Brown v. Tromba

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 29 2026

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARLON LORENZO BROWN, No. 24-5505

Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:17-cv-02396-APG-BNW

v.

MEMORANDUM*

DANTE TROMBA; LAS VEGAS

METROPOLITAN POLICE

DEPARTMENT; EASY BAIL, LLC;

MIKE SLYMAN; CLARK COUNTY

NEVADA; NEVADA EIGHTH JUDICIAL

DISTRICT COURT; JOSEPH

LOMBARDO; DAMIAN R. SHEETS;

AMERICAN SURETY; FALLER; CITY

OF LAS VEGAS; GARY MODAFFERI

Esquire, Attorney; STEVE WOLFSON;

DANAE ADAMS; BRUCE NELSON;

CLARK COUNTY DISTRICT

ATTORNEY’S OFFICE,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Andrew P. Gordon, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 26, 2026**

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

Before: S.R. THOMAS, MILLER, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

Nevada state prisoner Marlon Lorenzo Brown appeals pro se from the

district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action relating to his

pretrial detention. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de

novo the district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 2018). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Brown’s Fourth Amendment false

arrest claim against Dante Tromba because Brown did not allege the violation of

any clearly established rights. See Cuevas v. City of Tulare, 107 F.4th 894, 898

(9th Cir. 2024) (“Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability

under § 1983 unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and

(2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly established at the time.” (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also District of Columbia v. Wesby,

583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018) (explaining that “clearly established” means that the

constitutional question was “beyond debate,” such that every reasonable official

would understand that what he is doing is unlawful).

The district court properly dismissed Brown’s judicial deception claim as

barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because Brown concedes that

success on this claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, and

Brown has not demonstrated that his conviction has been invalidated. See Heck,

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512 U.S. at 487 (holding that if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would

necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence . . . the complaint

must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or

sentence has already been invalidated”).

The district court properly dismissed Brown’s equal protection claim

because Brown failed to allege facts sufficient to show that he was intentionally

treated differently from others similarly situated without a rational basis for the

difference in treatment. See SmileDirectClub, LLC v. Tippins, 31 F.4th 1110,

1122-23 (9th Cir. 2022) (setting forth elements of a “class-of-one” equal protection

claim).

The district court properly dismissed Brown’s municipal liability claims

against Clark County and Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (“LVMPD”)

because Brown failed to allege facts sufficient to show that he suffered a

constitutional violation as a result of an official policy or custom. See Horton by

Horton v. City of Santa Maria, 915 F.3d 592, 602-03 (9th Cir. 2019) (explaining

requirements to establish municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social

Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).

The district court properly dismissed Brown’s state law negligent hiring,

training, supervision, and retention claim against LVMPD because LVMPD is

immune from liability. See Paulos v. FCH1, LLC, 456 P.3d 589, 595 (Nev. 2020)

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(explaining requirements for discretionary immunity under Nevada law, and

holding that discretionary immunity bars a negligent hiring, training, and

supervision claim).

The district court properly denied Brown’s motion for summary judgment

because it properly dismissed Brown’s action. See Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d

1160, 1162-63, 1167 (9th Cir. 1991), amended (May 8, 1992) (setting forth

standard of review and holding that denial of an affirmative motion for summary

judgment is proper when underlying claims have been properly dismissed).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Brown’s motion for

reconsideration because Brown failed to establish any basis for relief. See Sch.

Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th

Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Brown’s motion for

sanctions because Brown failed to demonstrate any sanctionable conduct. See

Magnetar Techs. Corp. v. Intamin, Ltd., 801 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2015)

(setting forth standard of review); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(2) (setting forth

requirements for a motion for sanctions for a failure to admit).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

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appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

All pending motions are denied.

AFFIRMED.

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