The opinion
RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 26a0158p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
┐
ODINAKA ETHELBERTH NWOSU,
│
Petitioner, │
> No. 25-3831
│
v. │
│
TODD W. BLANCHE, Acting U.S. Attorney General, │
Respondent. │
┘
On Petition for Review from the Board of Immigration Appeals.
No. A 099 158 417.
Decided and Filed: May 29, 2026
Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; LARSEN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ON BRIEF: Glenn Eric Sproull, PALMER REY, PLLC, Southfield, Michigan, for Petitioner.
Jennifer P. Williams, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for
Respondent.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
MURPHY, Circuit Judge. After the government sought to remove Odinaka Ethelberth
Nwosu to Nigeria, he requested withholding of removal and cancellation of removal. To support
his withholding-of-removal claim, Nwosu alleged that individuals in Nigeria had kidnapped his
father back in 2004. To support his cancellation-of-removal claim, Nwosu alleged that his
removal would significantly harm his children. But an immigration judge rejected his
withholding claim because he did not corroborate his testimony about the kidnapping with other
No. 25-3831 Nwosu v. Blanche Page 2
evidence. And the judge rejected his cancellation claim because he did not introduce evidence to
establish that his partner lacked the means to support their children by herself. Nwosu
challenges these conclusions, but his arguments rest on a misunderstanding of the law. We thus
deny his petition for review.
I
Nwosu was born in Nigeria in 1967. He grew up and received a university education
there. In 2002, Nwosu came to the United States on a business visa that expired early the next
year. He has lived in this country ever since, making his home in Detroit, Michigan. Two years
after his entry, Nwosu obtained his current job working for a company that helps children and
the elderly. He also got married soon after his arrival. Nwosu’s wife filed a petition that would
allow him to remain here, but they separated in 2007. He then met his current partner, a U.S.
citizen who was also born in Nigeria. The couple live together with their three children. They
each contribute to paying the family’s expenses. Nwosu’s partner works full-time as a nurse in
the intensive care unit of a Detroit hospital.
In 2010, the government issued Nwosu a notice to appear in removal proceedings.
It charged him with being deportable for remaining in the country after his visa expired. See
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B). Nwosu conceded that he was deportable. And he conceded that he
could not apply for asylum because he did not seek that relief in time. See id. § 1158(a)(2)(B).
But Nwosu applied for cancellation of removal and withholding of removal. (He also applied for
relief under the Convention Against Torture. But he has “abandoned” this relief by failing to
mention it in his opening brief. Mbonga v. Garland, 18 F.4th 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2021).)
For reasons that the parties do not identify, Nwosu’s removal proceedings languished for
over a decade. He eventually sought to prove his withholding and cancellation claims at a
hearing in February 2022. During this hearing, Nwosu testified that a group of individuals had
kidnapped his father back in 2004. His father was in his 80s at this time. These individuals
allegedly called Nwosu in the United States and tried to extort $50,000 from him by threatening
to kill his father. Nwosu told the kidnappers that he did not have any money, and he and his
family chose not to contact the “corrupt” police. Admin. R. (A.R.) 168, 171. The kidnappers
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released his father after five days, allegedly because he was sick. One of Nwosu’s brothers
eventually went to the police. The authorities allegedly caught the kidnappers and “sentenced”
them “to five years in jail in Nigeria.” A.R. 166. Nwosu’s father died from a cardiac condition a
few months after the kidnapping. Because the kidnappers have now been released, Nwosu fears
that they will kill him if he returns to Nigeria.
An immigration judge denied Nwosu relief and ordered him removed to Nigeria. The
immigration judge first held that Nwosu did not produce enough evidence to establish his
withholding-of-removal claim. Although finding Nwosu “essentially credible,” the judge held
that this claim failed for a lack of “corroboration” about his father’s kidnapping. A.R. 101. For
example, a police report about the alleged crime noted only that Nwosu’s family had reported
their father “missing”; it said nothing about a kidnapping. Id.; see A.R. 446. Likewise, his
father’s death certificate did not mention a kidnapping. A.R. 101–02; see A.R. 448. Nwosu also
produced no records about the prosecution of the kidnappers or affidavits from family members
in Nigeria. A.R. 102. And even if Nwosu had supplied this corroborating evidence, the judge
also concluded that the harm to his father would have arisen for economic reasons, not for a
reason covered by the withholding-of-removal statute. A.R. 102–03.
Turning to Nwosu’s cancellation-of-removal request, the judge held that he failed to
prove that his removal would cause the required “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”
to his children. A.R. 103. The judge reasoned that his children would remain in this country,
that they are healthy, and that they have done well in school. And while they would lose
Nwosu’s financial support, their mother worked full-time. Nwosu produced no evidence about
how much she made, so he failed to show that her income would fall short.
The Board of Immigration Appeals upheld the immigration judge’s decision. The Board
agreed that Nwosu failed to “sufficiently corroborate” his withholding-of-removal claim. A.R. 4.
It thus opted not to reach the other rationales for rejecting this claim. The Board next agreed that
Nwosu did not prove that his children would suffer the required hardship.
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II
Nwosu has petitioned our court to review the denial of his withholding-of-removal and
cancellation-of-removal claims. Although we generally review the Board’s decision as the final
agency action, the Board here largely adopted the relevant parts of the immigration judge’s
decision as its own. See Sy v. Bondi, 168 F.4th 828, 834 (6th Cir. 2026). So we will review the
immigration judge’s decision against the relevant legal standards. See id.
A. Withholding of Removal
Nwosu first challenges the Board’s rejection of his request for withholding of removal.
Under the withholding-of-removal statute, “the Attorney General may not remove an alien to a
country if the Attorney General decides that the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in
that country because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). Immigrants bear the burden to prove that
they meet “the applicable eligibility requirements” for this relief. Id. § 1229a(c)(4)(A)(i).
The immigration laws make clear that immigration judges bear the primary fact-finding
responsibility for all factual questions that could affect a request for withholding of removal.
Those laws direct immigration judges to follow the asylum statute’s evidentiary and procedural
framework when determining these facts. Id. § 1231(b)(3)(C) (citing id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii)–
(iii)). Under this framework, an immigration judge may find that an immigrant’s “testimony”
alone meets the immigrant’s burden of proof if it is “credible,” “persuasive,” and “specific” in
nature. Id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). But the framework also allows an immigration judge to require
corroborating evidence: “Where the trier of fact determines that the applicant should provide
evidence that corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such evidence must be provided unless
the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.” Id. To
reject a claim on corroboration grounds, though, our precedent now requires the immigration
judge to give immigrants “an opportunity to explain” the “absence” of this corroborating
evidence. Guzman-Vazquez v. Barr, 959 F.3d 253, 261 (6th Cir. 2020).
In contrast to immigration judges, appellate courts have only a secondary responsibility
for factual questions. Congress told courts to follow a deferential standard when evaluating an
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immigration judge’s decision to require corroborating evidence: “No court shall reverse a
determination made by a trier of fact with respect to the availability of corroborating
evidence . . . unless the court finds . . . that a reasonable trier of fact is compelled to conclude
that such corroborating evidence is unavailable.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4). In other words, courts
must treat an immigration judge’s finding that the immigrant could have produced corroborating
evidence as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to
the contrary.” Id. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see Urbina-Mejia v. Holder, 597 F.3d 360, 367 (6th Cir.
2010).
This “highly deferential” test forecloses Nwosu’s claim. Garland v. Ming Dai, 593 U.S.
357, 365 (2021) (citation omitted). A “reasonable trier of fact” could have found (as the
immigration judge did) that Nwosu should have produced “corroborating evidence” to support
his allegation that individuals kidnapped his father. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4). For one thing,
Nwosu was able to produce a police report (indicating that his father had gone “missing”) and his
father’s death certificate (showing that he died from heart failure). A.R. 101–02, 446, 448.
Neither document mentioned any kidnapping. But other public records likely memorialized this
crime because Nwosu testified that the authorities arrested and prosecuted the kidnappers and
sentenced them to five years’ imprisonment. Because Nwosu was able to produce other official
records, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that he should have produced the police or court
records that would have confirmed this arrest and prosecution.
For another thing, Nwosu testified that he still has many relatives in Nigeria. He added
that many of his “family members” knew about his father’s kidnapping. A.R. 196. A reasonable
factfinder could expect him to obtain letters from his mother, brother, or other siblings giving
their firsthand accounts of the kidnapping. See Andret v. Garland, 2024 WL 167115, at *4 (6th
Cir. Jan. 16, 2024); Guerrero-Ramirez v. Wilkinson, 843 F. App’x 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2021); Lin
v. Holder, 565 F.3d 971, 977 (6th Cir. 2009). Indeed, Nwosu said that he still “talk[s] to” his
mother and that his brother tracked down the police report and death certificate for him. A.R.
192–93. Why couldn’t they have sent letters too?
The immigration judge also gave Nwosu an adequate “opportunity to explain” why he
did not have this evidence. Guzman-Vazquez, 959 F.3d at 263. On cross-examination, the
No. 25-3831 Nwosu v. Blanche Page 6
government’s counsel asked Nwosu if he had asked his mother for a letter. He responded
vaguely that “some letters” were produced. A.R. 192. But he did not point to any letter
corroborating the kidnapping. And he later conceded that he “didn’t have” any of his relatives
send such a letter (without providing any excuse for this oversight). A.R. 196. Likewise, when
asked why he did not produce a “police report” or official record showing the kidnappers’ arrest
and prosecution, he responded that he “did not know that . . . you need that.” A.R. 195. Yet he
was represented by counsel and had over a decade to gather this corroborating evidence during
his lengthy removal proceedings. So a reasonable factfinder could find Nwosu’s failure to
“provide[]” any “reason” for the lack of corroboration even more remarkable. Guzman-Vazquez,
959 F.3d at 265.
Nwosu’s responses do not change things. He first suggests that the immigration laws
required the immigration judge to accept his testimony “as true” once the judge found him
credible. Petitioner’s Br. 13 (quoting Skripkov v. Barr, 966 F.3d 480, 486 (6th Cir. 2020))
(emphasis omitted). Not so. Those laws make clear that an immigrant might need to produce
“evidence that corroborates” the immigrant’s “otherwise credible testimony[.]” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (emphasis added). So the Supreme Court has held that an immigration judge
need not treat an immigrant’s testimony as “sufficient to meet the burden of proof” even if the
judge finds the testimony “credible” as a general matter. Ming Dai, 593 U.S. at 371. And our
cases are not to the contrary. True, we once said that an immigrant’s “factual statements should
be accepted as true” when the immigration judge found him “credible[.]” Skripkov, 966 F.3d at
486. There, though, the immigration judge had accepted the relevant factual claims as true and
rejected the immigrant’s requests for relief on other grounds. Id. at 485–86. So our decision said
nothing about whether we must accept testimony as true when an immigration judge rejects it for
lack of corroboration.
Nwosu next argues that the immigration judge “overlooked” other corroborating
evidence: reports about the general conditions in Nigeria. Petitioner’s Br. 14, 15–18. But the
judge noted that he had “considered” all the “documentary evidence,” including these “country
conditions materials[.]” A.R. 121. And a “reasonable trier of fact” could conclude that nothing
No. 25-3831 Nwosu v. Blanche Page 7
in this generic country-condition evidence corroborated Nwosu’s specific claim that individuals
had kidnapped his father in 2004. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4).
Nwosu also criticizes the immigration judge’s decision for its brevity, noting that the
judge used all of “one long paragraph” to reject his withholding-of-removal claim. Petitioner’s
Br. 15. Yet the immigration laws do not give us the authority to grade an immigration judge’s
“‘opinion-writing’ abilities.” Palucho v. Garland, 49 F.4th 532, 539 (6th Cir. 2022) (citation
omitted). Instead, we may ask only whether an immigration judge gave enough of a “rational
explanation” that we can understand the basis for the rejection of an immigrant’s claim. Zometa-
Orellana v. Garland, 19 F.4th 970, 976 (6th Cir. 2021); see Palucho, 49 F.4th at 539. And here,
the judge’s paragraph of analysis left no doubt about the grounds for the denial of relief: Nwosu
did not provide any corroboration for his claim that his father had been kidnapped even though
that evidence should have been available to him. The judge did not need to say anything more.
Nwosu thus transitions to another alleged process error. He says that the immigration
judge failed to give him the “opportunity” that our precedent requires to explain why he did not
introduce corroborating evidence. Petitioner’s Br. 17 (quoting Guzman-Vazquez, 959 F.3d at
261) (emphasis omitted). But Nwosu had multiple chances to explain the absence of this
evidence. True, the immigration judge did not disclose that he might use the lack of
corroboration against Nwosu or ask him why he had not produced this evidence. But the
government’s counsel questioned Nwosu on cross-examination about the lack of letters from his
family and the lack of public records from the criminal case against the kidnappers. Our caselaw
required nothing else. See Guzman-Vazquez, 959 F.3d at 263; Gaye v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 519,
529–30 (6th Cir. 2015). In response to these questions, though, Nwosu said only that he “didn’t”
ask for any letters and “did not know that” he “need[ed]” the public records. A.R. 195–96. A
“reasonable trier of fact” could conclude that these excuses fell short of establishing that Nwosu
could not “reasonably obtain [this] evidence.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii), 1252(b)(4).
Lastly, Nwosu contends that the immigration judge wrongly failed to decide whether he
had adequately alleged a cognizable “particular social group” covered by the withholding-of-
removal statute and whether he had shown a well-founded fear of persecution in Nigeria.
Petitioner’s Br. 19–22. Yet the immigration judge had no need to decide these issues because the
No. 25-3831 Nwosu v. Blanche Page 8
judge found that any persecution would arise for “economic” reasons and thus would not be “on
account of” Nwosu’s membership in his alleged particular social groups. A.R. 102–03. In any
event, the Board upheld the judge’s decision for lack of corroboration alone. A.R. 3–4. Because
that ground provided an independent basis to reject Nwosu’s claim, it was “unnecessary” for the
Board to consider Nwosu’s other arguments. Rahman v. Bondi, 131 F.4th 399, 409 (6th Cir.
2025) (quoting INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (per curiam)). And we need not
(indeed, cannot) consider issues that the Board did not reach. See Mbonga, 18 F.4th at 893.
B. Cancellation of Removal
Nwosu next challenges the Board’s rejection of his request for cancellation of removal.
The immigration laws give the Attorney General discretion to “cancel removal of” immigrants
who meet four preconditions. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). As relevant now, immigrants can qualify
for this relief if they “establish[] that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship to” a qualifying relative (including a U.S. citizen child). Id. § 1229b(b)(1)(D).
The immigration laws regulate our jurisdiction over this hardship question. See id.
§ 1252(a)(2)(B), (D). On the one hand, we lack jurisdiction to review any of the factual findings
that an immigration judge makes when concluding that an immigrant has failed to show the
required hardship. See Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328, 347 (2022); Singh v. Rosen, 984 F.3d
1142, 1149–50 (6th Cir. 2021). On the other hand, we have jurisdiction to review the Board’s
answer to purely legal questions, such as its decision about what Congress meant by the phrase
“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” Singh, 984 F.3d at 1149–50 (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b)(1)(D)). And we have jurisdiction over the Board’s answer to the main “mixed
question of law and fact” in this context: Does an immigrant’s factual situation rise to the level
of hardship that this law requires? Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 212 (2024).
We review any purely legal questions de novo. See Moctezuma-Reyes v. Garland, 124
F.4th 416, 420 (6th Cir. 2024). And as we have said, the plain language of the cancellation-of-
removal provision (“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”) makes clear that it sets a
demanding standard. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). To qualify as exceptional and extremely
unusual, a relative’s hardship must exceed the “[o]rdinary” and “expected” difficulties that
No. 25-3831 Nwosu v. Blanche Page 9
accompany any close relative’s removal. Moctezuma-Reyes, 124 F.4th at 422; see In re
Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 65 (BIA 2001). To decide whether hardship to a
qualifying relative rises to the required level, we look to the totality of the circumstances,
including the relative’s economic situation, health conditions, and educational opportunities.
See, e.g., Baltazar Us v. Blanche, __ F.4th __, 2026 WL 1162684, at *3 (6th Cir. Apr. 29, 2026);
Moctezuma-Reyes, 124 F.4th at 423–24; Singh, 984 F.3d at 1154–55; Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. &
N. Dec. at 63–64.
Until recently, we had yet to decide on the specific standard of review to govern the
Board’s answer to the “mixed” question whether a relative’s factual situation met this hardship
test. See Singh, 984 F.3d at 1154. But we have now held that we must follow the statutory
substantial-evidence standard for factual findings. See Baltazar Us, 2026 WL 1162684, at *2.
Under this standard, we must treat the Board’s answer as “conclusive unless any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B)).
This combination of a demanding hardship test with a forgiving standard of review leads
us to reject Nwosu’s challenge. A “reasonable adjudicator” could conclude that Nwosu did not
show that his three children would suffer the rare type of hardship that permits cancellation of
removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see Moctezuma-Reyes, 124 F.4th at 421. His children would
remain in this country, where they have been “healthy and doing well in school.” A.R. 5. And
his partner has a full-time job as a nurse at a hospital, so Nwosu failed to show that she would be
unable to financially support the children by herself.
Nwosu responds by pointing to the allegedly dire conditions in Nigeria. He first suggests
that the “conditions for children” are particularly egregious. Petitioner’s Br. 25. But he
conceded that his children would not return with him, so those conditions are beside the point.
He next suggests that the children would be harmed because they will “worry about” his safety.
Id. This logic would mean that all immigrants removed to Nigeria could show the required
hardship to relatives who will remain in this country merely by pointing to the conditions there.
We doubt that an immigrant could ever prove the required hardship based on this type of fear.
But we need not resolve this broader point because Nwosu has not done so based on his return to
No. 25-3831 Nwosu v. Blanche Page 10
Nigeria. After all, he testified that most of his relatives continue to safely live in Nigeria. And
he testified that his own children had visited the country before. So he has shown only that his
children will suffer the types of “emotional strains” that exist in nearly any removal case.
Moctezuma-Reyes, 124 F.4th at 423. Yet these strains do not meet the governing test. Id.
Nwosu next argues that his children will suffer a diminished standard of living without
his income. But these “financial” “strains” are likewise expected in most cases when a parent is
removed. Id. And Nwosu disregards the immigration judge’s response to this claim. The
cancellation-of-removal provision placed the burden of proof on Nwosu to “establish[]” this
hardship. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D); see id. § 1229a(c)(4)(A)(i); Sustaita-Lopez v. Garland,
2024 WL 509619, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 9, 2024). Yet he did not introduce any evidence showing
his partner’s nursing income. Even on appeal, he claims that the children will face an
“uncertain” future economically. Petitioner’s Br. 26. But uncertainty does not suffice to show
(as Nwosu must) that the children will face an abnormally difficult economic hardship. In sum, a
reasonable adjudicator would not be compelled to conclude that Nwosu’s “removal would result
in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to his children. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D).
We deny the petition for review.