The opinion
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as
Olentangy Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Revision, Slip Opinion No.
2026-Ohio-1963.]
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2026-OHIO-1963
OLENTANGY LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, APPELLANT, v.
DELAWARE COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES.
OLENTANGY LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, APPELLANT, v.
DELAWARE COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
may be cited as Olentangy Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Delaware Cty. Bd.
of Revision, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-1963.]
Taxation—Valuation of real property for tax purposes—R.C. 2506.01(C) excludes
a board of revision’s property-valuation decisions from the class of
decisions appealable to a common pleas court under R.C. 2506.01(A) since
property-valuation decisions are appealable to a higher administrative
authority, Board of Tax Appeals, under R.C. 5717.01—Property-valuation
decisions are appealable to a court of common pleas under R.C. 5717.05
only when the appellant owns the property at issue—Court of appeals’
judgment affirmed.
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
(Nos. 2024-0814 and 2024-0815—Submitted June 3, 2025—Decided May 29,
2026.)
APPEALS from the Court of Appeals for Delaware County,
Nos. 23 CAE 09 0061 and 23 CAE 90 0057, 2024-Ohio-1566.
__________________
HAWKINS, J., authored the opinion of the court, which KENNEDY, C.J., and
FISCHER, DEWINE, DETERS, and SHANAHAN, JJ., joined. BRUNNER, J., dissented,
with an opinion.
HAWKINS, J.
{¶ 1} Historically, a board of education could appeal a county board of
revision’s decisions regarding the valuation of real property for tax purposes in one
of two ways: (1) by filing an appeal with the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”)
under R.C. 5717.01 or (2) if the board of education owned the property at issue, by
filing an appeal in a court of common pleas under R.C. 5717.05. But effective
July 21, 2022, the General Assembly amended R.C. 5717.01, see 2022
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 126 (“H.B. 126”), eliminating a board of education’s ability to
appeal the property-valuation decisions of a board of revision to the BTA when the
board of education does not own or lease the property in question.
{¶ 2} Appellant, the Olentangy Local School District Board of Education
(“Olentangy”), contends that with the statutory amendment, the General Assembly
opened a path for boards of education to appeal a board of revision’s property-
valuation decisions to a court of common pleas under the general statute governing
appeals of administrative decisions, R.C. 2506.01, despite leaving the property-
owner requirement in R.C. 5717.05 untouched. Both the Delaware County Court
of Common Pleas and the Fifth District Court of Appeals determined that no such
2
January Term, 2026
avenue of appeal exists under the amended statutory scheme.1 See 2024-Ohio-
1566, ¶ 14, 35-46 (5th Dist.).
{¶ 3} We agree. Board-of-revision decisions concerning the valuation of
real property are not appealable to a court of common pleas under R.C. 2506.01(A),
because R.C. 2506.01(C) precludes such an appeal. Moreover, property-valuation
decisions are appealable to a court of common pleas under R.C. 5717.05 only when
the appellant owns the property at issue. Olentangy’s appeals were therefore
properly dismissed by the common pleas court, and we affirm the judgment of the
Fifth District.
1. The General Assembly again amended R.C. 5717.01 while these appeals were pending. Effective
September 30, 2025, the General Assembly enacted 2025 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 96, which includes
revisions to R.C. 5717.01 regarding who may appeal a board of revision’s decisions to the BTA.
The relevant language now provides:
An appeal from a decision of a county board of revision may be taken to
the board of tax appeals . . . except that a subdivision or the legislative authority
or mayor of a subdivision may file such an appeal only if the subdivision owns or
leases the property that is the subject of the board of revision’s decision, and
except that no such appeal may be taken by a third party complainant, as defined
in [R.C. 5715.19].
The legislative act provides that the amendment
is intended to be a remedial measure and applies to any appeal taken from a
decision of a board of revision rendered on or after July 21, 2022, except that the
amendment . . . prohibiting an appeal by a third party complainant, as defined in
[R.C. 5715.19], applies to any appeal taken from a board of revision decision
rendered on or after the effective date of this section.
2025 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 96, Section 757.90(B). This most recent amendment retains the language
pertinent to this appeal: a “legislative authority,” which is defined in R.C. 5715.19(A) to include a
board of education, may not appeal the property-valuation decisions of a board of revision to the
BTA when the board of education does not own or lease the property in question. Neither party has
argued to the contrary or otherwise requested the opportunity to file additional briefs to address the
most recent statutory amendment. To accurately state the parties’ arguments, citations to R.C.
5717.01 in this opinion refer to the version enacted in 2022 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 126 (effective July
21, 2022), unless otherwise noted. Our analysis and the outcome of this appeal is the same under
both the 2022 and 2025 amendments.
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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
I. BACKGROUND
{¶ 4} In early 2023, Olentangy filed complaints with appellee Delaware
County Board of Revision challenging the 2022 tax-year value of parcels owned by
appellees Northport Place, L.L.C. (case No. 2024-0814) and PSLC Enterprises,
L.L.C. (case No. 2024-0815), seeking an increase in the valuation of those
properties. At an open-session meeting in May 2023, the Delaware County Board
of Revision dismissed the complaints for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under
R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)(a), which governs the procedure for filing a complaint against
valuation.
{¶ 5} Olentangy, citing R.C. 2506.01, appealed the dismissals to the
Delaware County Court of Common Pleas. The property owners filed a motion to
dismiss the appeals for lack of jurisdiction in each case. The common pleas court
granted the motions on the ground that Olentangy did not have statutory standing
to file an administrative appeal under R.C. 2506.01.
{¶ 6} Olentangy appealed to the Fifth District, arguing that R.C. 2506.01
gives it an independent statutory right of appeal to the court of common pleas based
on the plain language of the statute and caselaw. Unconvinced by this argument,
the Fifth District affirmed the court of common pleas’ judgments of dismissal. See
2024-Ohio-1566 at ¶ 45-46 (5th Dist.). After considering the impact of H.B. 126
on R.C. 2506.01, 5717.01, and 5717.05, the Fifth District concluded that a board of
education is prohibited from appealing a board of revision’s property-valuation
decisions to either the BTA (unless the board of education owns or leases the
property in question) or the court of common pleas (unless the board of education
owns the property). See id. at ¶ 28-44. Accordingly, the Fifth District held that
Olentangy lacked standing to appeal the 2022 tax-year valuations to the common
pleas court and, therefore, the lower court did not err in dismissing the appeals. Id.
at ¶ 44-45.
4
January Term, 2026
{¶ 7} Olentangy appealed, and we accepted jurisdiction over the following
three propositions of law:
Proposition of Law No. 1: R.C. 2506.01 creates an
independent statutory right of appeal of all final decisions of
administrative bodies and political subdivisions of the state.
Proposition of Law No. 2: Pursuant to this court’s decisions
in Walker [v. Eastlake, 61 Ohio St.2d 273 (1980)], Sutherland-
Wagner [v. Brook Park Civil Serv. Comm., 32 Ohio St.3d 323
(1987)], and NUSPL [v. Akron, 61 Ohio St.3d 511 (1991)], an appeal
is available pursuant to R.C. 2506.01 because neither existing R.C.
5717.05 nor the revisions to R.C. 5717.01 prohibit an appeal
pursuant to R.C. 2506.01.
Proposition of Law No. 3: The perceived intent of the
General Assembly in enacting H.B. 126 may not be elevated above
the actual words the General Assembly used in the revisions to R.C.
5717.01 or to insert words in R.C. 5717.05 that the General
Assembly did not insert to preclude an appeal pursuant to R.C.
2506.01.
See 2024-Ohio-3227. We also consolidated the cases for briefing and decision. See
id.
II. ANALYSIS
{¶ 8} Under its three propositions of law, Olentangy argues that
R.C. 2506.01 provides it with statutory standing to appeal the property-valuation
decisions of the Delaware County Board of Revision to the Delaware County Court
of Common Pleas, considering the amendments to R.C. Ch. 5717 effected by H.B.
126. Because this issue concerns the meaning of statutory language, which is a
5
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
question of law, we conduct a de novo review. State v. Vanzandt, 2015-Ohio-236,
¶ 6.
{¶ 9} In undertaking this review, “we first look to the plain language of the
statute, and if that language is unambiguous and definite, we apply it as written.”
State v. Pettus, 2020-Ohio-4836, ¶ 10. “We must ‘read words and phrases in
context and construe them in accordance with rules of grammar and common
usage’ ” and in a manner that does “not restrict, constrict, qualify, narrow, enlarge,
or abridge the General Assembly’s wording.” State ex rel. Carna v. Teays Valley
Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2012-Ohio-1484, ¶ 18, quoting State ex rel. Russell
v. Thornton, 2006-Ohio-5858, ¶ 11.
{¶ 10} The text of the relevant statutes, as written, determines the outcome
of these cases. In R.C. 5717.01, the General Assembly established that a board of
revision’s property-valuation decisions may be appealed to a higher administrative
authority, the BTA. Consequently, a board of revision’s property-valuation
decisions plainly fall outside the scope of decisions that may be appealed to a court
of common pleas under R.C. 2506.01(A) based on the definition of “final . . .
decision” provided in R.C. 2506.01(C). On this basis, the Delaware County Court
of Common Pleas correctly dismissed Olentangy’s appeals of the Delaware County
Board of Revision’s property-valuation decisions.
A. The availability of an R.C. 2506.01 appeal is tied to the challenged decision
{¶ 11} R.C. 2506.01, which has not changed since 2006, generally permits
appeals from a political subdivision’s administrative decisions to be filed in a court
of common pleas. MacDonald v. Shaker Hts. Bd. of Income Tax Rev., 2015-Ohio-
3290, ¶ 12. R.C. 2506.01 provides the following, with exceptions not applicable
here:
(A) . . . every final order, adjudication, or decision of any . .
. board . . . or other division of any political subdivision of the state
6
January Term, 2026
may be reviewed by the court of common pleas of the county in
which the principal office of the political subdivision is located as
provided in [R.C. Ch.] 2505.
(B) The appeal provided in this section is in addition to any
other remedy of appeal provided by law.
(C) As used in this chapter, “final order, adjudication, or
decision” means an order, adjudication, or decision that determines
rights, duties, privileges, benefits, or legal relationships of a person,
but does not include any order, adjudication, or decision from which
an appeal is granted by rule, ordinance, or statute to a higher
administrative authority if a right to a hearing on such appeal is
provided . . . .
{¶ 12} The text of R.C. 2506.01 addresses only (1) the types of decisions
that may be appealed (“every final order, adjudication, or decision of any
[administrative agency] of any political subdivision of the state,” with certain
exceptions), R.C. 2506.01(A); (2) that an appeal established under R.C. 2506.01 is
not precluded by other remedies at law, R.C. 2506.01(B); and (3) the standard for
assessing whether the administrative order, adjudication, or decision is final and
appealable for purposes of the statute, R.C. 2506.01(C). R.C. 2506.01 does not
state who may pursue an appeal. That reading would effectively add words to the
statute, which steps beyond this court’s role in determining the meaning of a law as
written by the General Assembly. See Hulsmeyer v. Hospice of Southwest Ohio,
Inc., 2014-Ohio-5511, ¶ 23, 26-27.
{¶ 13} While the General Assembly did not restrict the applicability of
R.C. 2506.01 by specifying who may appeal decisions from an administrative
agency of a political subdivision to a common pleas court, it limited the scope of
R.C. 2506.01 by defining a “final . . . decision” for purposes of the statute.
7
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
Relevant to these appeals, R.C. 2506.01(C) specifies that a final decision
appealable under R.C. 2506.01(A) excludes those decisions that have been granted
an appeal to a “higher administrative authority” with the right to a hearing.
{¶ 14} Accordingly, to determine whether Olentangy can maintain its
appeals to the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas under R.C. 2506.01, we
must first determine, as a threshold issue, if the challenged property-valuation
decisions fall within the scope of decisions that may be appealed under R.C.
2506.01. If they do not, any further discussion on the matter is inconsequential and
therefore inappropriate. See State v. Gideon, 2020-Ohio-6961, ¶ 26 (an issue is
moot when it is no longer live as a result of some other decision rendered by the
appellate court); see also Capital Care Network of Toledo v. Ohio Dept. of Health,
2018-Ohio-440, ¶ 31 (discussing this court’s practice to not decide more than is
necessary to resolve an appeal).
B. A board of revision’s property-valuation decisions may be appealed to a
higher administrative authority
{¶ 15} The General Assembly has established in R.C. Ch. 5717 the statutory
scheme governing appeals from a board of revision’s decisions. Under that scheme,
an appeal from a board of revision’s property-valuation decision may be filed with
the BTA within a set time frame and after meeting certain procedural requirements.
R.C. 5717.01. When those prerequisites are met, the board of revision certifies the
record of proceedings, and the BTA conducts a hearing and issues a report.
R.C. 5717.01; see also R.C. 5703.02(A)(2) and (D)(3). As an alternative to the
appeal provided for in R.C. 5717.01, an appeal from a board of revision’s decision
“may be taken directly to the court of common pleas of the county by the person in
whose name the property is listed or sought to be listed for taxation.” R.C. 5717.05.
{¶ 16} Under the pre-H.B. 126 amendments to R.C. 5717.01, a board of
education could appeal to the BTA valuation decisions concerning property that it
did not own or lease. See former R.C. 5717.01, 2018 Sub.H.B. No. 34 (effective
8
January Term, 2026
Nov. 2, 2018) (granting “any board [or] legislative authority . . . authorized by
[R.C. 5715.19] [the right] to file complaints against valuations or assessments” and
appeal to the BTA a county board of revision’s decisions). Olentangy
acknowledges that under former R.C. 5717.01, the “higher administrative
authority” limitation in R.C. 2506.01(C)—precluding administrative appeals to a
court of common pleas under R.C. 2506.01(A) when the right to appeal has been
granted elsewhere (e.g., in a rule, ordinance, or statute)—has historically barred
boards of education from pursuing R.C. 2506.01 appeals.
{¶ 17} However, Olentangy argues that no such barrier exists now, since
H.B. 126 revoked its ability to appeal to the BTA a board of revision’s property-
valuation decisions when it does not own or lease the property in question. See
R.C. 5717.01, H.B. 126 (granting “any board [or] legislative authority . . .
authorized by [R.C. 5715.19] [the right] to file complaints against valuations or
assessments” and appeal to the BTA a county board of revision’s decisions, “except
that a subdivision that files an original complaint or counter-complaint under
[R.C. 5715.19] with respect to property the subdivision does not own or lease may
not appeal the decision of the board of revision with respect to that original
complaint or counter-complaint”); see also Marysville Exempted Village Schools
Bd. of Edn. v. Union Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2024-Ohio-3323, ¶ 12 (“H.B. 126
amended R.C. 5717.01 to include an exception that limits the circumstances under
which a political subdivision may appeal to the BTA to only those instances in
which the subdivision owns or leases the property in question”).
{¶ 18} In Olentangy’s view, because the amendment to R.C. 5717.01 in
effect removed the R.C. 2506.01(C) prohibition, and an appeal is not expressly
prohibited in R.C. 5717.05, it may appeal the Delaware County Board of Revision’s
decisions to the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas under R.C. 2506.01(A).
We disagree.
9
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
{¶ 19} Olentangy’s inability to appeal the Delaware County Board of
Revision’s decisions to the BTA under R.C. 5717.01 is beside the point. In enacting
R.C. 5717.01, the General Assembly has provided a statutory right of appeal from
a board of revision’s decisions to a higher administrative authority, the BTA, and
that appeal process provides for a hearing. In doing so, the General Assembly
excluded board-of-revision decisions from the meaning of “final order,
adjudication, or decision” set forth in R.C. 2506.01(C). As a result, Olentangy’s
appeals to the common pleas court under R.C. 2506.01(A) are barred. And because
an appeal of a board of revision’s property-valuation decisions cannot be
maintained under R.C. 2506.01(A), the “additional” remedy provision of R.C.
2506.01(B) by its plain terms is inapplicable.
{¶ 20} The cases Olentangy relies on, including Roper v. Richfield Twp. Bd.
of Zoning Appeals, 173 Ohio St. 168 (1962); Walker, 61 Ohio St.2d 273;
Sutherland-Wagner, 32 Ohio St.3d 323; Nuspl, 61 Ohio St.3d 511; and Willoughby
Hills, 1992-Ohio-111, do not compel a different reading or application of the
relevant statutes. These cases do not address R.C. 2506.01 in the context of an
appeal of a board of revision’s property-valuation decision to the court of common
pleas; nor do they consider the statutory scheme that the General Assembly
established in R.C. Ch. 5717 to provide for appeals of those decisions. These cases
are distinguishable on those bases alone and do not control the outcome here.
{¶ 21} We conclude that, contrary to Olentangy’s arguments, the text of
R.C. 2506.01 and 5717.01 shows that the Delaware County Court of Common
Pleas properly dismissed the appeals in these cases. Board-of-revision decisions
are appealable to a higher administrative authority under R.C. 5717.01; therefore,
R.C. 2506.01(C) precludes the appeal of such decisions to a common pleas court
under R.C. 2506.01(A). Olentangy could not appeal the Delaware County Board
of Revision’s decisions to the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas under
R.C. 2506.01(A) in these cases. Because this determination is dispositive of the
10
January Term, 2026
interrelated propositions of law, we decline to address the parties’ remaining
arguments. See Pettus, 2020-Ohio-4836, at ¶ 10, 17 (if the plain language of a
statute “is unambiguous and definite, we apply it as written” and “engage in no
further analysis” of the parties’ alternative arguments regarding legislative intent).
III. CONCLUSION
{¶ 22} R.C. 2506.01(C) excludes a board of revision’s property-valuation
decisions from the class of decisions appealable to a common pleas court under
R.C. 2506.01(A) since property-valuation decisions are appealable to a higher
administrative authority, the BTA, under R.C. 5717.01. Consequently,
R.C. 2506.01 does not provide a board of education with an avenue to appeal a
board of revision’s property-valuation decisions.
{¶ 23} The Fifth District Court of Appeals therefore did not err in
determining that Olentangy’s appeals from the Delaware County Board of
Revision’s decisions to the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas were
properly dismissed. We accordingly affirm the Fifth District’s judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
__________________
BRUNNER, J., dissenting.
{¶ 24} I dissent from the court’s judgment affirming the dismissal of an
appeal by appellant, the Olentangy Local School District Board of Education
(“Olentangy”), to the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas from certain
property-valuation decisions of appellee, the Delaware County Board of Revision.
I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion’s conclusion that Olentangy lacks
a “final order, adjudication, or decision” as defined in R.C. 2506.01(C) that would
allow it to appeal the board of revision’s decisions to the common pleas court under
R.C. 2506.01(A). See majority opinion, ¶ 19. The majority opinion interprets
R.C. 2506.01(C) as prohibiting any of the board of revision’s decisions from being
appealed to a common pleas court as a final order under R.C. 2506.01(A) and, in
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doing so, leaves Olentangy and others similarly situated without a remedy. See
majority opinion at ¶ 19.
{¶ 25} Olentangy has attempted to avail itself of an appeal under
R.C. 2506.01(A), a catchall administrative-appeal provision that broadly authorizes
appeals from “every final order, adjudication, or decision of any officer, tribunal,
authority, board, bureau, commission, department, or other division of any political
subdivision of the state” to “the court of common pleas of the county in which the
principal office of the political subdivision is located.” R.C. 2506.01 does not
identify who is authorized to make such appeals. It does, however, define the
phrase “final order, adjudication, or decision” to exclude “any order, adjudication,
or decision from which an appeal is granted by rule, ordinance, or statute to a higher
administrative authority if a right to a hearing on such appeal is provided.”
R.C. 2506.01(C).
{¶ 26} The majority opinion points to the General Assembly’s having
authorized some entities to appeal some property-valuation decisions of a board of
revision to the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”) under R.C. 5717.01, and it
notes that the BTA’s appeal process provides for a hearing, see R.C. 5703.02(D)(2).
See majority opinion at ¶ 19. From this, the majority reasons that all board-of-
revision property-valuation decisions must be considered appealable to a “higher
administrative authority” under R.C. 2506.01(C), which in turn means that all such
decisions are excluded from the definition of “final order, adjudication, or
decision.” See majority opinion at ¶ 8-21.
{¶ 27} The problem with the majority opinion’s analysis is that it treats
R.C. 2506.01 as permitting appeals on an all-or-nothing basis. In other words, the
majority opinion’s analysis avoids the “higher administrative authority” portion of
R.C. 2506.01(C) and requires the entity seeking to appeal a board of revision’s
decision to show that neither it nor anyone else could appeal the general type of
decision at issue to a “higher administrative authority.” Nothing in the text of
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January Term, 2026
R.C. 2506.01 supports this view. Nothing in R.C. 2506.01 indicates that the
availability of the avenue of appeal it creates turns on the general type of decision
at issue. And nothing in R.C. 2506.01 addresses in any way who may appeal.
{¶ 28} By focusing on individual orders, adjudications, and decisions, the
text of R.C. 2506.01 by its plain language indicates that the exact opposite of what
the majority opinion says is true. R.C. 2506.01(A) authorizes appeals from “every
final order, adjudication, or decision.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2506.01(C) then
excludes “any order, adjudication, or decision” that is appealable to a “higher
administrative authority” from the definition of “final order, adjudication, or
decision” as that phrase is used in division (A). Finally, R.C. 2506.01(B) makes
clear that the appeal that division (A) authorizes “is in addition to any other remedy
of appeal provided by law.” Read cumulatively, these statutory provisions indicate
that in any analysis of how R.C. 2506.01 applies, the focus should be on the
particular order at issue, rather than the general category into which that order falls
or whether any entities other than the one seeking to appeal could do so to a higher
administrative authority. I therefore do not agree with the majority opinion that
R.C. 2506.01(C) prevents Olentangy from appealing the board of revision’s
decisions at issue here to the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas under
R.C. 2506.01(A).
{¶ 29} I would also hold that the amendments to R.C. 5717.01 enacted by
2022 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 126 (“H.B. 126”) materially affect how R.C. 2506.01
applies to a board of education seeking to appeal a board of revision’s property-
valuation decision concerning property that the board of education does not own or
lease. Before the enactment of H.B. 126, the law was clear that a board of education
could appeal such a decision to the BTA under R.C. 5717.01, which meant that the
“higher administrative authority” portion of R.C. 2506.01(C) prevented the board
of revision’s decision from being appealed directly to a common pleas court under
R.C. 2506.01(A). However, because H.B. 126 removed authorization for a board
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of education to appeal such a decision to the BTA under R.C. 5717.01, the “higher
administrative authority” portion of R.C. 2506.01(C) no longer applies. As a result,
Olentangy is authorized under R.C. 2506.01(A) to appeal the property-valuation
decisions at issue here to the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas.
{¶ 30} Notwithstanding that, Olentangy must still establish that it has
standing to pursue an appeal to the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas under
R.C. 2506.01(A). Establishing standing to appeal generally means the appellant
must show that it has been aggrieved by a final order:
Under the common law, it is well settled that the right to appeal can
be exercised only by those parties who are able to demonstrate a
present interest in the subject matter of the litigation which has been
prejudiced by the judgment of the lower court. . . . “Appeal lies only
on behalf of a party aggrieved by the final order appealed from.
Appeals are not allowed for the purposes of settling abstract
questions, but only to correct errors injuriously affecting the
appellant.”
Willoughby Hills v. C. C. Bar’s Sahara, Inc., 1992-Ohio-111, ¶ 8, quoting Ohio
Contract Carriers Assn., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 140 Ohio St. 160 (1942),
syllabus. Olentangy may establish standing on appeal to the common pleas court
by showing that it was adversely affected by the board of revision’s property-
valuation decisions. See, e.g., Schomaeker v. First Natl. Bank of Ottawa, 66 Ohio
St. 2d 304 (1981), paragraph two of the syllabus (holding that a property owner has
standing to appeal a local planning commission’s grant of a variance to a
neighboring property owner under R.C. Ch. 2506 when the property owner has
established that he or she would be “directly affected” by the commission’s
decision by having previously indicated an interest in the matter by prior court
14
January Term, 2026
action challenging the intended use and attending a hearing with counsel on the
matter); Roper v. Richfield Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 173 Ohio St. 168, 173-174
(1962) (holding that a property owner had standing to appeal a board of zoning
appeals’ decision concerning another person’s property under R.C. 2506.01
because the decision would “damage” his property and it “affected and determined
[his] rights as a property owner”).
{¶ 31} Olentangy argues that it is “directly affected” by the board of
revision’s decisions at issue in these cases because it was a party to the property-
valuation proceedings—it filed statutorily authorized complaints seeking an
increase in the valuation of the properties under R.C. 5715.19(A)(6)—and the
board of revision rejected its claims for relief. It also explains in its reply brief how
the property valuations here have a direct, dollar-for-dollar impact on its revenues:
For PSLC Enterprises, LLC’s[2] property, the total effective
Class II millage rate for the property was 85.344573 mills, and for
Northport Place, LLC’s[3] property, the total effective Class II
millage rate was 83.768702 mills for tax year 2022. Olentangy
Local School District’s effective Class II millage rate was
63.857748 mills and it therefore receives 74.8% of the real property
taxes from PSLC’s property and 76.2% of the real property taxes
from Northport’s property. See https://tax.ohio.gov/researcher/tax-
data-series/tds1.
(Boldface and underlining in original.)
2. In case No. 2024-0814, Olentangy asserts the right to appeal the board of revision’s property-
valuation decision concerning property owned by PSLC Enterprises, L.L.C.
3. In case No. 2024-0815, Olentangy asserts the right to appeal the board of revision’s property-
valuation decision concerning property owned by Northport Place, L.L.C.
15
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
{¶ 32} We have previously recognized that a board of education has an
interest in a property’s valuation in the district being “correct.” Tower City
Properties v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 49 Ohio St.3d 67, 70 (1990). That
said, the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas and the Fifth District Court of
Appeals did not address whether Olentangy was adversely affected by the board of
revision’s decisions at issue in these cases and therefore had standing to appeal
those decisions under R.C. 2506.01(A). Thus, we should not address that issue in
the first instance. I would therefore remand these cases to the Delaware County
Court of Common Pleas for it to allow the parties to brief the issue of standing and
present evidence as necessary and to then issue a decision on the matter.
{¶ 33} For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that the Fifth District erred
by concluding that R.C. 2506.01(A) does not authorize Olentangy to appeal the
board of revision’s property-valuation decisions at issue here to the Delaware
County Court of Common Pleas. I would therefore reverse its judgments and
remand the cases to the common pleas court for further proceedings as explained
above. Because the majority opinion does not, I respectfully dissent.
__________________
Rich & Gillis Law Group, L.L.C., Mark H. Gillis, and Kelley A. Gorry, for
appellant.
Melissa A. Schiffel, Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael P. Cavanaugh,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellees Delaware County Auditor and
Delaware County Board of Revision.
Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease, L.L.P., Nicholas M.J. Ray, Lauren M.
Johnson, and Steven L. Smiseck, for appellees Northport Place, L.L.C., and PSLC
Enterprises, L.L.C.
Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Mathura J. Sridharan, Solicitor General,
urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost.
__________________
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