Forest Grove Cit. Ass'n v. Forest Glen Med. Ctr.

Forest Grove Citizens Association, et al. v. Forest Glen Medical Center, LLP, et al.

No. 2475, Sept. Term, 2024

Opinion by Leahy, J.

Administrative Law > Judicial Review > Standard of Review

Where, as here, a party claims that an administrative agency’s decision is void as a matter

of law, we review whether the circuit court was “legally correct” in its determination. See

Halici v. City of Gaithersburg, 180 Md. App. 238, 249 (2008) (explaining that “a challenge

to the statutory authority of the administrative body to take the action at issue” is a “purely

legal issue” that may be considered by the reviewing court “at any time, even if it were not

raised before the agency”). Because the resolution of this issue requires statutory

interpretation, which is a question of law, we review the circuit court’s decision de novo.

M-NCPPC v. Anderson, 395 Md. 172, 181 (2006).

Zoning and Planning > Regional District Act > Montgomery County Code >

“Applicant”

Section 50-2.2(A) of the Montgomery County Code defines an applicant as an “individual,

partnership, corporation, or other legal entity and its agent that undertakes the subdivision

of land[,]” including “all persons involved in successive stages of the project, even though

such persons may change and ownership of the land may change.” MCC § 50-2.2(A). This

provision expressly contemplates that the entities involved in a project may shift over

time—and even ownership of the land itself may change—without undermining the

validity of the application.

Principal and Agent > Creation and Existence of Agency Relationship

Above all, the record in this case established that at the time of the Planning Board Hearing,

JLB Realty maintained the actual authority to pursue—and otherwise act in furtherance

of—the Plans as the developer and agent of Forest Glen Medical Center LLP (“FGMC”),

the property owner. An actual agency-principal relationship may be established “by

written or spoken words or other conduct of the principal which, reasonably interpreted,

causes the agent to believe that the principal desires him to act on the principal’s account.”

Citizens Bank of Md. v. Md. Indus. Finishing Co. Inc., 338 Md. 448, 459 (1995) (quoting

Restatement (Second) of Agency § 26) (internal quotation marks omitted). The purchase

contract and its expiration date do not determine the issue. What is most relevant are the

written words contained in FGMC’s authorization letter to JLB Realty and the subsequent

conduct of the principal, here FGMC.

Zoning and Planning > Regional District Act > Sector Plan

To the extent the Montgomery County Code has “elevated” the 2020 Forest

Glen/Montgomery Hills Sector Plan Sector Plan by requiring the Planning Board demand

substantial conformance to master plan (or sector plan) recommendations, see Greater

Baden-Aquasco, 412 Md. at 100-01, we observe that substantial conformance is not the

same as strict conformance. We have explained that even when a sector plan is binding on

the Planning Board in terms of what the Board “must find,” the Sector Plan’s specific

“recommendations” may remain “aspirational rather than mandatory.” Pringle v.

Montgomery Cnty. Plan. Bd. M-NCPPC, 212 Md. App. 478, 489 (2013). To hold

otherwise would require us to read “recommendations” as “requirements,” and equate

“substantial conformance” with mere “conformance,” running contrary to our canons of

statutory interpretation. See Koste v. Town of Oxford, 431 Md. 14, 25-26 (2013).

Circuit Court for Montgomery County

Case No. C-15-CV-24-001622

REPORTED

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF MARYLAND

No. 2475

September Term, 2024

______________________________________

FOREST GROVE CITIZENS ASSOCIATION,

ET AL.

v.

FOREST GLEN MEDICAL CENTER, LLP,

ET AL.

______________________________________

Leahy,

Reed,

McDonald, Robert N.

(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

______________________________________

Opinion by Leahy, J.

______________________________________

Filed: May 29, 2026

Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal

Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State * Judge Rosalyn Tang did not participate in the

Government Article) this document is authentic.

decision to report this opinion pursuant to Md.

Rule 8-605.1.

'00'04- 15:05:48 2026.05.29

Gregory Hilton, Clerk

As our Supreme Court once observed, “Montgomery County is somewhat unique

in the source and exercise of its municipal authority to regulate the use of land.” Remes v.

Montgomery Cnty., 387 Md. 52, 70 (2005). Most chartered counties in Maryland derive

their zoning and planning authority from the Express Powers Act, now codified at

Maryland Code (2013), Local Government Article (“LG”), §§ 10-101-330. However,

Montgomery County’s zoning power originates in the Regional District Act, a statute that

“divides broadly authority related to zoning, planning, and other land use matters between

the [Prince George’s and Montgomery] county (district) councils, the Maryland-National

Capital Park & Planning Commission [(“M-NCPPC”)], and the county planning boards.”

Cnty. Council of Prince George’s Cnty. v. Zimmer Dev. Co., 444 Md. 490, 525-26 (2015);

see also Pan American Health Organ. v. Montgomery Cnty., 338 Md. 214, 217-18 (1995);

Council of Chevy Chase View v. Rothman, 323 Md. 674, 685 (1991); Northampton Corp.

v. Prince George’s Cnty., 273 Md. 93, 96 (1974). Overall, subject to exceptions not

relevant here, “Montgomery County’s zoning authority arises from the Regional District

Act, and is regulated by the provisions of the Montgomery County Code.” Remes, 387

Md. at 71.

In this appeal, three different but interrelated chapters of the Montgomery County

Code (“County Code” or “MCC”) govern our analysis: Chapter 22(A) (“Forest

Conservation Law”), Chapter 50 (“Subdivision Regulations”), and Chapter 59 (“Zoning

Ordinance”).1 Respectively, these chapters prescribe the requirements for a preliminary

plan, a “drawing for a proposed subdivision submitted for approval before the preparation

of a plat[,]” MCC § 50-2.2; a site plan, a “detailed overview of the applicant’s

development[,]” MCC § 59-7.3.4(A)(4) (2014); and a forest conservation plan,

MCC § 22(A)-11(b)(2)(A).

Forest Grove Citizens Association, Nandini Arunkumar, Pamela Stanziani, and

Friends of Sligo Creek (collectively, “Appellants”) filed the underlying petitions for

judicial review in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. Appellants challenged a set

of resolutions (“Resolutions”) by the Montgomery County Planning Board of the

M-NCPPC (the “Planning Board” or “Board”), appellee, approving a preliminary plan, site

plan, and forest conservation plan (collectively, “Plans”). These Plans, submitted by

developer JLB Realty LLC (“JLB Realty”), involve the proposed redevelopment of a

3.78-acre property on Georgia Avenue facing the Forest Glen Metro Station (the

“Property”) owned by co-appellee Forest Glen Medical Center, LLP (“FGMC”). After a

hearing, the circuit court affirmed the resolutions, and this appeal timely followed.

Appellants present three questions for our review, which we rephrase as follows:2

1

The County Code is available online at

https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/montgomerycounty/latest/overview.

2

The Appellants’ questions presented in their brief are:

1. Did the Planning Board err when it approved JLB Realty’s

Preliminary Plan, Site Plan, and Forest Conservation plan, even after JLB

(Continued)

2

I. Are the Resolutions void as a matter of law because the purchase

contract between JLB Realty and FGMC expired prior to their

issuance by the Planning Board?

II. Is there substantial evidence in the record to support the Planning Board’s

determination that the preliminary plan and the site plan substantially

conform to the 2020 Forest Glen/Montgomery Hills Sector Plan?

III. Is there substantial evidence in the record to support the Planning

Board’s grant of the tree variance request associated with the forest

conservation plan?

For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

The Property

The facts of this appeal are generally not in dispute. The Property is located in the

northeast quadrant of Georgia Avenue and Forest Glen Road in Silver Spring, Maryland,

directly across from the Forest Glen Metrorail Station. It is zoned CRT-2.5, C-2.5, R-2.5,

H-120’3 under the Montgomery County Zoning Ordinance (“Zoning Ordinance”), codified

Realty no longer held any interest in the Subject Property or the associated

development application?

2. Did the Planning Board err as a matter of law by finding that the

Preliminary Plan and Site Plan substantially conform with the applicable

Master Plan?

3. Did the Planning Board violate Maryland’s Forest Conservation

Law by approving JLB Realty’s request for a variance to remove eight

Protected Tress and disturb the area within the critical root zone of one

Protected Tree as part of the Forest Conservation Plan?

3

The number immediately following the “CRT” classification represents the

maximum total floor area ratio (“FAR”) for the site; the numbers following the “C” and

“R” represent the maximum non-residential and residential FAR, respectively; and the

(Continued)

3

at Chapter 59 of the County Code. Under the Zoning Ordinance, a CRT zone—which

stands for a Commercial Residential Town zone—is “intended for small downtown,

mixed-use, pedestrian-oriented centers and edges of larger, more intense downtowns[,]”

MCC § 59-4.5.1(C), and is designed to, among other things, “implement the

recommendations of applicable master plans[.]”4 MCC § 59-4.5.1(A).

The governing master plan for the Property is the 2020 Forest Glen/Montgomery

Hills Sector Plan (the “Sector Plan”), which, in turn, represents “a comprehensive

amendment to portions of the approved and adopted 1989 Master Plan for the Communities

of Kensington-Wheaton[.]” According to its own abstract, the Sector Plan “provide[s]

comprehensive recommendations for the use of public and private lands,” which “should

be referred to by public officials and private individuals when making land use

decisions[.]”

The Property is described in the Sector Plan as follows:5

Constructed in 1967, the existing medical office building and associated

number following the “H” refers to the maximum building height in feet. See MCC §

59-2.1.3(D)(2); see also MCC § 59-4.5.2(A)(2).

4

The County Code provides that a “plan” means “the General Plan, an area master

plan, a sector plan, the Master Plan of Highways, a functional plan, and any amendments

to those plans,” MCC § 33A-2, but it does not specifically define “sector plan.” We

recently observed, however, that such plans are “widely used in both Montgomery and

Prince George’s Counties” and described them as “detailed plans for the development of a

portion of one or more master planning areas[.]” Heard v. Cnty. Council of Prince

George’s Cnty., 256 Md. App. 586, 610 n.15 (2022).

5

The Sector Plan describes the Property as “as a special exception in [an] R-60

zone,” and recommends its rezoning to CRT-2.5, C-2.5, R-2.5, H-120’. The Property had

already been rezoned as recommended prior to the approval of the Plans.

4

parking lot are situated on roughly 3.9 acres across multiple lots. . . . [T]he

building is nearing the end of its useful life and continuing maintenance and

upgrades may begin to exceed the cost of new development. On the site, a

roughly 1.25-acre vegetated area currently serves as a buffer between the

office building and adjacent residences.

The Sector Plan further outlines specific recommendations for the Property. Among

other things, for the Property’s land use and zoning, the Sector Plan recommends

“[p]rioritiz[ing] affordable housing and habitat preservation and restoration as the top

public benefit for optional method development.” Specifically, the Sector Plan notes:

Any optional method project that includes residential dwelling units should

provide a minimum of 15 percent [Moderately Priced Dwelling Units

(MPDU)]. In addition, with redevelopment, a minimum of 25 percent of

the units should be two-bedroom units and five percent of the units

should be three-bedroom units. Additionally, given the substantial

investment by the County in the Metro access tunnel construction, the Plan

recommends 10 percent of the units also be provided as affordable to

households earning at or below 100 percent of Area Median Income

(AMI).

(Emphasis added). Regarding the 1.25-acre vegetated area, which is “dominated by native

black locust trees[,]” the Sector Plan offers the following environmental recommendation:

[w]ith respect to the remnant forest, at the time of redevelopment,

maximum flexibility on the site should be given for providing an area of

equal environmental benefit that also provides for improved community

benefit and access. Equal environmental benefits may include improved

water and air quality, strategies that provide for reduced greenhouse gas

emissions and increased biodiversity and habitat protections, including

improved tree canopy. Development should also, as a part of its open space

requirement, preserve healthy indigenous trees and replant stratified

vegetation where possible.

(Emphasis added). Additionally, the Sector Plan outlines various recommendations for the

Property’s urban design and park access. Relevant to the Plans at issue in this appeal,

Section 7.3.4.(E)(2)(g) of the Zoning Ordinance and Section 50.4.2.(D)(2) of the

5

Subdivision Regulations require the Planning Board to find that a site plan application and

a preliminary plan application “substantially conform” with the recommendations of the

applicable master plan for approval.

FGMC and JLB Realty sign Contract to Purchase Property

FGMC has owned the Property Since 2003. On November 11, 2021, JLB Realty

entered into an agreement with the FGMC to purchase the Property.6 Subsequently, on

August 23, 2022, Harold Landis, the managing partner for FGMC, signed the following

letter:

Forest Glen Medical Center LLP is the Owner of the [Property].

* * *

This letter hereby affirms that J. Graham Brock at JLB Realty LLC, the

Contract Purchaser of the [Property], is authorized to sign for, file, and

pursue any and all applications and documents and permits on behalf of

Forest Glen Medical Center LLP, in connection with JLB Realty

redevelopment at the [Property]; including but not limited to

Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission and other

applicable government agencies that may be required in connection with

pursuing land use entitlements for the proposed project on the [Property].

Such applications and documents may include, but are not necessarily

limited to, those associated with . . . Forest Conservation Plan and other

related requirements, . . . Sketch Plan review, Preliminary Plan of

Subdivision review, and Site Plan review (collectively, the

“Applications”).

* * *

JLB Realty LLC, by and through its authorized representatives and its

affiliated entities, is specifically authorized to (i) execute all necessary

application forms and documents, (ii) obtain plans and drawings, and

(iii) act on behalf of Forest Glen Medical center LLP in furtherance of

such Applications.

(Emphasis added).

6

This agreement between JLB Realty and FGMC is not in the record.

6

The Planning Board Approves JLB Realty’s Sketch Plan7

In November 2022, JLB Realty, as contract purchaser, submitted sketch plan No.

320230020 (“Sketch Plan”) for the Property to the Planning Board for approval, after

having a pre-submittal meeting with the community members in September 2022. In the

Sketch Plan, JLB Realty proposed replacing the existing medical office building with a

mixed-use building, a civic green space, stratified vegetation, and accommodation for the

tunnel access to Forest Glen Metro Station.

On March 20, 2023, the Planning Board staff members (“Planning Staff” or “Staff”)

issued a report, recommending approval of the Sketch Plan subject to certain conditions.

In relevant part, Planning Staff listed issues that JLB Realty, as applicant, needed to address

for the preliminary and site plans, including:

• “The Applicant must submit and receive approval of a Preliminary/Final

Forest Conservation Plan.”

• “Plantings should use a variety of native plants that provide habitat and

food sources for wildlife.”

• “The Applicant should revisit the unit mix provided with the development

in order to meet the Sector Plan recommendation . . . for 3-bedroom units.”

On March 30, 2023, following a public hearing, the Planning Board voted 4-0—

with one member abstaining—to approve the Sketch Plan subject to certain enumerated

7

According to the Zoning Ordinance, a “sketch plan” is a developer’s preliminary

development plan, which “describes a project at an early stage to provide the public and

the Planning Board the chance to review the proposed development for general design,

density, circulation, public benefits, and relationship to the master plan before a developer

is required to expend significant resources on design and engineering.”

MCC § 59-7.3.3(A)(2). A party filing a sketch plan “must own the subject property or be

authorized by the owner to file the application.” MCC § 59-7.3.3(B)(1). To be approved

by the Planning Board, the sketch plan must also “substantially conform with the

recommendations of the applicable master plan[.]” MCC § 59-7.3.3(E)(2).

7

conditions. In a written resolution, consistent with Staff’s comments, the Planning Board

noted that JLB Realty needed to address issues regarding the Forest Conservation Plan,

native plantings, and the unit mix when filing preliminary and site plans. Still, the Planning

Board concluded that the Sketch Plan “substantially conform[ed] to the recommendations

of the Sector Plan.” In a footnote, the Planning Board also clarified that “the term

‘Applicant’ shall . . . mean the developer, the owner or any successor(s) in interest to the

terms of this approval” for the purpose of its resolution.

First Petition for Judicial Review

Forest Grove Citizens Association, Nandini Arunkumar, and Pamela Stanziani

(collectively, “Forest Grove Petitioners”) filed a petition for judicial review in the Circuit

Court for Montgomery County from the Planning Board’s Resolution approving the Sketch

Plan. They claimed, among other things, that the signage notifying the September pre-

submittal meeting “was not in conformance with” the County Code requirements. JLB

Realty countered that its signage “substantially complied with necessary standards[,]”

arguing that both the sign’s content and the high attendance at the pre-submitting meeting

established that the notice was “fundamentally fair[.]”

On November 16, 2023, the circuit court issued a written order,8 which remanded

the case to the Planning Board “for further proceedings, without affirming, reversing,

modifying [its] action” and instructed that

on remand, the [] Planning Board shall consider and decide, based on the

record and without further factfinding, whether (1) substantial compliance

8

Although the order indicates that the circuit court also announced its oral ruling on

November 14, 2023, no transcript from that hearing is available in the record.

8

with pre-submittal meeting signage can satisfy applicable notice

requirements, and (2) if substantial compliance can be sufficient, whether

[JLB Realty’s] notice signs substantially complied with the applicable notice

requirements[.]

On remand, the Planning Board, by 5-0 vote, concluded that: (1) that substantial

compliance with pre-submittal meeting signage satisfies notice requirements under

applicable Maryland law; and (2) the pre-submittal meeting sign at issue “substantially

satisfied” all relevant statutory and regulatory requirements. The Planning Board further

noted, “[a]ny variations were de minimis.” Thereafter, in January 2024, JLB Realty filed

a motion with the circuit court to affirm the Planning Board’s approval of the Sketch Plan.

The Plans

While the judicial review of the Sketch Plan was pending before the circuit court,

JLB Realty filed three separate applications on August 23, 2023, for approval of

preliminary plan No. 120230160 (the “Preliminary Plan”), site plan No. 820230130 (the

“Site Plan”), and forest conservation plan No. F.20240040 (the “Forest Conservation

Plan”), respectively. As described by the Planning Board, the Preliminary Plan proposed

consolidating six existing lots on the Property into a single 3.78-acre lot to accommodate

5,000 square feet of commercial area and 420,000 square feet of residential development.

The Preliminary Plan also anticipated the creation of a separate parcel to be conveyed to

the Montgomery County Department of Transportation (“MCDOT”) for a new entrance to

Forest Glen Metrorail Station. Consistent with the Preliminary Plan, the Site Plan

presented a mixed-use building that would include “420,000 square feet of residential

uses[] for up to 390 multi-family dwelling units,” 15% of which would be MPDUs, and

9

“5,000 square feet of retail non-residential uses.” The public and private open spaces

proposed as part of the Site Plan included a through-block connection at the north of the

property, a civic green and urban plaza at the south of the Property, and streetscape

improvements along Georgia Avenue, Forest Glen Road, and Woodland Drive.

Additionally, the Forest Conservation Plan provided for “0.43 acres of forest

clearing” and included a “request for a tree variance for impacts to subject trees.” JLB

Realty sought a variance under MCC § 22A-21 to remove eight specimen trees that

measured 30 inches or greater “in diameter-at-breast-height (dbh).”

Agency and Staff Review

Planning Staff and multiple governmental agencies, including MCDOT, Maryland

State Highway Administration (“SHA”), and Montgomery County Department of Housing

and Community Affairs (“DHCA”), reviewed the Plans. On February 8, 2024, the DHCA

sent an approval letter to Parker Smith, a Planning Staff member, recommending approval

“subject to the condition that [JLB Realty] modify their floorplans to comply with the

bedroom count percentages as recommended” in the Sector Plan. The letter stated:

The development referenced above is within a CRT Zone (CRT-2.5, C-2.5,

R-2.5, H-120). Section 4.5.1.A.(1) of Chapter 59 states that the intent of

CRT zones is to implement the recommendation of applicable master

plans.

* * *

Although the development is meeting the requirements of Chapter 25A by

providing 15 percent MPDUs, they are not substantially meeting the

recommendations of the Forest Glen Montgomery Hills Sector Plan, and

therefore of the zoning requirements, by either providing 10 percent of

the units at 100 percent AMI and/or providing 25 percent of the units as

2-bedroom units and 5 percent of the units as 3-bedroom units[.]

10

To substantially comply with the Master Plan recommendations, DHCA

requests that the applicant provide 5 percent 3-bedroom units at the

time of the Agreement to Build. As currently shown on their plans, 25

percent of the units should remain two-bedroom units to also comply with

the Master Plan.

(Emphasis added).

Planning Staff subsequently issued an 83-page report (the “Staff Report”),

containing its recommendations and proposed conditions for approval of the Plans. The

Staff Report contained exhaustive descriptions of the Property and the Plans, supplemented

by photos, maps, and computer-generated graphics. It further incorporated data from a

school adequacy test and transportation impact study to confirm the Plans’ compliance with

the relevant standards and requirements. Additionally, Staff detailed JLB Realty’s

community outreach efforts, attaching letters from community members, pre-submission

meeting minutes, and supporting affidavits. Based on the record, Staff concluded that the

Plans “substantially conform with” the Sector Plan’s recommendations and meet “all

requirements of the Subdivision Regulations, Zoning Code, and Forest Conservation Law.”

In support of its conclusions, Staff detailed the Plans’ compliance with each

individual Sector Plan recommendation. On the issue of affordable housing, Staff noted

that, consistent with the DHCA’s February 8, 2024 approval letter, JLB Realty would

“provide a minimum of 15 percent [MPDUs], a minimum of 25 percent of the units as two-

bedroom units, and a minimum of 5 percent of the units as three-bedroom units.” Staff

observed that “[p]rojects are awarded 12 Public Benefit points for every 1 percent of

MPDUs provided greater than 12.5 percent[,]” and therefore the Site Plan, with 15%

MPDUs, “qualifie[d] for 30 Public Benefit points in the [MPDU] category.”

11

As for the environmental recommendation, Staff observed that the Property contains

0.2 acres of tree cover and 0.43 acres of forest, according to the Natural Resources

Inventory/Forest Stand Delineation (“NRI/FSD”). Staff noted that “[t]he Property has

many constraints and requirements shaping the design of the proposed development[,]”

including: “an existing sewer line running through the center of the Property that must be

relocated”; “the storm drain line and stormwater management handling runoff from

Georgia Avenue”; the tunnel connecting to the Forest Glen Metro Station”; and the “Sector

Plan requirement of providing a minimum of one-half acre of civic green[.]” Staff noted

that JLB Realty proposes clearing the existing vegetated area to accommodate a relocated

sewer line. Staff found that, “even though small patches of forest are valuable for the

wildlife habitat and many environmental benefits,” the existing forest was not a “healthy,

regenerative ecosystem” due to heavy infestation by non-native plants. Staff further noted

that JLB would provide 0.46 acres of stratified plantings to mitigate the environmental

impact, explaining:

These planting areas include native trees, shrubs, perennials, grasses, and

groundcover that provide a mix of habitat and food sources. Special attention

was paid to the needs of the members of the Lepidoptera order (butterflies

and moths), which is an important group due to their roles as pollinators and

food source for many other animals. For example, Willow Oak (Quercus

phellos) is one of the canopy trees and it provides acorns that are an important

food source for small mammals, as well as serving as a host plant for

Lepidoptera species. Mapleleaf Virburnum (Viburnum acerifolium)

produces fruit for wildlife and the flowers provide support for pollinators, as

well as hosting the larvae for many species of Lepidoptera.

Accordingly, Staff concluded that the Plans offer a “healthy alternative ecosystem to the

existing remnant forest and tree cover[.]”

12

In addressing JLB Realty’s tree variance request as part of the Forest Conservation

Plan, Staff concluded that denying the variance would result in an “unwarranted hardship”

by denying JLB Realty “reasonable and significant use” of the Property. Staff also

evaluated the Plans’ impact on each specimen tree, concluding that JLB Realty’s

development would result in “the removal of eight (8) Protected Trees and impacts

to . . . one (1) Protected Tree[.]” After identifying each tree’s species, location, and size,

Staff noted:

Trees ST-3, ST-7, ST-8, and ST-11 are located in the forest and vegetated

area in the northern portion of the Property. The Sector Plan granted

maximum flexibility for the removal and mitigation of the forest and

vegetated area. This area will be impacted by the relocated sewer line and

site grading, requiring the removal of these Protected Trees.

Tree ST-13 is located adjacent to the existing entrance from Forest Glen

Road and will be impacted by the removal of the pavement. Redevelopment

of the Property requires the removal of the entrance from Forest Glen Road

and regrading of the Property to meet the open space requirements of the

Sector Plan. It is also adjacent to the new entrance to the Forest Glen Metro

Station, requiring the removal of this Protected Tree.

Trees ST-15, ST-16, and ST-17 are located within the Woodland Drive right-

of-way. Required frontage improvements along Woodland Drive, including

adding on-street parking and upgraded pedestrian facilities, require removing

these Protected Trees.

Tree OST-1 is an off-site tree located in the Sherwood Road right-of-way

that will be impacted by utility construction in the paved area of Woodland

Drive. This tree will be retained with minor impacts.9

9

Staff also recommended to the Planning Board that, in order for Applicant to meet

the requirements of the applicable Forest Conservation law,

1.11 acres of forest mitigation credits must be purchased through a forest

conservation bank located in the Sligo Creek watershed or other Priority

Area. If no credits are available in a forest conservation bank located in the

(Continued)

13

The report concluded with the findings required for granting a tree variance. First,

Staff found, granting the variance would “not confer on the Applicant a special privilege”

because the variance concerned “site-specific recommendations in the Sector Plan . . . that

would be applicable to any redevelopment of the Property.” Second, the need for the

variance was “not based on conditions or circumstances which are the result of the actions

by the [A]pplicant,” but was instead “based on existing site conditions and the requirements

to meet development standards, Sector Plan goals . . . and County Code requirements.”

Third, the requested variance was “not based on a condition related to land or building

use . . . on a neighboring property[,]” but instead was “a result of the existing conditions

and the required improvements on the Property[.]” Finally, granting the variance would

not “violate State water quality standards or cause measurable degradation” because the

subject trees were not located within a “stream buffer, wetland, or a special protection

area.”

Board Hearing on the Plans

On March 7, 2024, the Planning Board held a public hearing (“Board Hearing”) on

the Plans. The Board Hearing began with a PowerPoint presentation by Parker Smith and

Amy Lindsey, Planning Staff members who provided an overview of the Property and the

Sligo Creek watershed or other Priority Area, the Applicant must purchase

1.32 acres of forest mitigation credits through a forest conservation bank

located elsewhere in the County. If no forest mitigation credits are available

for purchase at any forest conservation banks in the County, the Applicant

may make a fee-in-lieu payment to satisfy the 1.32 acres of reforestation

required.

14

proposed development. During the presentation, they addressed the community’s concerns

about the development, which included: (1) the creation of a new “access point” on

Woodland Drive; (2) the amount of parking; (3) the development’s scale, design, and

compatibility; and (4) the loss of existing forest.

Smith explained that a traffic study approved by Staff, MCDOT, and SHA

confirmed the necessity of the Woodland Drive access point. In response to the concerns

that the proposed development would worsen the traffic congestion at the Forest Glen Road

and Georgia Avenue intersection, he explained that JLB Realty would be “required to

signalize the intersection of Tilton Drive and Georgia Avenue[,]” thus providing an

alternative route for drivers. On the issue of parking, Smith highlighted that the Plans

proposed 466 parking spaces, which marks “a decrease of 74 spaces” from the Sketch Plan,

and would require residents to pay an additional parking fee as a “concrete financial

incentive . . . to limit car possession and use.” He also testified that concerns about the

development’s scale, design, and compatibility had been “addressed through extensive

coordination and design review[.]”

Addressing environmental concerns, Lindsey acknowledged that the Plans

“propose[] to remove all 0.43 acres of forest” on the Property, while providing, among

other things, “0.46 acres of stratified plantings” in mitigation. Nonetheless, Lindsey

presented multiple photographs showing the degraded state of the existing vegetation on

the Property, explaining that much of the visible greenery was caused by Evergreen

Euonymus, an “invasive species that has covered many of the trees[.]” Following this

15

presentation, Staff members affirmed that the Plans substantially conformed to the

recommendations of the Sector Plan.

The Planning Board also heard testimony from community members, many of

whom voiced their opposition to the Plans. Pamela Stanziani testified on behalf of the

Forest Grove Citizens Association, which she described as a “community whose members,

residents, are directly impacted by this development,” and expressed concerns with the

“proposed mass increase of cars traveling throughout [her] neighborhood” and with the

“lack of notifications to . . . association residents” throughout the development process.

She also emphasized the importance of “maintain[ing] a community as opposed to

development for tax dollars and what is clearly not going to be significant affordable

housing.”

Nandini Arunkumar similarly raised general objections to the development process,

stating that there had been “no forum for the neighborhood and the community who [would]

be impacted by such a large development[.]” She also submitted a written letter to the

Planning Board as the Secretary of the Forest Grove Citizens Association listing the

community’s “concerns with the lack of conformance of this development to the Sector

Plan,” including “[c]lear cutting and removal” of all trees, and the developer’s “[r]efusal

to comply with affordable housing targets set forth in the Sketch Plan[.]”

Kit Gage, who identified herself as the “advocacy director” for Appellant Friends

of Sligo Creek, opposed the removal of the forest in the Property. Though acknowledging

that the forest “ha[d] seen better days[,]” Gage maintained that the forest “could be made

healthy with some serious effort” and was in fact “still functional . . . in many ways[,]”

16

emphasizing that it had “some big and substantially healthy trees” and “the dead or dying

trees [that] are home to woodpeckers . . . and worms and bugs that baby birds require to

live.”

Galen Rende, who also testified on behalf of Appellant Friends of Sligo Creek,

claimed that the Preliminary Plan and Site Plan did not “substantially conform” to the

Sector Plan’s environmental recommendations. According to Rende, although the Sector

Plan prioritizes “preserving and restoring the existing forest cover, rather than removing

and replacing it[,]” the Staff Report showed no meaningful consideration of “any

alternatives to the proposed development that might keep the existing forest intact.” Rende

also noted a discrepancy between the 1.25 acreage of the forest in the Sector Plan and the

0.43 acreage reported in the Staff Report, arguing that there was “no explanation . . . as to

why this value is so different[.]” Finally, Rende challenged JLB Realty’s variance request

under the Forest Conservation Plan, claiming that neither JLB Realty nor the Planning Staff

adequately explained how the Property’s conditions justify the variance and removal of

trees.

Near the end of the hearing, Amy Lindsey responded to the community’s concerns

with the Plans’ environmental impacts. As to the discrepancy between the forest acreages

cited in the Sector Plan and in the Staff Report, Lindsey explained that environmental

conditions on a property may change after a master plan is published, and it is not until a

development application is reviewed that the actual forest acreage is determined. She

expounded, “when we’re making Sector Plan recommendations and writing descriptions,

we’re not going out and doing all of the detailed field work required to make those

17

determinations.” According to Lindsey, the Forest Conservation Plan offers a more precise

measurement based on NRI/FSD “by looking at not only the number of stems and trees that

are in the area, but also how deep the area is and what the acreage of the area is.”

Lindsey also noted that the size and location of the Property made it difficult to meet

the Sector Plan’s recommendations without removing the existing forest. She explained:

It’s often very difficult in an infill situation to preserve forest because

we’re dealing with a lot of utilities that either have to be relocated.

You’re dealing with drainage considerations so that we’re not shedding water

onto adjacent properties. You’re dealing with an infill situation where you

have to meet grading on all four sides at -- with usually not a lot of extra

room, not a lot of extra flexibility.

So, for example, this property is really not that large. It’s under 4 acres, and

we were -- it -- through the sector plan, asking for half an acre to a full acre

of public open space. So there isn’t a lot of flexibility always and a lot of

space to move along. And when you include the three road frontages that all

have improvements on them, their pedestrian facility improvements on all

three of those frontages, that starts to add some levels of complication as well

as the grading necessary on this property. So there is a fairly substantial

grade. So in this case, we do not have a scenario that shows the existing

forest to be retained and still able to meet that -- the housing desire.

(Emphasis added). Nonetheless, Lindsey emphasized that Staff and JLB Realty worked

together to “take[] into account many of the ecosystem services that a forest actually

provides.” When the Planning Board asked if she followed procedures under the Forest

Conservation Law, Lindsey answered, “[a]bsolutely.”

J. Graham Brock also appeared on behalf of JLB Realty, along with JLB Realty’s

counsel. Regarding affordable housing, counsel confirmed that 15% of the housing would

be affordable housing and 25% of those affordable units would be two-bedrooms,

consistent with the Sector Plan’s recommendations. Although the Plans also included

18

three-bedroom units, counsel acknowledged that they comprised only 2.5%, falling short

of the Sector Plan’s 5% recommendation. Brock attributed this shortfall to architectural

and financial constraints, explaining that the physical configuration of the building—

limited by setbacks along Woodland Drive and site constraints at the corner of Georgia

Avenue—restricted the number of corners available for three-bedroom units, which are

typically larger. Brock also noted that increasing the number of three-bedroom units would

require combining smaller units, thereby reducing the overall unit count and impacting the

development’s financial feasibility.

On behalf of the DHCA, Maggie Gallagher addressed JLB Realty’s failure to meet

the 5% recommendation for three-bedroom units. She stated:

I just wanted to add that the Master Plan also recommended that they

include additional affordable units at slightly higher AMI than the

MPDUs. And we did talk to the applicant and decide that it would be

okay to waive that piece of the Master Plan since the market rate units

would likely be set around that price anyways, with the condition that they

show us that the market rate would be around that price.

So that’s why we kind of felt that kind of sticking with that 5 percent, three-

bedroom units was reasonable since we were already waiving that second

recommendation of the Master Plan.

(Emphasis added). The Planning Board then asked Gallagher whether “it’s really

important . . . to get the five percent, three bedrooms[,]” and she responded:

I think the reason we are kind of stuck on the five percent is because it’s one

more, three bedroom. It’s just one unit.

* * *

So if they could dedicate one market rate three bedroom as an MPDU. The

way we read the Master Plan is that it had to be 5 percent of the MPDUs.

And we really only have, you know, a say over those MPDUs. So if they

19

could designate one more three bedroom as an MPDU opposed to adding

additional three bedrooms to the site, we would be okay with that.

Counsel for JLB Realty stated that she thought DHCA was “requesting 5 percent of all of

the units as three bedrooms, not of the MPDUs[,]” and “[i]f that’s indeed the case, and it’s

5 percent of the MPDUs and it’s one more unit, that’s fine.”

The Planning Board Resolutions

At the conclusion of the hearing, the Planning Board unanimously approved the

Preliminary Plan, Site Plan, and Forest Conservation Plan with conditions and amendments,

and subsequently entered written Resolutions. Resolutions once again clarified that “for

the purpose of these conditions, the term ‘Applicant’ shall also mean the developer, the

owner or any successor(s) in interest to the terms of th[e] approval.” (Emphasis added).

The Resolutions further noted that the Planning Board, after considering Staff’s

recommendations “as presented at the hearing and/or as set forth in the Staff

Report, . . . hereby adopts and incorporates [Staff Report] by reference[.]”

The Planning Board then determined that the Preliminary Plan and the Site Plan

“substantially conform[ed] to” the Sector Plan, which “prioritizes affordable housing and

habitat preservation and restoration as the top public benefits” for the Property. More

specifically, regarding affordable housing, the Planning Board found:

As conditioned by DHCA in its approval letter dated February 8, 2024, to

achieve substantial conformance with the Sector Plan[,] the Applicant will

provide a minimum of 15 percent Moderately Priced Dwelling Units

(MPDUs), a minimum of 25 percent of the units as two-bedroom units, and

a minimum of 5 percent of the units as three-bedroom units.

Turning to the Sector Plan’s environmental recommendations, the Planning Board found:

20

According to the approved [NRI/FSD], approximately 0.43 acres of remnant

forest exist on the Site. To achieve equivalent environmental benefit, the

Applicant will plant stratified vegetation throughout the site, as well as

micro-bioretention planters along the perimeter of the building, some of

which will accommodate the stormwater needs associated with the [SHA’s]

Montgomery Hills/MD 97 project. In addition, the Applicant will construct

two consolidated open spaces, on the northern and southern portions of the

Site, with landscaped areas, terraces, and outdoor seating, both of which are

accessible for the benefit of the surrounding community.

The Planning Board also found that the Forest Conservation plan and its associated

variance “satisfie[d] all the applicable requirements of the Forest Conservation Law[.]” In

support of this conclusion, the Board adopted the Staff Report’s variance findings in their

entirety, including the specific finding that the variance request is “based on existing site

conditions and the requirements to meet development standards, Sector Plan goals, . . . and

County Code requirements[.]”

Thereafter, Forest Grove Petitioners filed a petition for judicial review on April 8,

2024 in Case No. C-15-CV-24-1622, which was amended on April 17, 2024 without

substantive changes. Also on April 8, 2024, Forest Grove Petitioners filed a petition for

administrative mandamus in Case No. C-15-CV-24-1628. Thereafter, Friends of Sligo

Creek and Arunkumar (“Sligo Creek Petitioners”), along with an additional individual not

a party to this appeal, filed a petition for a judicial review on May 17, 2024, in Case No.

C-15-CV-24-2507. The circuit court subsequently consolidated all petitions.

JLB Realty’s Contract with FGMC Expires

Meanwhile, the judicial review of the Sketch Plan took an unexpected turn. On

March 27, 2024, JLB Realty’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw and strike her appearance

as counsel for JLB Realty, representing that “JLB’s contract to purchase the Property ha[d]

21

expired” and “JLB no longer ha[d] any interest in the Property or the Sketch Plan[.]” Forest

Grove Petitioners subsequently filed a motion to vacate the Planning Board’s approval of

the Sketch Plan, arguing: (1) the approval was void as a matter of law because the applicant,

JLB Realty, “no longer ha[d] a cognizable interest” in the Property; and (2) alternatively,

the approval was rendered moot because, absent a proper applicant, the decision can no

longer affect anyone “with a legally cognizable interest[.]”

FGMC moved to intervene on April 30, 2024. While acknowledging that JLB

Realty’s contract to purchase the Property had expired “on or about March 5, 2024,”

FGMC’s counsel—the same attorney who had represented JLB Realty—pointed out that

on August 23, 2022, FGMC’s managing partner signed a letter authorizing JLB Realty to

file, among other things, a sketch plan application for the Property with the M-NCPPC.

Counsel for FGMC asserted that because the circuit court had just granted JLB Realty’s

motion to withdraw, FGMC should be permitted to enter the case so it can “adopt by

reference the arguments raised by JLB [Realty] (which were drafted by undersigned

counsel).”

Forest Grove Petitioners opposed the motion, but on June 17, 2024, the court

substituted FGMC for JLB Realty as a party to the judicial review and denied the

intervention motion as moot. On July 29, 2024, the circuit court affirmed the Planning

Board’s approval of the Sketch Plan, finding the decision was supported by substantial

evidence, was not legally erroneous, and was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

22

Circuit Court Denies Appellants’ Petition for Judicial Review

After the underlying petitions for judicial review and for a writ of administrative

mandamus were filed and consolidated, the circuit court conducted a non-evidentiary

hearing in November 2024. At the hearing, Forest Grove Petitioners maintained that the

expiration of the purchase contract between JLB Realty and FGMC rendered the

Resolutions void as a matter of law. In turn, Sligo Creek Petitioners challenged the merits

of the Resolutions, claiming that the Plans at issue did not substantially conform to the

Sector Plan’s recommendations and that the Resolutions were not supported by substantial

evidence. The court took the matter under advisement.

On January 23, 2025, the parties appeared in circuit court and the judge issued an

oral ruling affirming the Planning Board’s Resolutions. The judge first determined that the

expiration of JLB Realty’s purchase contract did not render the Resolutions void ab initio,10

10

Here, the judge seems to adopt the language from joint memoranda filed by

Petitioners in support of judicial review, in which they claimed that the Planning Board’s

Resolutions “should be reversed and vacated as void ab initio.” Specifically, in the

memorandums, the Petitioners argued that the Resolutions were void because “the Board

had no jurisdiction to take further action” on JLB Realty’s Plans once the purchase contract

expired.

It is true that “[a] judicial decree or judgment made by a court lacking jurisdiction

to enter it is void.” County Comm’r of Carroll Cnty. v. Carroll Craft Retail, Inc., 384 Md.

23, 44 (2004); see also Facey v. Facey, 249 Md. App. 584, 605 (2021) (observing that

“judgments that are void ab initio are a nullity—as for example, a judgment rendered by a

court lacking fundamental jurisdiction”). The term “jurisdiction” may “refer to either ‘i)

the power of a court to render a valid decree, [or] ii) the propriety of granting the relief

sought.’” Carroll Craft Retail, Inc., 384 Md. at 44. “It is only when the court lacks the

first kind of jurisdiction . . . that its judgment is void.” Id. This kind of jurisdiction, dubbed

as “fundamental jurisdiction” by the Supreme Court of Maryland, is “the power that the

law confers on a court to render judgments over a class of cases, within which a particular

case may fall.” Id. at 44-45. Our decisional law has clearly distinguished judgments “void”

(Continued)

23

explaining that the Planning Board had “broadened” the definition of “applicant” and

provided the parties with sufficient notice by clarifying that term in the Sketch Plan

resolution. Under this interpretation, the court found that other parties were “justified in

stepping in” as applicants “once JLB no longer had a valid contract.”

Next, quoting extensively from the Board Hearing record, the court found there was

substantial evidence in the record to support the Planning Board’s determinations that the

Site Plan and Preliminary Plan substantially conformed to the Sector Plan’s

recommendations. Specifically, the court observed that the Sector Plan’s affordable

housing recommendation was “open to more than one interpretation” and found that the

Planning Board was reasonable in interpreting that recommendation. Turning to the Forest

Conservation Plan and tree variance, the court found at the outset that Appellants had

standing because there was no dispute that they were “aggrieved persons by virtue of their

ownership of nearby properties[.]” On the merits, however, the court concluded that there

was sufficient evidence to support the Planning Board’s approval of the Forest

Conservation Plan and variance.

for lack of fundamental jurisdiction and those “voidable,” and “[i]ndeed, . . . has repeatedly

declined to hold void court or agency decisions that exceeded statutory limits but fell within

the basic or fundamental jurisdiction of the court or agency.” Id. at 45 (listing cases). Thus,

“rulings made in violation of statutory restrictions on a court’s authority or discretion as

inappropriate exercises of jurisdiction [are regarded as] voidable on appeal, rather than as

an inherently void excess of fundamental jurisdiction itself.” Downes v. Downes, 388 Md.

561, 575 (2005) (emphasis in original). Because we determine that the Planning Board

had jurisdiction over JLB Realty’s Plans and properly exercised that jurisdiction, we

conclude that the Resolutions were neither void nor voidable.

24

Days after the oral ruling, on January 27, 2025, the circuit court entered a written

order affirming the Resolutions. Appellants timely noted this appeal.

We supplement these facts in our discussion of the issues below.

DISCUSSION

I.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Overview of Laws Governing Preliminary Plan and Site Plan Approvals

Because much of our analysis in this appeal centers upon the preliminary plan and

site plan approvals, we begin our discussion with a brief outline of Montgomery County’s

statutory and regulatory framework governing these plans. The subdivision process

generally begins with the filing of a preliminary plan, which the Subdivision Regulations

define as a “drawing for a proposed subdivision submitted for approval before the

preparation of a plat.” MCC § 50-2.2(P). An applicant, who must either “own the property

or be authorized by the owner to file the application[,]” submits the preliminary plan to the

Planning Board, “together with the completed application form, supporting information,

and payment of the required fee.” MCC §§ 50-4.1(A)(1)-(2). Once a preliminary plan is

submitted, the Planning Board must either approve, approve with conditions, or disapprove

the preliminary plan. MCC § 50-4.2(C)(1). If approved, the preliminary plan is subject to

a three-year “validity period,”11 during which it must be implemented before it becomes

11

Specifically, Section 50-4.2(G)(2)(a) of the County Code provides that a

preliminary plan for a single-phase project approved after March 31, 2017, remains valid

for three years from its initiation date, whereas a preliminary plan approved after March

(Continued)

25

void. MCC §§ 50-4.2(G), (I). After a subdivision plan is approved, an applicant may

request that the approval be vacated by presenting “proof of ownership and notarized

signatures of all property owners or other persons who are authorized by the property

owner.” MCC § 50-4.2(K).

A preliminary plan may be filed in tandem with the site plan, which “provides a

detailed overview of the applicant’s development” to ensure that “the proposed

development satisfies current laws, regulations, . . . and substantially conforms with the

recommendations of the applicable master plan and approved guidelines.”

MCC § 59-7.3.4(A)(4). Although the preliminary plan and the site plan are governed by

distinct chapters of the County Code—the Subdivision Regulations and the Zoning

Ordinance, respectively—they require a similar set of findings for the Planning Board’s

approval, including that the proposed development satisfies all requirements under the

Forest Conservation Law and “substantially conforms” with the applicable master plan.

MCC § 50-4.2(D)(2); MCC § 59-7.3.4(E)(2)(g). The Zoning Ordinance further provides

that, after a site plan is approved, the “property owner may apply for a site plan amendment

to change a certified site plan.” MCC § 59-7.3.4(J).

Before an applicant may submit a preliminary plan or site plan for approval, the

applicant must submit a forest stand delineation to the Planning Director. MCC § 22A-11

(b)(1). Once notified that the forest stand delineation is complete and correct, the applicant

31, 2009, and before April 1, 2017, remains valid for five years. In the instant appeal, the

Resolutions confirm that the Preliminary Plan would remain valid for three years.

26

must submit a forest conservation plan to the Planning Director concurrently with any

preliminary plan of subdivision or site plan. MCC § 22A-11 (b)(2). “Compliance with the

preliminary forest conservation plan, when required and as amended by the Board, must

be made a condition of any approval of the first applicable development application.”

MCC § 22A-11 (b)(2)(C).

Standard of Review

In an appeal from judicial review of a final administrative agency decision, “we look

‘through’ the decision of the circuit court and review the decision of the agency.” Mayor

and Council of Rockville v. Pumphrey, 218 Md. App. 160, 193 (2014) (quoting People’s

Ins. Counsel Div. v. Country Ridge Shopping Ctr., Inc., 144 Md. App. 580, 591 (2002))

(cleaned up). When reviewing an administrative agency’s decision, our role is “limited to

determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency’s

findings and conclusions, and to determine if the administrative decision is premised on an

erroneous conclusion of law.” Clarksville Residents Against Mortuary Def. Fund, Inc. v.

Donaldson Props., 453 Md. 516, 532 (2017) (citation omitted).

We review an agency’s factual findings and conclusions under the “substantial

evidence” standard, and apply that same test to mixed questions of law and fact. Matter of

Cricket Wireless, LLC, 259 Md. App. 44, 66 (2023). Our decisional law defines

“substantial evidence” as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion.” Gigeous v. E. Corr. Inst., 363 Md. 481, 497 (2001)

(quoting Bulluck v. Pelham Wood Apartments, 283 Md. 505, 512 (1978)). Thus, in

applying the substantial evidence test, we must “decide whether a reasoning mind

27

reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion the agency reached.” Fire & Police

Emps.’ Retirement Sys. of City of Balt. v. Middleton, 192 Md. App. 354, 359 (2010). That

said, we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the administrative agency in reviewing

its findings of fact. Lillian C. Blentlinger, LLC v. Cleanwater Linganore, Inc., 456 Md.

272, 293-94 (2017) (citation omitted). Rather, so long as some basis exists for the agency’s

factual findings, “that would be enough, in and of itself, to satisfy the substantial evidence

test.” Md. Bd. of Physicians v. Elliot, 170 Md. App. 369, 386 (2006). Nevertheless, the

agency’s “[f]indings of fact must be meaningful and cannot simply repeat statutory criteria,

broad conclusory statements, or boilerplate resolutions.” Becker v. Anne Arundel Cnty.,

174 Md. App. 114, 139 (2007) (citation omitted).

We review the administrative agency’s legal conclusions de novo for correctness.

Comptroller of Md. v. FC-GEN Operations Invs. LLC, 482 Md. 343, 360 (2022). As the

Supreme Court of Maryland explained, questions of law “encompass[] a variety of legal

challenges, including: (1) the constitutionality of an agency’s decision; (2) whether the

agency had jurisdiction to consider the matter; (3) whether the agency correctly interpreted

and applied applicable case law; (4) and whether the agency correctly interpreted an

applicable statute or regulation.” Id. Typically, when interpreting a statute, “we look . . . to

the plain language of the statute, giving it its natural and ordinary meaning to determine

the purpose of the legislative body which enacted it.” Anne Arundel Cnty. v. 808 Best Gate

Realty, LLC, 479 Md. 404, 420 (2022) (cleaned up). We read the statute “as a whole so

that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless

or nugatory.” Koste v. Town of Oxford, 431 Md. 14, 25-26 (2013) (internal quotation marks

28

and citations omitted). In addition, “[w]e neither add nor delete language so as to reflect

an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute[.]” Lockshin

v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 275 (2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Rather, “[w]e presume that the Legislature intends its enactments to operate together as a

consistent and harmonious body of law, and, thus, we seek to reconcile and harmonize the

parts of a statute, to the extent possible consistent with the statute’s object and scope.” Id.

at 276. Finally, when interpreting a county code or local ordinance, we “apply the same

canons of construction . . . as we apply to the interpretation of state statutes.” 808 Best

Gate, 479 Md. at 420.

To be clear, “we may apply a degree of deference to an administrative agency’s

legal conclusion to the extent it is ‘premised upon an interpretation of the statutes that the

agency administers and the regulations promulgated for that purpose.’” FC-GEN, 482 Md.

at 362 (quoting Broadway Servs. Inc. v. Comptroller of Md., 478 Md. 200, 214-15 (2022)).

For example, if the plain language of the statute leaves room for interpretation regarding

its meaning, we “give some weight to the construction given the statute by the agency

responsible for administering it.” Magan v. Med. Mut. Liab. Ins. Soc’y of Md., 331 Md.

535, 546 (1991). Moreover, “[w]hen an agency clearly demonstrates that it has focused its

attention on the statutory provisions in question, thoroughly addressed the relevant issues,

and reached its interpretation through a sound reasoning process, the agency’s

interpretation will be accorded the persuasiveness due a well-considered opinion of an

expert body.” Balt. Gas & Electric Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 305 Md. 145, 161-

62 (1986). However, “[w]e are under no constraint . . . to affirm an agency decision

29

premised solely upon an erroneous conclusion of law.” Lillian C. Blentlinger, LLC, 456

Md. at 293 (citation omitted). Rather, when a party challenges an agency’s interpretation

of the statute that the agency is charged with administering, it is the reviewing court’s role

to “assess how much weight to accord that interpretation, keeping in mind that it is always

within the court’s prerogative to determine whether an agency’s conclusions of law are

correct.’” FC-GEN, 482 Md. at 362 (cleaned up).

Finally, we note that “judicial review of the actions of an administrative agency is

restricted primarily because of the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers”

established in the Maryland Constitution. Sadler v. Dimensions Healthcare Corp., 378 Md.

509, 530 (2003). Accordingly, when an appeal from a circuit court’s judicial review

involves a “matter to be resolved exclusively by the court[,]” this Court may not “apply the

conventional standard of review . . . whereby we ‘look through’ the circuit court’s ruling

and directly evaluate the decision of the agency.” Matter of Carpenter, 264 Md. App. 138,

147-48 (2024) (citation omitted). For example, “whether a party has standing to file a

petition for judicial review is an issue that we review de novo.” Id. at 148. Similarly,

where, as here, a party claims that an administrative agency’s decision is void as a matter

of law, we review whether the circuit court was “legally correct” in its determination. See

Halici v. City of Gaithersburg, 180 Md. App. 238, 249 (2008) (explaining that “a challenge

to the statutory authority of the administrative body to take the action at issue” is a “purely

legal issue” that may be considered by the reviewing court “at any time, even if it were not

raised before the agency”). Because the resolution of this issue requires statutory

interpretation, which is a question of law, we review the circuit court’s decision de novo.

30

M-NCPPC v. Anderson, 395 Md. 172, 181 (2006).

II.

THE PLANNING BOARD’S APPROVALS ARE NOT VOID

Parties’ Contentions

As a preliminary matter, Appellants contend that the Planning Board’s Resolutions

were “void as a matter of law.” Appellants claim that FGMC’s August 23, 2022 letter,

which authorized JLB Realty to act on FGMC’s behalf, expressly limited such

authorizations to JLB Realty’s actions as a contract purchaser of the Property. Therefore,

according to Appellants, “there was no legally cognizable applicant” after JLB Realty’s

purchase contract with FGMC expired on March 5, 2024—two days before the Board

Hearing—and, by extension, “there was no valid application for the Planning Board to

consider, let alone approve.” Appellants assert that despite the expiration of the purchase

contract, JLB Realty “negotiated with the Planning Board on several proposed conditions

for the development” during the Board Hearing and sought modifications on those

conditions “based on financial constraints specific to JLB Realty.”

FGMC counters that Appellants’ argument ignores JLB Realty’s “clear authority to

continue to act on behalf of [FGMC] even after expiration of its contractual interest[.]”

Specifically, FGMC highlights that “there is absolutely no language in the [August 23,

2022] letter to indicate JLB Realty’s scope of authorization was limited to its capacity as

contract purchaser or to its particular redevelopment plans.” Rather, according to FGMC,

the August 23, 2022 letter authorizes JLB Realty to, among other things, “act on behalf of

[FGMC] in furtherance of such Applications.” (Emphasis in the brief). FGMC adds that

31

Appellants’ “bald assertion” that JLB Realty could not act as the applicant on its behalf “is

perplexing, to say the least, as it ignores the reality that the Property Owner—the party

defending this appeal—explicitly acknowledges that the Contract Purchaser was

authorized to continue to pursue the entitlements, which now bind the Property Owner’s

land, through the hearing.” (Emphasis in the brief).

FGMC also contends that development approvals, including the Preliminary Plan,

Site Plan, and Forest Conservation Plans, “run with the land” and therefore do not become

void just because ownership or interests change. Holding otherwise, according to FGMC,

“would make developing real estate an untenable investment[,]” as “the years-long

approval process must restart from scratch every time interests in the property change.”

The Planning Board, as a co-appellee, similarly argues that “[l]and use

approvals . . . must be tied to [the land] regardless of applicant or owner” and therefore,

even if JLB Realty no longer has any legally cognizable interest in the outcome of the

approval proceedings, that “does not mean . . . that the Planning Board’s approval of the

Preliminary, Site, and Forest Conservation Plans was somehow ‘void as a matter of law,’

as claimed by Appellants.” The Planning Board asserts that “[i]t is not uncommon for the

original applicant to change before the project gets to the building permit stage[,]” and

contends that “‘[l]and use approvals are just as they sound; they relate to, benefit, and

burden the land and must be tied to it regardless of applicant or owner.’”

In reply, Appellants claim that Appellees’ argument that the Planning Board

approvals in this case run with the land is inapposite because “[t]his case does not involve

a change in ownership or change in the applicant after a plan has been lawfully approved[.]”

32

Appellants clarify that they do not claim development approvals become void when

changes of ownership or interests occur. Rather, Appellants contend that “the public has a

right to know” the identity of the entity that has an interest in the Property, and asks this

Court “to confirm that the identity of the applicant must be disclosed prior to the required

public hearing[.]”

Relevant Law

Both the Subdivision Regulations and the Zoning Ordinance require that an

applicant filing a preliminary plan, sketch plan, or site plan “must own the subject property

or be authorized by the owner to file the application.” MCC §§ 50-4.1(A)(2); MCC § 59-

7.3.3 (B)(1); MCC § 59-7.3.4(B)(1). Although the Zoning Ordinance does not further

define the term “applicant,” Section 2.2(A) of the Subdivision Regulations defines

“Applicant, Developer or Subdivider” as follows:

An individual, partnership, corporation, or other legal entity and its agent

that undertakes the subdivision of land or the activities covered by this

Chapter. The terms include all persons involved in successive stages of

the project, even though such persons may change and ownership of the

land may change. Each term includes the other.

MCC § 50-2.2(A) (Emphasis added).

Maryland law defines “agency” as a “fiduciary relation which results from the

manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and

subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act.” Comptroller of Md. v. Broadway

Servs., Inc., 250 Md. App. 102, 114 (2021) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1

(Am. L. Inst. 1958)), aff’d, 478 Md. 200 (2022). More recently, this Court also observed:

33

[a]n agency relationship “is a legal concept which depends upon the

existence of required factual elements: the manifestation [of consent] by the

principal that the agent shall act for him, the agent’s acceptance of the

undertaking and the understanding of the parties that the principal is to be in

control of the undertaking.”

Haw v. NCAA, 260 Md. App. 310, 361 (2024) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency

§ 1, cmt. (1958)). Although the existence of an agency relationship is ordinarily a question

of fact, “where only one inference may be drawn from the evidence, it is proper for the

court to find the existence of [the] agency relationship as a matter of law.” Green v. H&R

Block, 355 Md. 488, 505 (1999).

Under Maryland law, a party may be deemed an agent based on either actual or

apparent authority. Jackson v. 2109 Brandywine, LLC, 180 Md. App. 535, 565 (2008).

As the Supreme Court of Maryland observed, “[a]ctual authority to do an act can be created

by written or spoken words or other conduct of the principal which, reasonably interpreted,

causes the agent to believe that the principal desires him to act on the principal’s account.”

Citizens Bank of Md. v. Md. Indus. Finishing Co. Inc., 338 Md. 448, 459 (1995) (quoting

Restatement (Second) of Agency § 26). Put differently, “[t]he relation of principal and

agent does not necessarily depend upon an express appointment and acceptance thereof,

but it may be implied from the words and conduct of the parties and the circumstances.”

Green, 355 Md. at 503 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, in

determining whether an actual agency relationship exists, a reviewing court may look to

the parties’ conduct, including acquiescence, to ascertain their intent to form such

relationship. See Dickerson v. Longoria, 414 Md. 419, 442 (2010).

Our decisional law has highlighted three specific factors as relevant to the

34

determination of an agency relationship: “(1) the agent’s power to alter the legal relations

of the principal; (2) the agent’s duty to act primarily for the benefit of the principal; and (3)

the principal’s right to control the agent.” Haw, 260 Md. App. at 361 (quoting Beyond Sys.,

Inc. v. Realtime Gaming Holding Co., LLC, 388 Md. 1, 27 (2005)) (cleaned up); Broadway

Servs. Inc. v. Comptroller of Md., 478 Md. 200, 216 (2022). To be clear, however, these

are “neither exclusive nor conclusive considerations in determining the existence of an

agency relationship” and should be viewed “within the context of the entire circumstances

of the transaction or relations.” Green, 355 Md. at 506. Ultimately, “the presence of an

agency relationship ‘turns on the parties’ intentions as manifested by their agreements or

actions.’” Andrews & Lawrence Pro. Servs., LLC v. Mills, 467 Md. 126, 166 (2020)

(quoting Green, 355 Md. at 503).

Even when “the legal definition of actual agency is not satisfied, the parties may

still have an ‘apparent agency’ relationship[.]” Williams v. Dimensions Health Corp., 480

Md. 24, 32 (2022). The Supreme Court of Maryland has instructed that “a principal can

be bound by the acts of a purported agent when that person has apparent authority to act

on behalf of the principal.” Dickerson, 414 Md. at 442; Patten v. Bd. of Liquor License

Comm’rs for Balt. City, 107 Md. App. 224, 237 (1995) (noting that a purported agent for

a partnership, if compliant with “apparent agency requirements, can legally represent and

bind [the] partnership”). The apparent agency relationship “results from certain acts or

manifestations by the alleged principal to a third party leading the third party to believe

that an agent had authority to act.” Klein v. Weiss, 284 Md. 36, 61 (1978) (holding that

general partners did not have apparent authority to revise or alter the partnership certificate

35

and agreement without the limited partners’ consent, where the general partners were only

authorized to handle the documents); see also Bradford v. Jai Med. Sys. Managed Care

Org., 439 Md. 2, 18 (2014) (discussing the doctrine of apparent agency in the context of

tort liability).

Analysis

At the outset, we find no legal authority—statutory or otherwise—to support

Appellants’ contention that a subdivision or site plan applicant who happens to be the

contract purchaser of the property in question is precluded from pursuing the subdivision

or site plan application upon the expiration of the purchase contract. 12 Similarly,

Appellants can point to no law that requires that the developer of a property must have any

ownership interest in the property, or any contract or option to purchase the property.

Rather, when read as a whole, the County Code consistently tethers a non-owner’s standing

as an “applicant” to the party’s authorization to file the application. For example, Section

4.1(A)(2) of the Subdivision Regulations provides that an applicant or subdivider “must

own the property or be authorized by the owner to file the [preliminary plan] application.”

MCC § 50-4.1(A)(2) (emphasis added). Similarly, as noted, Section 7.3.4 of the Zoning

12

Both FGMC and the Planning Board emphasize that the Resolutions “run with

the land” and are “tied to [the land] regardless of applicant or owner.” We agree with

Appellants, however, that this argument is wide of the mark. As Appellants highlight in

their reply brief, “[t]his case does not involve a change in ownership or change in the

applicant after a plan has been lawfully approved[.]” (Emphasis in the original). In fact,

Appellants do not deny that the applications, once approved, may run with the land. They

argue, instead, that the expiration of JLB Realty’s purchase contract occurred prior to the

March 27, 2024 hearing, and thus divested the Planning Board of its authority to approve

the Plans.

36

Ordinance provides that a site plan applicant “must own the subject property or be

authorized by the owner to file the application.” MCC § 59-7.3.4(B)(1) (emphasis added).

These provisions allow for a non-owner applicant, such as JLB Realty, to qualify as an

applicant if it has authorization from the owner “to file” the application. See Lockshin v.

Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 275 (2010) (“We neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an

intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute[.]”).

Our interpretation is further corroborated by Section 2.2(A) of the Subdivision

Regulations, which broadly defines an applicant as an “individual, partnership, corporation,

or other legal entity and its agent that undertakes the subdivision of land[,]” including “all

persons involved in successive stages of the project, even though such persons may change

and ownership of the land may change.” MCC § 50-2.2(A). This provision expressly

contemplates that the entities involved in a project may shift over time—and even

ownership of the land itself may change—without undermining the validity of the

application. Furthermore, the County Code does not contain any provision authorizing,

much less requiring, the Planning Board to dismiss a site plan or preliminary plan when an

applicant loses an interest in the project after filing the application. To the contrary, Section

4.2 of the Subdivision Regulations mandates that the Planning Board “must take” one of

three specific actions on any preliminary plan: approval, disapproval, or approval with

conditions. MCC § 50-4.2(C)(1). The only mention of “voiding” a plan is found in

Sections 4.2(H) and (I), which apply solely when a preliminary plan’s validity period

expires. See MCC §§ 50-4.2(H)(2), (I)(1), (I)(3). Because there is no dispute that JLB

Realty was properly authorized by FGMC to file the Plans, the expiration of the purchase

37

contract did not preclude the Planning Board from considering and approving the Plans.

Above all, the record in this case established that at the time of the Board Hearing,

JLB Realty maintained the actual authority to pursue—and otherwise act in furtherance

of—the Plans as the developer and agent of FGMC. As noted, an actual agency-principal

relationship may be established “by written or spoken words or other conduct of the

principal which, reasonably interpreted, causes the agent to believe that the principal

desires him to act on the principal’s account.” Citizens Bank of Md., 338 Md. at 459

(quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 26) (internal quotation marks omitted). The

purchase contract and its expiration date do not determine the issue, and tellingly, neither

party introduced the document into the record. What is most relevant are the written words

contained in FGMC’s authorization letter to JLB Realty dated August 23, 2022, and the

subsequent conduct of the principal, here FGMC.

The Authorization Letter

The August 23 letter explicitly authorizes JLB Realty “to sign for, file, and pursue

any and all applications . . . on behalf of Forest Glen Medical Center LLP, in connection

with JLB Realty[’s] redevelopment at the Propert[y].” (emphasis added). The letter further

states that JLB Realty “is specifically authorized to (i) execute all necessary application

forms and documents, (ii) obtain plans and drawings, and (iii) act on behalf of Forest Glen

Medical Center LLP in furtherance of such [a]pplications.” (emphasis added). As such,

the plain language of this authorization letter satisfies the three hallmarks of an agency

relationship that we highlighted in Haw v. NCAA, 260 Md. App. 310, 361 (2024). First,

JLB Realty was given the power to alter the legal relations of FGMC, the principal, by

38

filing and obtaining approval of applications—including the Plans—related to the

development of the Property. Second, the August 23, 2022 letter obligated JLB Realty to

act primarily for FGMC’s benefit by pursuing the Plans, which, if approved, would benefit

the Property’s owner regardless of whether JLB Realty would ultimately purchase it. Third,

FGMC maintained the right to control JLB Realty as an agent, as the letter authorized JLB

Realty to act only “on behalf of” FGMC “in connection with” the proposed development,

and FGMC, as the Property’s owner, retained statutory rights to seek a site plan amendment

or to request vacating an approved subdivision plan. See MCC §§ 50-4.2(K)(2) (“A request

to vacate an approved subdivision plan must include proof of ownership and notarized

signatures of all property owners.”); 59-7.3.4(J) (“Any property owner may apply for a site

plan amendment to change a certified site plan.”). Appellants’ contention that this

agent-principal relationship was contingent upon JLB Realty’s status as a “contract

purchaser[,]” is refuted by the August 23 authorization letter, which contains no such

limitation.13

13

Notably, although no reported Maryland case has directly spoken to this issue,

multiple courts outside Maryland have observed that the rights and obligations of the

parties to a land sale contract do not necessarily terminate when the contract “expires.” As

the Appellate Court of Connecticut explains:

Once the time limitation passes in an option contract, the authority to accept

the offer and to establish a binding purchase and sale agreement no longer

exists. . . . This case, however, does not deal with an option contract, but

with a contract to purchase land. Unlike in option agreements, a buyer

and seller in a contract to purchase land undertake mutual promises for

the purchase and sale of the property. Those obligations are not

necessarily extinguished after the specified closing date passes.

(Continued)

39

Conduct of the Parties

The ongoing authorization of JLB Realty to “act on behalf of Forest Glen Medical

Center LLP in furtherance of such [a]pplications” is further established by the conduct of

the parties. FGMC never revoked the authorization letter, nor did it object to JLB Realty’s

continued advocacy during the Board Hearing—even though, as FGMC acknowledges, the

purchase contract had expired by that time. When FGMC intervened in the judicial review

of the Sketch Plan, it expressly identified itself as the “successor to JLB” in regard to the

Plan, and argued that, without JLB Realty, its interests would be inadequately represented,

thus confirming that JLB Realty had been representing FGMC’s interests all along. Indeed,

FGMC retained the same counsel who had represented JLB Realty in defense of the Sketch

Plan and the Plans. Counsel for FGMC appeared with the JLB Realty team at the Board

Hearing on March 7, 2024, to defend the preliminary plan and site plan applications.

FGMC has continuously maintained the same counsel throughout this litigation, along with

its position that JLB Realty had “clear authority” to act on its behalf “even after expiration

of its contractual interest[.]”

Finally, Appellants’ argument that the Planning Board’s failure to consider the

expiration of the purchase contract “constitutes a fundamental procedural flaw” has no

merit, not only because the issue was not brought to the Board’s attention, but also—to the

Bethlehem Christian Fellowship, Inc. v. Plan. & Zoning Comm’n of Town of Morris, 755

A.2d 249, 253 (Conn. App. 2000) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added); see also Mola Dev.

Corp. v. City of Seal Beach, 57 Cal. App. 4th 405, 415 (1997) (recognizing that developers

have standing to challenge a city’s decision on a proposed development “even if they have

not yet concluded an agreement with the property owner to acquire the site, and even if

their contract with the property owner have terminated or expired”) (citation omitted).

40

extent that the Planning Board did not have complete information as to the current

relationship between the JLB Realty and FGMC—it was not an omission that would have

prejudiced Appellants so as to warrant voiding the Resolutions.14 In Beall v. Montgomery

County Council, 240 Md. 77 (1965), which we find instructive, the Supreme Court of

Maryland addressed a zoning application that was signed by only one property owner, who

held a seven-and-one-half percent interest in the subject property, and did not include any

of the co-owners as required by relevant provisions of the Montgomery County Zoning

Ordinance. Id. at 88-89. In rejecting the appellant’s argument that the failure to include

co-owners on the application constituted reversible error, the Supreme Court observed:

[Z]oning ordinances are concerned with the use of property, the height of

buildings and the density of population. They are not concerned with the

ownership of the property involved and title to real property is not tried in

zoning cases. . . . There was obviously no prejudice to the appellants from

not listing the names and addresses of all the owners.

14

Indeed, although the Appellants emphasize that there were no “applications,

signatures, or notifications . . . that would signal a ‘change’ in the ‘original applicant’”

before the Board Hearing, JLB Realty’s sketch plan, preliminary plan, and site plan

applications—all available on Montgomery County Planning Department website—clearly

identify JLB Realty as “owner’s representative or contract purchaser” and bear the

signature of J. Graham Brock as an applicant “legally authorized to represent the

owner(s)[.]” See Montgomery Cnty. Plan. Dep’t, Preliminary Plan Application, available

at https://montgomeryplanning-md-us-

projectdoxwebui.avolvecloud.com/File/FileViewer?fileID=511944. Furthermore, JLB

Realty’s application notice list expressly identified FGMC, including its tax account

number and mailing address, as the only entity identified under the “Subject Property”

heading. See Montgomery Cnty. Plan.Dep’t, Notice List, https://montgomeryplanning-md-

us-projectdoxwebui.avolvecloud.com/File/FileViewer?fileID=511284. We therefore

conclude that the Board and the Appellants were on sufficient notice before the Board

Hearing that JLB Realty was not the owner of the Property and was defending the Plans as

FGMC’s agent. This is not a case where there was a concealed transfer of development

rights to a new developer or owner.

41

Id. at 88. We find that the same rationale is applicable where, as here, the Appellants

challenges the Planning Board’s decision based on an applicant’s contractual or proprietary

interest in the subject property. Even if Appellants had established that the expiration of

the purchase contract somehow created an irregularity in the application and approval

process, which they have not, such irregularity would not affect the validity of the

Resolutions. See id. at 89 (“Mere irregularities in an application to a board for a permit not

amounting to a jurisdictional defect do not affect the validity of the permit.”).

For all of these reasons, we hold that the expiration of JLB Realty’s purchase

contract with FGMC did not extinguish JLB Realty’s authority to pursue any and all

applications and approvals on behalf of FGMC in connection with redevelopment of the

Property. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s determination that the Planning

Board’s Resolutions are not void as a matter of law.

III.

SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE

Parties’ Contentions

Appellants claim that neither the Site Plan nor the Preliminary Plan “substantially

conform[ed]” to the recommendations of the Sector Plan, which, according to Appellants,

“must be treated as a true regulatory device and interpreted in a similar manner to any other

authoritative statute.” Appellants point out “several inconsistencies and deficiencies in the

Preliminary Plan and Site Plan that render these plans non-conformant with the Sector Plan.”

First, Appellants assert that “[n]o explanation is provided for the drastic discrepancy

between the 1.25 acre figure reported in the Sector Plan and the 0.43 acre figure cited in

42

the staff report[.]” In turn, Appellants assert that the Plans fail to conform to the Sector

Plan’s recommendation to provide an area of equal environmental benefit as the existing

forest. Second, Appellants maintain that “JLB Realty’s development Plans fail to meet

both the requirement that five percent of the units be three-bedroom units and the

requirement that 10 percent of the units be provided as affordable housing.”

FGMC and the Planning Board both respond that “‘[s]ubstantial conformance’ is a

more forgiving standard than simple, pure, strict ‘conformance’” and that Appellants

“completely ignore the adverb ‘substantially[.]’” Both contend that the Planning Board’s

approval of the Preliminary Plan and Site Plan was supported by substantial evidence, such

as the Staff Report and the Board Hearing testimony.

FGMC urges that the Planning Board is entitled to deference in balancing various

“goals and objectives, not necessarily consistent when applied to a specific property.” The

Board asserts that Appellants’ argument that it should have undertaken a “comparative

analysis” in order to determine “equal environmental benefit” is “not required by the Code

or the Sector plan. . . . Appellants have invented this ‘requirement.’”

FGMC highlights that, at the hearing, Planning Board staff did “explain[] in great

detail” how the Plans substantially conformed, and why the 1.25 acres of forest mentioned

in the Sector Plan was not an accurate measurement. Additionally, the Staff Report

explained that the .43 acres of existing forest “is heavily impacted by non-native plan[t]s

and is not a healthy, regenerative ecosystem.” According to FGMC, the Planning Staff

recognized that the “development proposal would include numerous environmental

benefits, including tree canopy cover, lawn areas, biofiltration areas, solar facilities, new

43

plantings of stratified vegetation throughout the site, stormwater management facilities,

and open spaces.” Finally, FGMC points out that Maggie Gallagher testified on behalf of

DHCA that the “sector Plan’s language was that only five percent of the units reserved as

MPDUs need be three-bedroom[.]”

In reply, Appellants maintain that “[t]he binding effect of master plan

recommendations is not voided by the phrase ‘substantial conformance’” and that it is

“outdated and unlawful” to treat the Sector Plan recommendations as non-binding. Among

other things, Appellants further allege that Maggie Gallagher, on behalf of the DHCA, had

“distort[ed]” the recommendations during the Board Hearing, and that “the Planning

Board’s decision to endorse Ms. Gallagher’s unlawful views is not ‘fairly debatable.’”

Relevant Law

As a general matter, our decisional law has established that “[i]n the context of

land-use regulation, ‘plans, which are the result of work done by planning commissions

and adopted by ultimate zoning bodies, are advisory in nature and have no force of law

absent statu[t]es or local ordinances linking planning and zoning.” City of Hyattsville v.

Prince George’s Cnty. Council, 254 Md. App. 1, 53-54 (2022) (quoting Mayor & Council

of Rockville v. Rylyn Enters., Inc., 372 Md. 514, 530 (2002)). Thus, “[p]roposals for land

use contained in a plan[,]” such as the Sector Plan at issue here, typically “constitute a

non-binding advisory recommendation, unless a relevant ordinance or regulation, or

specific zoning, subdivision, or other land use approval, make compliance with the plan

recommendations mandatory.” Id. at 54 (quoting Cnty. Council of Prince George’s Cnty.

v. Zimmer Dev. Co., 444 Md. 490, 522 (2015)); see also Pattey v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs,

44

271 Md. 352, 360 (1974) (“[A] master plan is only a guide and is not to be confused with

a comprehensive zoning, zoning map, or zoning classification[.]”)

Having said that, as the Supreme Court of Maryland observed, “master plans are not

invariably advisory.” Boyds Civic Ass’n v. Montgomery Cnty. Council, 309 Md. 683, 699

(1987). Rather, “where the local government has enacted a statute, ordinance, or regulation

that links planning and zoning, ‘they serve to elevate the status of comprehensive plans to

the level of true regulatory device.’” Md.-Nat. Capital Park & Planning Comm’n v.

Greater Baden-Aquasco Citizens Ass’n, 412 Md. 73, 100-01 (2009) (quoting Rylyns

Enters., 372 Md. at 530). In cases involving subdivision matters and preliminary plans, “it

is equally well established that the recommendations of a master plan may be binding to

the extent there is a statute, regulation, or ordinance requiring that a proposed subdivision

conform to the master plan.” Id. at 100. “[W]here such a statute or ordinance exists, its

effect is usually that of requiring that zoning or other land use decisions be consistent with

a plan’s recommendations regarding land use[.]” Rylyns Enters., 372 Md. at 531.

Therefore, determining the weight to be accorded a master plan recommendation is

largely a matter of statutory interpretation. As we explained:

[T]he weight to be accorded a master plan or comprehensive plan

recommendation depends upon the language of the statute, ordinance,

or regulation establishing the standards pursuant to which the decision

is to be made. The specific types of governmental land use decisions clearly

embraced by that principle are rezonings, special exceptions, and subdivision

approvals. In such cases, we look first to the words of the applicable

statute, ordinance, or regulation to divine what the enabler intended the

weight to be accorded by the ultimate decision-maker to a

recommendation of the plan. This becomes largely an exercise in

statutory construction.

45

Trail v. Terrapin Run, LLC, 174 Md. App. 43, 53-54 (2007), aff’d, 403 Md. 523 (2008)

(citation omitted) (emphasis added).

Analysis

Applying the foregoing principles, we conclude that the plain language of the

governing statutes in the instant appeal does not reflect a legislative intent to mandate that

the Plans at issue strictly comply with the Sector Plan; but rather, that the Plans

“substantially conform” to the Sector Plan.

We begin with Section 4.2 of the Subdivision Regulations, which provides, in

relevant part: “[t]o approve a preliminary plan, the Board must find that . . . the preliminary

plan substantially conforms to the master plan[.]” MCC § 50-4.2(D)(2). Likewise, under

Section 7.3.4(E) of the Zoning Ordinance, the Planning Board “must find” that a proposed

site plan “substantially conforms with the recommendations of the applicable master plan

and any guidelines approved by the Planning Board that implement the applicable plan[.]”

MCC § 59-7.3.4(E)(2)(g).

In their opening brief, Appellants rely on HNS Development, LLC v. People’s

Counsel for Baltimore County, 200 Md. App. 1, 35 (2011), aff’d, 425 Md. 436 (2012), to

argue that these statutory provisions “elevate[]” the Sector Plan “to the status of a true

regulatory device,” rendering the recommendations therein “mandatory.”

To the extent Montgomery County Code has “elevated” the 2020 Forest

Glen/Montgomery Hills Sector Plan Sector Plan by requiring the Planning Board demand

substantial conformance to master plan (or sector plan) recommendations, see Greater

Baden-Aquasco, 412 Md. at 100-01, we observe that substantial conformance is not the

46

same as strict conformance. We have explained that even when a sector plan is binding

on the Planning Board in terms of what the Board “must find,” the Sector Plan’s specific

“recommendations” may remain “aspirational rather than mandatory.” Pringle v.

Montgomery Cnty. Plan. Bd. M-NCPPC, 212 Md. App. 478, 489 (2013). To hold

otherwise would require us to read “recommendations” as “requirements,” and equate

“substantial conformance” with mere “conformance,” running contrary to our canons of

statutory interpretation. See Koste v. Town of Oxford, 431 Md. 14, 25-26 (2013).

Indeed, the Sector Plan itself lacks mandatory directives, instead consistently

employing the terms “should” rather than “shall,” and “recommends” rather than

“requires.” For example, the Sector Plan’s housing recommendation provides:

Any optional method project that includes residential dwelling units should

provide a minimum of 15 percent [Moderately Priced Dwelling Units]. In

addition, with redevelopment, a minimum of 25 percent of the units should

be two-bedroom units and five percent of the units should be three-bedroom

units. Additionally, given the substantial investment by the County in the

Metro access tunnel construction, the Plan recommends 10 percent of the

units also be provided as affordable to households earning at or below 100

percent of Area Median Income (AMI).

(Emphasis added). In its environmental recommendation, the Sector Plan similarly

employs discretionary language.

With respect to the remnant forest, at the time of redevelopment, maximum

flexibility on the site should be given for providing an area of equal

environmental benefit that also provides for improved community benefit

and access. Equal environmental benefits may include improved water and

air quality, strategies that provide for reduced greenhouse gas emissions and

increased biodiversity and habitat protections, including improved tree

canopy. Development should also, as a part of its open space requirement,

preserve healthy indigenous trees and replant stratified vegetation where

possible.

47

(Emphasis added). Numerous courts in Maryland and other jurisdictions have recognized

that the word “should” generally indicates a “mere recommendation.” See Pringle, 212

Md. App. at 489-92 (discussing cases).

The discretionary language woven throughout the Montgomery County Code

distinguishes the instant appeal from HNS Development. In HNS Development, a developer

challenged the decision by the Baltimore County Board of Appeals, which denied an

amendment to a proposed development plan for noncompliance with the Baltimore County

Master Plan. 200 Md. App. at 5. Rejecting the developer’s argument that the “Master Plan

is a guide and not a rule[,]” we observed:

Here, direct statutory provisions—[Baltimore County Code (“BCC”)] § 26-

166(a) of the 1988 [BCC], providing: “All development of land must

conform to the master plan, including adopted community plans and these

regulations . . . ” and the current [BCC] § 32-4-102(a)(1), providing:

“Subject to limitation in the Charter, all development of land shall conform

to: The Master Plan; . . .”—support the conclusion that the Master Plan is

binding.

Id. at 35 (emphases added). In affirming our decision, the Supreme Court of Maryland

further highlighted that

according to the Baltimore County Code, the Master Plan is an

inextricable part of the development regulations and, as such,

compliance with its recommendations is a binding regulatory

requirement of the subdivision and development plan review process in

the County. Thus, nonconformity with the Master Plan can provide a valid

and an independent basis for denying approval of a proposed amended

development plan, compliance with the other requirements of the

development regulations notwithstanding.

HNS Dev. LLC v. People’s Counsel for Balt. Cnty., 425Md. 436, 448 (2012) (emphasis

added).

48

Returning to the record on appeal, substantial evidence supports the Planning

Board’s determination that the Preliminary Plan and Site Plan substantially conformed to

the Sector Plan’s recommendations. Included in the record is the 83-page Staff Report, in

which Planning Staff detailed how JLB Realty achieved substantial conformance with the

Sector Plan’s recommendations regarding, among other things, urban design, parks, traffic

safety, environment, and affordable housing. Specifically, the Staff Report extensively

evaluates the development’s environmental impact on the Property by describing the

degraded state of the existing forest and then contrasting it with JLB Realty’s proposal to

plant “native trees, shrubs, perennials, grasses, and groundcover that provide a mix of

habitat and food sources” for local fauna. Given the extensiveness of the Staff Report and

supporting testimony from Planning Staff, we conclude that the Planning Board’s findings

were far from a mere enumeration of “statutory criteria, broad conclusory statements, or

boilerplate resolutions.” Becker v. Anne Arundel Cnty., 174 Md. App. 114, 139 (2007)

(citation omitted). Rather, the record before the Planning Board was “enough, in and of

itself, to satisfy the substantial evidence test.” Md. Bd. of Physicians v. Elliot, 170 Md.

App. 369, 386 (2006).

In attempt to persuade us otherwise, Appellants allege “several inconsistencies and

deficiencies” in the Staff Report’s environmental analysis. First, as previously mentioned,

Appellants claim that Planning Staff failed to sufficiently explain the discrepancy between

the forest acreage of 1.25 in the Sector Plan and the 0.43 acreage reported by Staff. We

disagree. Amy Lindsey explained at the Board Hearing that the discrepancy occurred

because the area noted on the Sector Plan is not always exact:

49

Now, the Sector Plan . . . do[es] state an acreage of forest. However, forest

is actually determined through the regulatory process, and we don’t get into

exactly what is forest, what is not forest until we are reviewing a regulatory

plan.

So for example, sometimes there can be 10 or 20 years in-between when we

make recommendations for the Sector Plan and when we see a Regulatory

Plan. Additionally, when we are doing -- when we’re making Sector Plan

recommendations and writing descriptions, we’re not going out and doing all

of the detailed field work required to make those determinations. So those

are the first two things I kind of want to separate.

So the Forest Conservation Plan is based on the Natural Resource Inventory

that was submitted and reviewed. And the acreage was determined by

looking at not only the number of stems and trees that are in the area, but also

how deep the area is and what the acreage of the area is. So for example, a

tiny area that’s maybe, you know, 1000 square feet would not qualify. So

there are regulatory -- there are legal definitions of what is forest and what is

not forest.

Appellants also claim that the Staff Report gave “[n]o consideration . . . to the

Sector Plan’s express recommendation to prioritize the preservation and restoration of

existing forest cover.” Again, we disagree. As this Court observed, “there is no

requirement that the Board must set out in its findings of fact a discussion of all of the

evidence.” Heard v. Cnty. Council of Prince George’s Cnty., 256 Md. App. 586, 636

(2022) (citation omitted). Moreover, contrary to Appellants’ claim, both the Staff Report

and the Planning Board’s Resolutions expressly recognize that the Sector Plan identifies

“affordable housing and habitat preservation and restoration as the top public benefit[.]”

These objectives were further addressed by Lindsey’s testimony, which detailed physical

and topographical constraints that made it very difficult to preserve the existing forest on

the Property.

The record further establishes that the Planning Board was reasonable in finding

50

substantial conformance to the Sector Plan’s affordable housing recommendations.

Significantly, Appellants do not dispute that the Plans satisfied the recommendations to

provide 15 percent MPDUs and “a minimum of 25 percent of the units” as two-bedroom

units. Appellants’ claims center on two other Sector Plan recommendations—namely that

“five percent of the units should be three-bedroom units” and that “10 percent of the units

also be provided as affordable to households earning at or below 100 percent of [AMI].”

At the Board Hearing, however, Maggie Gallagher testified on behalf of DHCA that the

three-bedroom requirement applied to the units reserved as MPDUs and was not meant to

apply to all units. Accordingly, under the existing Plans, the Sector Plan requirement could

be met by simply “designat[ing] one more three[-]bedroom as an MPDU[,]” rather than

adding a new unit to the proposed development. Regarding the 10 percent affordable unit

recommendation, Gallagher testified that the DHCA found it “ok to waive” it on the

condition that JLB Realty demonstrate the “market rate would be around that price[,]”

because “the market rate units would likely be set around that price anyways[.]”

Appellants argue that the DHCA did not “have the legal authority to alter or

otherwise ‘waive’ any recommendation of the Sector Plan[.]” However, the dispositive

question is not whether the DHCA could waive the Sector Plan’s recommendations, but

whether the Planning Board’s conclusion was “fairly debatable” and “supported by

substantial evidence on the record taken as a whole.” Tochterman v. Balt. Cnty., 163 Md.

App. 385, 409 (2005) (quoting Mortimer v. Howard Rsch., 83 Md. App. 432, 441 (1990))

(emphasis removed). Here, in light of Gallagher’s testimony that the market rates would

likely be set around affordable unit prices, the Planning Board was entitled to find that the

51

proposed Plans substantially conformed to the Sector Plan requirement. Further, in as

much as Appellants may dispute Gallagher’s view, “we do not reweigh the evidence for

ourselves during appellate review” so long as “the evidence was ‘fairly debatable.’” Matter

of HRVC Ltd. P’ship, 266 Md. App. 391, 426 (2025) (citation omitted). Accordingly,

because the record establishes that the Planning Board’s finding of substantial conformance

was reasonable, we affirm the approval of the Preliminary Plan and Site Plan.

Forest Conservation Plan and Tree Variance

Parties’ Contentions

In their final challenge to the Planning Board’s Resolutions, Appellants challenge

the Planning Board’s approval of the Forest Conservation Plan and associated variance

request. Specifically, Appellants claim that the Planning Board failed to make sufficient

findings to support the variance, emphasizing that the relevant findings contained in the

Staff Report were “conclusory in nature[.]” Furthermore, Appellants assert that the

granting of the tree variance request violated the Forest Conservation Law because the need

for the variance was largely “necessitated by JLB Realty’s own actions and desires for the

finished development design.”

The Planning Board counters that the tree variance was supported by substantial

evidence and that JLB Realty successfully demonstrated an “unwarranted hardship” in the

absence of variance. In response to Appellants’ assertion, the Planning Board also

emphasizes that the variance request was “not based on conditions or circumstances which

are the result of actions by the Applicant[,]” but rather “based on existing site conditions

and the requirements to meet development standards, Sector Plan goals, . . . and County

52

Code requirements[.]” The Board also maintains that Appellants’ logic would effectively

render variances impossible, since any development plan inherently involves an applicant’s

own action.

FGMC raises a threshold issue, contending that Appellants are not entitled to

judicial review under Title 7, Chapter 200 of Maryland Rules because the Forest

Conservation Law “provides no express authorization” for such an action. And, citing

Bhargava v. Prince George’s County Planning Board, 265 Md. App. 172, 198 (2025),

FGMC claims that a writ of administrative mandamus does not lie in this appeal because

neighbors have no cognizable property right to trees on another property owner’s land.15

On the merits, FGMC echoes the Planning Board’s arguments, maintaining that the record

contains “substantial evidence” to support the Board’s approval. Specifically, FGMC

asserts the developer and property owner “had no hand in creating the peculiar

circumstances that caused the need for the variance—such as the physical constraints

15

Although we agree that a writ of administrative mandamus will lie only where

“any substantial right of the plaintiff may have been prejudiced,” Md. Rule 7-403,

administrative mandamus is not appropriate in this case because a statutory path for judicial

review already exists under the Forest Conservation Law. See Gray v. Fenton, 245 Md.

App. 207, 212 (2020). Specifically, the relevant Code provision states:

A person aggrieved by the decision of the Planning Board on the

approval, denial, or modification of a forest conservation plan (including

a request for a variance) may seek judicial review of the decision in the

Circuit Court under the applicable Maryland Rules of Procedure governing

judicial review of administrative agency decisions. A party aggrieved by the

decision of the Circuit Court may appeal that decision to the Court of Special

Appeals.

MCC § 22A-20(b) (emphasis added).

53

previously described, the location of the trees, and the applicable zoning and Sector Plan

requirements—the unwarranted hardship is not self-created[.]”

Relevant Law

The General Assembly enacted the Forest Conservation Act of 1991 (the “Act”) to

preserve Maryland’s forests “by making the identification and protection of forests and

other sensitive areas an integral part of the site planning process.” Chesapeake Bay Found.,

Inc. v. Creg Westport I, LLC, 481 Md. 325, 329 (2022); see also Md. Code (2018 Repl.

Vol.), Natural Resources Article (“NR”) § 5-1601, et seq. In relevant part, the Act outlines

“standards for local jurisdictions with planning and zoning authority to enforce during

development.” Chesapeake Bay Found., 481 Md. at 329. The Act also “establishes the

minimum standards that must be included in a local forest conservation program.” Id. at

349. Specifically, the Act requires that a “local forest conservation program . . . include[]

a policy document and all applicable new and amended local ordinances relating to

implementation of the regulated activities, exemptions, the review, approval and appeal

processes, incentives, legal instruments for protection, enforcement program, and

penalties[.]” NR § 5-1603(c)(2)(i). Thus, as the Supreme Court of Maryland observed,

although the Maryland Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”) is responsible for

administering the Act, it is “implemented primarily by local jurisdictions having planning

and zoning authority.” Chesapeake Bay Found., 481 Md. at 329.

Montgomery County implemented the Act by enacting the Forest Conservation

Law, which is codified in Sections 22A-1 through 22A-31 of the County Code. Relevant

here, Section 22A-21 provides: “[a]n applicant may request in writing a variance from

54

[Chapter 22A] or any regulation adopted under it if the applicant shows that enforcement

would result in unwarranted hardship.” MCC § 22A-21(a). The applicant for a variance

must:

(1) describe the special conditions peculiar to the property or other

conditions which would cause the unwarranted hardship;

(2) describe how enforcement of [Chapter 22A] will deprive the landowner

of rights commonly enjoyed by others in similar areas;

(3) verify that State water quality standards will not be violated and that a

measurable degradation in water quality will not occur as a result of

granting the variance; and

(4) provide any other information appropriate to support the request.

MCC § 22A-21(b); see also NR § 5-1611(a) (providing that “the State and local authorities

shall provide for the granting of variances to the requirements of this subtitle, where . . .

implementation of this subtitle would result in unwarranted hardship to an applicant”).

The variance “may only be granted” if it meets the “unwarranted hardship” criteria in §

22A-21(a); however, the Planning Board may not grant the variance if granting the request:

(1) will confer on the applicant a special privilege that would be denied to

other applicants;

(2) is based on conditions or circumstances which result from actions by the

applicant;

(3) is based on a condition relating to land or building use, either permitted

or nonconforming, on a neighboring property; or

(4) will violate State water quality standards or cause measurable

degradation in water quality.

MCC § 22A-21(d).

Although the Forest Conservation Law does not statutorily define “unwarranted

55

hardship,” our decisional law offers guidance. For example, in Assateague Coastal Trust,

Inc. v. Schwalbach, 448 Md. 112 (2016), the Supreme Court of Maryland examined the

“unwarranted hardship” standard in the context of the Critical Area law and concluded:

in order to establish an unwarranted hardship, the applicant has the

burden of demonstrating that, without a variance, the applicant would

be denied a use of the property that is both significant and reasonable.

In addition, the applicant has the burden of showing that such a use

cannot be accomplished elsewhere on the property without a variance.

Id. at 139. Notably, according to the Supreme Court, a variance applicant need not show

that “he would be denied all reasonable and significant use of his land without the

variance[,]” because such requirement would amount to “in essence, a showing of an

unconstitutional taking[.]” Id. at 117 (emphasis in the original). Rather, the Supreme Court

clarified, “a showing of ‘unwarranted hardship’ is . . . whether, without the variance, the

applicant is denied ‘a reasonable and significant use’ that cannot be accomplished

somewhere else on the property.” Id. at 138-39 (emphasis in the original). More recently,

in West Montgomery County Citizens Association v. Montgomery County Planning Board,

248 Md. App. 314, 346-47 (2020), we extended the Supreme Court’s definition of

“unwarranted hardship” to the tree variance context, holding that the Planning Board

properly approved a tree variance where, “without the tree variance, the [a]pplicant would

not be able to develop two lots, which is a use of the [s]ubject [p]roperty that is significant

and reasonable” and the applicant “could not accomplish the use elsewhere, as the other

environmental constraints precluded shifting the proposed lots.” Id. at 347.

56

Analysis

Because the Forest Conservation Law authorizes judicial review of the Forest

Conservation Plan and tree variance,16 our standard of review remains the same as the one

that we apply in our review of the Preliminary Plan and the Site Plan—“determining if

there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency’s findings and

conclusions[.]” Clarksville Residents Against Mortuary Def. Fund, Inc. v. Donaldson

Props., 453 Md. 516, 532 (2017) (citation omitted).

Applying this standard, we find substantial evidence in the record to support the

Planning Board’s determination that the denial of the requested variance would deprive

FGMC of “a use of the [P]roperty that is both significant and reasonable.” West

Montgomery Cnty. Citizens Assoc., 248 Md. App. at 347 (quoting Assateague Coastal

Trust, Inc., 448 Md. at 139). The Planning Board found that the Forest Conservation plan

and its associated variance “satisfie[d] all the applicable requirements of the Forest

Conservation Law,” and the Board adopted the Staff Report’s variance findings in their

16

Appellants had standing to file their petition for judicial review from the Planning

Board’s Resolutions approving the site plan and preliminary plan, which approvals are

conditioned, in part, on approval of the forest conservation plan. MCC §§ 50-4.2(D)(4);

59-7.3.4(E)(2). However, as Appellants have not identified “any cognizable right that they

had to the trees on” the Property, they would likely have failed to show the special

aggrievement required for standing to petition for judicial review of the approval of the

Forest Conservation Plan separately. Bhargava v. Prince George’s Cnty. Planning Bd.,

265 Md. App. 172, 198 (2025). In Bhargava, we explained that the adjacent property

owners lacked a legally cognizable interest in the Prince George’s County Planning

Board’s grant of a variance from the tree ordinance. Id. Notwithstanding the Appellants’

failure in this case to show how they were specially aggrieved by the tree variance in this

case, we determine that there was substantial evidence to support the Planning Board’s

Resolutions, including its approval of the underlying Forest Conservation Plan which is

intertwined with the approval of the preliminary plan and the site plan.

57

entirety. That report identified each protected tree subject to removal, along with the tree’s

respective size and location, and provided an extensive list of “constraints and requirements”

surrounding the Property that necessitate the removal of those trees. Such constraints

included “a north-south slope, with a decrease of eight feet from the northern extent of

Woodland Drive frontage to the southern extent[,]” “an existing sewer line running through

the center of the Property that must be relocated before redevelopment,” and “the storm

drain line and stormwater management handling runoff from Georgia Avenue.” The Staff

Report evaluated these site-specific conditions in light of the Sector Plan, which “granted

maximum flexibility for the removal and mitigation of the forest and vegetated area[,]” and

concluded that the variance was necessary to “meet development standards, Sector Plan

goals, . . . and County Code requirements.”

The Staff Report provided sufficient basis for the Planning Board to find that,

without the variance, the proposed development would not be able to meet the

“development standards, Sector Plan goals, . . . and County Code requirements”—

including relocation of existing sewer and storm drain lines—constituting uses of the

Property that are significant and reasonable. Accordingly, we hold that substantial

evidence supported the Planning Board’s approval of the Forest Conservation Plan and the

tree variance.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT

FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY

AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY

APPELLANTS.

58