Harris

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

CENTRAL DIVISION

LEON HARRIS, JR. PLAINTIFFS

and MALCOM JONES

v. CASE NO. 4:24-CV-00641-BSM

BLYTHEVILLE SCHOOL DISTRICT

BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al. DEFENDANTS

ORDER

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 16] is granted on plaintiffs’

First Amendment retaliation claims under section 1983 and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act,

plaintiffs’ Title VII claims, and plaintiffs’ individual capacity claims against Hammett under

the Arkansas Civil Rights Act. Summary judgment is denied on plaintiffs’ due process and

Arkansas Whistleblower Act claims. Summary judgment is grant in part and denied in part

on the issue of punitive damages.

I. BACKGROUND

Leon Harris and Malcolm Jones are suing the Blytheville School District Board of

Education and its president, Desmond Hammett, because the board voted not to renew their

contracts. See Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (SUMF) ¶¶ 1–3, Doc. No. 18.

Harris was the district’s athletics director and interim head boy’s basketball coach from 2022

until his contract was not renewed and Jones was its assistant superintendent from 2023 until

his contract was not renewed. Id. ¶¶ 2–3.

As athletics director, Harris was responsible for overseeing the district’s sports

programs, including managing the coaches and athletes and maintaining the district’s athletic

facilities. Harris Dep. 19–20, Ex. A, Doc. No. 22. In late 2023, Harris began to hear rumors

that his contract would not be renewed for the following school year and that the district was

looking to hire another coach. Id. 78–79; SUMF ¶¶ 18, 32, 34. Harris filed an internal

grievance on April 29, 2024, raising concerns about Hammett’s alleged criminal history and

interference with Harris’s job duties. Id. ¶¶ 17, 29–31, 37; Harris Grievance, Ex. A, Doc.

No. 16. One week later, the board voted not to renew Harris’s contract. Id. ¶ 5. Harris

asserts that the board took this action because he filed his grievance. Defendants, however,

assert that the board’s decision was based on Harris’s poor performance, misconduct,

financial concerns, and his lack of community engagement. Id. ¶ 13; Defs.’ Br. Supp. Mot.

Summ. J. (Defs.’ Br.) at 2, Doc. No. 17. Defendants claim that athletic events had to be

forfeited because Harris failed to schedule referees and that Harris had been reported for not

turning in funds. Id. ¶¶ 14–15.

As assistant superintendent, Jones supervised the district’s middle school, high school,

and sixth-grade academy, including transportation, operations, maintenance, and security.

See Jones Dep. 14–15, Ex. B, Doc. No. 22. In 2023, Hammett told Jones that he needed to

“dust off his resume” because Hammett had received calls from people who did not like

Jones. SUMF ¶ 22. Jones also heard rumors that Hammett was blocking his and Jones’s

contracts from being renewed for the next school year. Id. ¶¶ 18, 23. When Jones told the

board at its March 2024 meeting that Hammett was “the problem with the district,” Hammett

responded, “I got your ass.” Id. ¶ 21. Jones filed an internal grievance four days later

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regarding Hammett’s conduct at the meeting. Id. ¶¶ 19–21. In that grievance, Jones reported

that Hammett was wrongfully interfering with his and Harris’s job duties, wasting public

funds, and attempting to undermine his professional reputation. Id.; Jones Grievance, Ex.

B, Doc. No. 16. In May 2024, the board voted not to renew Jones’s contract, and soon after

that, eliminated the assistant superintendent position. Id.¶¶ 1, 7. Defendants state that the

decision to not renew Jones’s contract was based on Jones’s poor performance, district

financial issues, and the decision to eliminate the assistant superintendent position. Id. ¶¶

8–12; Defs.’Br at 2. Jones states the decision was retaliation for the grievance he filed.

Harris and Jones are suing the board and Hammett for retaliation under Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act; violations of the Arkansas Whistle-

Blower Act (AWBA); and First Amendment and Due Process violations under 42 U.S.C.

section 1983. Defendants move for summary judgment on all claims.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249–50 (1986). Once the moving party

demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute of material fact, the non-moving party may not

rest upon the mere allegations or denials in his pleadings. Holden v. Hirner, 663 F.3d 336,

340 (8th Cir. 2011). Instead, the non-moving party must produce admissible evidence

demonstrating a genuine factual dispute requiring a trial. Id. All reasonable inferences must

be drawn in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Holland v. Sam’s Club, 487

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F.3d 641, 643 (8th Cir. 2007). The evidence is not weighed, and no credibility

determinations are made. Jenkins v. Winter, 540 F.3d 742, 750 (8th Cir. 2008).

III. DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is granted on plaintiffs’ First Amendment retaliation claims under

section 1983 and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, plaintiffs’ Title VII claims, and plaintiffs’

Arkansas Civil Rights Act claims against Hammett in his individual capacity. Summary

judgment is denied on plaintiffs’ due process and Arkansas Whistleblower Act claims.

Summary judgment is grant in part and denied in part on the issue of punitive damages.

A. First Amendment Retaliation

Summary judgment is granted on plaintiffs’ First Amendment retaliation claims. To

prevail on these claims, plaintiffs must show (1) they engaged in activity protected by the

First Amendment; (2) the defendants took an adverse employment action against them; and

(3) the protected conduct was the but-for cause of the defendants’ decision to take the

adverse employment action. See Davison v. City of Minneapolis, Minn., 490 F.3d 648,

654–55 (8th Cir. 2007); Laney v. City of St. Louis, Mo., 56 F.4th 1153, 1157 n.2 (8th Cir.

2023) (holding that “but-for causation” rather than “a substantial factor” must now be

shown).

1. Harris

Summary judgment is granted on Harris’s retaliation claim because his grievance was

not protected speech under the First Amendment. This is true because Harris was not

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speaking primarily as a private citizen on matters of public concern.

A public employee engages in speech protected under the First Amendment if he

speaks as a private citizen on a matter of public concern. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410,

418 (2006). Speech involves a matter of public concern when it can fairly be said to relate

to a political, social, or other legitimate concern of the community. Mayfield v. Missouri

House of Representatives, 122 F.4th 1046, 1053 (8th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). The context

in which the speech occurs—in addition to the content and form of the speech—is also

relevant. Buazard v. Meridith, 172 F.3d 546, 548 (8th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).

Harris’s grievance alleged that (1) Hammett’s position on the board violates Arkansas law

because Hammett has a felony conviction; (2) Hammett harassed Harris and undermined his

authority by interfering with athletic department matters, such as hiring an interim football

coach and renting the school facilities and gym without Harris’s knowledge; (3) spread

rumors that Harris’s tenure as the boy’s basketball coach was coming to an end; and (4)

created a hostile work environment. See Harris Grievance.

While Harris’s allegation regarding Hammett’s felony conviction is a matter of public

concern, the primary purpose of his grievance was to further his own private interests. See

Marlow v. City of Clarendon, 78 F.4th 410, 418 (8th Cir. 2023) (focus is on the purpose of

employee’s speech); Bailey v. Dep’t of Elementary and Secondary Educ., 451 F.3d 514, 518

(8th Cir. 2006) (when employee speech contains both matters of public concern and personal

interest, question is whether speech was primarily intended to further the employee’s private

interests, rather than raise issues of public concern); White Plains Towing Corp. v. Patterson,

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991 F.2d 1049, 1059 (2d Cir. 1993) (where public employee raises an issue of public concern

solely to further his employment interest, “his First Amendment right to comment on that

issue is entitled to little weight”) (citing Connick, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983)).

This is true because Harris’s allegations and requested relief focus exclusively on his

perception that Hammett was interfering with his ability to do his job; a mere reference to

Hammett’s criminal history does not overcome this. Cox v. Dardanell Public School Dist.,

790 F.2d 668, 672 (8th Cir. 1986) (focus is on whether employee assumed role of concerned

public citizen, informing the public that the institution is improperly discharging its duties,

or as an employee, concerned only with internal policies or practices which are of relevance

only to the employees of that institution). Harris’s testimony regarding his grievance

confirms this point. See, e.g., Harris Dep. 42:10–11; 80:12–21 (“[Hammett was] taking

power from my job as the [Athletic Director]) (“[Hammett] hinders me from performing my

job duties . . . he interfer[es] with all the decisions that were going on in athletics.”).

Moreover, the internal nature of the grievance and Harris’s role as an employee in making

the statements weigh against a finding of protected speech. Buazard, 172 F.3d at 550.

2. Jones

Summary judgment is granted on Jones’s First Amendment retaliation claim because

he was either speaking pursuant to his official duties or reporting matters of private concern.

Jones’s grievance alleged that Hammett (1) wrongfully intervened in the decision to select

a new basketball coach; (2) wasted public funds and violated school policy by letting his

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friends and associates use the school gym for free; and (3) threatened to “get” Jones during

a board meeting after Jones told a citizen that Hammett was “the problem,” in order to

intimidate Jones and undermine his professional reputation. See Jones Grievance.

While the waste of public money is a matter of public concern, Jones raised this

allegation pursuant to his official duties; not as a private citizen. See SUMF ¶ 28 (“Jones’s

job duties included facility use. He was the last signature on any facility use contract.”);

Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 (speech not protected if public employee makes statements

pursuant to his official duties); Lyons v. Vaught, 875 F.3d 1168, 1175 (8th Cir. 2017) (not

protected when “[public employee] reports conduct that interferes with his job

responsibilities, even if the report is made outside of his chain of command”). Moreover, this

statement was “closely tied to a personal employment dispute,” and therefore “does not attain

the status of public concern simply because ‘its subject matter could, in different

circumstances, have been the topic of a communication to the public.’” Dahl v. Rice Cnty,

Minn., 621 F.3d 740, 744 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 148)). Even if Jones

was not speaking pursuant to his official duties, the grievance is still not protected because

its primary purpose was to address Hammett’s interference with the district’s internal

protocols and Jones’s professional reputation and interests “as the vice-president of the

school board.” Such claims about “internal . . . practices which are of relevance only to the

employees of [the district]” are not protected speech. Cox, 790 F.2d at 672. Summary

judgment is therefore granted.

3. Non-Adverse Actions

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To the extent plaintiffs claim retaliation based on Hammett’s hostility, belittling and

interference with Harris’s job duties, summary judgment is granted because these are not

adverse employment actions. See Bonenberger v. St. Louis Metro. Police Dep’t, 810 F.3d

1103, 1107 (8th Cir. 2016) (adverse employment action is tangible change in working

conditions that produce a material disadvantage); Duffy v. McPhillips, 276 F.3d 988, 991–2

(8th Cir. 2002) (minor shifts or reductions in work responsibility typically not adverse

employment actions). Although Hammett’s attempt to convince the board to replace Harris

as basketball coach could be considered an adverse employment action if it caused his

termination, Harris does not allege Hammett succeeded in this effort. Indeed, it appears

Harris remained basketball coach for some time after Hammett attempted to have him

replaced. Finally, even if these were adverse employment actions, summary judgment would

still be appropriate because, as discussed above, plaintiffs’ complaints regarding Hammett

did not constitute protected activity.

4. Arkansas Civil Rights Act

Summary judgment is granted on plaintiffs’ ACRA speech-retaliation claims for the

same reasons. See McCullogh, 559 F.3d at 865 (ACRA claims undergo the same analysis

as federal First Amendment retaliation claims).

B. Title VII

Summary judgment is granted on plaintiffs’ Title VII claims because they were

abandoned by plaintiffs’ failure to respond to the motion for summary judgment on them.

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C. Due Process

Summary judgment is denied on plaintiffs’ procedural due process claims. To show

a violation of procedural due process, plaintiffs must prove they (1) had a protected interest

and (2) did not receive adequate procedures. Clark v. Kansas City, Mo. Sch. Dist., 375 F.3d

698, 701 (8th Cir. 2004). The parties dispute both elements.

These claims, and the responses to them, are a little muddled, and although the hearing

requirement is a flexible standard, there appear to be material disputes as to whether plaintiffs

were notified of the district’s policy and given an opportunity to be heard. First, defendants’

argument that Arkansas law does not entitle plaintiffs to notice and hearing is well-taken, but

plaintiffs have presented sufficient facts to indicate their “good name, reputation, [and]

integrity” were at stake, nonetheless requiring “notice and an opportunity to heard.” Bd. of

Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972). And plaintiffs claim they were not

notified or given a chance to respond, either before or after the decision was made.

Defendants’ argument that plaintiffs waived these claims by not requesting post-termination

process is not convincing because a reasonable jury could find that plaintiffs did not receive

notice or opportunities to appeal the board’s decision.

D. Arkansas Whistle-Blower Act

Summary judgment is denied on plaintiffs’ whistle-blower claims. To prove

violations of the Arkansas Whistle-Blower Act, plaintiffs must show they suffered adverse

employment actions because they reported a waste of public funds or suspected violation of

the law. Ark. Code Ann. § 21-1-603. A public employer has an affirmative defense if the

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adverse action was due to misconduct or poor job performance. Entmeir v. City of Fort

Smith, 506 S.W.3d 253, 257 (Ark. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Ark. Code Ann. § 21-1-

604(e)(1)).

Jones blew the whistle on alleged public waste, claiming Hammett let his friends and

associates host events in the school gym for free in violation of district policies, possibly to

“buy votes.” Then his contract was not renewed. While quite thin, there appear to be factual

disputes as to the nature and extent of Hammett’s use of the gym, and the reasons for Jones’s

non-renewal. Likewise, Harris’s grievance was a protected whistle-blowing communication;

he appears to have claimed in good faith that Hammett’s position on the school board

violated Arkansas law because he had a felony conviction. Hammett allegedly told Harris

in a Lowe’s parking lot that he had “been to prison for selling dope.” Harris Dep. 34:1–8.

A week after Harris filed the grievance, his contract was not renewed. While also very thin,

whether the non-renewal was motivated by Harris’s allegations rather than misconduct or

poor job performance is a factual dispute for the jury to decide.

Defendants’ argument that summary judgment is proper because plaintiffs did not

report any actual violations is not convincing because, even if true, good faith reports of

suspected violations or waste are also protected. See Ark. Code Ann. § 21-1-603; Bales v.

City of Fort Smith, 505 S.W.3d 705, 712–13 (Ark. 2016) (rejecting argument that finding of

no actual waste precludes AWBA claim because only a good faith report is required).

E. Individual Capacity Claims

Summary judgment is granted on plaintiffs’ ACRA claims against Hammett in his

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individual capacity. See Smith v. Ark. Highway Police, No. 4:13-CV-00301-JLH, 2013 WL

12320409, at *9 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 7, 2013) (no individual capacity claims under ACRA unless

“employer” under statute). Summary judgment is denied as moot on any AWBA claims

against Hammett in his individual capacity because such claims are not brought by plaintiffs.

See Resp., Doc. No. 23.

F. Punitive Damages

Summary judgment is granted on claims for punitive damages against the board or

Hammett in his official capacity, and for claims under the AWBA. City of Newport v. Fact

Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981) (“[A] municipality is immune from punitive

damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”); Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 738

(1989) (public school districts are municipal entities); Grisson v. Cole, 3:06-CV-00037-BD,

2008 WL 276582, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 30, 2007) (no punitive damages against individual

in his official capacity because such a claim is a claim against the city); Ark. Code Ann. §

21-1-605 (no provision for punitive damages). Summary judgment is denied on claims for

punitive damages against Hammett in his individual capacity because a reasonable jury could

find that Hammett acted intentionally and maliciously. Shaub v. VonWald, 638 F.3d 905,

923 (8th Cir. 2011).

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted on plaintiffs’

First Amendment retaliation claims under section 1983 and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act

(ACRA), plaintiffs’ Title VII claims, and plaintiffs’ individual capacity claims against

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Hammett under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act. Summary judgment is granted in part and

denied in part on the issue of punitive damages. Plaintiffs’ due process and Arkansas

Whistleblower Act claims may proceed.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 6th day of March, 2026.

— . ) ‘

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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