a plaintiff to prove his case: the direct route, where the plaintiff persuades the

Court that a discriminatory reason “more likely” motivated the employer, or the

indirect route, where the plaintiff shows that the employer’s “proffered explanation is

unworthy of credence.” Id. (quoting Texas Dep’t of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,

256 (1981)).

But this burden-shifting method is not the only way to prevail. The “ultimate

question” at the core of the McDonnell Douglas framework is whether “the defendant

intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.” Id. McDonnell Douglas, like all “tests

and rubrics for viewing discrimination claims,” is merely one approach to answering

this ultimate question. Li v. Fresenius Kabi USA, LLC, 110 F.4th 988, 994 (7th Cir. 2024)

(quoting Ortiz v. Werner Enters. Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016)). As a general

matter, a plaintiff may survive summary judgment if he shows that the totality of the

evidence “would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff’s race,

ethnicity, sex, religion, or other proscribed factor caused the discharge or other adverse

employment action.” Id.

a. Prima Facie Case

First, IDOC argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because Mr. Payne

cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination in violation of Title VII. A prima

facie case under McDonnell Douglas requires a plaintiff to show “(1) he belongs to a

protected class; (2) he met his employer’s legitimate expectations, (3) he suffered an

adverse employment action, and (4) another similarly situated employee outside of his

protected class received better treatment from his employer.” Igsaki v. Ill. Dep’t of Fin.

and Prof’l Regulation, 988 F.3d 948, 957 (7th Cir. 2021). IDOC contends that Mr. Payne

can neither show that he met IDOC’s legitimate expectations nor show that a similarly

situated employee outside of his protected class received better treatment from IDOC.

i. Legitimate Expectations

To show that Mr. Payne failed to meet legitimate employer expectations, IDOC

points to the Assessment prepared by the IDOC investigative team. Mr. Payne contests

the admissibility of the Assessment, and argues that the testimony of Mr. Hyatte, Mr.

Curry, and Mr. Carter creates a genuine issue of material fact over whether Mr. Payne

was meeting IDOC’s legitimate expectations. He also argues that IDOC cannot

conclusively establish the reason behind Mr. Payne’s demotion. The Court agrees with

Mr. Payne.

The only evidence that IDOC puts forward to show that Mr. Payne failed to meet

its legitimate expectations is the Assessment. The Assessment was drafted by IDOC

legal counsel Anna Quick. (ECF 64-1 ¶ 5). Among other things, it includes summaries of

staff interviews in which employees express dissatisfaction with Mr. Payne. (See ECF 63

at 8, 17–22). Mr. Payne contends that the Assessment is inadmissible hearsay.

Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter

asserted in the statement. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). With some exceptions, it is inadmissible.

Fed. R. Evid. 802. Only evidence admissible at trial may be considered at summary

judgment. Smith v. City of Chi., 242 F.3d 737, 741 (7th Cir. 2001). Thus, for the

Assessment to be considered here, IDOC must show either that it is not hearsay or that

it falls into a hearsay exception.

IDOC first argues that the Assessment is not hearsay. It contends that the

Assessment is not offered to prove the truth of the statements in it but to show what

information IDOC decisionmakers had when they decided to demote Mr. Payne. Mr.

Payne responds that the Assessment is being offered not to show the information

available to IDOC decisionmakers but to show that Mr. Payne was in fact not meeting

legitimate expectations.

To prevail on this element of the prima facie case, IDOC must demonstrate that

no reasonable jury could find that Mr. Payne met IDOC’s legitimate expectations. If, as

IDOC argues, the Assessment is merely evidence of what information IDOC

decisionmakers had when they decided to demote Mr. Payne, the Assessment would

only offer insight into whether those decisionmakers believed Mr. Payne was meeting

expectations when they decided to demote him. This is not the inquiry. The prima facie

case requires a plaintiff to show that he was meeting legitimate employer expectations.

It does not require him to show that decisionmakers were aware he was meeting

expectations and imposed an adverse employment action anyway. Such a requirement

would be at cross-purposes with the indirect, burden-shifting framework of McDonnell

Douglas, which “evolved” precisely “[b]ecause ‘smoking gun’ evidence of

discriminatory intent is hard to come by.” Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910, 917 (7th Cir.

2016).

If, on the other hand, the Assessment is offered as evidence that Mr. Payne was

actually failing to meet IDOC’s legitimate expectations, it becomes difficult to argue that

the Assessment is not being offered for the truth of the matters asserted within. To pick

an example, one summary of an interview with an unidentified correctional employee

relays the employee’s opinion that Mr. Payne “would get upset and have staff

reassigned to a different shift” as a result of a “grudge.” (ECF 63 at 20). This is only

evidence that Mr. Payne failed to meet IDOC’s expectations to the degree that the

employee’s statement is true. The same goes for the rest of the complaints. The

Assessment only holds evidentiary value on this issue if it is true that Mr. Payne did

“not listen or communicate well with most staff, (id. at 19), was prone to “outbursts,”

(id.), and was “running people off from working at the facility,” (id. at 21). Because all of

these statements were made out of court, and they are relied on here for their truth,

they are hearsay.

IDOC next argues that these statements are admissible under the business

records exception to the rule prohibiting hearsay. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 803,

records of a regularly conducted activity, though hearsay, may still be admitted if they

meet certain criteria. Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). It is not clear that the Assessment meets these

criteria. To qualify for this exception, documents must have been made in the regular

course of business. Id. It is “well established” that documents “prepared in anticipation

of litigation” are not admissible under this exception. Jordan v. Binns, 712 F.3d 1123, 1135

(7th Cir. 2013). As the assessment was drafted by IDOC’s legal counsel in the wake of

several deaths at the facility and with the “secondary purpose” of offering

“recommendations for the future employment of the current administration of MCF,”

(ECF 63 at 2), it strikes the Court as unlikely that it was produced in the regular course

of business. In addition, for this exception to apply, documents must be accompanied

by “testimony of the custodian or another qualified witness, or by a certification that

complies with [Federal Rule of Evidence] 902(11) or (12) or with a statute permitting

certification.” Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)(D). Here, the only evidence identified by the parties

that approaches that requirement is Mr. Curry’s affidavit, in which he states that the

assessment was prepared and that it included complaints from staff members about

members of MCF’s administration. (ECF 62-3 ¶ 12). Again, this does not seem to satisfy

the requirements of Rule 803(6).

But the Court need not reach a final determination on this issue today, because

even if the Assessment is admissible, Mr. Payne has introduced sufficient contradictory

evidence to create a genuine issue of fact over whether he was meeting IDOC’s

legitimate expectations. First, he points to the testimony of Mr. Hyatte. It is undisputed

that Mr. Hyatte, the MCF Warden and Mr. Payne’s direct superior, believed complaints

against Mr. Payne were “low grade bellyaching” arising from his and Mr. Payne’s

attempts to hold staff accountable. (ECF 67-4 at 29:6–30:24, 70:6–21). Mr. Payne argues

in his brief that staff were displeased with Mr. Payne because he was doing what he

was brought in to do: “get the staff to change their old habits in order to address the

issues caused by an increase in high level offenders at MCF.” (ECF 68 at 6). In support,

he emphasizes Mr. Hyatte’s testimony that before Mr. Payne arrived, inmates “had free

run of the place,” and staff were struggling to adjust to MCF’s transition from “a

medium/minimum security minded facility” to one with “high security level

offenders.” (ECF 67-4 at 30:4–24). Mr. Hyatte described himself and Mr. Payne as

“trying to get [staff] out of their old habits,” (id.), praised Mr. Payne’s work as

“exceptional,” and testified that Mr. Payne “did exactly what he was told, when he was

told,” (id. at 19:23–20:8).

In response, IDOC points to the undisputed fact that Mr. Hyatte did receive oral

complaints about Mr. Payne. It emphasizes that “a jury could find credibility issues with

Hyatte’s testimony” because Mr. Hyatte retired as a result of the MCF incidents. (ECF

71 at 5 (emphasis added)). Finally, it points out that Mr. Hyatte was not a member of the

investigative team or a decisionmaker for IDOC in the wake of the deaths at MCF. For

these reasons, IDOC argues that Mr. Hyatte’s testimony cannot create a dispute of

material fact over whether Mr. Payne met IDOC’s legitimate expectations.

IDOC’s arguments miss the mark. First, IDOC inverts the summary judgment

standard. IDOC’s burden is not to show that a jury “could” decline to credit Mr.

Hyatte’s testimony. Instead, it must show that no reasonable jury could credit Mr.

Hyatte’s testimony. See Martinsville Corral, Inc. v. Soc’y Ins., 910 F.3d 996, 998 (7th Cir.

2018). Because IDOC has not met that high bar, the Court will not disregard Mr.

Hyatte’s testimony. And the fact that Mr. Hyatte received oral complaints about Mr.

Payne is not remotely dispositive of whether Mr. Payne met IDOC’s legitimate

expectations. Bearing in mind its duty to draw reasonable inferences in Mr. Payne’s

favor, the Court need not strain to reach an explanation for why Mr. Payne’s supervisor

and the staff Mr. Payne was tasked with bringing in line might have different opinions

of his job performance. Lastly, the fact that Mr. Hyatte was not a decisionmaker

involved in Mr. Payne’s demotion is not particularly relevant to whether Mr. Payne was

meeting IDOC’s legitimate expectations when he served directly under Mr. Hyatte.

Though Mr. Hyatte may not have had the benefit of all the information considered by

those decisionmakers, as Mr. Payne’s immediate superior he was certainly well-

positioned to develop informed opinions about Mr. Payne’s job performance.

Next, Mr. Payne points the Court to the testimony of Mr. Curry, IDOC’s Acting

Deputy Commissioner, and Mr. Carter, IDOC’s former Commissioner. It is undisputed

that Mr. Curry disagreed with Mr. Payne’s demotion, characterizing it as “egregious”

and “over the top.” Though Mr. Carter could not recall Mr. Payne’s demotion in detail,

he remembered Mr. Payne and testified that he had no reason to believe Mr. Payne’s

performance was deficient. (ECF 67-1 at 34:1–17).

This evidence is not as strong as Mr. Hyatte’s testimony. Mr. Carter was unable

to testify to the details of Mr. Payne’s demotion, (see id. at 32–35), and Mr. Curry,

though clearly against Mr. Payne’s demotion, has little to say about Mr. Payne’s job

performance before the demotion. IDOC argues that this testimony is unpersuasive

because it does nothing to establish disparity of treatment based on race or sex. This

argument is misplaced. Though the question of discrimination is the ultimate end of the

burden shifting inquiry, Mr. Payne may establish that he met IDOC’s legitimate

expectations without showing any disparate treatment. Again, this is precisely the point

of the burden shifting approach. Though there may be the rare “fabled employer who

admits to firing an employee because of race [or sex,] . . .[f]ew discrimination cases are

so straightforward.” Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765. Even so, this testimony does not create a

genuine issue of material fact over this issue.

Though the testimony of Mr. Curry and Mr. Carter does not create a genuine

issue over whether Mr. Payne met IDOC’s legitimate expectations, the addition of Mr.

Hyatte’s testimony is enough to create such a dispute of material fact. Drawing all

reasonable inferences in Mr. Payne’s favor, Mr. Hyatte’s approval of Mr. Payne’s work

could convince a reasonable jury that Mr. Payne was meeting IDOC’s legitimate

expectations. Thus, this issue is inappropriate for resolution at summary judgment.

ii. Similarly Situated Comparator

Next, IDOC argues that Jacqueline Scaife, the MCF Deputy Warden who retained

her rank when Mr. Payne was demoted, is not an adequate comparator for Title VII

purposes.

The essence of the comparator inquiry can be reduced to a single question: “are

there enough common features between the individuals to allow a meaningful

comparison?” Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 841 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Humphries

v. CBOCS West, Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 405 (7th Cir. 2007), aff’d, 553 U.S. 442 (2008)). Though

the similarly-situated inquiry does not require “mechanical, one-to-one mapping

between employees,” id. at 847, courts generally require comparator employees to have

“dealt with the same supervisor, [be] subject to the same workplace rules, and [have]

engaged in similar conduct, but nonetheless received disparate treatment for no

apparent legitimate reason.” Adams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 324 F.3d 935, 940 (7th Cir.

2003). “Whether a comparator is similarly situated is usually a question for the fact-

finder.” Coleman, 667 F.3d at 846.

IDOC accepts that Mr. Payne and Ms. Scaife were similarly situated due to their

titles at the relevant time, that they both reported to Warden Hyatte, and that they both

engaged in similar conduct because they both held the position of Deputy Warden. But

these, IDOC maintains, are the “lone comparable traits between Scaife and [Mr.

Payne].” (ECF 71 at 7).

As Mr. Payne notes in response, those are a lot of comparable traits. To

differentiate the two Deputy Wardens, IDOC leans heavily on Ms. Scaife’s comparative

lack of experience. It points out that Mr. Payne had 16 more years of experience at

IDOC than Ms. Scaife, including 6 more years of experience as a Deputy Warden. But

Ms. Scaife held the same job as Mr. Payne and was subject to the same standards. In

fact, Ms. Scaife was the Deputy Warden of Operations leading up to the deaths at the

facility, a role which both parties agree involves overseeing custody staff, food service

schedules, recreation schedules, and day-to-day operations. Considering the obvious

similarities between her role and Mr. Payne’s, her comparative lack of experience in that

role is not enough to eliminate any genuine issue of material fact over whether she is an

adequate comparator. Thus, the Court may not resolve this issue at summary judgment.

b. Legitimate Non-Discriminatory Rationale

IDOC argues that even if Mr. Payne can make out a prima facie case for

discrimination, he cannot overcome IDOC’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for

his demotion. In support, it cites the Assessment as support for IDOC’s conclusion that

Mr. Payne failed to effectively manage his subordinates while Deputy Warden at MCF.

In response, Mr. Payne argues that the support of his supervisors, the suspicious

circumstances of his demotion, and IDOC’s institutional protectiveness of Black women

employees show that this rationale is pretext for discrimination.

To show that an employer’s reason is pretextual, a plaintiff “must present

evidence suggesting that the employer is dissembling.” O’Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc.,

657 F.3d 625, 635 (7th Cir. 2011). It is not enough to show that “the employer’s stated

reason was inaccurate or unfair.” Id. The question is “whether the employer honestly

believed the reasons it has offered to explain the discharge.” Id. Put another way, the

plaintiff must show that “the employer’s proffered reason . . . was a lie.” Naik v.

Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 627 F.3d 596, 601 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ineichen v.

Ameritech, 410 F.3d 956, 961 (7th Cir. 2005). To meet this burden, the plaintiff must

“identify such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, or contradictions” in the

proffered reason “that a reasonable person could find [it] unworthy of credence.”

Coleman, 667 F.3d at 852 (quoting Boumehdi v. Plastag Holdings, LLC, 489 F.3d 781, 792

(7th Cir. 2007)). Even if the employer’s proffered reasons are “foolish, trivial, or base,”

honest belief in those reasons defeats the plaintiff’s argument. Boumehdi, 489 F.3d at 792.

But if the proffered reason was not “what induced [the employer] to take the challenged

employment action, it was pretext.” Forrester v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 453 F.3d 416, 418

(7th Cir. 2006).

To show pretext, Mr. Payne first points to Mr. Hyatte’s testimony. Mr. Hyatte

testified that his “35 years” in the IDOC system had taught him that IDOC was worried

about its “look” when it came to “diversity and inclusion.” (ECF 67-4 at 37:11–21). He

believed IDOC “didn’t want to mess with Jackie Scaife, because . . . she’s a black

female,” so it made Mr. Payne a “scapegoat.” (Id. at 37:25–38:3). Mr. Payne then

reiterates that Mr. Carter did not believe Mr. Payne’s performance was deficient and

Mr. Curry and Mr. Hyatte disagreed with Mr. Payne’s demotion. Finally, he argues that

the circumstances around his demotion were suspicious. To support this, he points to

IDOC’s interrogatory response, which represents that Mr. Carter demoted Mr. Payne,

(ECF 67-5 at 3). As Mr. Payne notes, Mr. Carter testified that he was not involved in Mr.

Payne’s demotion and that it would have been handled by a deputy commissioner.

(ECF 67-1 at 29:14–30:8).

In response, IDOC argues that the identity of the party who demoted Mr. Payne

is not material, Mr. Hyatte’s testimony is vague and conclusive, and the support of Mr.

Payne’s supervisors does not show that he was discriminated against. For purposes of

summary judgment, none of these arguments avail.

In its brief, IDOC definitively states that Mr. Payne was demoted because “he did

not know how to communicate with staff, he was problematic as a managing figure at

MCF, . . . [he] ran ‘help off’ from MCF, . . . [he] threatened staff members, and [he]

created an atmosphere of fear amongst his subordinates while Deputy Warden at

MCF.” (ECF 61 at 11). This is generally supported by IDOC’s interrogatory response on

the subject. (ECF 62-6 at 3). But the evidentiary value of the interrogatory response is

diminished because it identifies Mr. Carter as the party who demoted Mr. Payne. In his

deposition testimony, Mr. Carter flatly contradicts this, denying that he played a role in

Mr. Payne’s demotion. IDOC argues in its reply that any dispute over who actually

demoted Mr. Payne is “immaterial” because IDOC itself is the only defendant here.

(ECF 71 at 11). This is wrong. While IDOC may be the defendant, the inquiry here is

whether Mr. Payne was demoted for discriminatory reasons. The identity of the person

or people who decided to demote him is material to that question because Mr. Payne’s

case turns on whether that person or those people’s intent was discriminatory.

Similarly, Mr. Hyatte’s testimony cannot be discounted out of hand. While the

Court need not accept “conclusory allegations” that are unfounded in personal

knowledge at summary judgment, Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888

(1990), Mr. Hyatte grounds his opinions in his 35 years of experience within IDOC.

Because of that experience, a reasonable jury may well believe his testimony that IDOC

used Mr. Payne as a “scapegoat” to avoid “mess[ing] with Jackie Scaife,” a Black

woman. (ECF 67-4 at 37:22–38:4). Mr. Hyatte’s testimony is not dispositive of the matter,

but just as he is well-positioned to know whether Mr. Payne met IDOC’s legitimate

expectations, he is also well-positioned to testify to how IDOC made employment

decisions about Deputy Wardens in his facility.

But it is less clear that Mr. Carter, Mr. Curry, and Mr. Hyatte’s disagreement

with Mr. Payne’s demotion is relevant to the question of pretext. Aside from Mr.

Hyatte’s belief that Mr. Payne was demoted due to race, the three IDOC employees do

not cast doubt on IDOC’s proffered reason for Mr. Payne’s demotion. While they

express skepticism that the demotion was fair or prudent, their testimony does not

directly implicate IDOC’s honest belief in its rationale.

Mr. Carter’s disavowal of responsibility for Mr. Payne’s termination does. When

asked in discovery to identify the reason for Mr. Payne’s demotion and the person

responsible for his demotion, IDOC identified Mr. Carter and listed reasons that

presumably led Mr. Carter to demote Mr. Payne. But Mr. Carter denied involvement.

This casts doubt on IDOC’s rationale for demoting Mr. Payne. A reasonable jury could

infer that if IDOC misidentified who decided to demote Mr. Payne, it also

misrepresented the reasons that went into that decision. If the finder of fact doubts

IDOC’s proffered reason, Mr. Hyatte’s testimony offers an alternative explanation:

IDOC needed to blame someone for the problems at MCF. Ms. Scaife was the Deputy

Warden of Operations at the time of the deaths, but IDOC did not want to demote a

Black woman. So Mr. Payne, a white man already unpopular among the staff due to his

strictness, was scapegoated because of his racial identity and gender. Though a jury

may well decline to draw this inference against IDOC or credit Mr. Hyatte’s alternative

explanation, there are sufficient factual disputes present that IDOC may not prevail on

this issue as a matter of law.

It is “axiomatic” that this Court “may not weigh conflicting evidence or make

credibility determinations” at summary judgment. Whitaker v. Dempsey, 144 F.4th 908,

917 (7th Cir. 2025). Instead, the Court has “one task, and one task only: to decide, based

on the evidence of record, whether there is any material dispute of fact that requires a

trial.” Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994). Because IDOC has

not established that there is no genuine issue of material fact over whether its reasons

for demoting Mr. Payne were pretextual, the Court may not issue summary judgment.

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, IDOC’s motion for summary judgment, (ECF 60), is DENIED.

SO ORDERED on May 4, 2026.

/s/Cristal C. Brisco

CRISTAL C. BRISCO, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT