Wright

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

JASON P. WRIGHT and JACQUELINE A. Case No.: 3:26-cv-00987-AN

WRIGHT,

Plaintiffs, OPINION AND ORDER

v.

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, doing business

as Rushmore Servicing; CLEAR RECON

CORP; ALDRIDGE PITE, LLP; JOHN SCOTT

BAILEY – QUICK COLLECT; CHANDLER &

NEWVILLE, INC.; RAZZLE DAZZLE

PROPERTIES, LLC; WOLF FAMILY TRUST;

JASON M. WOLF; STACY CHANDLER

WILCUT WOLF; WILLCUTS COMPANY

REALTORS; RON WILLCUTS; STACY

WILLCUTS; MATT WILLCUTS; MARC

WILLCUTS; CHANDLER WILLCUTS;

RENEE VERLEE HANKS WILLCUTS; RED

HILLS DEVELOPMENT LLC; RYAN

ROWLANDS; LORI FETTIG GOODWIN;

RENEE ATKINSON; PARIS FETTIG; BETSY

FETTIG; ELIZABETH FETTIG; ALLISON

FETTIG; FETTIG FAMILY TRUSTS;

SAMANTHA COOLEY; OPT REAL ESTATE;

DREW COLEMAN; LYNN EARL SMITH;

JESSICA FREED, also known as Jessica Cain

and Jessica Kane; PREMIUM PROPERTY

MANAGEMENT, INC.; JOSH NOBLE; RON

NOBLE; DAM NOBLE; JOSHUA KAUFMAN

MENDENHALL; AUSTIN SCHULTZ; and

DOE DEFENDANTS 1-10,

Defendants.

Plaintiffs Jason P. Wright and Jacqueline A. Wright, who are self-represented and thus

proceeding pro se, bring this action against numerous defendants regarding an allegedly wrongful

foreclosure of real property. Alongside the complaint, plaintiffs additionally filed an application to

procced without paying filings fees, (i.e., in forma pauperis or “IFP”) and a motion for a temporary

restraining order (“TRO”) and preliminary injunction. For the reasons stated below, plaintiffs’ IFP

application and plaintiffs’ motion for TRO and preliminary injunction are both DENIED.

LEGAL STANDARDS

A. IFP

District courts are authorized by statute to permit a party to commence litigation “without

prepayment of fees or security therefor” if that party submits an affidavit showing that, in light of the assets

of that party, they are “unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Section

1915 “applies to all persons notwithstanding” its references to incarcerated litigants. Andrews v. Cervantes,

493 F.3d 1047, 1051 n.1 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Lister v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 408 F.3d 1309, 1312 (10th

Cir. 2005)). When determining what, if any, filing fee a plaintiff must pay, “‘the court may consider the

plaintiff’s cash flow in the recent past, and the extent to which the plaintiff has depleted his savings on

nonessentials.’” Hymas v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 73 F.4th 763, 768 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Alexander

v. Carson Adult High Sch., 9 F.3d 1448, 1449 (9th Cir. 1993)).

In addition to permitting litigants to proceed without paying filing fees, Section 1915 also requires

a court to dismiss a complaint on its own accord, even before service of process, if it determines that the

complaint is “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B);

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). A complaint is frivolous “where it lacks an

arguable basis either in law or in fact,” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), meaning it does not

“contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). See Watison v. Carter, 668

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.”). When this standard is not met, “section 1915(e)

not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an [IFP] complaint that fails to state a claim.” Lopez,

203 F.3d at 1127. Additionally, a court must dismiss a complaint on immunity grounds once it has

“sufficient information to make a determination” that defendants are entitled to absolute or qualified

immunity. Chavez v. Robinson, 817 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 2016).

B. Pleadings by Self-Represented Litigants

In determining whether a self-represented litigant’s complaint lacks merit, courts must use “less

stringent standards than” those used for “formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551

U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).

Further, “[u]nless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect,” a self-represented litigant

proceeding IFP is “entitled to notice of the complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to

dismissal of the action.” Garity v. APWU Nat’l Labor Org., 828 F.3d 848, 854 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting

Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam)).

C. TROs

TROs are subject to substantially the same factors as preliminary injunctions. See Stuhlbarg Int’l

Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). Each is an “extraordinary remedy

that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res.

Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). Generally, a party seeking a TRO or preliminary injunction must

show (1) they are likely to succeed on the merits; (2) they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence

of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in the favor of the party; and (4) an injunction is in the

public interest. Id. at 20-22. In the Ninth Circuit, “serious questions going to the merits and a hardship

balance that tips sharply toward the plaintiff can support issuance of an injunction, assuming the other two

elements of the Winter test are also met.” All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131-32 (9th

Cir. 2011).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 provides that a court “may issue a preliminary injunction only

on notice to the adverse party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1). A court may issue an ex parte TRO without notice

to the adverse party only if “specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly shows that

immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be

heard in opposition” and “the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the

reasons why it should not be required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). The issuance of ex parte TROs is

“extremely limited” because “‘our entire jurisprudence runs counter to the notion of court action taken

before reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard has been granted both sides of a dispute.’” Reno

Air Racing Ass’n, Inc. v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Granny Goose Foods, Inc.

v. Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 70 of Alameda County, 415 U.S. 423, 438-

39 (1974)). Courts have recognized that issuance of an ex parte TRO may be appropriate in limited

circumstances “where notice to the adverse party is impossible either because the identity of the adverse

party is unknown or because a known party cannot be located in time for a hearing” or “because notice to

the defendant would render fruitless the further prosecution of the action.” Id. (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted).

BACKGROUND

The following allegations are based on plaintiffs’ complaint and the documents attached thereto.

Plaintiffs currently reside at a residential property located on Keyes Lane in Dundee, Oregon (the

“Property”), which plaintiffs allege maintains a fair market value exceeding one million dollars. Verified

Compl., ECF 1, at 2 (all citations refer to ECF pagination). Although plaintiffs tried to pay debts owed on

the Property, the Property was ultimately foreclosed upon. Id. at 2-3. On February 17, 2026, a trustee

auction was held, and “[o]n March 9, 2026, a deed was recorded selling the property at auction to Defendant

Chandler & Newville, Inc. for $520,000.” Id. at 3. On March 10, 2026, a deed was recorded showing that

the property was sold to defendant Razzle Dazzle Properties, LLC for $605,700. Id. Plaintiffs allege that

various defendants conspired together and used deceptive practices to carry out the foreclosure and sales.

See id.

On March 13, 2026, the Yamhill County Circuit Court issued a summons eviction against plaintiffs

and all other occupants of the Property. Id. at 8. The summons eviction, which was issued in Case Number

26LT06196, warned plaintiffs that their “landlord wants to evict” them and ordered plaintiffs to appear at

the Yamhill County Courthouse on March 24, 2026. Id. (capitalization modified). Plaintiffs allege that

they tried to seek a stay of proceedings and to disqualify the state judge presiding over the Yamhill County

case, but that they “cannot obtain a constitutionally compliant hearing.” Id. at 3. Plaintiffs further allege

that defendants “caused to be filed multiple fraudulent, clouded, and unverified liens,” that defendant Renee

Atkinson wrongfully notarized the transfer deeds despite a conflict of interest, and that the “state court

judge has direct, extensive familial, financial, and corporate ties to a regional real estate development,

property-flipping, and debt-collection” group that includes certain defendants. Id. at 3-4. On March 17,

2026, a notice of lis pendens was issued in Yamhill County Circuit Court Case Number 26CV12886. Id.

at 9-10. The notice states that “[t]he object of the action is the wrongful foreclosure of the [Property].” Id.

at 9. Plaintiffs are named as the petitioners on the notice. Id. On May 15, 2026, plaintiffs filed an

emergency motion to disqualify and to stay the state court proceedings. Id. at 4.

Plaintiffs initiated this action on May 18, 2026, by filing the complaint; an application to proceed

IFP, ECF 2 (“IFP Appl.”); and a motion for TRO and preliminary injunction, ECF 3 (“Pls. Mot.”). Although

plaintiffs do not expressly plead any causes of action, they appear to at least bring claims under the Federal

Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Racketeer Influenced and

Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). See Verified Compl. 2. Plaintiffs plead numerous prayers for relief,

including an order “enjoining Defendants and local law enforcement from executing any eviction, lockout,

or property transfer regarding the [Property]”; a “judicial declaration stating that the underlying foreclosure

sale and all subsequent state court eviction proceedings in local Circuit Court are unconstitutional, null, and

void”; “[a]n order quietening [sic] title to the [Property] . . . and restoring [] Plaintiff[s] to the peaceful,

unencumbered ownership of their 20-year family homestead”; compensatory and punitive damages; and an

order allowing plaintiffs to pursue discovery via various subpoenas. Id. at 4-6. In the motion for TRO,

plaintiffs ask the Court to halt “all eviction, construction, and lockout actions regarding the subject

property.” Pls. Mot. 2. As far as the Court is aware, none of these filings have been served on defendants.

DISCUSSION

A. IFP Application

Plaintiffs appear to have jointly filed one IFP application. See IFP Appl. Although it is signed

only by Jason Wright, the first page begins, “I, Jason P. Wright, Jacqueline Wright declare that I am the

plaintiff in the above-entitled proceeding.” Id. at 1, 4-5. Each plaintiff must file their own IFP application,

which they must each sign respectively. See, e.g., Smallwood v. Crim, No. 3:18-cv-1816-AC, 2018 WL

11581863, at *1 (D. Or. Dec. 5, 2018); Harrod v. Durik, No. 2:25-cv-01575-MMD-MDC, 2025 WL

2581895, at *2 (D. Nev. Sept. 4, 2025). While it appears that both plaintiffs would likely satisfy the

economic eligibility requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court cannot make this determination based on

the current filing. Plaintiffs’ IFP application is therefore denied with leave to amend.

Moreover, as described below, plaintiffs’ complaint does not state a claim upon which relief may

be granted. This separately requires that plaintiffs’ IFP application be denied. See Beckler v. Umpqua

Bank, No. 6:24-cv-2002-MC, 2024 WL 4972032, at *1 (D. Or. Dec. 4, 2024) (“To qualify for in forma

pauperis status, a civil litigant must demonstrate both that the litigant is unable to pay court fees and that

the claims the litigant seeks to pursue are not frivolous.”).

B. Complaint

Plaintiffs’ complaint does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted and must therefore

be dismissed as frivolous under Section 1915. The thrust of plaintiffs’ allegations is that defendants have

conspired to unlawfully foreclose upon and evict plaintiffs from the Property, and that the state court

proceedings have been fundamentally unfair. However, this Court may not interfere with ongoing state

court proceedings or review final state court decisions.

Beginning with challenges to ongoing state court proceedings, “Younger abstention is a common

law equitable doctrine holding that a federal court should refrain from interfering with a pending state court

proceeding.” Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654, 669 n.4 (9th Cir. 2004). “Younger abstention

applies when: (1) the state proceedings are ongoing; (2) the claims implicate important state interests; and

(3) the state proceedings provide an adequate forum to raise federal questions.” Beckler, 2024 WL

4972032, at *2 (citing Weiner v. County of San Diego, 23 F.3d 263, 266 (9th Cir. 1994)). All prongs appear

to be met here, where plaintiffs challenge eviction proceedings occurring in state court. See id. (noting that

Younger abstention likely barred federal action challenging eviction proceedings); see also Espiriquetzal v.

Quality Loan Serv. Corp. of Wash., No. 3:18-cv-00157-YY, 2018 WL 2988513, at *2 (D. Or. Apr. 19,

2018) (“Issuing a TRO in this case requiring Defendant . . . to stop its eviction would implicate important

state interests regarding the rightful possession to real property. Plaintiff has the opportunity to raise

challenges to the eviction in that case. It would be entirely inappropriate for this Court to interfere with the

state court process.”). And though there is a narrow exception providing that federal courts should not

abstain “if there is a ‘showing of bad faith, harassment, or some other extraordinary circumstance that would

make abstention inappropriate,’” plaintiffs have not pleaded sufficient facts showing such bad faith or

extraordinary circumstances. Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 765-66 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting

Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 435 (1982)). Plaintiffs’ allegations

on this point, for example that “Plaintiff cannot obtain a constitutionally compliant hearing or due process

in the local state forum due to the extensive political and financial influence of the Defendants’ network,

which explicitly includes the family of the presiding judge whose spouse served as a state legislator,” are

too conclusory and attenuated to support plaintiffs’ claims. Verified Compl. 3.

Federal courts are also prohibited from review[ing] final judgments of a state court in judicial

proceedings” under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482

(1983). “Rooker-Feldman prohibits a federal district court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over

a suit that is a de facto appeal from a state court judgment.” Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139

(9th Cir. 2004). District courts must also refuse to hear cases where “the parties do not directly contest the

merits of a state court decision” but the “claims raised in the federal court action are inextricably intertwined

with the state court’s decision such that the adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state

ruling or require the district court to interpret the application of state laws or procedural rules.” Reusser v.

Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The Ninth

Circuit has held that Rooker-Feldman applies to actions challenging unlawful evictions. See Bumphus v.

Hazeltree Apartments, 63 F. App’x 382, 383 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The district court properly dismissed [the

plaintiff’s] claim, which alleged a conspiracy that resulted in his illegal eviction, because the claim

effectively seeks review of a final, state court decision.”). It thus appears that this Court does not have

jurisdiction to address plaintiffs’ claims.

Even if this Court could reach the merits of plaintiffs’ claims, they are not sufficient to withstand

Section 1915 scrutiny. As to the FDCPA claim, “the Ninth Circuit has held that actions taken to facilitate

a non-judicial foreclosure, such as sending the notice of default and notice of sale, are not attempts to collect

a ‘debt’ as that term is defined by the [FDCPA].” Espiriquetzal, 2018 WL 2988513, at *2 (citing Ho v.

ReconTrust Co., N.A., 858 F.3d 568, 571-72 (9th Cir. 2017)). As to the Fourteenth Amendment claim,

plaintiffs must allege that the defendants are state actors, that each defendant’s actions “have resulted in a

deprivation of [plaintiffs’] constitutional rights” and that there exists “a sufficient causal connection

between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation.” Boyce v. DePaul, No. 3:24-cv-00596-HZ,

2024 WL 1603683, at *3 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2024) (citing Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227, 229 (9th Cir. 1980),

abrogated on other grounds by Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991)). Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged

that defendants are state actors, that defendants have each taken actions that resulted in deprivation of

plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, or that defendants’ actions caused plaintiffs’ deprivation. As to the RICO

claim, plaintiffs have not alleged the requisite “facts that establish a pattern of racketeering activity based

on a minimum of two predicate acts, a criminal enterprise in which the defendant[s] participated, and a

causal relationship between the predicate acts and the harm suffered by the plaintiff[s].” Moye v.

Jiraittewanna, No. C 08-2056 PJH, 2008 WL 1944126, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2008) (citing 18 U.S.C.

§§ 1961-68, 2314, 2315 and Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496-97 (1985)). Plaintiffs’

complaint must therefore be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under

Section 1915.

C. TRO and Preliminary Injunction

There is no doubt that plaintiffs may suffer irreparable harm if they are evicted from their home.

However, for the same reasons that plaintiffs have not stated a viable claim, plaintiffs have also not

demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. Because plaintiffs have not shown even serious

questions going to the merits, they have not shown that a TRO or preliminary injunction is warranted at this

juncture.

Separately, a preliminary injunction cannot issue without notice to the adverse party, Fed. R. Civ.

P. 65(a)(1), and plaintiffs have also failed to meet the procedural requirements for requesting a TRO ex

parte. Plaintiffs’ motion does not include either a certificate of service or a showing of efforts made to give

notice and the reasons that notice should not be required in this case. Nor do plaintiffs indicate that they

are unable to contract defendants such that they could not provide notice. And plaintiffs have not alleged

that defendants would take any steps to frustrate the purpose of this action if given notice. For all of these

reasons, the motion for TRO and preliminary injunction is denied.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, plaintiffs’ application to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF 2, is

DENIED with leave to amend. Plaintiffs’ motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary

injunction, ECF 3, is also DENIED. The Court DISMISSES plaintiff's complaint, ECF 1, for failure to

state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Dismissal is without prejudice and, out of an abundance of

caution, with leave to amend. Any amended complaint must be filed by June 19, 2026.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 19th day of May, 2026.

Adrienne Nelson

United States District Judge