J.O. v. Super. Ct.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

CALIFORNIA

J.O.,

Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY,

Respondent;

SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY PUBLIC CONSERVATOR,

Real Party in Interest.

S287285

Third Appellate District

C102071

San Joaquin County Superior Court

STK-MH-LPSC-2016-0000110

May 28, 2026

Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, in which

Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger,

Evans, and Brown* concurred.

*

Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate

District, Division Four, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant

to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

J.O. v. SUPERIOR COURT

S287285

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

“In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and

distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to

a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the

preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department

should have a will of its own . . . . [¶] . . . But the great security

against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the

same department, consists in giving to those who administer

each department the necessary constitutional means and

personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.”

(Madison, The Federalist Papers: No. 51 (Feb. 8, 1788).)1 This

case requires us to confront this very principle.

Code of Civil Procedure 2 section 170.6 states that any

party or attorney can compel the disqualification of a judge

simply by signing an affidavit or orally stating under oath that

the judge is “prejudiced” against the party, attorney, or their

1

Available at Lillian Goldman Law Library, The Avalon

Project, <https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed51.asp#:

~:text=In%20order%20to%20lay%20a,the%20principle%20mus

t%20be%20admitted> [as of May 28, 2026]. All Internet

citations in this opinion are archived by year, docket number,

and case name at <https://courts.ca.gov/opinions/cited-supreme-

court-opinions>.

2

All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil

Procedure unless otherwise specified.

1

J.O. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

respective interests. If the motion is timely and properly

presented, the disqualification is automatic and a new judge

must be assigned without any judicial inquiry into the veracity

of the affidavit or oral statement. (See Solberg v. Superior Court

(1977) 19 Cal.3d 182, 194 (Solberg).) Since the enactment of

section 170.6, reports of its abuse have been well chronicled,

including that section 170.6 has been invoked for the improper

purposes of “ ‘judge-shopping,’ ” to delay proceedings, to

disqualify a judge based on his or her “views on the law or on

the exercise of judicial discretion” or his or her “personality

traits” (Solberg, at p. 194), to “intimidate, punish, and/or

silence” a judge for an adverse ruling and warn other judges not

to rule similarly (People v. Superior Court (Tejeda) (2016)

1 Cal.App.5th 892, 930 (Tejeda)), or even as a vehicle for racial

discrimination (see People v. Williams (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 688,

706–707 (Williams)). These problems are particularly

pronounced when challenges are improperly lodged in a blanket

fashion. If, for example, a district attorney’s or public defender’s

office engages in the practice of removing a judge from all cases

or a substantial portion of cases on a bad-faith basis, or all cases

or a substantial portion of cases of a particular type, the office

can effectively control the extent to which that judge hears such

cases. Such practices can even force a judge out of a particular

judicial assignment altogether. The allegations here are

illustrative. Petitioner J.O. contends that after Judge Erin E.

Guy Castillo admonished an attorney from the San Joaquin

County Office of the Counsel (County Counsel) for actions that

were improper, County Counsel blanket disqualified Judge Guy

Castillo in all conservatorship cases, filing an estimated 325

challenges in the span of less than four months. Petitioner

2

J.O. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

asserts this alleged blanket policy eventually required that

Judge Guy Castillo be reassigned to a different department.

We considered the risk that blanket challenges pose to

judicial independence almost five decades ago in Solberg, supra,

19 Cal.3d 182. In Solberg, a majority of this court reaffirmed its

strong disapproval of blanket challenges but nevertheless

concluded that such abuses did not violate the separation of

powers doctrine because they do not “ ‘substantially impair’ . . .

the exercise of the constitutional jurisdiction of the trial courts.”

(Id. at p. 204.) We made clear that such an inquiry required us

to assess conditions at the time and also made clear that those

conditions might change in the future. (Ibid.) We observed that

section 170.6 had to accommodate “competing interests of bench,

bar, and public on the subject of judicial disqualification” and

the Legislature might have to make “future adjustments to this

sensitive balance.” (Solberg, at p. 204.) But in 1977, we

concluded that blanket challenges to judges under section 170.6

did not unconstitutionally interfere with the core functions of

the judicial branch. (Solberg, at p. 204.)

In the almost 50 years since Solberg was decided, the

judiciary has changed dramatically and, as a result, it is now

time to reconsider Solberg’s logic with respect to blanket

challenges. Since 1977, California’s superior courts have seen a

sharp increase in caseloads and case complexity. The judiciary

has also seen the adoption of many sweeping new laws, as well

as the rise of numerous specialty courts and specialty

proceedings, requiring the assignment of dedicated judges to

handle these specialized calendars. Given these changing

demands, if “a party or attorney” (§ 170.6, subd. (a)(1)) can

effectively force a judge from an assignment or department by

blanketly abusing the terms of section 170.6, then such use of

3

J.O. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

the statute can “ ‘substantially impair’ ” (Solberg, supra,

19 Cal.3d at p. 204) the effective administration of justice within

today’s court system. If a party does not like a ruling made by

a particular judge, blanket abuses of section 170.6 give the party

the power to essentially force the presiding judge to reassign the

judge or, at a minimum, to sideline the judge from a particular

assignment until the party decides that the judge is acceptable.

The mere threat of blanket abuses could cause litigants to

question the impartiality of the judicial system as a whole, as

they may be understandably concerned that judges might feel

pressure to rule in a particular manner to avoid reassignment.

Courts of Appeal have criticized Solberg’s approach to

blanket challenges and called for this court to reconsider

Solberg’s analysis in view of current judicial conditions. (See

Tejeda, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 910; see also NutraGenetics,

LLC v. Superior Court (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 243, 259–260

(NutraGenetics).) Commentators have critiqued abuses of

judicial “peremptory” challenges. (See, e.g., Note, Perfecting the

Judicial Peremptory Challenge: A New Approach Using

Preliminary Data on California Judges in 2021 (2024)

97 So.Cal. L.Rev. 253 (hereafter Note); Smith, Papering Justices

(2025) 50 BYU L.Rev. 681; Comment, Automatic Judicial

Disqualification Under Idaho Criminal Rule 25(a): A Necessary

Lawyering Tool or Potential Nuclear Weapon? (2006) 43 Idaho

L.Rev. 239 (hereafter Comment).) There have been increasingly

troubling reports around the state about the use of section 170.6

to improperly challenge judges based on their prior rulings and

perceived judicial philosophies, not on a good faith belief in

prejudice. (See Committee on Revision of the Penal Code

(hereafter Committee), Staff Memorandum 2025-04: Automatic

Disqualifications of a Judge and Related Matters (May 16, 2025)

4

J.O. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

pp. 6–7 [and newspaper articles cited therein].) In its amicus

curiae brief, the California Judges Association explains that

concerns about blanket challenges have risen to such a degree

that the Committee on Revision of the Penal Code has called for

reforms to “curb abuse of this rule.” (Id. at p. 9.) The Committee

staff concluded that, “[b]ecause blanket challenges present

serious threats to judicial independence and the administration

of justice, abuses of the practice should not be allowed.”

(Committee, Staff Memorandum 2025-10: Updates on Staff

Research and Preliminary Proposals: Gender Bias,

Retroactivity, and 170.6 Disqualifications (July 17, 2025) p. 6.)

Moreover, in the wake of Solberg, other states have prohibited

blanket abuses of similar judicial disqualification statutes that

pose a risk to judicial independence. (See State of Minnesota v.

Erickson (1999) 589 N.W.2nd 481, 483 (Erickson); State of

Arizona v City Court of Tucson (1986) 150 Ariz. 99, 102–103

(City of Tucson); People ex rel. Baricevic v. Wharton (1990)

136 Ill.2d 423 (Baricevic).)

In light of the additional information presented and the

different demands facing California’s judiciary since Solberg

was decided, we must now reconsider its relevant logic. The

nature and sheer scale of petitioner’s allegations in this matter,

over 300 section 170.6 challenges to Judge Guy Castillo in

specialized proceedings in less than four months, confirm that

we need to rethink Solberg’s approach to blanket challenges. We

do not here question the facial constitutionality of section

170.6’s “efficient and discreet procedure” (Solberg, supra,

19 Cal.3d at p. 204) when used as intended but overrule Solberg

to the extent it concluded that blanket abuses of section 170.6

are immune from as-applied challenges on separation of powers

grounds. Instead, we hold that if a party timely objects to a

5

J.O. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

section 170.6 motion and makes a prima facie showing that the

motion’s proponent is lodging bad faith blanket challenges

against a judge, a court may look beyond the section 170.6

affidavit or oral statement and inquire into the legitimacy of the

party’s assertions of prejudice. Since the trial court here

concluded that petitioner’s separation of powers objection to

County Counsel’s alleged blanket challenges to Judge Guy

Castillo was barred under Solberg, it had no occasion to consider

the substance of his allegations; the Court of Appeal then

summarily denied writ relief. Under these circumstances, we

remand the cause to the Court of Appeal to consider whether

any further proceedings are necessary in light of our opinion.3

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is subject to a conservatorship. The San

Joaquin County Public Conservator, represented by County

Counsel, is his conservator. On August 9, 2024, County Counsel

filed a section 170.6 motion to remove Judge Guy Castillo from

petitioner’s case, which Judge Guy Castillo granted on August

12, 2024. Thereafter, on August 14, 2024, petitioner filed an

opposition to County Counsel’s “blanket 170.6” motions,

asserting that “[s]aid motions are filed indiscriminately in all

cases” set before Judge Guy Castillo.4 In his opposition,

3

We note that Judge Guy Castillo’s apparent reassignment

does not make the issue moot because the operative

disqualification order may still be vacated if petitioner

ultimately prevails.

4

We granted and held for the instant matter four additional

petitions for review arising from identical allegations of County

Counsel’s blanket challenges under section 170.6 to Judge Guy

6

J.O. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

petitioner alleged that these “ ‘blanket’ filings commenced” after

a deputy county counsel attorney “was admonished [by Judge

Guy Castillo]” for improper conduct in a matter “on or before

May 17, 2024.” Petitioner asserts that “County Counsel [was]

endeavoring to force the bench to remove Judge Guy Castillo

from her court assignment through the use of a ‘blanket 170.6’

because they are being held accountable for their actions.”

Petitioner argued that County Counsel’s blanket challenges

unconstitutionally threatened judicial independence.

According to petitioner, in August of 2024, Judge Guy

Castillo was reassigned from the department hearing most

mental health and conservatorship matters to a different

department “where she currently hears misdemeanor cases,

traffic infraction cases, small claims cases, unlawful detainer

cases, restraining order cases, and expungement cases.” The

Honorable Kristine Eagle took over Judge Guy Castillo’s

previous assignment. Petitioner’s counsel estimates “that,

between the time that the County Counsel began ‘blanket’

section 170.6 motions against Judge Guy Castillo to the time

that Judge Guy Castillo was reassigned, the County Counsel

filed about 325 section 170.6 motions against her.”

On September 16, 2024, Judge Eagle denied petitioner’s

opposition to County Counsel’s “blanket 170.6,” citing Solberg,

supra, 19 Cal.3d 182. However, Judge Eagle observed that, “[i]f

the public defendant [sic] seeks to advocate for a change in the

Castillo. (See J.L. v. Superior Court, review granted Dec. 18,

2024, S287240; I.P. v. Superior Court, review granted Dec. 18,

2024, S287247; C.R. v. Superior Court, review granted Dec. 18,

2024, S287284; J.R. v. Superior Court, review granted Dec. 18,

2024, S287269.)

7

J.O. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

law . . ., the Court thinks that’s an entirely reasonable route to

take.”

Petitioner thereafter filed a petition for writ of mandate in

the Court of Appeal. In petitioner’s writ petition, he agreed that

the trial court’s ruling was compelled by Solberg, but he sought

an opinion from the Court of Appeal urging us to revisit

Solberg’s reasoning with respect to blanket challenges. The

Court of Appeal summarily denied writ relief and petitioner

sought our review.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Section 170.6 and Solberg’s Separation of

Powers Analysis

Section 170.6 provides that if any party or attorney makes

a timely motion to disqualify a judge, supported by an affidavit

or oral statement under oath that the judge is prejudiced against

such party or attorney or the interest thereof, “the judge must

recuse himself without further proof and the case must be

reassigned to another judge.” (Solberg, supra, 19 Cal.3d at

p. 187; see generally § 170.6; see also Barrett v. Superior Court

(1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 1, 4 [“Where a disqualification motion is

timely filed and in proper form, the trial court is bound to accept

it without further inquiry”]; La Seigneurie U.S. Holdings, Inc. v.

Superior Court (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1500, 1505 [“a court

should (provided a party has complied with the conditions set

forth in the statute) grant a disqualification motion — even if

the court suspects that the party has abused its right to utilize

section 170.6”].) We have referred to the right to disqualify a

judge under section 170.6 as “ ‘ “automatic” ’ ” (Solberg, at

p. 193) and a trial court’s obligation to grant a complying

petition as “mandatory” (McCartney v. Commission on Judicial

8

J.O. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

Qualifications (1974) 12 Cal.3d 512, 532 (McCartney)). “It is

well recognized that in enacting . . . section 170.6 the

Legislature guaranteed to litigants an extraordinary right to

disqualify a judge.” (Id. at p. 531, italics added.)

In Austin v. Lambert (1938) 11 Cal.2d 73 (Austin), we

determined that a prior judicial disqualification statute, former

section 170.5, was unconstitutional. Unlike section 170.6,

former section 170.5 did not contain an affidavit requirement; it

permitted litigants to make “a peremptory challenge” (former

§ 170.5) to the assigned judge without stating any reason for the

challenge. (See generally ibid.) We concluded that such a

legislatively delegated, unchecked power to disqualify a judge

amounted to an “unlawful interference with the constitutional

. . . processes of the courts.” (Austin, at p. 79.) We observed that

“to put in the hands of a litigant uncontrolled power to dislodge

without reason or for an undisclosed reason, an admittedly

qualified judge from the trial of a case in which forsooth the only

real objection to him might be that he would be fair and

impartial in the trial of the case would be to characterize the

statute not as a regulation but as a concealed weapon to be used

to the manifest detriment of the proper conduct of the judicial

department.” (Ibid.)

Years later, in 1957, the Legislature enacted section 170.6,

which, inter alia, added an affidavit requirement; it was

identical to the current version of section 170.6 except that it

only applied to civil actions and special proceedings. In Johnson

v. Superior Court (1958) 50 Cal.2d 693 (Johnson), we upheld

section 170.6 against a claim that the statute on its face

unconstitutionally violated the separation of powers doctrine.

(Id. at pp. 695–696.) The Johnson court acknowledged that

section 170.6 might “be abused by parties seeking to delay trial

9

J.O. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

or to obtain a favorable judge,” but that “was a matter to be

balanced by the Legislature against the desirability of the

objective of the statute” to mitigate judicial prejudice in cases

where it might be difficult to prove a judge’s actual bias.

(Johnson, at p. 697.) Furthermore, we underscored that section

170.6 “contains safeguards designed to minimize such abuses”

(Johnson, at p. 697), including limiting “each side” (§ 170.6,

subd. (a)(4)) to one challenge, requiring a declaration under oath

(id. at subd. (a)(2)), and providing time limits for making a

challenge (ibid.). (See Johnson, at p. 697.) We rejected the

argument that section 170.6 was no better than former section

170.5, which we declared unconstitutional in Austin, supra,

11 Cal.2d 73. (Johnson, at p. 698.) Former section 170.5

“differed materially” from section 170.6 in that it did not require

“the person making the challenge to state the ground for his

objection or to make a declaration under oath that the ground in

fact existed.” (Johnson, at p. 698.)

Nearly two decades after Johnson was decided, in Solberg,

we were “called upon to reconsider [Johnson] in light of the

experience with [section 170.6] during the intervening two

decades and as applied here in a criminal context.”5 (Solberg,

supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 187.) Solberg “conclude[d] that the [facial]

constitutionality of [section 170.6] should be reaffirmed,” and

also rejected the appellants’ as-applied challenge to blanket

abuses of section 170.6. (Solberg, at p. 187; id. at p. 196.) There,

a deputy district attorney challenged a municipal court judge

under section 170.6 in four pending criminal prostitution cases

5

Section 170.6 was amended in 1959, after Johnson was

decided, to apply to criminal actions. (See Solberg, supra,

19 Cal.3d at p. 201, fn. 20.)

10

J.O. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

and the judge refused to disqualify herself. (Solberg, at p. 187.)

The municipal court and the challenged judge alleged the

section 170.6 motions were improper “ ‘blanket challenges’

motivated by prosecutorial discontent with [the judge’s] prior

rulings of law” and violated the separation of powers doctrine.

(Solberg, at p. 188.) We rejected appellants’ efforts at

distinguishing Johnson and concluded that “[t]he experience of

the ensuing years ha[d] added quantitatively but not

qualitatively to our understanding of the problem.” (Solberg, at

p. 196.)

Solberg considered the appellants’ claim that Johnson was

distinguishable “because it ruled on the constitutionality of

section 170.6 only in a civil setting.” (Solberg, supra, 19 Cal.3d

at p. 201.) Since the parties tend to be the same in criminal

cases, with the district attorney representing the People and the

public defender representing many defendants, appellants

argued that “ ‘blanket challenges,’ ” or improper repeat

challenges to the same judge, posed a much greater threat to

judicial independence than was the case when section 170.6 was

confined to civil cases. (Solberg, at p. 202.) We observed that

blanket challenges to a judge in the criminal context can “force

[the judge’s] removal from the criminal bench and his

reassignment to a civil department.” (Ibid.) While we

reaffirmed our strong disapproval of blanket challenges, the

Solberg majority concluded that the Legislature foresaw their

risk and the practice did not “distinguish the present criminal

proceeding from Johnson.” (Id. at p. 204.) The majority

“conclude[d] that to the extent that abuses persist in the

utilization of section 170.6 they do not, in our judgment,

‘substantially impair’ or ‘practically defeat’ the exercise of the

constitutional jurisdiction of the trial courts. Rather, it may be

11

J.O. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

helpful to view them as a relatively inconsequential price to be

paid for the efficient and discreet procedure provided in section

170.6.” (Ibid.) In sum, section 170.6 reasonably accommodated

the “competing interests of bench, bar, and public on the subject

of judicial disqualification,” but “future adjustments to this

sensitive balance” by the Legislature could become necessary.

(Solberg, at p. 204.)

In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Acting Chief

Justice Tobriner disagreed with the majority’s belief “that the

judiciary is helpless to prevent” abuses of section 170.6 in the

form of blanket challenges. (Solberg, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 205

(conc. & dis. opn. of Tobriner, Acting C. J.).) In Justice

Tobriner’s view, the municipal court judge properly rejected the

deputy district attorney’s disqualification motions because the

record demonstrated that they derived from a blanket policy

based on dissatisfaction with the judge’s prior rulings, as

opposed to “a good faith belief in her ‘prejudice.’ ” (Id. at p. 206.)

Under such circumstances, the express requirement of section

170.6 that the disqualification motion be “duly presented”

(§ 170.6, subd. (a)(4)) is necessarily violated and the judiciary

should not be “powerless to prevent such an abusive exercise of

the disqualification procedure.” (Solberg, at p. 207 (conc. & dis.

opn. of Tobriner, C. J.).)

In 2016, in Tejeda, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th 892, after Judge

Thomas Goethals found that the Orange County District

Attorney’s Office committed misconduct in a high-profile

murder case, the district attorney’s office began issuing section

170.6 challenges against him regularly. Between the time of the

adverse ruling in February 2014 and September 2015, the

district attorney challenged Judge Goethals in 46 out of 49

murder cases that were assigned to him. When the district

12

J.O. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

attorney challenged Judge Goethals in the Tejeda case, Judge

Richard M. King denied the challenge, finding it to be part of an

improper pattern of blanket challenges that substantially

interfered with the court’s administration of justice. (See

Tejeda, at pp. 897–899.) The Tejeda majority granted writ relief

and reversed, directing the trial court to assign “this case to a

judge other than Judge Goethals.” (Id. at p. 911.) The Tejeda

majority found itself bound by Solberg’s conclusion that section

170.6 is constitutional as applied to blanket challenges. (See

Tejeda, at pp. 905–907.)

Despite concluding that Solberg was binding authority,

the Tejeda majority criticized our reasoning in Solberg in

several respects and questioned “whether Solberg overreached

in its separation of powers analysis with regard to the specific

problem of blanket challenges in criminal law cases” (Tejeda,

supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 908, fn. 6) and whether its relevant

reasoning could still apply to “the current reality of the justice

system.” (Id. at p. 908.) The Tejeda majority urged this Court

to revisit Solberg’s reasoning with respect to blanket abuses of

section 170.6. (See Tejeda, at pp. 907–910.) We do so now.

B. Solberg’s Reasoning Warrants Reconsideration

County Counsel argues that we “should not revisit Solberg

because doing so risks undermining stability in judicial

disqualification law, interferes with legislative prerogatives,

and fails to address the root causes of modern judicial

challenges.”

County Counsel’s concerns about decisional consistency

are well-taken. We do not lightly depart from our own

precedent. “Stare decisis plays a vitally important role in our

work as a common law court; the policy of adherence to

13

J.O. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

precedent ensures the certainty, stability, and predictability on

which the rule of law depends.” (People v. Hardin (2024)

15 Cal.5th 834, 850.) However, “[w]e have recognized that

reexamination of precedent may become necessary when

subsequent developments indicate an earlier decision . . . has

become ripe for reconsideration.” (In re Jaime P. (2006)

40 Cal.4th 128, 133.) County Counsel acknowledges that

“circumstances such as increased caseloads and budget

constraints have evolved,” but asserts that such changes “do not

fundamentally alter the principles underpinning Solberg.”

According to County Counsel, “[i]ncreased use of section 170.6

reflects broader systemic issues (e.g., resource shortages or

prosecutorial strategy)” that “should be addressed through

broader reforms, not by destabilizing Solberg.”

We disagree. Solberg itself contemplated an evolving

approach to section 170.6 that necessarily considered conditions

at the time the challenge was brought. In its first paragraph,

Solberg explained that the court was assessing whether

Johnson’s conclusion that section 170.6 does not interfere with

judicial independence should be reconsidered “in light of the

experience with the statute during the intervening two

decades.” (Solberg, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 187; see id. at p. 186,

citing Johnson, supra, 50 Cal.2d 693.) In a later analysis of

whether abuses of section 170.6 “ ‘substantially impair[ed]’ ”

judicial operations at the time, Solberg observed that section

170.6 had to accommodate “competing interests of bench, bar,

and public on the subject of judicial disqualification” and the

Legislature might have to make “future adjustments to this

sensitive balance.” (Solberg, at p. 204.)

Against this backdrop, we now must reevaluate Solberg’s

approach to blanket abuses of section 170.6.

14

J.O. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

C. Separation of Powers Principles

The separation of powers clause in the California

Constitution provides: “The powers of state government are

legislative, executive, and judicial. Persons charged with the

exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others

except as permitted by this Constitution.” (Cal. Const., art. III,

§ 3.) The doctrine limits “the authority of one of the three

branches of government to arrogate to itself the core functions

of another branch. Although the doctrine does not prohibit one

branch from taking action that might affect another, the

doctrine is violated when the actions of one branch defeat or

materially impair the inherent functions of another.” (Steen v.

Appellate Division of Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1045,

1053 (Steen).) “The primary purpose of the separation of powers

doctrine ‘ “is to prevent the combination in the hands of a single

person or group of the basic or fundamental powers of

government[,]” ’ [citation], as well as to avoid overreaching by

one governmental branch against another.” (Case v. Lazben

Financial Co. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 172, 183 (Case).)

The California Constitution vests the judicial power of the

state in our court, the Courts of Appeal, and the superior courts.

(Cal. Const., art. VI, § 1.) “It is . . . a core judicial function ‘to

ensure the orderly and effective administration of justice.’ ”

(Case, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 184.) Courts have “ ‘ “the

right to control [their] order of business and to so conduct the

same that the rights of all suitors before them may be

safeguarded.” ’ ” (People v. Engram (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1131,

1148 (Engram), quoting Lorraine v. McComb (1934) 220 Cal.

753, 756, italics omitted.) “ ‘ “This power has been recognized as

judicial in its nature, and as being a necessary appendage to a

court organized to enforce rights and redress wrongs.” ’ ” (Case,

15

J.O. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

at p. 185.) In furtherance of such right, article VI, section 6 of

the California Constitution establishes the Judicial Council,

which is the policymaking body for the California courts. “To

improve the administration of justice the [Judicial Council]

shall survey judicial business and . . . adopt rules for court

administration, practice and procedure . . . . The rules adopted

shall not be inconsistent with statute.” (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 6,

subd. (d).) “Subject to the rules of the Judicial Council, the

presiding judge shall distribute the business of the court among

the judges, and prescribe the order of business.” (Gov. Code, §

69508, subd. (a).) California Rules of Court, “[r]ule 10.603(c)(1)

confirms the presiding judge ‘has ultimate authority to make

judicial assignments.’ Rule 10.603(b)(1)(A) and (B) authorizes

the presiding judge to ‘[a]ssign judges to departments,’

‘designate supervising judges for divisions,’ and ‘[a]pportion the

business of the court, including assigning and reassigning cases

to departments.’ ” (Alvarez v. Superior Court (2010)

183 Cal.App.4th 969, 978.)

D. Solberg’s Assessment of the Impact of Blanket

Abuses of Section 170.6 Is No Longer Viable

With these principles in mind, we now explain why

Solberg’s conclusion in 1977 that blanket abuses of section 170.6

did not “ ‘substantially impair’ or ‘practically defeat’ the exercise

of the constitutional jurisdiction of the trial courts” (Solberg,

supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 204) is no longer tenable.

Today, California’s superior courts look much different

than they did nearly five decades ago, and blanket abuses of

section 170.6 can now have an outsized impact on the judiciary’s

duty to effectively administer justice. Superior court case filings

have significantly increased; for instance, in 1977, there were

54,653 felony criminal cases filed, whereas in the 2023 to 2024

16

J.O. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

fiscal year, there were 179,821 criminal felony filings. (See Nat.

Center for State Courts, State Court Caseload Statistics:

Annual Report 1977 (1982) p. 148; Judicial Council of Cal., 2025

Court Statistics Report: Statewide Caseload Trends (2025) p. 3.)

In the midst of growing operational demands, the judicial

branch has also been hampered by budget cutbacks. (See, e.g.,

Daniels, California superior courts crisis (2023)

<https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/law/california-

superior-courts-crisis#full-article> [as of May 28, 2026]

[“California Superior Courts have endured a period of being

underfunded and understaffed, which has had dire

consequences for the citizens of the state”]; ibid. [“After the state

economy plunged in the 2000s due to the Great Recession, steep

cuts were made to the judicial budget, creating the host of

problems”]; National Association for Presiding Judges and

Court Executive Officers, California Budget Cuts: “All Courts

are Going to Feel the Pain” (May 14, 2012)

<https://napco4courtleaders.org/2012/06/california-budget-cuts-

all-courts-are-going-to-feel-the-pain/> [as of May 28, 2026]

[“During the last three years, the state’s huge court system has

been cut by $650 million” and “State judicial leaders warned

Monday that the proposed cuts for the California courts may

jeopardize public access to the justice system”].) Additionally,

the superior courts have been impacted by judge shortages. As

the Legislature recently recognized, “judicial need” exceeds the

number of superior court judgeships and “[i]n some counties, the

existing disparity between authorized and funded positions and

judicial need is expected to widen due to continued dramatic

population growth in the future.” (Stats. 2023, ch. 482, § 1,

subds. (c), (d), adding Gov. Code, § 69614.5.) As of 2022, “17

courts need[ed] new judgeships, for a total need of 98 judges,”

17

J.O. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

including 30 judges in San Bernardino County, 22 judges in

Riverside County, and 11 judges in Kern County. (Judicial

Council of Cal., The Need for New Judgeships in the Superior

Courts: 2022 Update of the Judicial Needs Assessment (Nov.

2022) p. 5 <https://courts.ca.gov/sites/default/files/courts/

default/2024-12/report-to-the-legislature_2022-update-of-the-

judicial-needs-assessment.pdf> [as of May 28, 2026]; ibid. at p.

6 [Table 2].) In Riverside County, judicial shortages led to the

dismissal of hundreds of criminal cases. (See Coulter, Hundreds

of Riverside County criminal cases dismissed amid shortage of

judges, The Desert Sun (Oct. 25, 2022) <https://

www.desertsun.com/story/news/crime_courts/2022/10/25/hundr

eds-riverside-county-criminal-cases-dismissed-amid-judge-

shortage/10598314002/> [as of May 28, 2026].) These stressors

all combine to create a situation that is very different from the

one facing the Solberg court: today’s court system handles a vast

increase in case filings. But though the complexity of managing

that system has increased, that system must navigate serious

budget pressures and judicial shortages. In such a delicate

judicial ecosystem, the impact of blanket abuses of section 170.6

to fundamentally alter judicial assignments becomes amplified.

When a party utilizes section 170.6 to engage in the bad faith

practice of removing a judge from all or a substantial portion of

cases, or all or a substantial portion of cases of a particular type

without a legitimate belief in the judge’s prejudice toward the

litigant, the court is forced to redistribute work amongst its

limited judges at the cost of both judicial efficiency and

independence across its entire caseload. (Accord Erickson,

supra, 589 N.W.2d at p. 484 [“considering the broad impact of

blanket filings, which affect not only the specific cases at issue,

but also the cases of many of our other citizens that are pending

18

J.O. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

at the same time,” and observing that blanket judicial

disqualifications “greatly” affect the efficient utilization of

judicial resources].) The court is busier and more under

resourced than it was in 1977, making the impacts of blanket

challenges far more severe.

In addition to superior courts’ increase in workload and

case complexity in the years since Solberg was decided, the

California judiciary has seen a major shift in its approach to

certain types of cases. This shift has necessitated greater

judicial specialization, which is undermined if parties can abuse

section 170.6 to force a specialized judge from his or her

designated assignment. More specifically, the role of specialty

courts, like juvenile dependency court and family court, has

become increasingly prominent. (See, e.g., Edwards, Protecting

Children and Reuniting Families (2008) p. 6 [“The juvenile

dependency court was not a significant part of the workload of

the California Superior Courts until after 1980”]

<http://www.judgeleonardedwards.com/docs/HistofDepFINAL1

-13-09DB.pdf> [as of May 28, 2026]; Adam & Brady, Fifty Years

of Judging in Family Law: The Cleavers Have Left the Building

(2013) 51 Fam. Ct. Rev. 28, 28 [“Not until the 1970s did the

movement for a separate court to handle family law cases really

gain momentum. The huge increase in cases and the

development of a significant body of case law about the family

has led most states to develop dedicated family law benches,

designed to deal effectively and appropriately with the complex

issues facing families dealing with divorce and parental

separation”].) Moreover, there has been a marked increase in

“[p]roblem-solving courts (or collaborative justice courts)

includ[ing] specialized drug courts, domestic violence courts,

community courts, family treatment courts, DUI courts, mental

19

J.O. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

health courts, peer/youth courts and homeless courts,” which

“seek to use the authority of courts to improve outcomes for

victims, communities and defendants.” (Judicial Council of Cal.,

California’s Collaborative Justice Courts: Building a Problem-

Solving Judiciary (2005) p. 2 <https://courts.ca.gov/sites/default/

files/courts/default/2024-08/california_story.pdf> [as of May 28,

2026].) California now “has more than 400 collaborative courts

in all but three small jurisdictions, with many jurisdictions

having four or more types of collaborative courts. The most

numerous types of collaborative courts include adult drug courts

(84), adult mental health courts (55), veterans’ courts (47),

dependency drug courts (35), juvenile drug courts (24), DUI

courts (22), reentry courts (20), homeless courts (18), community

courts (12), and juvenile mental health courts (12). Newer

courts such as girls’ courts and CSEC courts for commercially

sexually exploited children are also growing.” (California

Association of Collaborative Courts, Court Finder

<https://wearecacc.org/court-finder/> [as of May 28, 2026].)

Though collaborative courts are premised on cooperation and

may not face blanket challenges with great frequency, they have

fundamentally changed the way in which superior courts

conduct their business and added complexity to the

management of judicial assignments. If section 170.6 can be

weaponized to remove a dedicated judge from a specialized

calendar, like juvenile dependency court and family court, then

it can defeat the presiding judge’s assignment authority (Cal.

Rules of Court, rule 10.603(c)(1)) and “materially impair” (Steen,

supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 1053) the judiciary’s right to conduct

business so “ ‘ “that the rights of all suitors before them may be

safeguarded.” ’ ” (Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1148, italics

omitted; cf. Babb, Fashioning an Interdisciplinary Framework

20

J.O. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

for Court Reform in Family Law: A Blueprint to Construct a

Unified Family Court (1998) 71 So.Cal. L.Rev. 469, 501 [judicial

“[specialization provides] improved precision and predictability

of adjudication; more accurate adjudication; more coherent

articulation of legal standards; greater expertise of the bench;

economies of scale that flow from division of labor, particularly

including speed, reduced costs and greater efficiency through

streamlining of repetitive tasks and wasted motions”].)

There have also been countless changes in the law since

1977 that similarly require judicial specialization. Blanket

abuses of section 170.6 can materially undermine the effort to

assign judges to courtrooms who possess particularized

knowledge and training regarding these changes. Superior

courts have been faced with both voter and legislative

enactments that have generated entirely new proceedings,

increased caseloads and case complexity, and have significantly

altered the substantive law. These new laws require specialized

knowledge for their implementation. Courts will not be able to

optimize that specialized knowledge and experience if judges

can be unfairly removed from all or a substantial portion of cases

of a particular type. For instance, the Community Assistance,

Recovery, and Empowerment (CARE) Act (Stats. 2022, ch. 319),

which became effective in 2023, established a new program “to

connect a person in crisis with a court-ordered CARE plan or

agreement for up to 12 months” (California Health and Human

Services Agency, CARE Act Overview (Aug. 2023) p. 1

<https://sf.courts.ca.gov/system/files/general/care_overview.pdf

> [as of May 28, 2026]) and requires judicial officers to receive

specialized training. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5983, subd. (c).)

Recently enacted Proposition 36 (Prop. 36, § 7, as approved by

voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 2024), eff. Dec. 18, 2024), requires

21

J.O. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

courts to establish “detailed treatment program[s]” for certain

qualifying drug offenders. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11395, subd.

(d)(1)(A).) Similarly, pretrial diversion programs, which require

ongoing court supervision, have been expanded for certain

individuals; these programs include primary caregiver diversion

(Pen. Code, § 1001.83), drug diversion (Pen. Code, § 1000),

mental health diversion (Pen. Code, § 1001.36), military

diversion (Pen. Code, § 1001.80), and misdemeanor diversion

(Pen. Code, § 1001.95). The Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act

of 2014 reclassified certain nonserious, nonviolent offenses from

felonies to misdemeanors and permitted offenders to petition

the superior court to redesignate their felony convictions to

misdemeanors and reduce their sentences. (See Pen. Code, §

1170.18.) The Criminal Justice Realignment Act of 2011

“significantly change[d] the punishment for some felony

convictions.” (People v. Scott (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1415, 1418.) The

Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Prop. 36, as approved by

voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012)) reduced punishment for

certain Third Strike offenders and permitted already convicted

offenders to seek resentencing under its terms. (See Pen. Code,

§ 1170.126.) The California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (Stats.

2020, ch. 317, § 1), effective January 1, 2021, enacted sweeping

changes to our criminal law in an effort to address “ ‘the

unfortunate effects of centuries of racial discrimination.’ ”

(Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 2, subd. (b).) The Racial Justice Act now

permits individuals to seek relief in the superior courts if race

played a role in their charging, conviction, or sentencing. (See

Pen. Code, § 745; Stats. 2022, ch. 739, § 1 [extending the Racial

Justice Act to existing judgments “[t]o ensure equal access to

justice for all”].) Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.)

(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) changed the criteria for murder liability

22

J.O. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

(see Pen. Code, §§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e), as amended

by Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2, 3) and “also added section 1170.95

to the Penal Code [now Penal Code section 1172.6], which

creates a procedure for convicted murderers who could not be

convicted under the law as amended to retroactively seek relief.”

(People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957, fn. omitted.) Penal

Code section 1172.6 was subsequently amended to also apply to

those convicted of attempted murder under the natural and

probable consequences doctrine and manslaughter, with

recognition of the “potentially-major” impact this would have on

courts “likely to receive an influx of petitions.” (Sen. Com. on

Appropriations, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg.

Sess.) as amended Feb. 19, 2021, p. 1; see Pen. Code, § 1172.6,

subd. (a).) Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)

amended Penal Code section 186.22 to require proof of

additional elements to establish a gang enhancement. (Assem.

Bill No. 333, § 3, eff. Jan. 1, 2022.) These are massive changes

to the law, requiring corresponding changes to our court

administration. These new laws have significantly altered the

volume and nature of superior courts’ “ ‘ “order of business” ’ ”

(Engram, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1148, italics omitted) in a

manner that has elevated the importance of the judiciary’s

“ultimate authority” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 10.603(c)(1)) to

control its business through the assignment of judges.

In sum, given how the California judicial system has

evolved since 1977, blanket abuses of section 170.6 now

unconstitutionally interfere with the “ ‘effective administration

of justice’ ” — a “core judicial function” of court

administration — by permitting a party to unilaterally decide,

for improper reasons, that a judge cannot oversee all or a

substantial portion of cases, or all or a substantial portion of

23

J.O. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

cases of a particular type, to which he or she is assigned. (Case,

supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 184; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule

10.603(c)(1) [“The presiding judge has ultimate authority to

make judicial assignments”].) Today’s judiciary is faced with

heightened budgetary constraints and judicial shortages, it has

seen the proliferation of specialized courts, and it has witnessed

sweeping changes to our procedural and substantive law. In

this context, the judiciary’s responsibility to oversee the

“ ‘effective administration of justice’ ” is made unacceptably

harder if a judge can be effectively barred from hearing all or a

substantial portion of assigned cases at the whim of a party.

Contrary to County Counsel’s suggestion, blanket abuses of

section 170.6 present far more than a mere “administrative”

burden or “personnel management” issue, they prove

unconstitutionally injurious to the judiciary’s performance of its

“adjudicative function.”

Consider the allegations here. The presiding judge in San

Joaquin County Superior Court might have determined that the

court and litigants were best served by assigning Judge Guy

Castillo to the department dedicated to conservatorship

matters. If, as alleged, County Counsel, after being admonished

by Judge Guy Castillo, abused section 170.6 to blanket

disqualify her in all conservatorship cases (over 300 cases in less

than four months) and force her reassignment to a different

department, then County Counsel’s use of section 170.6 could

“materially impair,” if not entirely defeat (Steen, supra,

59 Cal.4th at p. 1053), the presiding judge’s assignment

authority. The potential consequences of blanket abuses are

particularly acute where the judge, like Judge Guy Castillo, is

overseeing a specialized calendar, or assigned to a specialized

court or department. And one judge’s forced reassignment from

24

J.O. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

certain types of cases, or from a particular department, will

inevitably have negative spillover effects for the court as a

whole.

In smaller counties, like Mariposa County or Del Norte

County, where there are only two judges for the entire county

(Gov. Code, §§ 69588.3, 69582.3), the risk of interference from

blanket challenges is even more pronounced since it would likely

require the other sitting judge to hear such matters, thereby

enabling a party to essentially preselect its judge. Even in

larger counties, where work might be more easily redistributed

amongst judges when one judge is repeatedly challenged, the

impacts of blanket challenges can be equally disruptive. For

instance, Orange County has over 100 judges and is among

those counties with the highest number of judicial officers. (See

Gov. Code, § 69591; see generally Gov. Code, §§ 69580–69620.)

Nevertheless, in Tejeda, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at page 898, the

Orange County Superior Court described the “ ‘crisis’ ” created

by the district attorney’s blanket challenges to Judge Goethals.

According to the respondent court, “ ‘Six months after the People

began disqualifying Judge Goethals, the negative impact

became readily apparent,’ ” as the court had a growing backlog

of murder cases, as well as an increasing backlog in “ ‘shorter

felony cases because [short cause judges] were presiding over

two-to-three-week murder trials.’ ” (Ibid.) The blanket

challenges to Judge Goethals caused cases of all types “ ‘to

languish unnecessarily’ ” (ibid.) at the expense of “ ‘the court’s

responsibility to ensure the orderly administration of justice,’ ”

but Solberg prevented the Orange County Superior Court from

stopping the blanket practice. (Tejeda, at p. 899.)

The nature and sheer scale of petitioner’s allegations in

this matter further confirm the extent of the problem.

25

J.O. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

Petitioner alleges County Counsel lodged section 170.6

challenges against Judge Guy Castillo in over 300 specialized

conservatorship proceedings in less than four months, forcing

her reassignment to a different department handling, inter alia,

misdemeanor and traffic cases. While we take no view on the

truth of petitioner’s allegations, the number of alleged

challenges to Judge Guy Castillo in her specialized assignment

supports our conclusion that blanket abuses of section 170.6

pose a clear and unacceptable risk of interfering with court

operations. The judiciary should no longer be helpless to remedy

the problem of blanket abuses. (Accord Baricevic, supra,

136 Ill.2d at p. 435 [addressing alleged blanket challenges to a

judge by the state prosecutor under Illinois’s analogous judicial

disqualification statute and concluding, “where the

independence of the judiciary is endangered by encroachment

from the other branches of government, this court has a duty to

act”].)

We are not alone in recognizing the now heightened threat

that blanket challenges to a particular judge under section 170.6

can pose to the constitutional jurisdiction of today’s superior

courts. Since Solberg, there has been increasing recognition of

the fact that blanket challenges to a judge can materially

interfere with judicial operations. Courts of Appeal have

questioned Solberg’s “efficacy in the context of the current

reality of the justice system” (Tejeda, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at

p. 908) and “wish[ed] [they] could do more to stop” abuses of

section 170.6 (NutraGenetics, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at p. 259).

There have been increasingly troubling reports about abuses of

section 170.6 to remove judges from cases for reasons other than

a good faith belief in prejudice. In its amicus curiae brief here,

the California Judges Association asserts that abuses of section

26

J.O. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

170.6 are “pervasive” and government attorneys’ improper use

of section 170.6 has given rise to a “constitutional crisis”

garnering the attention of the Committee on Revision of the

Penal Code. Staff from the Committee on Revision of the Penal

Code recently proposed that section 170.6 be amended “to

prohibit or curtail blanket peremptory judicial disqualification”

since blanket challenges threaten judicial independence.

(Committee, First Supplement to Memorandum 2025-04:

Automatic Disqualifications of a Judge and Related Matters

(May 22, 2025) p. 2 [of Judge Daniel P. Maguire’s submission];

ibid. [among the “deleterious effects” necessitating section

170.6’s reform are the “[u]surpation of the presiding judge’s

statutory authority to make assignments” and “[d]egradation of

judicial independence”]; see also Riff, It’s time to deep six the “6”,

Daily Journal (Nov. 13, 2025) at p. 4 [calling for the repeal of

section 170.6 on several grounds, including that “the 170.6

process is a serious affront to judicial independence in the face

of institutional ‘blanket’ challenges to a judicial officer,” which

contravene “the presiding judges’ authority to make judicial

assignments in the best interests of the court”]; Kane, CCP

170.6 Should Be Repealed (Summer 2002) vol. 11, No. 3, ABTL

Report 10 [advocating for the repeal of section 170.6 in part

because “section 170.6 diminishes respect for the institution of

our trial courts. It reduces the appearance of impartiality in

making judicial assignments of cases because it allows the

litigants to manipulate that process”].)

Notably, California is “in a shrinking minority of states —

currently only 5 other states allow blanket challenges — that

permit this practice.” (Committee, Staff Memorandum 2025-10:

Updates on Staff Research and Preliminary Proposals: Gender

Bias, Retroactivity, and 170.6 Disqualifications, supra, at p. 6;

27

J.O. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

cf. Comment, supra, 43 Idaho L. Rev. at p. 242 [“A significant

minority of states have adopted statutes or court rules that . . .

allow[] peremptory or automatic judicial disqualifications”

(italics added)].) Since Solberg, the high courts in three states

have invalidated blanket challenges pursuant to similar judicial

disqualification statutes. (See City of Tucson, supra, 150 Ariz.

102 [holding that an Arizona city prosecutor’s blanket

disqualifications of a magistrate judge in all DUI cases

undermined judicial independence]; Baricevic, supra, 136 Ill.2d

at p. 434 [where there was evidence to suggest the State

Attorney was using Illinois’s disqualification statute “to coerce

the chief judge . . . to reassign” a judge, the court permitted

judicial scrutiny of the peremptory challenges]; Erickson, supra,

589 N.W.2d 481 [prohibiting the prosecutor’s blanket abuse of

Minnesota’s judicial disqualification statute].) States have also

taken action, by rule of court or statute, to protect against

improperly motivated blanket judicial disqualifications. (See,

e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. § 14.260(7)(a) [challenged judge may request

a hearing “[i]f a party, attorney, law firm, district attorney’s

office, defense consortium or public defender’s office files a

motion or series of motions . . . that effectively denies the judge

assignment to a criminal or juvenile delinquency docket”]; Ariz.

Rule of Crim. Proc. 10.2(b)(1), (2)(E) [each side in a criminal case

is entitled to one peremptory challenge of a judge if accompanied

by an “avowal that the party is making the request . . . not for

[the] improper purpose” of “using the rule against a particular

judge in a blanket fashion”].) Commentators have repeatedly

warned of the dangers of permitting judicial “peremptory”

challenges given their risk of abuse: “They argue that marginal

improvements to judicial accountability do not warrant

sacrificing judicial independence and integrity.” (Note, supra,

28

J.O. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

97 So.Cal. L.Rev. at p. 277; see also Comment, supra, 43 Idaho

L.Rev. at p. 264 [“courts . . . need to protect judges and the

judiciary as a whole from outside influence, such as pressure by

prosecutor’s and public defender’s offices exerted through

blanket peremptory judicial disqualifications”].) Moreover, as

evidenced by the allegations here and in other pending matters,6

our courts seem to be encountering claims of blanket abuses of

section 170.6 with increasing regularity.

As we have said before, “ ‘[w]e cannot permit a device

intended for spare and protective use to be converted into a

weapon of offense . . . .’ ” (Solberg, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 198,

quoting McClenny v. Superior Court (1964) 60 Cal.2d 677, 689.)

If section 170.6 can be abused in a blanket fashion for reasons

other than a good faith belief in a judge’s prejudice in a

particular case, i.e., for purposes of “ ‘judge-shopping,’ ” to delay

proceedings, to disqualify a judge based on his or her “views on

the law or on the exercise of judicial discretion” or his or her

“personality traits” (Solberg, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 194; see id.

at pp. 195–196), to “ ‘intimidate, punish, and/or silence’ ” a judge

for an adverse ruling and warn other judges not to rule similarly

(Tejeda, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 930), or, worse yet, on the

basis of a racial or other group bias (see Williams, supra,

6

In Hoglund v. Superior Court, S291333, which we granted

and held for this matter on August 30, 2025, the petitioner

alleges that the San Francisco District Attorney has blanket

challenged a judge before whom the district attorney has never

appeared in an attempt “to reshape the San Francisco criminal

court to be more favorable towards her agenda,” not a good faith

belief in prejudice.

29

J.O. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

8 Cal.App.4th 688),7 then such use of section 170.6 can

“materially impair” (Steen, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 1053) the

“core judicial function ‘to ensure the orderly and effective

administration of justice.’ ” (Case, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at

p. 184.) This is far too consequential a price to be paid for

section 170.6’s efficient procedure.

We now agree with Justice Tobriner’s ultimate conclusion

that we are not powerless to act in the face of such an assault on

the judiciary. To the contrary, our constitutional structure

requires us to act. Few would accept, for example, that Solberg’s

logic forecloses judicial inquiry into a claim that the prosecution

unconstitutionally lodged a section 170.6 challenge on the basis

of the judge’s race. (See, e.g., Williams, supra, 8 Cal.App.4th

688.) Here, too, we can no longer endorse Solberg’s logic to

immunize blanket challenges under section 170.6 from judicial

inquiry when such challenges threaten the separation of powers.

We therefore overrule Solberg’s reasoning to the extent it bars a

7

See also Note, supra, 97 So.Cal. L.Rev. at page 258

(“Section 170.6 can . . . exacerbate the very problem it was

designed to minimize. Bias is a two-way street in which

litigants can also discriminate against judges of a particular

gender, race, or ethnicity, among other demographics”);

Committee, Staff Memorandum 2025-10: Updates on Staff

Research and Preliminary Proposals: Gender Bias,

Retroactivity, and 170.6 Disqualifications, supra, at page 6 (“In

Yolo County, prosecutors blanket challenged the only Hispanic

judge in the county and disqualified her from hearing felony

criminal cases. Defense attorneys raised an equal protection

challenge to the 170.6 disqualifications, but the Presiding Judge

was forced to deny it without any record of intentional

discrimination”).

30

J.O. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

court from entertaining as-applied challenges to alleged blanket

abuses of section 170.6 on separation of powers grounds.8

E. Blanket Abuses of Section 170.6’s Terms Invade

the Province of the Judiciary

We now conclude, contrary to Solberg’s logic, that blanket

abuses of section 170.6 materially impair judicial operations.

However, that does not end our separation of powers inquiry. A

separation of powers conflict necessarily requires two branches

of government, one encroaching upon the other. (See, e.g., Steen,

supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 1053.) We solicited supplemental

briefing from the parties on the question of whether blanket

challenges to a particular judge under section 170.6 implicate

separation of powers concerns only when the challenges are

made by executive branch offices or may also be implicated when

nonexecutive branch entities and private parties lodge blanket

challenges. If it is the former, then only blanket challenges by

executive actors would be subject to a separation of powers

challenge. But if the statute itself encroaches on judicial

functions when blanketly abused, then blanket challenges by

any litigant could be challenged as an unconstitutional

encroachment by the Legislature into judicial functions. The

8

While our holding overrules Solberg’s logic in its entirety

with respect to blanket abuses of section 170.6, we find it

necessary to state that we are troubled by the observation in

Solberg that such abuses of section 170.6 were “self-limiting”

because they “may well . . . antagonize the remaining judges of

the court.” (Solberg, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 202.) We agree with

the Tejeda majority that this reasoning “is [and always has

been] offensive to the judiciary” by “assuming judges will

[retaliate] in bad faith to overuse of the statute.” (Tejeda, supra,

1 Cal.App.5th at pp. 909–910.)

31

J.O. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

parties and amici curiae are split on the proper characterization

of the conflict at issue.

Petitioner, as well as amici curiae Law Offices of

Marsanne Weese and the California Public Defenders

Association, argue that only bad faith blanket challenges by

executive agencies can unconstitutionally encroach on judicial

functions because “entities that do not exercise executive power

. . . are not capable of ‘materially impairing’ another branch’s

constitutional functions.” They assert that nonexecutive

agencies act on behalf of individuals, not a branch of

government, and thus they cannot be the source of an inter-

branch conflict proscribed by the separation of powers doctrine.

The Public Defenders Association emphasizes that, unlike the

prosecution, defense attorneys “represent one client at a time,”

to whom they owe a duty to ensure a fair hearing. As a result,

any perceived “blanket” challenges to specific judges are “driven

by” a public defender’s “duties of loyalty and zealous advocacy”

to his or her clients, not any office-wide policy concerns.

Furthermore, the Public Defenders Association points out that

a rule prohibiting blanket challenges from public defenders, who

represent a large percentage of criminal defendants, could have

a disparate impact on indigent defendants because a privately

retained attorney for a single client is unlikely to have the

capacity to challenge a judge en masse. The Law Offices of

Marsanne Weese also notes that the district attorney is a party

to almost every action, whereas “a public defender will rarely

control the entire court calendar, because some defendants will

retain private counsel . . . [or] be appointed alternative counsel.”

County Counsel, amici curiae California District

Attorneys Association and the California Judges Association

contend that section 170.6 should be applied in the same way to

32

J.O. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

all entities “who regularly occupy a large portion of the court’s

calendar.” The California Judges Association posits that “[t]he

identity of the challenging party does not cure this

constitutional defect since it is the legislative scheme itself that

offends the separation of powers doctrine.” According to amicus

curiae California District Attorneys Association, “the public

defender stands in nearly the same position” as the district

attorney, “represent[ing] approximately 80 percent of all

persons charged with felonies in California,” and thus the public

defender has an equal capacity to materially interfere with court

operations by way of blanket challenges.

We agree with County Counsel, as well as amici curiae

California District Attorneys Association and the California

Judges Association, that the problem of judicial interference

from blanket challenges derives from the legislative scheme

itself and not just the activities of certain executive branch

officers. More specifically, the legislatively adopted terms of

section 170.6 prohibit inquiry into the veracity of timely and

properly presented affidavits or oral statements under oath (see

§ 170.6, subd. (a)(4)), even when there is reason to believe that

such affidavits are being blanketly abused. (Accord Tejeda,

supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at pp. 912–913, fn. 2 (conc. opn. of Aronson,

J.) [“the power or right at issue is one the Legislature created

and delegated not only to the district attorney, but to all

litigants and attorneys in any civil or criminal action . . . . It is

the express terms of the statute that create the potential for

undermining court functions”].) We therefore conclude “[t]he

separation of powers conflict at issue . . . arises between the

legislative and judicial branches.” (Id. at p. 913, fn. 2 (conc. opn.

of Aronson, J.); see also id. at p. 899 [quoting the trial court’s

order observing that “ ‘[t]o allow a party to manipulate the court

33

J.O. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

into removing a judge from hearing certain criminal cases [by

blanket abuse of section 170.6] — . . . would be a concession

against judicial independence’ ”].) When section 170.6 is abused

to challenge a particular judge in all or a substantial portion of

his or her assigned cases, or all or a substantial portion of cases

of a particular type, without a good faith belief in the judge’s

prejudice, such abuse of the statute “materially impair[s]”

judicial operations (Steen, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 1053); this

reality does not depend on the identity of the party lodging the

blanket challenges. As such, blanket abuses of section 170.6 by

any party may be subject to challenge on separation of powers

grounds.

We recognize that, as a general matter, institutional

parties like the district attorney or public defender pose a

greater risk of interference with judicial operations because they

appear with such frequency before the court. A district attorney

who decides to exercise blanket challenges against a judge in a

felony criminal assignment, for example, could essentially

exclude that judge from all matters assigned to the judge.

However, a private practitioner or law firm could also employ

section 170.6 to unconstitutionally interfere with judicial

operations. For example, a single law firm in a small county

that handles the bulk of specialized matters in that field (e.g.,

unlawful detainers) “could interfere with the court’s powers by

exercising a blanket challenge to the only judge hearing cases

involving that area of the law.” (Tejeda, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at

p. 913, fn. 2 (conc. opn. by Aronson, J.).) And in any event, the

separation of powers problem at issue here arises whenever a

litigant engages in bad faith blanket challenges to avoid

appearing before a judge, even if other judges remain available

34

J.O. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

to adjudicate cases involving that litigant. The effect of such

blanket challenges may differ in degree, but not in kind.

F. The Opponent of a Section 170.6 Motion Must

Establish a Prima Facie Case of Blanket Abuses

Since we have concluded, for the first time, that a court

may consider a separation of powers objection to alleged blanket

abuses of section 170.6, we must outline for trial courts the

procedure for implementing this novel holding. We, like the

Illinois Supreme Court (see Baricevic, supra, 136 Ill.2d 423),

find Batson’s burden shifting procedure for considering

constitutional objections to peremptory challenges of

prospective jurors to provide a helpful analogue. (See Batson v.

Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson); Baricevic, at pp. 437–440

[adopting a procedure “patterned after” Batson for addressing a

separation of powers challenge to Illinois’s analogous judicial

disqualification statute].) Indeed, “the procedure for

scrutinizing peremptory challenges set forth in Batson

represents an effort by the Supreme Court to rectify (and

prevent) the unconstitutional use of a constitutional statute (i.e.,

the use of a statutory right to exercise peremptory challenges for

the purpose of discriminating against minorities).” (Baricevic,

at p. 437.) In our view, this approach effectively “confine[s]

section 170.6 to its proper application without undermining the

principal purpose of the section.” (Solberg, supra, 19 Cal.3d at

p. 206 (conc. & dis. opn. of Tobriner, Acting C. J.).)

We have long affirmed that section 170.6’s “efficient and

discreet procedure” (Solberg, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 204) is

constitutional on its face. (Cf. Superior Court v. County of

Mendocino (1996) 13 Cal.4th 45, 58–59 [“the Legislature

generally may adopt reasonable regulations affecting a court’s

inherent powers or functions, so long as the legislation does not

35

J.O. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

‘defeat’ or ‘materially impair’ a court’s exercise of its

constitutional power or the fulfillment of its constitutional

function”].) As we have explained, section 170.6 serves the

laudatory goal of “insur[ing] confidence in the judiciary”

(Johnson, supra, 50 Cal.2d at p. 697) by requiring only a good

faith belief in a judge’s prejudice, not proof of actual prejudice

(Solberg, at p. 193). And while good faith challenges,

particularly on a blanket basis, can interfere with court

operations, they do not raise the same separation of powers

concerns as bad faith challenges. Unlike bad faith challenges,

good faith challenges are in step with the courts’ duty to ensure

the effective and efficient administration of justice because they

properly guard against prejudice from judicial officers and

thereby “avoid the suspicion which might arise from the belief

of a litigant that the judge is biased in a case where it may be

difficult or impossible for the litigant to persuade a court that

his belief is justified.” (Johnson, supra, 50 Cal.2d at p. 697.) We

underscore that our opinion in no way restricts a litigant’s right

in a particular case to disqualify a judge whom he or she believes

is “prejudiced” within the meaning of section 170.6, subdivision

(a)(2). And a challenge to a judge under section 170.6, of course,

remains distinguishable from a challenge to a judge “for cause”

under section 170.1, which places the burden on the complaining

party “to establish as a fact” that the challenged judge is biased

or prejudiced against the party. (Estate of Buchman (1955)

132 Cal.App.2d 81, 104; see § 170.1.) Instead, pursuant to

section 170.6, the movant “may establish [a judge’s] prejudice

. . . by affidavit or declaration under penalty of perjury, or an

oral statement under oath, that the judge . . . is prejudiced[.]”

(§ 170.6, subd. (a)(2).) Moreover, much like a prosecutor is

presumed to exercise peremptory challenges to prospective

36

J.O. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

jurors in a constitutional manner (see People v. Cleveland (2004)

32 Cal.4th 704, 732), we presume that parties will not adopt bad

faith blanket policies to disqualify judges under section 170.6.9

(Cf. Solberg, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 197 [“ ‘We cannot properly

assume that there will be a wholesale making of false

statements under oath’ ”].)

Borrowing from Batson’s three-step process, the opponent

of a section 170.6 motion must first timely object10 to a section

170.6 motion and demonstrate a prima facie case that the

motion’s proponent is lodging bad faith blanket challenges

against a particular judge. More specifically, the opponent of a

section 170.6 motion must show “ ‘ “that the totality of the

relevant facts gives rise to an inference of [a bad faith blanket

9

We also note that a person who files a false

disqualification affidavit can be held in contempt. (Cf. In re

Ciraolo (1969) 70 Cal.2d 389, 391 [upholding “an order of

contempt . . . arising out of the filing . . . of a certain false

disqualification affidavit” supporting removal for cause].)

10

On the record here, petitioner raised an objection to

County Counsel’s motion, and we therefore have no occasion to

consider whether a judge can sua sponte initiate an inquiry into

the basis of a party’s section 170.6 motions. (Cf. Baricevic,

supra, 136 Ill.2d at p.438 [“First, the trial judge must determine

whether there is prima facie evidence that the motions are being

used in an effort to thwart the chief judge of the circuit court’s

independence in assigning cases to the judges in his circuit [and

if the judge makes such a determination, a hearing should be

conducted by a different judge]”].) At oral argument, petitioner’s

counsel resisted this approach, asserting that permitting a

judge to initiate a prima facie inquiry into the basis for a party’s

section 170.6 motion could raise questions about improper

judicial embroilment in a case. Any such considerations are

beyond the scope of this opinion.

37

J.O. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

policy],” ’ ” as opposed to a good faith belief that a judge is

prejudiced in a specific case. (People v. Armstrong (2019)

6 Cal.5th 735, 766 (Armstrong).) Among the factors that may be

considered in making this prima facie determination are

whether the party has lodged persistent strikes against the

same judge in all or a substantial portion of cases assigned to

that judge, or all or a substantial portion of cases of a particular

type. Such a showing may alone be persuasive in establishing a

prima facie case of a bad faith blanket policy. As described

below, the burden then “shifts to the [proponent] of the motion

to give an adequate . . . explanation for the challenges.” (People

v. Gutierrez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1150, 1158 (Gutierrez).)

While it is impossible to chronicle all the facts and

circumstances that might combine to establish a prima facie

case of a party’s bad faith blanket policy to disqualify a

particular judge, the relevant case law may provide some helpful

insights. In Tejeda, for instance, the district attorney’s

challenges to Judge Goethals in murder cases increased

dramatically in number following Judge Goethals’s finding that

the Orange County District Attorney’s Office had engaged in

misconduct in connection with the use of inmate informants.

(See Tejeda, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at pp. 897–898; see also id. at

p. 898 [“ ‘For over three years, from December 7, 2010 through

February 24, 2014, Judge Goethals was assigned 35 murder

cases for trial and was disqualified once by the People. From

February 25, 2014 through September, 2015, a period of [18]

months, Judge Goethals was assigned 49 murder cases for trial

and was disqualified 46 times by the People’ ”].) Such an uptick

in challenges after an adverse ruling could evidence bad faith.

Indeed, it is well established “that a judge’s . . . prior rulings of

law do not afford a proper basis for a claim of prejudice” under

38

J.O. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

section 170.6. (Solberg, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 205 (conc. & dis.

opn. of Tobriner, J.).) Nor can a party move to disqualify “a

judge because of his [or her] views on the law or on the exercise

of judicial discretion.” (Solberg, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 194.) It

would also be improper for an office to have a written policy to

always challenge a specific judge without a good faith belief that

the judge was prejudiced. In McCartney, supra, 12 Cal.3d 512,

for instance, there was evidence the public defender’s office had

a written policy to file section 170.6 affidavits of prejudice

against a judge “ ‘on all trials’ assigned to [him],” and later all

“ ‘preliminaries, arraignments, bail settings and any other

appearances which require an act of judicial discretion.’ ”

(McCartney, at p. 538, fn. 13.) Or as in Solberg, it might very

well be that a party “explicitly confirm[s] the existence of the

‘blanket challenge’ policy in his [or her] statement in open

court.” (Solberg, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 207 (conc. & dis. opn. of

Tobriner, J.).)11 As Justice Tobriner explained, it is not enough

“[t]hat a party or attorney believes that a judge is likely to rule

against his interests” based on the evidence in the case,

“ ‘prejudice’ . . . refer[s] to the mental attitude or disposition of

the judge towards a party to the litigation” without regard to the

evidence. (Solberg, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 205 (conc. & dis. opn.

of Tobriner, J.).)

In the absence of a prima facie showing that a party’s

challenge to a particular judge is based on a bad faith blanket

policy, the section 170.6 motion must be granted without further

11

In citing these examples from McCartney and Solberg, we

do not suggest that evidence of a formal written policy or explicit

confirmation will always be required to support a finding of bad

faith.

39

J.O. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

inquiry. If, however, “a prima facie case is found to exist, a

hearing shall be conducted as soon as possible before a judge

other than the judge named in the motion.” (Baricevic, supra,

136 Ill.2d at p. 439.) At the hearing, “ ‘the “burden shifts to the

[proponent of the section 170.6 motion] to explain adequately

the [challenge]” by offering’ ” a good faith basis for its belief that

the challenged judge is personally prejudiced against the party

in the particular case. (Armstrong, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 766.)

This means that the judiciary may now look behind the section

170.6 affidavit or oral statement and inquire into the basis for

the party’s challenges. “The judge named in the motion need

not testify at the hearing, but [the judge] may submit an

affidavit if [the judge] wishes.” (Baricevic, at p. 439.) Consistent

with section 170.6, “[t]he [proponent of the motion] need not

prove that the judge is, in fact, prejudiced. Instead, the [party]

must [establish] facts or circumstances related to the particular

case at hand which [support a good faith belief] that the judge is

prejudiced.” (Baricevic, at p. 439.) “The inquiry is focused on

whether the proffered . . . reasons [for believing the judge is

prejudiced] are subjectively genuine.” (People v. Hardy (2018)

5 Cal.5th 56, 76.) “To meet the second step’s requirement, the

[proponent] of the motion must provide ‘a “clear and reasonably

specific” explanation of his [or her] “legitimate reasons” for

exercising the challenges.’ (Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 98, fn.

20.)” (Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1158.)

“Third, if the [proponent of the section 170.6 motion]

indeed tenders a[n] . . . explanation [for his or her belief that the

judge is prejudiced in the particular case], the trial court must

decide whether the [opponent of the challenge] has proven [a

bad faith blanket policy].” (Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at

p. 1158.) In other words, if after considering the proffered basis

40

J.O. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

for the judge’s removal within the larger context of the overall

pattern of strikes against the judge, the judge finds the section

170.6 motion to have been made in bad faith, the trial court

should deny the motion and the case will remain with the judge

named in the motion. If the trial court finds the party’s

allegations of prejudice to be made in good faith, it must grant

the motion and reassign the case to a different judge than the

judge named in the motion. (Cf. People v. Stanley (2006)

39 Cal.4th 913, 936 [within the framework of Batson, trial

courts consider a party’s “ ‘ “ ‘ “explanation [for dismissing a

juror] in light of the circumstances of the case” ’ ” ’ ” to determine

whether the proffered reason is “ ‘ “genuine” ’ ”].)12

III. DISPOSITION

Pursuant to Solberg, the trial court barred petitioner’s

objection to County Counsel’s alleged blanket challenges to

Judge Guy Castillo at the threshold, without consideration of

petitioner’s specific allegations, and the Court of Appeal

summarily denied relief. Given our departure from Solberg’s

pertinent reasoning, we remand the cause to the Court of Appeal

to consider whether any further proceedings are necessary in

light of our opinion.

12

In its amicus curiae brief, the California Judges

Association asserts that the only satisfactory remedy for blanket

challenges is to bar, full stop, government attorneys from filing

section 170.6 motions. We agree with the parties that amicus

curiae’s proposed solution is too far-reaching and would amount

to improper judicial legislating. Of course, as we recognized in

Solberg, the Legislature is free to amend section 170.6 as it

deems “necessary or desirable.” (Solberg, supra, 19 Cal.3d at

p. 204.)

41

J.O. v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

GROBAN, J.

We Concur:

GUERRERO, C. J.

CORRIGAN, J.

LIU, J.

KRUGER, J.

EVANS, J.

BROWN, J.*

*

Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate

District, Division Four, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant

to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

42

See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who

argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion J.O. v. Superior Court

__________________________________________________________

Procedural Posture (see XX below)

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding

Review Granted (published)

Review Granted (unpublished) XX Denial order filed 10/1/24 – 3d

Dist.

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S287285

Date Filed: May 28, 2026

__________________________________________________________

Court: Superior

County: San Joaquin

Judge: Kristine A. Eagle

__________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Judyanne D. Vallado, Public Defender, Janis D. Everett and Nelson C.

Lu, Deputy Public Defenders, for Petitioner.

Marsanne Weese and Rose Mishaan for the Law Offices of Marsanne

Weese as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

Charles M. Denton and Kathleen Guneratne, Public Defenders

(Alameda), for the California Public Defenders Association as Amicus

Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Rosing Pott & Strohbehn and Heather L. Rosing for California Judges

Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Respondent.

Edward J. Kiernan, County Counsel, Jonathan N. King, Chief Deputy

County Counsel, and Claudine L. Sherron, Deputy County Counsel, for

Real Party in Interest.

Gregg Totten; Dan Dow, District Attorney (San Luis Obispo), Richard

J. Sachs, Deputy District Attorney; and Albert Locher, Assistant

District Attorney (Sacramento), for the California District Attorneys

Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for

publication with opinion):

Nelson C. Lu

Deputy Public Defender

102 South San Joaquin Street, Room 1

P.O. Box 201030

Stockton, CA 95201

(209) 468-2749

Jonathan N. King

Chief Deputy County Counsel

44 North San Joaquin Street, Suite 679

Stockton, CA 95202

(209) 468-2980

Richard J. Sachs

Deputy District Attorney

2495 Natomas Drive, Suite 575

Sacramento, CA 95833

(916) 443-2017