Lutnes

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

ANN LUTNES, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. CIV-25-1292-PRW

)

STATE OF OKLAHOMA, )

et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ANN LUTNES and SETH McKEE, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) Case No. CIV-25-1353-PRW

)

OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF )

HUMAN SERVICES, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Before the Court are the Motions to Dismiss (Case No. 25-1292, Dkts. 13, 15, 17,

20, 22, 25, 60, 61 and 64; Case No. 25-1353, Dkts. 16, 17, and 20) filed by a multitude of

Defendants. The Motions to Dismiss in Case No. 25-1292 seek to dismiss the Complaint

filed by Plaintiff Ann Lutnes on March 11, 2026. The Motions to Dismiss in Case No. 25-

1353 seeks to dismiss the Complaint filed by Plaintiffs Lutnes and Seth Mckee on

November 14, 2025. For the reasons that follow, the Court CONSOLIDATES these cases,

DISMISSES the Complaints (Case No. 25-1292, Dkt. 69; Case No. 25-1353, Dkt. 1)

WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and DENIES the motions AS MOOT.

Background

Each of these cases contain several common characteristics. These are civil rights

actions, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging the same child custody proceedings

in Oklahoma state court. According to the Complaints, Defendants have each contributed

to unconstitutional interference by the Oklahoma Department of Human Services (DHS)

with Plaintiffs’ constitutionally protected parental rights. Plaintiffs allege similar Fourth

and Fourteenth Amendment violations in both Complaints, in addition to various violations

of state and federal law. Accordingly, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a),

the Court consolidates the above-captioned cases, as they “involve a common question of

law or fact[.]”

I. The Facts

Plaintiffs Lutnes and McKee are the biological parents of minor children M.R.L.

and M.L.-M. The Complaints are hard to decipher, but as best the Court can tell, between

April 1, 2025, and April 7, 2025, Plaintiffs took M.L.-M. to the University of Oklahoma

Children’s Hospital for unspecified reasons. At that appointment, Plaintiffs allege that OU

Children’s did not “diagnose” any neglect.1 Plaintiff also alleged that Defendants Dr. Mary

Stockett and Dr. Garrett Jones “authored unverified medical reports that triggered DHS

1 Compl. (No. 25-1353, Dkt. 1), ¶17.

intervention.”2 Following the hospital visit, DHS was apparently provided a “near-death”

referral by an unspecified party3 and opened an administrative review of some sort on April

7, 2025. Plaintiffs do not provide any details on the “near-death” referral. Plaintiffs allege

that on April 18, 2025, before DHS had completed its administrative review, Defendant

Brenda Nipp, who served as an assistant district attorney, presumably for Payne County,

filed a deprivation petition, which included an affidavit that Plaintiffs allege was unsigned,

unsworn, and riddled with hearsay. Using the language of the deprivation petition, a

sheriff’s deputy (presumably, Defendant Officer John Kuhn) filed “a probable-cause

affidavit for arrest,” which Special Judge Susan Worthington then issued.4 Lutnes was

jailed on April 26, 2025.

On April 18, 2025, Judge Worthington entered an emergency order that apparently

affected Plaintiffs’ custody of the children, but Plaintiffs do not explain in what way the

legal guardianship of their children was altered, nor for that matter to which children the

emergency order applied (though it appears that the emergency order may have delegated

custody to DHS of one or both of the children). According to Plaintiffs, Defendant

Elizabeth Henninger, a Payne County DHS worker, “certified the order as if probable cause

existed.”5 While it is not clear what that means, Plaintiffs allege that this violated

2 Compl. (No. 25-1292, Dkt. 69), ¶10.

3 This may be referring to the medical report authored by Dr. Stockett and Jones.

4 Compl. (No. 25-1292, Dkt. 69), ¶¶7–8.

5 Id. at ¶4.

Oklahoma law, asserting that unspecified parties violated 12 O.S. § 611 and “Rule 52(a).”6

Plaintiffs further aver that they were not provided a 48-hour probable cause hearing

transcript, presumably from a hearing related to the emergency custody order.

On April 22, some sort of “Show-Cause Hearing” was held.7 What happened at that

hearing is not stated. Sometime afterwards Nipp and another assistant district attorney,

Defendant Laura Austin Thomas, allegedly filed “motions to bypass reunification and

terminate rights without new evidence.”8 Plaintiffs allege DHS completed its

administrative review of the deprivation petition on April 28, 2025.

Plaintiffs allege that throughout these custody proceedings their court-appointed

counsel, Defendant Carter Jennings, colluded with Nipp and DHS staff. In particular,

Plaintiffs allege that Jennings met privately with and forwarded client emails to Nipp and

DHS staff without Plaintiffs’ consent. Plaintiffs claim “[t]hese acts constitute joint state

action under Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914 (1984).”9

Plaintiffs also allege that on May 14, 2025, an unspecified court delegated visitation

authority to DHS without making any findings.

Plaintiffs then allege that at some unspecified time, medical records indicate that a

corrective eye surgery was scheduled for M.L.-M. Plaintiffs claim that records incorrectly

indicate that Plaintiffs were notified of the scheduled surgery. Plaintiffs allege that DHS

6 Compl. (No. 25-1353, Dkt. 1), ¶23.

7 Compl. (No. 25-1292, Dkt. 69), ¶5.

8 Id. at ¶9.

9 Id. at ¶14.

misled them for months about scheduled medical procedures for their children and

promised to alert Plaintiffs if any surgeries were ultimately scheduled. Plaintiffs allege that

DHS eventually approved and transported M.L.-M. for corrective eye surgery at an

unspecified time to an unspecified place without Plaintiffs first providing their consent.

Here, Plaintiffs claim a Fourth Amendment violation and Fourteenth Amendment

violations against their parental autonomy.

The Court then construes the Complaints to allege that after the eye surgery, at a

visitation at an unspecified time and place, an unnamed DHS worker demanded that

Plaintiffs sign a consent form that Plaintiffs claim retroactively authorized DHS’s

unspecified prior medical decisions made on behalf of unspecified children. During this

episode, Plaintiffs allege the DHS worker threatened that Plaintiffs would not see their

children that day if they did not sign the consent form, which Plaintiffs now challenge as

void because they signed it under duress.

Plaintiffs then attempted to file a notice of constitutional challenge pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.1, presumably with the Payne County Clerk of Court,

but the Plaintiffs claim the Clerk either refused or failed to certify that Plaintiffs had

provided the requisite notice to an unspecified employee of the Oklahoma Attorney

General. The Plaintiffs claim the Clerk violated their right to constitutional review, as

protected by Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution. Plaintiffs do not allege when they

attempted to file such notice, nor which law’s constitutionality they were challenging such

as to trigger Rule 5.1’s notice requirement.

Plaintiffs submitted a “complete grievance” to the Oklahoma Bar Association at an

unspecified time and against unspecified parties, the contents of which Plaintiffs do not

detail in the Complaint.10 Plaintiffs claim that they received read receipts from the OBA

that the grievance was delivered, but the OBA has not acknowledged, docketed, or taken

any other action with respect to the grievance, which Plaintiffs allege is state inaction

affecting their constitutional rights.

Finally, to make an already confusing story more confusing, the Complaint (Case

No. 25-1292, Dkt. 69) names Defendants Caitlin Fishburn, Michelle Burdick, Steven

Hickey, Hilary Vaughn, Chanda Smith, John Smith, and Angela D. Mainka, and Sherry

Debord without specifying how they are connected to the custody proceedings or any

wrongdoing. It is unclear to the Court how these defendants contributed to Plaintiffs’

alleged injury.

II. Causes of Action

A. Complaint (Case No. 25-1292)

On October 30, 2025, Plaintiff Lutnes, individually and as next friend of minor

children M.R.L. and M.N.L.-M., filed a Complaint against Defendants State of Oklahoma,

Oklahoma DHS, Dr. Stockett, Dr. Jones, Fishburn, Henninger, Hickey, Burdick, Vaughn,

the Smiths, Mainka, Debord, Judge Worthington, Thomas, Nipp, Jennings, Officer Kuhn,

Payne County Sheriff’s Office, and Payne County Juvenile Court.

10 Compl. (No. 25-1353, Dkt. 1), ¶36.

Lutnes seeks (1) a declaration stating all removal and custody orders are void for

lack of jurisdiction, (2) an injunction enjoining adoption proceedings or termination

actions, (3) an order forcing DHS, the DA’s Office, and court personnel to comply with

the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, Title IV-E of the Social Security Act,

and the Constitution, (4) an award of compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney’s

fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and (5) any other relief this Court deems just and proper.

All Defendants, except Burdick, Fishburn, Henninger, Hickey, Vaughn, Mainka,

and the Payne County Juvenile Court, have filed motions to dismiss this action under Rule

12(b)(6).

B. Complaint (Case No. 25-1353)

On November 14, 2025, Lutnes, now joined by McKee, filed a new complaint

against the Payne County Director of DHS, Nipp, Judge Worthington, the Payne County

Court Clerk, and the Chief Disciplinary Officer of the Oklahoma Bar Association.

Plaintiffs seek an injunction asking this Court to (1) order DHS to cease “all custody

actions,” “freeze all medical decision-making,” and “order complete medical disclosure,”

(2) “void coerced signatures,” and (3) order “clerk compliance,” “OBA compliance,” and

“ongoing court oversight.”11 Plaintiffs further request unspecified declaratory and

compensatory relief, as well as fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

11 Id. at 5–6.

Defendants Judge Worthington, Nipp, and the Chief Disciplinary Officer of the

OBA each filed motions to dismiss this action under Rules 12(b)(1) and (6). Defendant

Nipp also moves to dismiss under Rule 8(a)(2).

Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that, “[t]hough a complaint need

not provide ‘detailed factual allegations,’ it must give just enough factual detail to provide

‘fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’”12 A district court

may dismiss a complaint under Rule 41(b) if it fails to comply with Rule 8.13 Dismissal

under Rule 41(b) may be done with or without prejudice.14

“A pro se litigant’s pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to a less stringent

standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”15 Courts should not, however, “assume

the role of advocate for the pro se litigant.16 And the broad construction of a pro se

plaintiff’s complaint “does not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of alleging sufficient facts

on which a recognized legal claim could be based.”17 Because a pro se plaintiff “requires

no special legal training to recount the facts surrounding his alleged injury,” his pro se

12 Warnick v. Cooley, 895 F.3d 746, 751 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570) (2007)).

13 Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, at Arapahoe County Justice Center, 492 F.3d

1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007).

14 Id. at 1162.

15 Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).

16 Id.

17 Id.

status does not overcome the rule that “conclusory allegations without supporting factual

averments are insufficient to state a claim on which relief can be based.”18

Plaintiffs are not required to set forth a prima facie case in their complaint.19

Plaintiffs are, however, required to set forth plausible claims, so in determining whether a

claim is plausible, the elements of a prima facie case are helpful.20

Analysis

I. The State of Oklahoma and Oklahoma Department of Human Services are

protected by sovereign immunity.

“The Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdictional bar that precludes unconsented suits

in federal court against a state and arms of the state.”21 As the party asserting jurisdiction,

Plaintiffs “bears the burden of proving that sovereign immunity has been waived.”22

Exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity exist where a state consents to suit in federal

court or where Congress has abrogated a state’s sovereign immunity.23 Oklahoma has not

18 Id. (citations omitted).

19 Khalik v. United Airlines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1192 (10th Cir. 2012).

20 Id. at 1192; see Frappied v. Affinity Gaming Black Hawk, LLC, 966 F.3d 1038, 1054

(10th Cir. 2020); Morman v. Campbell Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., 632 F. App’x 927, 933 (10th

Cir. 2015).

21 Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1205 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted).

22 Impact Energy Res., LLC v. Salazar, 693 F.3d 1239, 1244 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal

quotation marks and alteration omitted).

23 Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Pruitt, 669 F.3d 1159, 1166 (10th Cir. 2012).

consented to suit in federal court,24 and Section 1983 does not abrogate the State’s

sovereign immunity.25

Because the Tenth Circuit and federal district courts in Oklahoma have held that the

Department of Human Services is an arm of the state, and Lutnes does not argue otherwise,

the Court finds that the Department of Human Services is entitled to sovereign immunity

under the Eleventh Amendment.26 As mentioned above, Lutnes seeks injunctive relief. And

while Ex Parte Young permits a plaintiff to pursue prospective equitable relief against an

official of a state agency, “it has no application against the States and their agencies, which

are immune from suit regardless of the relief sought.”27 Accordingly Lutnes’s Section 1983

24 OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 152.1(B) (“[I]t is not the intent of the state to waive any rights

under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.”).

25 Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64–66 (1989).

26 See, e.g., McKinney v. State of Okla., Dep’t of Hum. Servs., Shawnee OK, 925 F.2d 363,

365 (10th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he eleventh amendment bars [the] plaintiff from seeking money

damages against the Oklahoma Department of Human Services.”); Luther v. Okla. ex rel.

Okla. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., No. CIV-25-279-J, 2025 WL 1165282, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Apr.

2, 2025); Miller v. Okla. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., No. CIV-22-507-D, 2022 WL 16541217,

at *2 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 28, 2022) (collecting cases).

27 Romero v. City & Cnty. of Denver Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 57 F. App’x 835, 838 (10th Cir.

2003) (cleaned up) (collecting cases).

claims against the State of Oklahoma and its Department of Human Services are dismissed

without prejudice.28

II. For the remaining Defendants, Plaintiffs’ Complaints violate Rule 8(a)(2) and

are also dismissed without prejudice.

“[T]o state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what each defendant

did to [the plaintiffs]; when the defendant did it; how the defendant's action harmed [the

plaintiffs]; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated.”29 To

determine whether a complaint satisfies Rule 8(a)(2), “[t]he law recognizes a significant

difference between notice pleading and ‘shotgun’ pleading.”30 A shotgun pleading “is a

type of pleading that contains several counts or causes of action, each of which incorporates

by reference the entirety of its predecessor.” In other words, the shotgun pleader fails to

connect facts to its corresponding claim. Neither the Court nor the Defendants are required

to piece together Plaintiffs’ arguments for them.31

Here, both Complaints are classic examples of shotgun pleadings. Plaintiffs’

noncompliance with Rule 8 produces three defects warranting dismissal: it precludes any

analysis into abstention, results in overbroad and indeterminate requests for injunctive

28 Rural Water Sewer & Solid Waste Mgmt., Dist. No. 1, Logan Cnty., Okla. v. City of

Guthrie, 654 F.3d 1058, 1069 n.9 (10th Cir. 2011) (Dismissal under sovereign immunity

grounds must be without prejudice.).

29 Nasious, 492 F.3d at 1163.

30 Glenn v. First Nat. Bank in Grand Junction, 868 F.2d 368, 371 (10th Cir. 1989).

31 Hart v. Salois, 605 Fed. App’x 694, 701 (10th Cir. 2015).

relief, and obscures the nature of Plaintiffs’ claims by failing to tie specific facts to specific

causes of action.

First, before the Court can assess whether any of Defendants’ numerous asserted

defenses apply in this case, or even if it should abstain under Younger v. Harris or another

such abstention doctrine,32 the Court must understand what Plaintiffs are alleging each

Defendant did. The muddled Complaints make that task impossible. As the Court

repeatedly notes in its summary of the facts from the Complaint, Plaintiffs exclude

important details about the time, place, and even identities of perpetrators of key events.

Defendants raise defenses based on a variety of immunity doctrines and urge the

Court to abstain from intervening in state court proceedings, but the application of the

asserted immunity defenses, such as qualified or absolute immunity, require fact-specific

analyses. For instance, state prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity against Ҥ 1983 [actions]

for activities intimately associated with the judicial process.”33 State judges are likewise

absolutely immune from such actions.34 Qualified immunity, too, applies when a plaintiff

demonstrates a defendant violated one of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights and that right

was “clearly established” when the violation allegedly occurred such that all reasonable

officials would have been on notice that their actions violated the law.35 The Complaints

32 Joseph A. ex rel. Corrine Wolfe v. Ingram, 275 F.3d 1253, 1272 (10th Cir. 2002).

33 Gagan v. Norton, 35 F.3d 1473, 1475 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting Pfeiffer v. Hartford Fire

Ins. Co., 929 F.2d 1484, 1489 (10th Cir. 1991)) (internal quotations omitted).

34 Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (quoting Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers

Union, 446 U.S. 719, 734–35 (1980)).

35 Morris v. Noe, 672 F.3d 1185, 1191 (10th Cir. 2012)

fail to provide the Court with any basis to assess Defendants’ liability and defenses. For

example, in Case No. 25-1353, Plaintiffs name Judge Worthington as a Defendant in the

case caption and assert she is sued only for “administrative acts outside judicial

immunity[,]”36 but the Complaint does not state which court performed each of the judicial

actions recounted. Plaintiffs cannot evade an immunity doctrine by simply pleading vague

facts and declaring that any such immunity does not apply.

Of special note is the extent to which the Court is still left in the dark on what seems

to be the most important issue underlying the whole case—the custody order. The Court

doesn’t know whether the emergency order altering the children’s legal guardianship has

been superseded by a separate order, to which children any such order applies, who has

custody of the children, whether any custody order is still in effect, or the basis for the

emergency that necessitated the order. All to say, the Complaints simply do not provide

“the [C]ourt sufficient clarity to adjudicate the merits.”37

Second, Plaintiffs’ requests for injunctive relief are similarly too vague. Rule 65(d)

requires that injunctions be “specific in terms” and describe the acts to be restrained or

compelled “in reasonable detail[.]”38 Here, Plaintiffs seek exceptionally broad remedies.

They ask the Court to (1) order DHS to “cease exercising custody without court findings,”

“disclose all medical records within 72 hours,” and enjoin it from “authorizing medical

procedures[;]” (2) order an unspecified “Clerk to certify Rule 5.1 notice”—about which

36 Compl. (No. 25-1353, Dkt. 1), ¶14.

37 Nasious, 492 F.3d at 1163 (internal citations omitted).

38 Monreal v. Potter, 367 F.3d 1224, 1236 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)).

the Court has been provided no details—to an unspecified attorney general; and (3) order

the Oklahoma Bar Association “to process grievances,” and perform “immediate

compliance reporting” of an unspecified nature.39 Plaintiffs also request that the Court

“[e]join further adoption or termination actions until due process is restored” and “[o]rder

DHS, DA’s Officer, and court personnel to comply with ICPC, Title IV-E, and

constitutional requirement.”40 Such bald requests are simply insufficient.

As a first matter, injunctions ordering Defendants “to obey the law and prohibiting

[] Defendant[s] from violating it are impermissible.”41 Second, Plaintiffs ask the Court to

enjoin DHS from doing some things and to do other things, but Plaintiffs do not specify as

to whom the injunction should apply. Indeed, the Complaint in Case No. 25-1353 reads as

though Plaintiffs are asking the Court, for instance, to order DHS to cease all custody

actions in the state of Oklahoma as to all children, which would of course exceed the

Court’s authority.42 Additionally, the only DHS official named in the Complaint in Case

No. 25-1353 is the director of the Payne County office. The Court cannot enjoin the Payne

39 Memo (No. 25-1353, Dkt. 2), at 6.

40 Compl. (No. 25-1292, Dkt. 69), at 4.

41 VerSteeg v. Bennett, Deloney & Noyes, P.C., Case No. 08-CV-153-B, 2009 WL

10670543, at *2 (D.Wyo. Feb. 19, 2009) (internal citations omitted).

42 “It is well settled [that] an injunction must be narrowly tailored to remedy the harm

shown.” ClearOne Communications, Inc. v. Bowers, 643 F.3d 735, 752 (10th Cir. 2011)

(quoting Garrison v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc., 287 F.3d 955, 962 (10th Cir.

2002)) (internal quotations omitted).

County director in an effort to cease all custody actions throughout Oklahoma. Plaintiffs

must connect each request for injunctive relief to a specific Defendant.43

Third, the Complaints require the Court and Defendants to guess which causes of

action Plaintiffs intend to assert. Although each Complaint includes a section labeled

“Causes of Action,” both also scatter additional statutory and constitutional references

throughout without clearly identifying them as distinct claims.44 Accepting such pleadings

would force the Court to speculate as to the nature and scope of Plaintiffs’ claims—an

approach that is both unfair to Defendants, who cannot reasonably respond, and makes the

Court’s job of adjudicating the case and these motions all but impossible.

III. An amended complaint must cure the deficiencies identified in this Order.

Plaintiffs’ pleadings need not be perfect, but they must adequately put Defendants

on notice on what unlawful acts each of them is alleged to have done, what claims are

asserted against each of them, and what relief is sought from each of them. The Court has

put Plaintiffs on notice of the Complaints’ deficiencies, such that failure to cure the

deficiencies in an amended complaint would likely warrant dismissal without leave to

further amend.45 Plaintiffs must ensure their complaint sufficiently states a claim and

otherwise complies with the Court’s Local Rules and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

43 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2).

44 E.g., Compl. (No. 25-1353, Dkt. 1-2), at 1 (referencing compelled speech).

45 Nasious, 492 F.3d at 1163 (noting that the culpability of a pro se party in not complying

with pleading requirements increases with the helpfulness and clarity a district court

provides in explaining the requirements of a well-pleaded complaint before a pro se party

amends his complaint).

both of which can be accessed for free online. Also, new complaints supersede old

complaints.46 This means that if Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, the Court will not

consider anything included in the original Complaints.

Plaintiffs must also be aware that abstention under Rooker-Feldman, Younger, or

both doctrines might preclude the Court from exercising jurisdiction over this case, based

on the allegations within the four corners of the Complaints and arguments found within

many of the Defendants’ motions to dismiss. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents this

Court “from hearing cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by

state-court judgments rendered before [these federal proceedings] commenced and inviting

[this Court’s] review and rejection of those judgments.”47

Under Younger, this Court may abstain from exercising jurisdiction if “(1) there is

an ongoing state criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding, (2) the state court provides

an adequate forum to hear the claims raised in the federal complaint, and (3) the state

proceedings involve important state interests, matters which traditionally look to state law

for their resolution or implicate separately articulated state policies.”48

To the extent Plaintiffs’ claims arise from or relate to state-court proceedings,

Plaintiffs should include sufficient factual detail regarding those proceedings, including

46 Mink v. Suthers, 482 F.3d 1244, 1254 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted).

47 Velasquez v. Utah, 775 Fed. Appx. 420, 422 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting Exxon Mobil

Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284) (internal quotations omitted)).

48 Amanatullah v. Colorado Bd. of Medical Examiners, 187 F.3d 1160, 1162 (10th Cir.

1999) (citing Taylor v. Jaquez, 126 F.3d 1294, 1297 (10th Cir. 1997)) (internal quotations

omitted).

their status and nature, to allow the Court to assess whether jurisdictional or abstention

doctrines may apply. Plaintiffs are not required to anticipate defenses, but the amended

complaint must contain sufficient facts for the Court to evaluate its jurisdiction.

As to the second prong of Younger, Plaintiffs at this stage need only to allege

plausible facts related to the inadequacy of the state fora. An inadequate state forum is not

one that simply produces a result Plaintiffs find dissatisfying.49 Unless state law absolutely

bars Plaintiffs from injecting their federal claims into the action, Plaintiffs likely will have

an adequate opportunity to raise those federal claims in state court.50 And as a reminder to

Plaintiffs, state courts are generally able to hear federal claims and claims which elicit

defenses grounded in federal law, whether raised under federal law or the Constitution.51

Further, conclusory allegations that state court judges are all complicit in conspiracies to

deprive Plaintiffs of their rights must include specific, plausible allegations demonstrating

the absence of any adequate state court forum.52

Conclusion

Because the Complaints do not satisfy Rule 8(a), the Court DISMISSES the

Complaints (Case No. 25-1292, Dkt. 69; Case No. 25-1353, Dkt. 1) WITHOUT

49 Winn v. Cook, 945 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 2019).

50 Id. (quoting Crown Point I, LLC v. Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass’n, 319 F.3d 1211,

1215 (10th Cir. 2003)).

51 Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458–59 (1990) (collecting cases and noting that “state

courts have inherent authority, and are thus presumptively competent, to adjudicate claims

arising under the laws of the United States.”).

52 See Dorman v. Bradshaw, Case No. CIV-26-225-PRW, 2026 WL 964009, at *4 (W.D.

Okla. Apr. 9, 2026).

PREJUDICE.” Further, all pending motions in Case Nos. 25-1353 and 25-1292 are

DENIED AS MOOT and the cases (Nos. 25-1292 and 25-1353) are CONSOLIDATED.

The Clerk is directed to terminate Case No. 25-1353. All parties are directed to submit

future filings in Case No. 25-1292.

The Court will permit Plaintiffs to file a motion—on or before May 25, 2026—for

leave to amend their Complaints to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and file one amended complaint in Case No. 25-1292. Should Plaintiffs fail to

timely seek leave to amend or fail to follow the applicable Federal or Local Rules of Civil

Procedure, a judgment will be entered in favor of the Defendants.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 4th day of May 2026.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); Nasious, 492 F.3d at 1162 (“Employing Rule 41(b) to dismiss

a case without prejudice for failure to comply with Rule 8 of course allows the plaintiff

another go at trimming the verbiage; accordingly, a district court may, without abusing its

discretion, enter such an order without attention to any particular procedures.”).

18