In re Ashton

No. 26 May 21, 2026 293

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF OREGON

In re Complaint as to the Conduct of

Derek J. ASHTON,

OSB No. 871552,

Respondent.

(OSB 2202) (SC S071535)

En Banc

On review of the decision of a trial panel of the Disciplinary

Board.*

Argued and submitted November 18, 2025.

C. Robert Steringer, Harrang Long P.C., Portland, argued

the cause and filed the briefs for respondent. Also on the

briefs were Arden J. Olson, and Julian W. Marrs.

Courtney C. Dippel, Disciplinary Counsel, Tigard, argued

the cause and filed the brief on behalf of the Oregon State

Bar. Also on the brief was Samuel Leineweber, Assistant

Disciplinary Counsel.

PER CURIAM

Respondent is suspended from the practice of law for

30 days, commencing 60 days from the date of this decision.

______________

* Corrected trial panel opinion dated November 14, 2024.

294 In re Ashton

Cite as 375 Or 309 (2026) 295

PER CURIAM

In this lawyer disciplinary proceeding, a trial panel

of the Disciplinary Board found that respondent Derek J.

Ashton committed three violations of Rule of Professional

Conduct (RPC) 3.4(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from paying,

offering to pay, or acquiescing in the payment of compensa-

tion to a witness contingent on the content of the witness’s

testimony or the outcome of a case), one violation of RPC

3.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly disobeying an

obligation under the rules of a tribunal), and two violations

of RPC 8.4(a)(4) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in con-

duct prejudicial to the administration of justice). The trial

panel suspended respondent from the practice of law for 60

days.

In its request for review, the Oregon State Bar chal-

lenges only the sanction that the trial panel imposed and

asks this court to suspend respondent for at least six months.

In his answering brief, respondent challenges the trial pan-

el’s findings that he committed the charged violations. BR

10.5(1) (permitting opposing litigants to raise additional

issues in answering briefs). In addition, respondent con-

tends that, if this court concludes that he did commit some

or all of the offenses as found by the trial panel, then a sanc-

tion ranging from a public reprimand to a 60-day suspen-

sion is appropriate. For the reasons that follow, we conclude

that respondent did not violate RPC 3.4(b) as alleged in the

Bar’s complaint. We find that respondent committed one

violation of RPC 3.4(c) and two violations of RPC 8.4(a)(4),

and we conclude that a 30-day suspension is an appropriate

sanction for respondent’s misconduct.

I. BACKGROUND

In lawyer disciplinary proceedings, we review the

record de novo. Bar Rules of Procedure (BR) 10.6. On de novo

review, this court sits as factfinder based on the record devel-

oped by the trial panel; that record must demonstrate that

the Bar has proved each violation by clear and convincing

evidence. BR 5.2. Having reviewed the record and consid-

ered the parties’ arguments, we may adopt, modify, or reject

the decision of the trial panel. BR 10.6.

296 In re Ashton

In 2015, respondent represented a client, Bean, in

a high-profile criminal case in which the client was alleged

to have had sex with a minor, G, in 2013 (the 2013 incident).

During the course of his representation of Bean in the crimi-

nal matter, respondent learned that G’s mother had retained

a lawyer, Lori Deveny, to pursue a civil claim against Bean

relating to the 2013 incident. In May 2015, respondent talked

to Deveny about the possibility of resolving the criminal case

and G’s civil claims against Bean through a civil compro-

mise.1 Negotiations to that end proceeded, and the parties

scheduled a mediation session for June 10, 2015. In prepa-

ration for that mediation, respondent drafted a proposed

settlement agreement. At the mediation, the parties agreed

on a $200,000 settlement payment. Respondent updated the

draft and presented it to the mediator, and the draft was

signed on June 10, 2015, by G, G’s mother, and Deveny, and

by Bean and respondent.2 That settlement agreement, enti-

tled “Confidential Settlement Agreement, Release, Civil

Compromise, and Covenant Not to Sue” (June settlement

agreement), provided that, in exchange for $200,000, G would

release “any and all claims—civil and/or criminal—against

[Bean] that were or could have been asserted related to the

[2013 incident].” The June settlement agreement acknowl-

edged that G did not “want the State of Oregon * * * to crim-

inally prosecute” Bean and that G understood that that

agreement would “operate as a civil compromise of any/all

criminal charges related to the [2013 incident].”

The June settlement agreement also included sev-

eral provisions purporting to limit G’s ability to testify in

future legal proceedings about Bean’s involvement in the

2013 incident, including requiring G (1) to “release, cove-

nant and agree forever to refrain from instituting, prosecut-

ing, claiming, testifying, or asserting he/they have the basis

for any action, claim or proceeding—civil and/or criminal—

against Bean related to [the 2013 incident]”; (2) “not to ever

1

A civil compromise is a procedural mechanism by which a criminal defen-

dant seeks dismissal of criminal charges based on a civil settlement with the

victim. Civil compromises are subject to court approval under ORS 135.705(1)(a).

2

As we explain later in the opinion, although that settlement agreement—

and two subsequent settlement agreements—appeared to have been signed by

G and his mother, G later claimed that he had not signed any of them.

Cite as 375 Or 309 (2026) 297

claim, assert, or testify that Bean engaged or attempted

to engage in tortious, criminal, and/or unlawful activity

related to [the 2013 incident]”; and (3) to “never again assert,

claim, testify, prosecute, or institute any action against

Bean, regarding claims alleged or which could have been

alleged related to [the 2013 incident].” None of those provi-

sions excluded circumstances in which G may be ordered to

testify by a court or quasi-judicial authority.

Respondent filed a motion with the trial court to

approve the civil compromise, asking the court to dismiss

the criminal case against Bean under ORS 135.703 (permit-

ting compromise of certain crimes) and attaching a decla-

ration from G that he had received full satisfaction for his

alleged damages and injuries and did not want the state

to prosecute Bean. The state opposed the motion, and the

trial court denied it. All parties understood that the June

settlement agreement would be void if the trial court denied

the motion to approve the civil compromise, and, therefore,

Bean made no payment to G under that agreement.

Subsequently, the parties attended a status confer-

ence with the trial court judge assigned to Bean’s criminal

case. During that conference, Deveny informed the court that

G was reluctant to participate in the criminal case and that

he would not accept service of a trial court subpoena. She

also informed the court that, if he were served, G would move

to quash the subpoena in California, where he then lived.

The prosecutor acknowledged that G was an uncooperative

witness, but he informed the court that the state planned

to proceed with the prosecution and to find and serve G in

California. The court set the trial for August 11, 2015.

In the meantime, Deveny continued to threaten to

file a civil complaint against Bean on G’s behalf. Respondent

met with Deveny in her office in an effort to persuade her

to delay filing the complaint until after the criminal trial

had concluded. Deveny told respondent that she would file

the civil complaint within days unless Bean agreed to pay

G $200,000. Respondent explained to Deveny that Bean

could not settle G’s civil claims before the criminal trial

because settlement agreements on behalf of minors require

probate court approval under ORCP 27 I and seeking that

298 In re Ashton

approval would place details of the settlement in the pub-

lic record, which, in turn, could prejudice Bean’s defense

in the criminal trial. During the conversation, Deveny

told respondent that G had an immediate need for money

because he was suicidal and urgently needed mental health

treatment but that he could not obtain treatment because

he did not have health insurance. At the end of that meet-

ing, Deveny repeated that she had a civil complaint ready

to file unless Bean agreed to settle immediately.

According to respondent, after that meeting, he

tried to think of ways to meet Deveny’s demands that did not

require a public filing with the probate court. Respondent

wanted to delay the filing of any civil complaint until after

the criminal trial because he was concerned that a civil suit

would prejudice Bean’s defense by revealing facts that were

not known to prosecutors and that a civil complaint would

generate publicity that could taint the jury pool. Respondent

then proposed to Deveny that Bean would pay G $20,000 to

settle only G’s economic damages claims for past and future

mental health evaluation and treatment related to the 2013

incident, and, in exchange, G would postpone filing a civil

complaint seeking other damages until the criminal trial

had concluded.3

Deveny agreed to that proposal, and, on July 20, 2015,

respondent drafted, and the parties executed, a settlement

agreement entitled “Confidential Settlement Agreement,

Release, and Limited Covenant Not to Sue” (July settlement

agreement). Like the June settlement agreement, the July

settlement agreement purported to restrict G’s ability to

testify in future legal proceedings. Also similarly, the July

settlement agreement provided, among other things, that

G would (1) “forever * * * refrain from instituting, prosecut-

ing, claiming, testifying, or asserting he/they have the basis

for any action, claim or proceeding for economic damages

for past and future mental health evaluation and treatment

against [Bean] related to events alleged to have occurred

3

Respondent testified that he proposed paying G $20,000 specifically,

because he estimated that that amount would cover G’s mental health treat-

ment and because a settlement of less than $25,000 did not require probate court

approval.

Cite as 375 Or 309 (2026) 299

[in the 2013 incident]”; (2) “not * * * ever claim, assert, or tes-

tify that [Bean] engaged or attempted to engage in tortious

conduct resulting in [G’s] need for past and future mental

health evaluation and treatment related to [the 2013 inci-

dent]”; and (3) “never again assert, claim, testify, prosecute,

or institute any action against [Bean] for economic damages

for past and future mental health evaluation and treatment

related to claims alleged or which could have been alleged

related to [the 2013 incident].” After the July settlement

agreement was signed, respondent’s law firm wired $20,000

to Deveny’s lawyer trust account.

Also in July 2015, the prosecutor in Bean’s crimi-

nal case notified respondent and Deveny that he planned to

serve G in California with a subpoena to appear at Bean’s

criminal trial. Deveny then set in motion a plan to secrete

G at a cabin in Oregon to evade law enforcement. G and

his mother hid in the Oregon cabin for about a week, and

police were unable to locate and serve G with the subpoena.

The state then moved to continue the August 11 trial date.

Deveny and respondent opposed the motion and asked the

court instead to dismiss the case with prejudice. The court

set the trial over until September 1, 2015, to give the police

more time to locate and serve G. Ultimately, G decided to

stop evading service and accepted service of a subpoena to

appear at Bean’s criminal trial.

G was suffering from severe mental health problems

at the time, including feeling suicidal. Deveny and G met

with the prosecutor in Bean’s criminal case and told him of

G’s mental health struggles and that G did not want to partic-

ipate in the criminal case and would return to and remain in

California despite the subpoena. The prosecutor told G that

the state would not issue a material witness arrest warrant

to force him to appear if he were to ignore the subpoena.

The day before the trial was scheduled to begin,

Deveny called the prosecutor and confirmed that G would

not appear. On the morning of September 1, the date set

for the trial, respondent emailed Deveny about the possibil-

ity that the court would dismiss the criminal case, and he

told Deveny that, if the case were dismissed, Bean wanted

to settle the civil claim. Later that morning, the parties

300 In re Ashton

appeared at a hearing before the trial court judge, and the

state informed the court that it was not ready to proceed.

The court then orally dismissed the charges against Bean

without prejudice, and it entered a general judgment of dis-

missal later that day.

After the hearing, respondent and Deveny agreed

to settle G’s civil case for $200,000, and respondent pre-

pared another draft agreement (the September settlement

agreement). Respondent testified that he had prepared the

September settlement agreement in about five minutes, edit-

ing the June settlement agreement to reflect that the “crimi-

nal indictment was dismissed on September 1, 2015” and that

the $200,000 would be transferred on or before September 8,

2015.4 However, respondent did not materially change the

name of the agreement, and the September settlement

agreement continued to indicate that it was a civil compro-

mise agreement even though the criminal case had been dis-

missed. In addition, respondent did not change virtually any

of the terms of the June settlement agreement, and, there-

fore, like the June settlement agreement, the September

settlement agreement repeatedly referenced the criminal

charges. Importantly, like the June settlement agreement,

the September settlement agreement conditioned payment

of the settlement funds on G’s agreement not to testify in

future legal proceedings about Bean’s involvement in the

2013 incident without excluding circumstances in which G is

ordered to testify by a court or quasi-judicial authority.

Deveny provided respondent with a copy of the

September settlement agreement that included the signa-

tures of G and his mother dated September 2, 2015, and

on September 8, respondent’s law firm wired $200,000 to

Deveny’s lawyer trust account. Deveny did not seek approval

of the September settlement agreement from the probate

court under ORCP 27 I.

Three years later, in 2018, it came to light that

Deveny, in an elaborate scheme executed over many years,

4

Respondent states in his brief to this court that he also made a few other

minor wording changes to the June settlement agreement. The Bar’s brief details

all the changes made to the June settlement agreement, confirming respondent’s

statement that the other changes were minor.

Cite as 375 Or 309 (2026) 301

had stolen millions of dollars from her clients’ settlement

funds. She was eventually convicted of state and federal

criminal charges and sentenced to prison, and she resigned

from the Bar under threat of disbarment after the Bar

became aware of her misconduct.5

In July 2018, G read a news article about Deveny’s

resignation from the Bar and her embezzlement of client

funds. He telephoned respondent to talk about the matter.

G denied having ever signed settlement agreements with

Bean, and he expressed concern that Deveny had stolen his

settlement money. Respondent then mailed G copies of the

three settlement agreements. In a subsequent phone call,

G told respondent that he had not seen or signed the July or

September settlement agreement and had not received any

money from Deveny. Respondent advised G to contact the

police and the Bar.

In August 2018, G and his father called the

Portland police and reported that Deveny had stolen money

from him. Police conducted a criminal investigation and, in

the course of that investigation, began to look more closely

at the 2015 criminal case against Bean, the three settle-

ment agreements, and Deveny’s efforts to assist G in avoid-

ing testifying. In October 2018, G learned conclusively that

Deveny had stolen the settlement money from him, and he

retained new lawyers to file a federal lawsuit against Bean

related to the 2013 incident. And, in late 2018, G informed

prosecutors that he wanted to pursue prosecution of the sex

crimes against Bean. In January 2019, the Lane County

District Attorney’s Office refiled criminal charges against

Bean.

Respondent at first continued to represent Bean in

the 2019 criminal case, but, unbeknownst to respondent,

the police had also begun investigating him for his alleged

5

Deveny was convicted of federal crimes and sentenced in federal court to

nearly eight and one-half years in prison for cheating more than 135 clients out of

more than $3.8 million, and she was convicted of state crimes in state court and

sentenced to 14 years for stealing $1.8 million from 36 clients. In respondent’s

disciplinary proceeding, the Bar stipulated that Deveny had perpetrated the

“worst series of frauds in the history of the Oregon State Bar” and that Deveny

had “proven to be the most prolific liar and fraud in the history of the Oregon

State Bar.”

302 In re Ashton

role in the scheme to help G evade service of the subpoena.

In the course of that investigation, police met several times

with Deveny. She admitted her role in secreting G at the

Oregon cabin, and she made several statements to the

police implicating respondent in the scheme. In June 2019,

respondent learned that the police were investigating him,

and, soon thereafter, he withdrew from his representation

of Bean. New counsel took over Bean’s defense. In October

2019, respondent was arrested and charged with having

committed “computer crime” under ORS 164.377(2) related

to his drafting of the September settlement agreement.6

In February 2021, respondent offered to plead

guilty to contempt of court in exchange for dismissal of the

computer crime charge. The prosecutor accepted the plea

offer, and, in May 2021, respondent filed a “Petition to Admit

Contempt of Court.”7 In that document, respondent admit-

ted that he had engaged in “contempt of court as alleged in

Count 1 of the Information,” which provided:

“On or about September 4, 2015, [respondent] willfully

resisted the court’s authority * * * by negligently drafting

a civil settlement agreement after the dismissal of a crim-

inal case that included language copied from a global set-

tlement agreement related to a proposed civil compromise

of the criminal case, where the copied language purported

to foreclose a party’s ability to cooperate with a potential

future prosecution and where the proposed civil compro-

mise had been previously denied by the court.”

The petition further stated that the parties had agreed that

respondent’s lawyer had provided the District Attorney with

6

ORS 164.377(2) provides:

“Any person commits computer crime who knowingly accesses, attempts

to access or uses, or attempts to use, any computer, computer system, com-

puter network or any part thereof for the purpose of:

“(a) Devising or executing any scheme or artifice to defraud;

“(b) Obtaining money, property or services by means of false or fraud-

ulent pretenses, representations or promises; or

“(c) Committing theft, including, but not limited to, theft of proprietary

information or theft of an intimate image.”

7

Respondent was charged under ORS 33.015(2). As relevant here, ORS

33.015(2) provides that a person commits “contempt of court” if the person will-

fully commits an act of “[d]isobedience of, resistance to or obstruction of the

court’s authority, process, orders or judgments.”

Cite as 375 Or 309 (2026) 303

“written, verifiable information that shows that * * *

[respondent’s] actions in drafting the settlement agree-

ment to resolve the civil claims following the dismissal of

the underlying criminal case represented an isolated act

of negligence and were not part of a pattern or practice

related to multiple alleged victims, and were not a deliber-

ate attempt designed to deprive any alleged criminal vic-

tim of their right to testify, and were not an intentional

effort to deprive, impede, or interfere with the State’s abil-

ity to call a witness at trial in a criminal case.”

The prosecutor acknowledged the foregoing in a docu-

ment filed with the trial court, and the trial court entered

a general judgment finding respondent “[i]n contempt”

for “Contempt of Court/Punitive—Finding in Contempt

Count 1.” The court sentenced respondent to 40 hours of

community service.

In January 2022 the state moved to dismiss Bean’s

criminal case on the ground that G “wish[ed] this office to

resolve the pending matters against the defendant without a

conviction in the case at bar.” The court granted the motion

and dismissed the case.

The Bar filed a formal complaint against respon-

dent in 2023 and an amended complaint in 2024, alleging

multiple violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct. As

relevant here, the Bar alleged that respondent’s conduct in

connection with the three settlement agreements violated

RPC 3.4(b), which prohibits a lawyer from “acquiesce[ing] in

payment of compensation to a witness contingent upon the

content of the witness’s testimony,” because the agreements

promised payments to G for his agreement never to testify

about the 2013 incident. The Bar also alleged that the same

conduct violated RPC 8.4(a)(4) because it was prejudicial to

the administration of justice. In addition, the Bar alleged

that respondent violated RPC 3.4(c), which prohibits a law-

yer from “knowingly disobeying an obligation under the

rules of a tribunal,” because, after the circuit court issued

its order denying the motion to civilly compromise the 2015

criminal charges against Bean, respondent drafted the

September settlement agreement and thereby facilitated a

$200,000 settlement payment to G based on terms similar

to the civil compromise agreement that the trial court had

304 In re Ashton

rejected. The Bar also alleged that that conduct violated

RPC 8.4(a)(4).8

The trial panel found that respondent had com-

mitted three violations of RPC 3.4(b) and one violation of

RPC 8.4(a)(4) by offering or acquiescing in the payment of

compensation to G contingent upon the content of his testi-

mony and by engaging in conduct prejudicial to the admin-

istration of justice in drafting and offering three settlement

agreements that contained provisions conditioning pay-

ment of settlement funds on G’s agreement not to testify in

future legal proceedings against Bean relating to the 2013

charges. In addition, the trial panel found that respondent

had knowingly disobeyed an obligation under the rules of a

tribunal in violation of RPC 3.4(c) in light of his guilty plea

and conviction in 2021 for contempt of court based on the

September settlement agreement, and that he engaged in

conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in viola-

tion of RPC 8.4(a)(4) based on that same conduct. For those

violations, the trial panel suspended respondent from the

practice of law for 60 days.

The Bar requests that this court adopt the trial

panel’s findings that respondent committed three violations

of RPC 3.4(b), one violation of RPC 3.4(c), and two violations

of RPC 8.4(a)(4), but it asks us to reject the trial panel’s

determination that a 60-day suspension is the appropriate

sanction for respondent’s misconduct and, instead, to sus-

pend him for no less than six months. Respondent, for his

part, contends that none of the three settlement agreements

violated RPC 3.4(b) or RPC 8.4(a)(4), because none of those

agreements contained an offer to pay G money “contingent

on the content” of his testimony at a future legal proceed-

ing. Respondent also contends that the trial panel erred in

concluding that he violated RPC 3.4(c) and RPC 8.4(a)(4) by

8

In addition to those allegations, the Bar alleged that, during the course of

respondent’s representation of Bean, in violation of RPCs 3.4(f), 8.4(a)(1), 8.4(a)(2),

and 8.4(a)(3), respondent bribed G by facilitating a payment to Deveny that was

intended to help her hide G from law enforcement and avoid service of a trial sub-

poena on G in Bean’s criminal case. The trial panel found that the Bar had not

proved those allegations by clear and convincing evidence and the Bar does not

challenge that ruling in this proceeding. We therefore do not need to—and do

not—detail the Bar’s allegations or explain the trial panel’s ruling with respect to

those charges in this opinion.

Cite as 375 Or 309 (2026) 305

knowingly disobeying a court order, because the District

Attorney stipulated that respondent had not “knowingly”

disobeyed a court order. Finally, respondent argues that,

if this court concludes that he committed all the violations

found by the trial panel, then, at most, a 60-day suspension

is appropriate.

II. ANALYSIS

A. RPC 3.4(b), Prohibiting Offering to Pay or Acquiescing

in Payment of Compensation to a Witness Contingent

Upon the Content of the Witness’s Testimony or Outcome

of the Case

RPC 3.4(b) provides that a lawyer shall not

“falsify evidence; counsel or assist a witness to testify

falsely; offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited

by law; or pay, offer to pay, or acquiesce in payment of com-

pensation to a witness contingent upon the content of the

witness’s testimony or the outcome of the case; except that

a lawyer may advance, guarantee or acquiesce in the pay-

ment of [certain expenses, none of which is involved here].”

In its amended formal complaint, the Bar alleged that,

in drafting the three settlement agreements, respondent

“acquiesced in payment of compensation to a witness con-

tingent upon the content of the witness’s testimony or out-

come of the case” in violation of RPC 3.4(b). In finding that

respondent had committed the three violations of RPC

3.4(b), the trial panel stated that “[i]t is a per se violation of

RPC 3.4(b) for a lawyer to include in a settlement agreement

a provision that purports to pay compensation to a witness

in exchange for the witness’s agreement not to testify in a

future legal proceeding.” The trial panel found that respon-

dent had committed those violations of that rule by drafting

and proposing provisions in the June, July, and September

settlement agreements that required G to agree never to

testify against Bean relating to the 2013 incident.

Respondent had argued that the settlement agree-

ment did not contain terms that made payment “contingent

on the content” of G’s testimony, because the payment to

G did not depend on what G would say or whether a specific

case were resolved in a certain way. Rather, respondent had

306 In re Ashton

argued, the agreements prohibited G from testifying at all

about Bean’s conduct. The trial panel rejected that argu-

ment on the ground that “[t]hat simply cannot be,” because

it would “make a mockery of RPC 3.4(b) and undermine the

spirit and purpose of the disciplinary rules.” In support of

its finding, the trial panel cited In re Boothe, 303 Or 643,

653, 740 P3d 785 (1987), for the proposition that attempting

to induce a witness not to testify violates the disciplinary

rules.

The Bar concurs in the trial panel’s conclusion.

Respondent, for his part, reprises his argument that he did

not violate RPC 3.4(b) as alleged in the complaint, because

the settlement agreements did not include provisions mak-

ing payment to G contingent on the content of his testimony

in violation of RPC 3.4(b). Respondent argues that the rule is

intended to prohibit lawyers from paying or offering money

to a witness in return for specific witness testimony—in

other words, it is intended to prohibit a lawyer from buying

a witness’s testimony—and that is not what the settlement

agreements here do.9

The parties’ arguments and the trial panel’s opin-

ion reflect a disagreement over the meaning of the phrase,

in RPC 3.4(b), “contingent upon the content of the witness’s

testimony.” As noted, respondent argues that the provisions

in the settlement agreements that condition payment on G’s

agreement not to testify are not “contingent upon the content

of the witness’s testimony” because they are not contingent

on what G would say at trial. In other words, respondent

contends, an agreement is only contingent on the “content”

of a witness’s testimony if the witness promises to testify in

a certain way in a future proceeding, and none of the settle-

ment agreements that respondent drafted contained such

9

Respondent further contends that RPC 3.4(b) does not prohibit agreements

between parties that are intended to secure a global agreement to settle all claims

related to a particular event. He argues that the inclusion of the word “testify” in

the agreements he drafted simply supported the parties’ intended dismissal of all

claims and the anticipated dismissal of all criminal charges to which any such tes-

timony could have been relevant. Respondent explains at length why, in his view,

none of the settlement agreements violates RPC 3.4(b). We do not need to recount

or address those arguments here, because, as we explain in the text, we conclude

that the Bar has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that any of the settle-

ment agreements made payment to G “contingent on the content” of his testimony.

Cite as 375 Or 309 (2026) 307

a provision. Therefore, he contends, the settlement agree-

ments do not violate RPC 3.4(b).

The Bar does not address the meaning of the phrase

“contingent on the content” of the witness’s testimony.

Rather, it explains that RPC 3.4(b) was designed to pro-

hibit lawyers from improperly influencing witnesses, and

it cites Boothe for the proposition that an effort to induce

a witness not testify is unethical. In addition, the Bar

cites a Washington Supreme Court case, In re Disciplinary

Proceeding Against Bonet, 144 Wash 2d 502, 514, 29 P3d

1242, 1248-49 (2001), in which that court held that it was

a violation of the Washington Rule of Professional Conduct

(Washington RPC) 3.4(b) to offer an inducement to a wit-

ness in order to influence a witness not to testify.

As we will explain, we agree with respondent that

he did not offer an inducement that was “contingent on the

content” of G’s testimony within the meaning of that phrase

in RPC 3.4(b). However, that does not mean that offering an

inducement to a witness not to testify at all is not a viola-

tion of the disciplinary rules. Offering an inducement to a

witness not to testify in a future legal proceeding may well

violate other parts of RPC 3.4(b) or even other disciplinary

rules, but the Bar did not charge respondent with violating

those provisions.

This court has not previously interpreted RPC

3.4(b). We have stated that, when interpreting a disciplinary

rule, the court looks to “ ‘the wording of the rule, read in

context.’ ” In re Harris, 366 Or 475, 483, 466 P3d 22 (2020),

quoting In re Hostetter, 348 Or 574, 583, 238 P3d 13 (2010).

The court also considers any interpretive guidance from its

prior case law. In re Duboff, 370 Or 720, 727, 525 P3d 62

(2023). And finally, when a Rule of Professional Conduct is

modeled after an American Bar Association Model Rule of

Professional Conduct, we look to the Model Rule commen-

tary as “persuasive in interpreting the meaning of” the rule

at issue. Id. at 726.

We observe that RPC 3.4(b) may be violated in four

ways: the rule prohibits a lawyer from (1) falsifying evi-

dence; (2) counseling or assisting a witness to testify falsely;

308 In re Ashton

(3) offering an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by

law; and (4) paying, offering to pay, or acquiescing in pay-

ment of compensation to a witness contingent upon the con-

tent of the witness’s testimony or the outcome of the case.

As noted, the Bar charged respondent with violating RPC

3.4(b) by “acquiesc[ing] in payment of compensation to a wit-

ness contingent upon the content of the witness’s testimony

or the outcome of the case.” As the parties’ arguments sug-

gest, whether respondent committed the charged violation

depends on the meaning of the phrase “contingent on the

content.”

The definition of the words “contingent” and “con-

tent” support respondent’s argument that the phrase “contin-

gent upon the content of the witness’s testimony” is concerned

with prohibiting a lawyer from paying a witness to testify in

a certain way. As relevant here, the word “contingent” means

“dependent on, associated with, or conditioned by something

else.” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 493 (unabridged

ed 2002). The word “content,” as relevant here, is defined as

the “topics, ideas, facts, or statements in a book, document,

or letter” or “the matter esp. of a book or discourse : subject

matter, substance.” Id. at 492. Thus, in prohibiting payment

to a witness “contingent upon the content of the witness’s tes-

timony,” that phrase in RPC 3.4(b) appears to prohibit only

making a payment to a witness dependent on the subject

matter or substance of the testimony—in other words, con-

tingent on specifically what the witness testifies about.

However, cases from other jurisdictions interpret-

ing similarly worded disciplinary rules uniformly pro-

hibit paying a witness to testify rather than focusing spe-

cifically on the content of the testimony. For example, in

Patel v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 2015 WL 9701133 (CD Cal 2015), a

California federal district court, applying California Rule

of Professional Conduct 3.4(d), which, like Oregon’s RPC

3.4(b), prohibits a lawyer from acquiescing in the payment

to a witness “contingent upon the content of the witness’s

testimony,” explained that that rule is intended to

“ ‘prohibit a lawyer from paying or offering to pay money or

other rewards to witnesses in return for their testimony,

be it truthful or not, because it violates the integrity of the

Cite as 375 Or 309 (2026) 309

justice system and undermines the proper administration

of justice. Quite simply, a witness has the solemn and fun-

damental duty to tell the truth. He or she should not be

paid a fee for doing so.’ ”

Id. at *5 (quoting Golden Door Jewelry Creations, Inc. v.

Lloyds Underwriters Non-Marine Assn., 865 F Supp 1516,

1526 (SD Fla 1994), rev’d in part on other grounds, 117 F3d

1328, 1335 n 2 (11th Cir 1997). The court in Patel cited

Dyll v. Adams, 1997 WL 222918 (ND Tex 1997), in which

a federal district court applied Texas Rule of Professional

Conduct 3.4(b), which also prohibits lawyers from acquiesc-

ing in payment to a witness contingent upon the content of

the witness’s testimony. In Dyll, the court stated, “Payment

for factual testimony is generally prohibited even if the tes-

timony sought is truthful.” Id. at *2. In addition, the Patel

court cited Caldwell v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 86 AD3d 46,

925 NYS2d 103 (2011), in which the New York Appellate

Division applied New York Rule of Professional Conduct

3.4(b), which also prohibits lawyers from acquiescing in pay-

ment to a witness contingent upon the content of the wit-

ness’s testimony. There, the court stated that, although wit-

nesses are entitled to attendance fees and travel expenses,

the “giving of testimony as to facts within one’s knowledge is

a matter of public duty” and an “inherent burden of citizen-

ship, which requires no compensation.” 86 AD3d at 50, 925

NYS2d at 106 (citations and internal quotation marks omit-

ted). The Patel court noted that, “to compensate otherwise

would be subversive of the orderly and efficient administra-

tion of justice, even where a witness is contracted to tell the

truth, rather than to testify falsely, and payment creates an

incentive, even unconscious, toward biased testimony.” 2015

WL 9701133 at *5 (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted). Those cases all support the conclusion that a law-

yer acquiesces in the payment to a witness “contingent upon

the content” of the witness’s testimony if the witness is paid

to give testimony, whether truthful or not.

Whether it prohibits paying a witness to testify

generally or paying a witness to testify in a specific way, the

phrase “contingent upon the content of the witness’s testi-

mony” is not easily understood to speak to paying a witness

not to testify at all, and neither of the authorities offered by

310 In re Ashton

the Bar hold otherwise. As discussed, the Bar cites Boothe

and the Washington State case, Bonet, in support of its

argument that respondent violated RPC 3.4(b). However,

neither of those cases involves an allegation that the law-

yer paid or acquiesced in the payment to a witness “contin-

gent on the content” of the witness’s testimony. In Boothe,

after a client filed a bar complaint against his lawyer over a

fee dispute, the lawyer offered to settle the fee claim if the

client agreed not to testify against him in any bar disci-

plinary proceeding. Based on that conduct, the Bar charged

the respondent with engaging in conduct prejudicial to the

administration of justice in violation of former DR 1-102

(A)(5), the predecessor to RPC 8.4(a)(4). The court held that

an attempt to induce a potential witness not to testify in an

official proceeding, even if unsuccessful, is prejudicial to the

administration of justice. Boothe, 303 Or at 653. Boothe did

not involve former DR 7-109(C), RPC 3.4(b)’s predecessor. In

fact, the Bar did not charge the respondent in Boothe with

paying, offering to pay, or acquiescing in payment of com-

pensation to a witness contingent upon the content of the

witness’s testimony in violation of former DR 7-109(C), and

it did not discuss the meaning of the phrase “contingent on

the content” of a witness’s testimony.

In addition, as noted, in Bonet, the Washington

Supreme Court held that inducing a witness not to testify

violated Washington RPC 3.4(b). However, the Washington

version of RPC 3.4(b) does not include a prohibition on a law-

yer acquiescing in the payment to a witness contingent upon

the content of the witness’s testimony. Rather, it provides

that a lawyer shall not “falsify evidence, counsel or assist a

witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness

that is prohibited by law.” Thus, in finding that the lawyer

had violated Washington RPC 3.4(b), the Washington court

found that the lawyer had “offer[ed] an inducement to a wit-

ness that is prohibited by law.” 144 Wash 2d at 514. It did not

have occasion to determine whether the lawyer had paid or

acquiesced in the payment to a witness “contingent on the

content” of the witness’s testimony.

Based on our analysis of the wording of RPC 3.4(b),

read in context, we conclude that a lawyer acquiesces in a

Cite as 375 Or 309 (2026) 311

payment to a witness contingent upon the content of the wit-

ness’s testimony if the payment to the witness depends on

the witness testifying, whether truthful or not. The Bar has

not contended that any provision in any of the three settle-

ment agreements conditioned payment to G on his agree-

ment to testify—or to testify in any particular way—in a

legal proceeding. We therefore hold that the Bar has failed

to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, in draft-

ing the three settlement agreements, respondent violated

RPC 3.4(b) by “acquiesce[ing] in payment of compensation

to a witness contingent upon the content of the witness’s tes-

timony or the outcome of the case.”

The fact that we conclude that respondent’s con-

duct did not violate RPC 3.4(b) as alleged in the Bar’s com-

plaint does not necessarily mean that that conduct does not

violate any other part of RPC 3.4(b) or some other Rule of

Professional Conduct. Each of the settlement agreements

included provisions that purported to prohibit G from tes-

tifying in a future legal proceeding, using wording broad

enough to apply even if G were subject to a lawful subpoena

or an order of a court or quasi-judicial authority to testify

and he lacked a basis for asserting privilege. Offering agree-

ments with those provisions could violate the part of RPC

3.4(b) that prohibits offering an inducement to a witness

that is prohibited by law. That is so because an Oregon stat-

ute, ORS 162.285(1)(a), provides that a person commits the

crime of tampering with a witness if the person “induces or

attempts to induce a witness or a person the person believes

may be called as a witness in any official proceeding to * * *

unlawfully withhold any testimony.” That conduct also could

violate RPC 3.4(f) (prohibiting “advis[ing] or caus[ing] a per-

son to secrete himself or herself or to leave the jurisdiction

of a tribunal for purposes of making the person unavailable

as a witness therein”) because paying a witness not to tes-

tify in a legal proceeding could be seen to “cause” the person

to avoid service of process that would require the person to

testify.

However, the Bar did not charge respondent with

violating RPC 3.4(b) by offering an inducement that is

prohibited by law and it has not argued that we may find

312 In re Ashton

respondent guilty of violating a part of a disciplinary rule

different from what was charged in the complaint or argued

to the trial panel. As we stated in In re Ellis, 356 Or 691,

738, 344 P3d 425 (2015), a respondent in a disciplinary

case must be put on notice of the conduct constituting the

violation as well as the rule violation at issue. See also BR

4.1(3) (providing that a formal complaint “shall set forth suc-

cinctly the acts or omissions of the respondent, including the

specific statutes or rules of professional conduct violated, so

as to enable the respondent to know the nature of the charge

or charges against the respondent” (emphasis added)). Here,

the Bar notified respondent that the described conduct vio-

lated the part of RPC 3.4(b) prohibiting acquiescing in a

payment to a witness that was contingent on the content

of the witness’s testimony. However, the complaint did not

put respondent on notice that he could be found guilty of

violating a different part of that rule. Importantly, it did

not allege that respondent’s conduct violated the prohibition

against offering an inducement prohibited by law (much less

identify which law or laws). For that reason, we conclude

that the Bar failed to prove that respondent violated RPC

3.4(b) in this case.

B. RPC 3.4(c), Prohibiting Knowingly Disobeying an

Obligation Under the Rules of a Tribunal

RPC 3.4(c) provides that a lawyer shall not “know-

ingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal,

except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no

valid obligation exists.” The trial panel found that respon-

dent violated RPC 3.4(c) when he drafted and executed the

September settlement agreement that purported to civ-

illy compromise Bean’s criminal charge and facilitated a

$200,000 settlement payment to G based on terms similar

to those in the June settlement agreement that the trial

court had rejected. The trial panel explained that, in 2021,

respondent had pleaded guilty to and found in convicted of

contempt of court under ORS 33.015(2) for preparing the

September settlement agreement in violation of the trial

court’s order rejecting the June settlement agreement.

As relevant here, ORS 33.015(2)(b) defines “con-

tempt of court” as certain acts “done willfully”, including

Cite as 375 Or 309 (2026) 313

“disobedience of, resistance to or obstruction of the court’s

authority, process, orders or judgments.” The trial panel

stated that the 2021 contempt judgment established that

the state had proved beyond a reasonable doubt all the

material elements of a contempt-of-court charge against

respondent: that a valid court order existed, that respon-

dent knew of that order, and that respondent willfully failed

to comply with that order. Therefore, the trial panel con-

cluded, the contempt judgment conclusively established that

respondent had willfully disobeyed a ruling of a tribunal in

a proceeding in violation of RPC 3.4(c).

On review, respondent argues that the court is not

required to find that he violated RPC 3.4(c) simply because he

pleaded guilty to “willfully” committing contempt of court.

Respondent asserts that he admitted in his petition that he

“willfully resisted the court’s authority * * * by negligently

drafting” the September settlement agreement. (Emphasis

added.) Thus, he contends, the evidence that he presented

to the trial panel demonstrates that his conduct was merely

negligent and that this court should not conclude that he

knowingly disobeyed an obligation under the rules of a tri-

bunal as required to find that he violated RPC 3.4(c).10

We reject that argument because a finding of con-

tempt of court has the mental state requirement of willful-

ness, and, as the trial panel observed, respondent “freely and

voluntarily” admitted, in his Petition to Admit Contempt of

Court, that he committed contempt of court by “willfully

resist[ing] the court’s authority.” In State ex rel Mikkelsen v.

Hill, 315 Or 452, 458, 847 P2d 402 (1993), this court held that

“willfulness,” for purposes of the contempt-of-court statute,

ORS 33.015(2), may be established by showing “proof that

10

At oral argument in this case, respondent also argued that his guilty plea

is not sufficient to prove that he violated RPC 3.4(c) because that rule requires a

finding that he “disobeyed” a court order, and he pleaded guilty only to “resist-

ing” a court order. That is, as noted, a person commits contempt of court in one

of three ways: by disobeying or resisting or obstructing the court’s authority,

process, orders or judgments. ORS 33.015(d). In this case, respondent pleaded

guilty to willfully resisting a court order, not disobeying an order, and, therefore,

he contends, he did not actually violate RPC 3.4(c). Respondent did not, however,

develop the argument that committing contempt of court by willfully resisting—

rather than disobeying—a court order does not violate RPC 3.4(c), and the Bar

did not have an opportunity to respond. For those reasons, we do not address that

argument in this opinion.

314 In re Ashton

a party had knowledge of a valid court order and failed to

comply with that order.” Thus, in admitting that he acted

“willfully” in committing contempt of court, respondent

has also admitted that he acted “knowingly.” The fact that

respondent attempted to limit his admission by stating that

he acted willfully by acting negligently does not change our

analysis. In pleading guilty to contempt of court, respondent

admitted facts that establish that he committed contempt

of court, including that he acted willfully, and those facts

establish a violation of RPC 3.4(c). We therefore conclude

that respondent violated RPC 3.4(c).11

C. RPC 8.4(a)(4), Prohibiting Conduct Prejudicial to the

Administration of Justice

As discussed, the trial panel also found that respon-

dent violated RPC 8.4(a)(4). That rule provides that “[i]t is

professional misconduct for a lawyer to * * * engage in con-

duct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”

This court has held that RPC 8.4(a)(4) requires the Bar

to prove three elements by clear and convincing evidence:

(1) that the respondent’s actions were “improper”; (2) that

the respondent’s conduct occurred during the course of a

judicial proceeding; and (3) that the respondent’s conduct

had, or could have had, a prejudicial effect on the adminis-

tration of justice. In re Ard, 369 Or 180, 193, 501 P3d 1036

(2021). The rule does not contain an express mental state

requirement; rather, “it focuses on the effect of the lawyer’s

conduct, not on the lawyer’s intent.” Id. at 194 (internal quo-

tation marks and citations omitted).

As relevant here, the Bar charged respondent with

three counts of violating RPC 8.4(a)(4): (1) for drafting and

offering the June, July, and September settlement agree-

ments that included provisions conditioning payment to

G on his agreement not to testify about Bean’s conduct in

the 2013 incident, (2) for drafting the September settlement

agreement to include terms similar to the civil compro-

mise agreement that the trial court had rejected in denying

Bean’s motion for a civil compromise, and (3), similarly, by

11

We express no opinion about whether the trial court, in denying the defense

motion to dismiss the charges against Bean through a civil compromise, imposed

an “obligation” on respondent not to file a similar agreement in the future.

Cite as 375 Or 309 (2026) 315

pursuing the objective of the civil compromise after the trial

court denied the motion. Although the trial panel did not

expressly reject the Bar’s contention that respondent had

committed two separate violations of RPC 8.4(a)(4) by vio-

lating RPC 3.4(c), it found that that Bar had proved by clear

and convincing evidence that respondent had committed

only two violations of RPC 8.4(a)(4) in total. The trial panel

found two violations because, as it stated, the same conduct

that violated RPC 3.4(b) and RPC 3.4(c) also violated RPC

8.4(a)(4), the conduct occurred during a judicial proceeding,

and the conduct caused or could have had a prejudicial effect

on the administration of justice.

Respondent’s only challenge to the trial panel’s find-

ings that he violated RPC 8.4(a)(4) is a reprisal of his argu-

ments that he did not violate either RPC 3.4(b) or RPC 3.4(c).

We agree with the trial panel that respondent’s violation of

RPC 3.4(c) also violates RPC 8.4(a)(4). However, as discussed,

we find that the Bar did not prove by clear and convincing

evidence that respondent violated RPC 3.4(b) in the manner

charged in the complaint when he drafted the three settle-

ment agreements to include provisions prohibiting G from

testifying against Bean in a future legal proceeding, even

though they contained no exception for testimony pursuant

to a lawful subpoena. Nonetheless, as we shall explain, we

conclude that that conduct does independently violate RPC

8.4(a)(4).

First, with respect to petitioner’s conduct in includ-

ing provisions in the three settlement agreements purport-

ing to prohibit G from testifying against Bean in a future

legal proceeding, our case law suggests that paying a wit-

ness not to testify in a future legal proceeding may be

“improper.” As discussed, in Boothe, this court held that a

lawyer’s attempt to induce a potential witness not to tes-

tify in a Bar disciplinary proceeding was prejudicial to the

administration of justice in violation of former DR 1-102

(A)(5), the predecessor rule to RPC 8.4(a)(4). Boothe, 303 Or

at 653. Similarly, in In re Smith, 316 Or 55, 60-61, 848 P2d

612 (1993), this court held that a lawyer’s attempt to induce

an examining doctor not to express a particular medical

opinion in his client’s worker’s compensation proceeding,

316 In re Ashton

even if unsuccessful, was prejudicial to the administration

of justice in violation of former DR 1-102(A)(5). Those cases

seem to suggest that a lawyer engages in conduct prejudicial

to the administration of justice any time the lawyer offers

an inducement to a potential witness not to testify in a legal

proceeding.

However, neither Boothe nor Smith involved payment

to a party in connection with the settlement of all civil claims

between the parties to the agreement. We are unaware of any

case holding that settlement agreements cannot include pro-

visions precluding one party from testifying against another

party concerning matters covered by the agreement, and we

are reluctant to so hold. Nonetheless, it is indisputable that

any such agreement would be prejudicial to the administra-

tion of justice if it purported to compel a party to refuse to

comply with a subpoena or other lawful order to testify in a

future legal proceeding. In this case, the settlement agree-

ments that respondent drafted and offered to G prohibited

G from testifying in a future legal proceeding and did not

include an exception for circumstances in which G may

be ordered to testify by a court or quasi-judicial authority.

Therefore, we conclude that respondent’s conduct in facilitat-

ing a payment to G in exchange for G’s agreement not to tes-

tify against Bean in a future legal proceeding was “improper.”

We next consider whether respondent’s improper

conduct occurred during the course of a judicial proceed-

ing.12 As the trial panel noted, respondent conceded that the

June settlement agreement was drafted while the 2015 crim-

inal case against Bean was pending. We therefore find that

respondent’s improper conduct in drafting that agreement

was “during the course of a judicial proceeding.” The crimi-

nal case also was pending when the July settlement agree-

ment was drafted and executed. The trial panel rejected

respondent’s argument that his conduct in connection with

the July settlement agreement did not occur “during the

course of a judicial proceeding,” because that agreement

related only to unfiled civil claims. The trial panel found

that the July settlement agreement prohibited G from

12

By “judicial proceeding,” we also mean “proceeding with the trappings of a

judicial proceeding.” In re McGraw, 362 Or 667, 691, 414 P3d 841 (2018).

Cite as 375 Or 309 (2026) 317

testifying that Bean had engaged in “tortious wrongdoing”

in any proceeding, and that could have included the ongoing

criminal case. We agree. Respondent’s improper conduct in

drafting the July settlement agreement occurred “during

the course of a judicial proceeding.”

Whether respondent’s improper conduct in drafting

the September settlement agreement also occurred during

the course of a judicial proceeding is a closer question,

because, by the time the parties had signed that agreement,

the trial court judge had orally dismissed the criminal case.

The trial panel found that the improper conduct occurred

during a judicial proceeding because respondent drafted the

September settlement agreement and sent a copy to Deveny

before the judge’s order was entered and the case was offi-

cially closed. We agree with the trial panel’s conclusion, but

for a different reason.

As is evident from our discussion thus far, we rou-

tinely repeat that an element of a violation of RPC 8.4(a)(4)

is that the misconduct occurred “in the course of a judicial

proceeding.” See, e.g., Ard, 369 Or at 193; In re Maurer, 364

Or 190, 199, 431 P3d 410 (2018); In re McGraw, 362 Or 667,

691, 414 P3d 841 (2018). However, as this case highlights,

that phrasing unduly narrows the circumstances in which

conduct that is actually prejudicial to the administration of

justice will violate RPC 8.4(a)(4). That is, in the trial panel’s

view, applying that criterion, whether a violation occurred

here depended on the fortuitous fact that respondent hap-

pened to send Deveny a copy of the settlement agreement

before the trial court entered the order dismissing the crim-

inal case. But here, and in any case involving paying a wit-

ness not to testify in a future legal proceeding, any harm

to the administration of justice would necessarily occur in

a future case, if there is one. Thus, it does not make sense

always to require that the lawyer’s misconduct occur in the

course of a current judicial proceeding. Rather, in a case like

this one, if the harm that will result from a lawyer’s miscon-

duct is in connection with a judicial proceeding, including a

judicial proceeding that may or may not occur in the future,

the lawyer’s misconduct relates to the administration of jus-

tice as required for a violation of RPC 8.4(a)(4).

318 In re Ashton

Finally, we also find that respondent’s improper

conduct “had, or could have had, a prejudicial effect upon

the administration of justice.” As the trial panel noted,

that inquiry “focuses upon the potential effect of a law-

yer’s conduct upon the functioning of a proceeding, as well

as upon a party’s substantive interest in the proceeding.”

In re Gustafson, 327 Or 636, 643, 968 P2d 367 (1998). Here,

improperly inducing G not to testify in a legal proceeding

could have harmed the prosecution of the 2015 and 2019

criminal cases against Bean and any other future legal

proceedings at which G could have been subpoenaed and

ordered by a court or quasi-judicial authority to testify.

Accordingly, we conclude that the Bar has proved

by clear and convincing evidence that respondent’s drafting

and offering the settlement agreements so as to condition

payment to G on his agreement not to testify against Bean

in a future legal proceeding, without an exception for cir-

cumstances in which G may be ordered to testify by a court

or quasi-judicial authority, was prejudicial to the adminis-

tration of justice in violation of RPC 8.4(a)(4). In addition,

as discussed, we have found that respondent violated RPC

3.4(c) and we conclude that that violation also constitutes a

violation of RPC 8.4(a)(4). Therefore, we conclude that the

trial panel did not err in finding that respondent committed

two violations of RPC 8.4(a)(4).

III. SANCTION

The trial panel suspended respondent from the

practice of law for 60 days as a sanction for his misconduct.

The Bar urges us to impose a suspension of at least six

months. Respondent, for his part, contends that, if this court

finds that he committed the charged violations, a sanction

ranging from a public reprimand to a suspension of no more

than 60 days is appropriate. In determining the appropriate

sanction, we apply the framework set out in the American

Bar Association’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

(1991) (amended 1992) (ABA Standards): We first deter-

mine the preliminary sanction by identifying the nature

of the ethical duty violated, the respondent’s mental state

at the time of the violation, and the extent of any actual

or potential injury caused by the respondent’s misconduct.

Cite as 375 Or 309 (2026) 319

In re Abel, 374 Or 350, 366, 577 P3d 777 (2025). We then

consider aggravating and mitigating factors to determine

whether the preliminary sanction should be adjusted.

Id. Finally, we consider this court’s case law to decide the

appropriate sanction. Id. As explained below, we conclude

that a suspension of 30 days is an appropriate sanction for

respondent’s misconduct.

A. Preliminary Determinations

1. Duties violated

Turning first to the ethical duties violated, we con-

clude that respondent violated his duties to the legal system

by engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration

of justice in including terms in the three settlement agree-

ments that offered an improper inducement to a witness not

to testify in a future legal proceeding and in failing to obey

a court order. ABA Standard 6.0.

2. Mental state

The ABA Standards recognize that a lawyer may

act intentionally, knowingly, or negligently. ABA Standards

at 5. The most culpable mental state is acting with intent.

“Intent” is defined as “the conscious objective or purpose to

accomplish a particular result.” Id. at 7. The next most cul-

pable mental state is acting with knowledge. “Knowledge”

is defined as “the conscious awareness of the nature or

attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the

conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular

result.” Id. And the least culpable mental state is negligence.

“Negligence” is defined as “the failure of a lawyer to heed a

substantial risk that circumstances exist or that a result

will follow, which failure is a deviation from the standard of

care that a reasonable lawyer would exercise in the situa-

tion.” Id.

The trial panel found that respondent acted know-

ingly in violating RPC 3.4(b) by drafting the three settlement

agreements to include provisions conditioning payment to

G on his agreement never to testify in a future legal proceed-

ing about Bean’s conduct in the 2013 incident. As discussed,

we conclude that respondent did not violate RPC 3.4(b) as

320 In re Ashton

alleged in the complaint, but we find that respondent vio-

lated RPC 8.4(a)(4) by drafting three settlement agreements

that conditioned payment to G on G’s agreement not to tes-

tify in a future legal proceeding, even in response to an

order of a court or quasi-judicial authority. For that reason,

the trial panel’s discussion of respondent’s mental state for

the RPC 3.4(b) violations applies to respondent’s conduct in

violating RPC 8.4(a)(4).

The trial panel found that respondent was con-

sciously aware that those agreements conditioned the pay-

ment of funds to G on G’s agreement not to testify, but it

found that the Bar had failed to prove by clear and convinc-

ing evidence that respondent subjectively intended the set-

tlement agreements to prevent G from testifying in a future

criminal case. The trial panel found respondent credible

when he testified that he subjectively believed that any

provision preventing G from testifying would be unenforce-

able and that, in any case, G would not cooperate with any

prosecution of Bean or appear in any criminal trial against

him. As for the violation of RPC 3.4(c), the trial panel found,

based on the 2021 contempt judgment, that respondent had

acted knowingly.

Respondent does not challenge the trial panel’s con-

clusion that he acted knowingly in drafting and presenting

the three settlement agreements. The Bar, however, urges

us to find that respondent acted intentionally, at least with

respect to the September settlement agreement, because,

it contends, in drafting that agreement, respondent made

“exacting changes” to the June settlement agreement and

because he testified before the trial panel that, after talking

to G in 2018, his first thought was “You agreed that you

weren’t going to[,] you know, bring any criminal charges.”

After reviewing respondent’s testimony and com-

paring the June and September settlement agreements,

we do not think that there is clear and convincing evidence

in the record that respondent intended that agreement to

prohibit G from testifying pursuant to a lawful subpoena.13

13

The trial panel found that respondent’s explanation—that, except with

respect to the provisions concerning the timing and amount of the payment to

G, he was careless in preparing the September settlement agreement—not to

Cite as 375 Or 309 (2026) 321

Nonetheless, we agree with the trial panel that respon-

dent acted knowingly in including the word “testify” in the

September settlement agreement. It is not exculpatory that

respondent believed that provisions in the agreement pre-

venting G from testifying would be unenforceable or that

respondent believed that G—independent of the agreement—

would not cooperate with any prosecution of Bean or appear in

any criminal trial against him. But, as the trial panel found,

those facts show that respondent had a “conscious awareness

of the nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct,” but

that he did not have “the conscious objective or purpose” to

prohibit G from testifying pursuant to a lawful subpoena.

As previously discussed, we also agree with the trial

panel that the contempt judgment conclusively establishes

that respondent acted knowingly in drafting the September

settlement agreement to include provisions similar to those

in the civil compromise agreement that the trial court had

rejected. Finally, because the second violation of RPC 8.4

(a)(4) is based on the same conduct that underlies the vio-

lation of RPC 3.4(c), we also find that that violation was

knowing.

3. Injury

In determining an appropriate sanction, the court

considers both actual and potential injury. ABA Standards

at 6; In re Keller, 369 Or 410, 417, 506 P3d 1101 (2022). The

Bar urges us to conclude that respondent’s misconduct

caused actual injury to the court, the legal system, and to

be credible, because, in the trial panel’s view, in drafting the September settle-

ment agreement, respondent made “meticulous additions and detailed edits” to

the June settlement agreement, “including verb changes and other modifications

that belie any suggestion that [r]espondent merely ‘cut and paste[d]’ language

from the June agreement without closely reviewing and editing that language.”

Respondent disputes that credibility determination because the September set-

tlement agreement is identical to the June settlement agreement in almost all

material respects, including, importantly, the title, which refers to a civil compro-

mise, even though the criminal case had been dismissed at that point, and all the

provisions in which the word “testify” appeared. We conclude that it ultimately

is irrelevant whether respondent’s edits were meticulous or merely careless,

because, as we explain in the text, we agree with the trial panel that respon-

dent knowingly included provisions in each of the three agreements prohibiting

G from testifying in future legal proceedings without an exception for a circum-

stance in which he was required to do so by a lawful subpoena or other court

order but that respondent did not draft any of the agreements with the intent to

require G to refuse to testify in any matter pursuant to a lawful subpoena.

322 In re Ashton

the legal profession because, in including provisions in the

three settlement agreements conditioning payment to G on

G’s agreement not to testify about the 2013 incident in any

future legal proceeding, respondent actually induced G not to

testify in the criminal proceedings against Bean. In support

of that argument, the Bar points to G’s refusal to cooperate

in the criminal trials against Bean, which ultimately led to

their dismissal. The Bar also contends that respondent’s vio-

lation of RPC 3.4(c) caused actual injury because any time a

lawyer commits contempt of court, it “seriously undermine[s]

the court system and the integrity of the profession.”

We disagree that the Bar proved by clear and con-

vincing evidence that respondent’s misconduct caused actual

injury. Like the trial panel, we find that the Bar has not

established by clear and convincing evidence that G based

his decision not to testify against Bean in the two crimi-

nal cases on the fact that he was prohibited from doing so

by provisions in the settlement agreements. For one thing,

Deveny made clear to respondent from the outset that G did

not wish to participate in any criminal proceeding, even in

response to a subpoena, and the Bar has not pointed to any

evidence in the record that G was motivated not to partici-

pate by the settlement agreements themselves. For similar

reasons, and because the parties signed the September set-

tlement agreement after the trial court had orally granted

a motion to dismiss the criminal case, respondent’s violation

of RPC 3.4(c) also did not cause actual injury.

However, respondent’s misconduct did cause poten-

tial injury to the legal system and the legal profession

because the settlement agreements could have persuaded

G not to testify against Bean in a subsequent civil or crimi-

nal case. In addition, respondent’s misconduct caused poten-

tial injury because offering money to a witness in exchange

for agreeing not to testify without excluding circumstances

in which the witness may be ordered to testify by a court

or quasi-judicial authority could interfere with the proper

functioning of the justice system and, when done by a law-

yer, as here, it undermines confidence in the legal profes-

sion. Likewise, resisting court orders also has the potential

Cite as 375 Or 309 (2026) 323

to interfere with the administration of justice and under-

mines confidence in the legal profession.

4. Preliminary sanction

Taking together the duties violated, respondent’s

mental state, and the actual and potential injury caused

by respondent’s misconduct, and before considering aggra-

vating and mitigating factors, the following ABA Standard

applies. Under ABA Standard 6.22, suspension is gen-

erally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly violates a

court order and causes actual or potential injury to a cli-

ent or party or interference or potential interference with

a legal proceeding. Neither of the other ABA Standards

that apply to knowing violations of duties owed to the legal

system—neither ABA Standard 6.12 nor ABA Standard

6.3214 —directly applies here, but to the extent they have

any relevance at all, they also suggest that a suspension is

generally appropriate for a knowing violation of the disci-

plinary rules. Thus, given our conclusion that respondent’s

violations of RPC 3.4(c) and RPC 8.4(a)(4) were knowing

and caused at least potential harm to the legal system

and the legal profession, we conclude that the presumptive

sanction is a suspension.

B. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

1. Aggravating factors

The trial panel found that the following aggravat-

ing factors are present in this case: Pattern of misconduct,

ABA Standard 9.22(c); multiple offenses, ABA Standard

9.22(d); refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct,

ABA Standard 9.22(g); vulnerability of the victim, ABA

14

ABA Standard 6.12 provides:

“Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows that false state-

ments or documents are being submitted to the court or that material infor-

mation is improperly being withheld, and takes no remedial action, and

causes injury or potential injury to a party to the legal proceeding, or causes

an adverse or potentially adverse effect on the legal proceeding.”

ABA Standard 6.32 provides:

“Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in communica-

tion with an individual in the legal system when the lawyer knows that such

communication is improper, and causes injury or potential injury to a party

or causes interference or potential interference with the outcome of the legal

proceeding.”

324 In re Ashton

Standard 9.22(h); and substantial experience in the practice

of law, ABA Standard 9.22(i). The Bar urges us to find those

aggravating factors and additionally to find that respondent

had a dishonest or selfish motive, ABA Standard 9.22(b).

Respondent counters that the record does not sup-

port findings that all those aggravating factors are present.

First, he contends that the trial panel correctly rejected the

Bar’s argument that he acted with a dishonest or selfish

motive. ABA Standard 9.22(b). We agree. The Bar does not

offer any evidence to support its argument that respondent

acted with a selfish or dishonest motive, and we agree with

the trial panel that the evidence showed that respondent

zealously advocated for his client and did not stand to gain

personally from his drafting of the settlement agreements.

Respondent also contends that there was no “pat-

tern of misconduct.” The trial panel found that this aggra-

vating factor was present because respondent drafted and

proposed three agreements that each contained similar pro-

visions conditioning payment on G’s agreement not to testify

against Bean. Respondent argues that that does not show a

“pattern” of misconduct as would a case in which a lawyer

commits the same violations with multiple clients or in dif-

ferent circumstances. Rather, it merely shows that respon-

dent repeatedly tried to resolve the same issue between the

same client and the same adverse party. He argues that

that may give rise to multiple disciplinary offenses, but it

does not show a “pattern” of misconduct.

In In re Redden, 342 Or 393, 397, 153 P3d 113 (2007),

this court examined “the elements of a ‘pattern of miscon-

duct’ that the Bar must prove to establish that aggravating

circumstance.” The court stated that, “[w]hen considering

the sanction issue, this court has found a pattern of mis-

conduct in [neglect] cases when the accused lawyer engaged

in similar misconduct in the past, the lawyer’s conduct vio-

lated multiple disciplinary rules, or the lawyer neglected the

legal matters of multiple clients.” Id.; In re Walton, 352 Or

548, 559, 287 P3d 1098 (2012) (court has applied pattern-of-

misconduct aggravating factor “only in cases in which the

lawyer has violated the disciplinary rules in more than one

case or matter”); see also In re Davenport, 334 Or 298, 321,

Cite as 375 Or 309 (2026) 325

40 P3d 91 (2002) (no pattern of misconduct where all mis-

representations occurred in same proceeding and pertained

to same subject). Here, although we have found that respon-

dent’s conduct violated two different disciplinary rules,

we have not found that he committed the same violations

against multiple clients or that respondent had committed

similar violations in the past. We therefore agree that the

Bar has not shown that respondent engaged in a pattern of

misconduct under RPC 9.22(c).

Respondent also argues that the trial panel erred in

finding that his refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature

of his conduct was an aggravating factor. RPC 9.22(g). He

observes that this court has held that accused lawyers

have the right to “vigorously defend themselves against all

charges and [they] may refuse to concede the Bar’s factual

allegations without reprisal for doing so.” Maurer, 364 Or at

204. The Bar responds that that statement from this court’s

opinion in Maurer was cabined by the court’s further state-

ment that, “when a lawyer admits the Bar’s factual allega-

tions in nearly all material respects but continues to claim

his conduct was not blameworthy or detrimental, the law-

yer has failed to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his

conduct.” Id. The Bar argues that that aggravating factor

applies because respondent has admitted all the predicate

facts that demonstrate that he committed the alleged viola-

tions, and, therefore, his refusal to concede the wrongfulness

of his conduct is unreasonable.

Notably, in Maurer, this court went on to say that

“[a] lawyer does not refuse to acknowledge the wrongful-

ness of his or her conduct when he or she makes a plausible

legal argument that the admitted conduct does not violate

the disciplinary rules.” Id. In this case, respondent made

a plausible legal argument that his admitted conduct did

not violate RPC 3.4(b) as charged by the Bar, and, as dis-

cussed, we agree and find that the Bar has not shown by

clear and convincing evidence that respondent committed

those alleged violations. And, although we have concluded

that respondent’s conduct resulting in the contempt judg-

ment violated RPC 3.4(c), we do not think that respondent’s

argument that it did not violate that rule was implausible.

We therefore conclude that the aggravating factor set out in

326 In re Ashton

RPC 9.22(g)—refusal to acknowledge the wrongfulness of

one’s conduct—does not apply.

Finally, respondent argues that the trial panel

erred in concluding that the vulnerability of the victim, ABA

Standard 9.22(h), was an aggravating factor in this case.

Respondent contends that the allegations in the complaint

do not relate to the mistreatment of a vulnerable victim;

rather, they all relate to the integrity of the judicial system.

Moreover, respondent continues, all of his interactions with

G were through G’s lawyer, Deveny, and respondent asserts

that he had no reason to doubt that Deveny was advocating

for and protecting her client.

The trial panel found that that aggravating factor

applied because G was a vulnerable minor and alleged sex-

ual abuse victim whom respondent knew to be experiencing

financial and severe emotional distress. However, the trial

panel stated that it was assigning “less weight” to that fac-

tor given that respondent had no direct contact with G and

that G was represented by counsel.

We are not aware of any case in which we have held

that a person represented by opposing counsel in a matter

in which the respondent was charged with disciplinary vio-

lations was deemed a “vulnerable victim” of the respondent.

Respondent was entitled to expect that Deveny was fully

representing G’s interests in any negotiation or proposed

settlement of any civil and criminal proceedings. G was not

respondent’s client, and he was not respondent’s “victim.”

The “vulnerable victim” aggravating factor does not apply.

We are then left with two aggravating factors: mul-

tiple offenses, ABA Standard 9.22(d); and substantial expe-

rience in the practice of law, ABA Standard 9.22(i). The trial

panel also found several mitigating factors: absence of a

prior disciplinary record, ABA Standard 9.32(a); absence of

a dishonest or selfish motive, ABA Standard 9.32(b); char-

acter or reputation, ABA Standard 9.32(g); and delay in the

disciplinary proceedings; ABA Standard 9.32(j). The trial

panel explained as to that last factor that all of respondent’s

misconduct took place in 2015, ten years before the disci-

plinary proceedings. And, although the Bar made the point

Cite as 375 Or 309 (2026) 327

that it had not discovered respondent’s misconduct until he

was indicted in 2019 and that it had stayed its investigation

until those charges were resolved, respondent’s criminal

case ended in May 2021, and the Bar did not file its com-

plaint until July 2023. The trial panel observed that respon-

dent was responsible for some of the delay, but it found that

his actions did not unreasonably delay the Bar’s investiga-

tion or the proceedings. Accordingly, it afforded some, but

not much, mitigating weight to the delay in the proceedings

since the misconduct occurred. The Bar does not challenge

the trial panel’s findings of mitigating factors.

We agree with the trial panel’s findings as to miti-

gation, and we conclude that the mitigating factors outweigh

the aggravating factors. We turn to consider this court’s

case law.

C. This Court’s Case Law; Sanction Determination

We have found that respondent committed one vio-

lation of RPC 3.4(c) and two violations of RPC 8.4(a)(4) and

that those violations were knowing. In addition, we have

found that the mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating

factors. We are aware of no case that closely matches those

circumstances.

In considering the appropriate sanction for respon-

dent’s conduct in offering an inducement to G not to testify,

the trial panel pointed to In re Moore, 29 DB Rptr 73 (2015),

in which the respondent stipulated to a public reprimand for

knowingly offering an improper inducement in violation of

RPC 3.4(b) and RPC 8.4(a)(4). In that case, the stipulation

noted that the respondent had prior disciplinary offenses

and substantial experience in the practice of law, but that he

did not have a dishonest or selfish motive, he cooperated with

the disciplinary proceedings, he had expressed remorse, and

the prior offenses had taken place years earlier. Thus, the

stipulation noted that, although a suspension is generally

appropriate when a lawyer offers an improper inducement

to a witness and causes injury or potential injury to a party

or interference with the outcome of legal proceedings, in

light of the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors, a

reprimand was the correct sanction.

328 In re Ashton

The trial panel in this case also cited two other cases

in which a public reprimand was found to be the appropriate

sanction for a lawyer who committed a single violation of

RPC 3.4(b) by offering an improper inducement. In re Wolf,

27 DB Rptr 208 (2013) (stipulated public reprimand for law-

yer who violated RPC 3.4(b) by drafting a settlement agree-

ment for a defendant that conditioned payment of money in

part on the plaintiff signing and affidavit that negated part

of her complaint); In re Lafky, 11 DB Rptr 9 (1997) (public

reprimand for lawyer who violated former DR 7-109(C), the

predecessor to RPC 3.4(b), by offering to pay a witness a fee

in exchange for providing supportive testimony).

In addition, the trial panel cited several cases from

other states in which the courts imposed suspensions of 30

to 90 days for conduct that the trial panel considered to be

more like respondent’s conduct here, because they involved

lawyers who had offered to settle claims in exchange for a

witness’s agreement not to testify: In re Kennedy, 864 NW2d

342, 347 (Minn 2015) (imposing 30-day suspension where

lawyer engaged in conduct prejudicial to administration of

justice by offering in a letter to settle a crime victim’s civil

claims for a cash payment and agreement not to testify in

the defendant’s criminal case); The Florida Bar v. Machin,

635 So 2d 938 (Fla 1994) (imposing 90-day suspension where

lawyer engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration

of justice by offering to set up a trust fund for a minor victim

of lawyer’s client if the victim’s family agreed not to testify

against his client during a sentencing hearing); and Matter

of Lutz, 101 Idaho 24, 27, 607 P2d 1078, 1081 (1980) (impos-

ing one-month suspension where lawyer, “[Bean]y drafting

the ‘covenant not to testify’ and by tenaciously clinging to

its terms, * * * attempted to short-circuit the judicial pro-

cess, and in so doing was guilty of conduct prejudicial to the

administration of justice”).

The Bar urges the court to impose a suspension of

at least six months for respondent’s violations of RPC 3.4(b).

Again, we have found that the Bar has not proved those vio-

lations by clear and convincing evidence, but we have found

that respondent’s conduct in drafting and proposing the set-

tlement agreements did violate RPC 8.4(a)(4). We therefore

Cite as 375 Or 309 (2026) 329

consider the Bar’s argument as to the appropriate sanction

in that light. Nonetheless, we reject the Bar’s argument as

to the appropriate sanction for a violation of RPC 8.4(a)(4)

because it presumes that this court would find that the pre-

sumptive sanction is disbarment, that respondent inten-

tionally committed three separate violations of RPC 3.4(b),

and that the aggravating factors significantly outweigh

the mitigating factors, which we have not done here. The

Bar points to this court’s decision in Boothe, in which the

court suspended the respondent for six months for five vio-

lations of the disciplinary rules, but Boothe is inapposite.

The respondent’s violations in Boothe included engaging in

conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice by offer-

ing an improper inducement, but they also included other

serious violations, including failing to account to his client

for $9,000 paid to him and his subsequent withdrawal of

$6,000 from his client trust account even though he knew

that there was a dispute over his attorney fee. 303 Or at

655. The Bar also points to multiple other cases in which

the court imposed lengthier terms of suspension, but those

cases also involved more serious offenses than were com-

mitted here.15 We therefore reject the Bar’s suggested case

matching as inapposite.

Apart from disputing the Bar’s case-matching,

respondent provides little argument concerning the appro-

priate sanction, but he argues that a public reprimand is an

appropriate sanction for his attempt to improperly induce a

witness not to testify.

We conclude that the Oregon cases that the trial

panel cited, in which the lawyer had offered an inducement

15

Those cases include the following: Gustafson, 327 Or 636 (six-month sus-

pension imposed for a deputy district attorney’s unjustified threatening of a

criminal defense attorney with criminal or ethical charges in order to secure

the defense attorney’s favorable testimony); In re Jeffery, 321 Or 360, 898 P2d

752 (1995) (nine-month suspension for a criminal defense attorney (whom the

court also found to have conflicts of interest) who threatened to refuse to put on

defense for client in criminal case for purposes of creating reversible error unless

the court granted his motion to continue); In re Allen, 31 DB Rptr 2 (2017) (lawyer

suspended for one year for engaging in the unlawful practice of law and then

intentionally offering to pay individual who made Bar complaint to dismiss the

complaint); In re Chancellor, 22 DB Rptr 27 (2008) (stipulated 12-month suspen-

sion for prosecutor who met socially with a rape victim in a case he was prosecut-

ing and engaged in sexual contact with her, and also committed other crimes).

330 In re Ashton

prohibited by law, are the most apt, and they support a pub-

lic reprimand for respondent’s violation of RPC 8.4(a)(4) in

drafting the three settlement agreements.

As for respondent’s violation of RPC 3.4(c), the trial

panel noted that, in prior disciplinary cases, lawyers have

generally received public reprimands for violations of court

orders. In In re McDonald, 28 DB Rptr 30 (2014), for exam-

ple, the lawyer received a public reprimand after he pleaded

guilty to contempt of court for knowingly disobeying a

restraining order. In In re Rubin, 25 DB Rptr 13 (2011), the

lawyer received a public reprimand for violating a protec-

tive order. In In re Karlin, 22 DB Rptr 346 (2008), the law-

yer received a public reprimand after being found guilty of

contempt of court for violating a marriage dissolution judg-

ment. And in In re Jones, 13 DB Rptr 133 (1999), the lawyer

received a public reprimand for a single violation of his DUII

probation.

The trial panel cited several cases in which the law-

yers received suspensions rather than public reprimands for

disobeying an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, but

those cases generally involved more serious misconduct than

that present here. For instance, in In re Carini, 354 Or 47,

59-60, 308 P3d 197 (2013), the court imposed a 30-day sus-

pension for the lawyer’s violation of a court order by repeat-

edly failing to appear at scheduled court hearings in his

client’s criminal case. In In re Chase, 339 Or 452, 121 P3d

1160 (2005), the court imposed a 30-day suspension because

the lawyer repeatedly failed to pay child support and know-

ingly violated the court’s order requiring him to pay child

support. In In re O’Neil, 34 DB Rptr 132 (2020), the lawyer

received a 60-day suspension for knowingly failing to obey

a subpoena to appear as a witness in a post-conviction case

and then failed to cooperate with disciplinary authorities.

And, in In re Coyner, 342 Or 104, 149 P3d 1118 (2006), the

lawyer was suspended for 90 days for neglecting two legal

matters, failing to deposit client funds in his lawyer trust

account, failing to render an appropriate accounting to a cli-

ent, and knowingly violating a court order prohibiting him

from drinking alcohol or visiting a bar.

Cite as 375 Or 309 (2026) 331

The Bar also points us to In re Arsanjani, 20 DB

Rptr 23 (2006), where the lawyer was suspended for 30 days

after being held in contempt for violating the terms of a

restraining order, and In re Gonzalez, 25 DB Rptr 1 (2011),

where the lawyer was suspended for 60 days after being

found in contempt for failing to comply with multiple court

orders.

The Bar’s disciplinary cases suggest that a sanction

ranging from a public reprimand to a 30-day suspension

would be an appropriate sanction for respondent’s violation

of RPC 3.4(c). Therefore, considering that respondent com-

mitted one violation of RPC 3.4(c) and two violations of RPC

8.4(a)(4), and after considering respondent’s mental state,

the duties violated, the potential for injury, the aggravating

and mitigating factors, and our case law, we conclude that

a 30-day suspension is the appropriate sanction for respon-

dent’s misconduct.

IV. CONCLUSION

We conclude that the Bar proved by clear and con-

vincing evidence that respondent violated RPC 8.4(a)(4)

when he included provisions in the three settlement pro-

visions improperly inducing G not to testify in a future

legal proceeding without excluding circumstances in which

G may be ordered to testify by a court or quasi-judicial

authority and that he violated RPC 3.4(c) and RPC 8.4(a)(4)

when he committed contempt of court. We suspend respon-

dent for 30 days.

Respondent is suspended from the practice of law for

30 days, commencing 60 days from the date of this decision.