Cole

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

AMANDA COLE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 2:24-cv-1669-EGL

)

OASIS HEALTHCARE, INC. )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On December 3, 2024, Plaintiff Amanda Cole sued Defendant Oasis

Healthcare, Inc. See Doc. 1. Oasis Healthcare now moves for summary judgment.

See Doc. 35. For the reasons below, the motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Oasis Healthcare, a hospice-care service, hired Cole on January 23, 2023, to

work as a Team Coordinator at its Birmingham location. Doc. 36 at 6, ¶¶1-3, 5; Doc.

41 at 7-8. Two Team Coordinators, a Director of Operations, a Clinical Manager, an

Admissions Nurse, and an Executive Director, typically worked out of that office.

Doc. 36 at 6-7, ¶6; Doc. 41 at 8. Other personnel, such as home-health aides and

nurses, reported there but worked in the field. Doc. 36 at 6-7, ¶6; Doc. 41 at 8. Team

Coordinators in Birmingham were responsible for placement, scheduling, ordering

medical equipment and supplies, responding to records requests, intake, following

up on physicians’ orders and signatures, referrals, and verifying benefits. Doc. 36 at

7, ¶7; Doc. 41 at 8. Those duties were divided between Team Coordinators, yet they

nevertheless were trained in each task, with no difference in difficulty or status

existing between roles. Doc. 36 at 7, ¶¶8-9; Doc. 41 at 8-9. Each Team Coordinator

therefore could be required to perform any of the job duties covered by the role, for

example, if one of them were absent. Doc. 36 at 8, ¶11; Doc. 41 at 9. For most of

her employment, Cole handled scheduling while another Team Coordinator, Mariah

Malcom, handled intake. Doc. 36 at 7-8, ¶10; Doc. 41 at 9.

During Cole’s employment, Oasis merged with Adoration Healthcare,

resulting in a third Team Coordinator, Cindy Moore, transferring to the Birmingham

office. Doc. 36 at 8, ¶12; Doc 41 at 9-10. The branch manager therefore allocated

some of Cole’s and Malcom’s duties to her. Doc. 36 at 8, ¶12; Doc. 41 at 9-10.

Moore was thereafter transferred to Tuscaloosa, where she became the Team

Coordinator for that office. Doc. 36 at 8, ¶13; Doc. 41 at 10.

In April 2024, Malcom resigned. Doc. 36 at 8, at ¶14; Doc. 41 at 10. Cole

wanted to take over Malcom’s former intake duties, but Cindy Moore was asked to

transfer back to the busier Birmingham branch to fill the vacancy instead, as the

branch was too large for one person alone. Doc. 36 at 8-9, ¶¶15-16; Doc. 41 at 10-

11. Accordingly, the allocation of duties amongst the Team Coordinators at the

Birmingham office remained the same, as management believed this was the most

efficient and least disruptive way of handling the transition. Doc. 36 at 9-10, ¶¶20-

21; Doc. 41 at 11-12. Race played no factor in the decision to have Moore return to

take on Malcom’s intake duties. Doc. 36 at 10, ¶23; Doc. 41 at 12.

At one point, Cole applied to join Oasis’s business-development team but did

not receive an offer because she did not have a college degree and lacked the work

experience needed. Doc. 36 at 10-11, ¶¶26, 28; Doc. 41 at 13. Race played no role

in that decision. Doc. 36 at 10, ¶27; Doc. 41 at 13.

On or around February 2024, Cole decorated a bulletin board at the

Birmingham office to commemorate Black History Month. Doc. 36 at 11, ¶29; Doc.

41 at 13. Cole claims that Malcom informed her that Malcom overheard Kim

Copeland, a white female, questioning whether the decorations were appropriate

because staff from corporate compliance was scheduled to visit the branch the next

day. Doc. 36 at 11, ¶¶30-31; Doc. 41 at 13-14. Malcom also reported this questioning

to Julie Doss, who then referred the report to HR Business Partner Deedee Johnson.

Doc. 36 at 11, ¶¶32-33; Doc. 41 at 14. Johnson investigated the report and

interviewed Cole, Malcom, Copeland, and another co-worker, Josh Shirley. Doc. 36

at 11-12, ¶34; Doc. 41 at 14. Johnson determined that Copeland had questioned

whether the bulletin board violated compliance rules, that she was informed it was

not inappropriate, and race was never mentioned in the questioning of the

appropriateness of the bulletin board decorations. Doc. 36 at 12, ¶¶35-36.1

On or about May 1, 2024, Cole complained to Doss, claiming she was

mistreated by Copeland. Doc. 36 at 12, ¶37; Doc. 41 at 16. She described being left

off emails, being temporarily moved to a large workspace at the back of the office

area, seeing a Facebook post by Copeland that she believed referred to Malcom’s

departure, and having trouble getting her office door to close when she was moved

back to the front of the office, though she never mentioned race in this report. Doc.

36 at 12-13, ¶¶38-39; Doc. 41 at 16-17. Cole admits that being left off emails did

not affect her pay, that she received information necessary to perform her job, and

that she was not disciplined or otherwise negatively affected by it. Doc. 36 at 13,

¶40; Doc. 41 at 17. The Facebook post consisted of a repost stating, “God will take

care of your wrongdoers,” and did not mention race, Cole, or Malcom; and Cole

admitted the post could have been unrelated to the workplace. Doc. 36 at 14, ¶47;

Doc. 41 at 22. After these complaints, Doss offered to transfer Cole to Oasis’s soon-

to-be-opened Cullman office, but Cole voluntarily resigned a few weeks later to

obtain other employment. Doc. 36 at 15, ¶¶52-53; Doc. 41 at 24-25; Doc. 34-2 at 21

1 Cole partially disputes this but cites no evidence relevant to whether this was Johnson’s

determination. See Doc. 41 at 14-15.

(Q: “So essentially you found a better opportunity instead of taking the transfer at

… Cullman?” [Cole:] “Yes.”).

On or about September 17, 2024, and after having left Oasis for her new job,

Cole filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC against Oasis, claiming

retaliation and discrimination on the basis of race in violation of Title VII, but did

not include a claim based upon a racially hostile work environment. Doc. 36 at 15,

¶¶54-55; Doc. 41 at 25.

STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when the facts, supported by the record and

taken in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, “show[] that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A factual dispute is genuine if the evidence would allow

a reasonable jury to find for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986). And one is “material” if it is an element of the underlying

claim that might affect the case’s outcome. Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642,

646 (11th Cir. 1997).

The movant bears the initial burden of proving that no genuine issue of

material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24 (1986). The

movant may discharge its burden by pointing out to the district court that there is no

evidence supporting an essential element of the nonmovant’s case. Id. at 325. The

district court must view the evidence and all factual inferences in the light most

favorable to the nonmovant. Johnson v. Clifton, 74 F.3d 1087, 1090 (11th Cir. 1996).

Once the movant has adequately supported its motion, the nonmovant then

must show that summary judgment is improper by coming forward with specific

facts showing a genuine dispute. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). If the record evidence would not permit a rational trier of

fact to find for the nonmovant, then there is no genuine dispute for trial. Id. All

reasonable doubts, however, are resolved in favor of the nonmovant. Fitzpatrick v.

City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993).

DISCUSSION

I. Disparate Treatment (Counts 1-3)2

Cole claims that Oasis discriminated against her by denying her a promotion

to the business development team; denying her the intake duties she requested;

temporarily placing her in the back of the office; and calling her “bad names.”3 Doc.

2 The Court addresses these counts together because they appear substantially identical. The Court

notes, however, that Cole invokes “the IHRA” as the cause of action supporting Count 2. See Doc.

1 at ¶¶31-37. This acronym is nowhere defined, and the Court cannot guess what law is meant.

Oasis posits that it may be a claim under the Illinois Human Rights Act that was mistakenly pasted

in from another pleading, because this case has nothing to do with Illinois. Doc. 36 at 5 n.1

Whatever the mystery claim may be, Cole does not say, and thus the Court grants Oasis summary

judgment on Count 2.

3 Cole claims for the first time in her briefing that she was accused of bringing a gun to the office,

and that this accusation also constitutes discrimination. Doc. 41 at 7. Regardless of the merits of

that claim, she does not support it with any evidence, and so the Court does not consider it. See

generally id.

1 at ¶¶24-44; Doc. 41 at 7. She claims that these actions constituted racially disparate

treatment in violation of Title VII and § 1981. Doc. 1 at ¶¶24-44.

Oasis argues that Cole has presented no direct evidence of discrimination. See

Doc. 36 at 17 n.3. Cole disagrees. Doc. 41 at 26-30. She relies solely on the

testimony of Josh Shirley—a former Oasis employee—who claims he heard either

Penny Novak or Kim Copeland (he doesn’t recall who) state that “We’re not going

to hire anymore black people,” and that Kovak once exclaimed “I don’t know why

black people act the way they do.” Id. at 30. No evidence, however, suggests these

comments were about any employment decision made against Cole. And “remarks

that are not tied to a challenged employment decision or are made by non-

decisionmakers do not qualify under [the Eleventh Circuit’s] definition of direct

evidence of discrimination.” Franks v. Chitwood, 572 F. Supp. 3d 1304, 1343 (N.D.

Ga. 2021); see also Scott v. Suncoast Beverage Sales, Ltd., 295 F.3d 1223, 1228

(11th Cir. 2002). “To constitute direct evidence, a remark must indicate that the

employment decision in question was motivated by race.” Melton v. I-10 Truck Ctr.

Inc, 166 F.4th 905, 914 (11th Cir. 2026) (internal quotation marks omitted). But Cole

does not tie these remarks to any of the challenged employment decisions.

Absent direct evidence, the Court must evaluate Cole’s claims through

circumstantial evidence. Where a plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence, she can

establish her claims by relying on the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting

framework, or by establishing a “convincing mosaic” of evidence sufficient for a

jury to infer discrimination. Ismael v. Roundtree, 161 F.4th 752, 760-61 (11th Cir.

2025). This is true for claims brought under either § 1981 or Title VII. See Nash v.

Palm Beach Cnty. Sch. Dist., 469 F. App’x 712, 713 n.3 (11th Cir. 2012).

To establish a prima facie disparate treatment claim under the McDonnell

Douglas framework, a plaintiff must show that (1) she belongs to a protected class;

(2) she suffered an adverse employment action; (3) her employer treated similarly

situated employees outside her class more favorably; and (4) she was qualified to do

the job. Howard v. Wilkie, 421 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1284 (N.D. Ala. 2019).

From there, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate

nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Id. Finally, the

plaintiff must rebut that articulation by presenting “significant probative evidence”

demonstrating that the proffered reason is a pretext for unlawful discrimination.

Mayfield v. Patterson Pump Co., 101 F.3d 1371, 1376 (11th Cir. 1996) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

Oasis does not dispute Cole’s membership in a protected class or her

qualifications as a Team Coordinator. Doc. 36 at 17-18. It argues instead that she

has identified no adverse employment action and cannot show that anyone outside

her protected class was treated better. Id. at 18.

An adverse employment action is one that causes “harm respecting an

identifiable term or condition of employment.” Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601

U.S. 346, 355 (2024). The harm need not be significant, serious, or substantial, but

it must be concrete. See id.at 354-55 (plaintiff “must show some harm respecting an

identifiable term or condition of employment”).

Cole concedes she was never demoted, never had her pay reduced, could

always perform her duties satisfactorily, was never formally disciplined, and never

received a negative performance review. Doc. 36 at 6, ¶4; Doc. 41 at 7-8. She further

concedes that she was denied a position on the business-development team because

it required a college degree and more work experience, not because of race. Doc. 41

at 13. And that the denial of her request to assume Malcom’s intake duties was

similarly not race-motivated. Id. at 12.

Two allegations therefore remain. First, Cole continues to maintain that her

temporary placement at the back of the office was racially motivated. Id. at 7. But

she has identified no similarly situated comparator outside her protected class who

was treated differently,4 and she has not shown that the action was harmful. Much

to the contrary, in fact: Cole testified that she preferred sitting in the back and had

no issue with it. Doc. 34-2 at 181, 185. Although “[o]riginally” she “didn’t prefer to

4 Cole does not dispute that Penny Kozak, a white woman, was also placed in the back of the office

at the same time. Doc. 36 at ¶46; Doc. 41 at 22.

sit in the back,” she “accepted it.” Id. at 186. She “grew to like being in the back.”

Id. “The vibe was better back there.” Id. at 185. Second, she claims that she and

Malcom were called “the girls,” which she characterizes as a discriminatory epithet.

Id. at 7, 21. That allegation, even accepted as true, does not constitute an adverse

employment action; it implicates no identifiable term or condition of employment.

See Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 807 (11th Cir. 2010)

(“Title VII is not a civility code, and not all profane ... language or conduct will

constitute discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment.”); see also

Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he mere utterance

of an … epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee does not affect

the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment to a sufficiently significant

degree to violate Title VII.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

In her complaint and response, Cole also alleges that she was

“micromanaged,” Doc. 1 at ¶3; Doc. 41 at 23-24, but does not specify which claim

she intends that allegation to support, see generally Docs. 1, 41. To the extent it

supports her disparate treatment claim, such a vague accusation is not cognizable

because it is insufficiently concrete. See Tamez v. A/C Storage Place, Ltd., 615-cv-

1541, 2017 WL 10059003, at *6 (M.D. Fla. June 20, 2017) (noting that allegations

regarding micromanagement are insufficiently concrete and collecting cases).

Moreover, the evidence Cole cites to substantiate her allegation suggests that

Copeland micromanaged everyone she supervised, regardless of race. See Doc. 41

at 23 (Q: “Did you feel as though she was a micromanager?” [Shirley]: “Yes. She

was a micromanager and poorly. She had bad decisions about things.”).

Because Cole has not identified an adverse employment action, she has not

established a prima facie case of disparate treatment under McDonnell Douglas. Nor

does she fare better under the “convincing mosaic” theory. Such a mosaic may be

assembled from circumstantial evidence, including “systematically better treatment

of similarly situated employees, pretext in the employer’s justification, suspicious

timing, ambiguous statements, or other evidence from which a discriminatory intent

might be drawn.” Thompson v. N. Am. Lighting, Inc., No. 3:24-cv-55, 2026 WL

1195044, at *8 (N.D. Ala. May 1, 2026). But a mosaic must be set on something.

Without an identifiable adverse employment action, Cole necessarily fails to

demonstrate a convincing mosaic of discrimination. See Sumpter v. Grady Mem’l

Hosp. Corp., No. 1:21-cv-04801, 2024 WL 6473304, at *13 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 14,

2024) (holding that plaintiff’s convincing mosaic argument cannot overcome the

lack of an adverse employment action). The Court therefore must GRANT summary

judgment in Oasis’s favor on this claim.

II. Hostile Work Environment (Counts 1-3)

Cole claims that she was subjected to a racially discriminatory hostile work

environment during her employment. See Doc. 1 at ¶¶24-44. She claims she was

subjected to racial comments, micromanaged, denied promotions, placed in the back

of the office, and generally mistreated. Id. She nevertheless omits this claim entirely

from her summary-judgment briefing. See generally Doc. 41. The Eleventh Circuit

has uniformly held that claims and arguments not raised in the initial response to a

motion for summary judgment should be deemed abandoned. See Resol. Tr. Corp.

v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, Oasis Health is

entitled to summary judgment on this claim. Even so, the claim also fails on the

merits.

To succeed on a claim for a hostile work environment, the mistreatment must

be sufficiently “severe or pervasive” that it can be said to alter the terms, conditions,

or privileges of employment. Monaghan v. Worldpay US, Inc., 955 F.3d 855, 861

(11th Cir. 2020). This must be established both subjectively and objectively. Harris

v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993). The objective inquiry depends on

examining the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 22-23. Those circumstances are

considered through four factors: (1) frequency; (2) severity; (3) whether the conduct

was physically threatening or humiliating, rather than merely offensive; and (4)

whether it unreasonably interfered with the employee’s job performance. Id.

None of the incidents Cole cites are objectively severe or pervasive enough to

support a hostile-work-environment claim. Two racial comments made about no one

in particular “come nowhere close to being actionable” under Title VII. Hudson v.

Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 209 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1314 (N.D. Ga. 2001). The general

accusation of micromanagement, even if the Court assumes such scrutiny was

racialized,5 is not enough to support a hostile-work-environment claim. See Rhenals

v. Fed. Express Corp., No. 1:24-cv-22556, 2024 WL 4665254, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Nov.

4, 2024). A comment about the propriety of her decorations, which was not made to

Cole and was later investigated by Oasis, comes nowhere close to supporting a claim

of severe or pervasive harassment. See, e.g., Walls v. Lowe’s Home Centers, LLC,

789 F. App’x 852, 855 (11th Cir. 2019). Cole states that she was “called bad names

during here employment,” Doc. 41 at 7, presumably referencing testimony from

Shirley that Copeland and Kovak would sometimes refer to Cole and Malcom as

“the girls,” id. at 21. But that testimony does not even prove that Cole was aware

that the phrase had been used. And even if the Court assumed that the phrase was

heard by Cole and was meant and/or received in a racially derogatory manner, that

would not rise to the level of a racially hostile work environment. See, e.g., McCann

v. Tillman, 526 F.3d 1370, 1378-79 (11th Cir. 2008). Nor does a mere rearrangement

of the office space. See, e.g., Raybon v. Ala. Space Sci. Ex. Comm’n, 337 F. Supp.

3d 1153, 1170-71 (N.D. Ala. 2018). Even taken together, the Court cannot see how

any reasonable person would consider these incidents to be severe or pervasive

5 And Cole has not provided evidence that any purported micromanagement was based on race,

rather than generally applied throughout the office. See supra at 10-11.

harassment. See generally Docs. 1, 41. Accordingly, summary judgment would be

warranted in Oasis’s favor, even if the claim had not been abandoned.

Ill. Retaliation (Counts 1 & 3)

Cole claims to have suffered retaliation in violation of Title VII and Section

1981, see Doc. 1 at §§]28, 42, yet she failed to address this claim in her summary-

judgment briefing, see generally Doc. 41. Accordingly, Oasis Health is entitled to

summary judgment on this claim. Resol. Tr. Corp., 43 F.3d at 599. The Court

nevertheless notes that within her complaint, Cole nowhere identifies any protected

activity. See generally Doc. 1. Such an activity is necessary to form the basis of a

retaliation claim. Olmsted v. Taco Bell Corp., 141 F.3d 1457, 1460 (11th Cir. 1998).

CONCLUSION

Given the absence of any genuine disputes of material fact, the Court HOLDS

that, as a matter of law, Cole has failed to produce sufficient evidence to sustain any

of her claims, and therefore Oasis is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Oasis Healthcare’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. 35) as to all counts.

DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of May, 2026.

EDMUND G.LACOURJR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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