State of Tennessee v. Michael Anthony Huerta

05/22/2026

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

March 25, 2026 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. MICHAEL ANTHONY HUERTA

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Blount County

No. C-28486 Tammy M. Harrington, Judge

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No. E2025-00063-CCA-R3-CD

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Defendant, Michael Anthony Huerta, was indicted for three counts of first degree murder

and pleaded guilty to one count of second degree murder. Defendant agreed to be

sentenced as a Range II offender with the length of the sentence to be determined at a

sentencing hearing. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant

to serve thirty-eight years at 100 percent release eligibility. On appeal, Defendant

challenges his sentence as excessive and argues that his guilty plea was involuntary and

unknowing. Because Defendant’s notice of appeal was untimely filed, we dismiss the

appeal.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Appeal Dismissed

TIMOTHY L. EASTER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J. ROSS DYER and

TOM GREENHOLTZ, JJ., joined.

Rick A. Owens (on appeal), Maryville, Tennessee; and T. Scott Jones (at trial), Knoxville,

Tennessee, for the appellant, Michael Anthony Huerta.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Courtney N. Orr, Deputy Attorney

General; Ryan Desmond, District Attorney General; and Tyler B. Parks, Assistant District

Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Guilty Plea

At the plea hearing, the State summarized the factual basis for the plea. On May

20, 2022, Kerry O’Hare called Defendant and told him that the victim, Blake Weckman,

was interested in buying drugs. Defendant believed that Mr. Weckman had previously

robbed his home, taking money and drugs. Defendant arranged, through Ms. O’Hare, to

meet Mr. Weckman at the M Star Hotel in Blount County, Tennessee. Defendant, armed

with a Glock 9mm handgun, rode in the back seat of a black Nissan Altima being driven

by D’Ambre Gray. Anisa Penn rode in the front passenger seat. Defendant communicated

with Ms. O’Hare and instructed her to direct Mr. Weckman to meet Defendant in the

parking lot of the hotel. Mr. Weckman approached the vehicle, and when he walked around

to the passenger side, Defendant got out of the vehicle and shot Mr. Weckman in the chest.

Defendant then fled on foot. Mr. Weckman died as a result of his injuries. When police

interviewed Defendant, he admitted that he believed Mr. Weckman had previously robbed

him and that he went to confront Mr. Weckman on May 20. Defendant admitted to

shooting Mr. Weckman and throwing the gun on the ground while he was fleeing. A Glock

9mm handgun was recovered in the area where Defendant stated he threw it, and ballistic

testing confirmed that it was used to kill Mr. Weckman.

At the outset of the hearing, the State announced that Defendant would plead guilty

to the lesser-included offense of second degree murder and be sentenced as a Range II

offender at a later sentencing hearing. The court responded, “So his range for punishment

will be between 25 to 40; is that correct?” Defendant’s counsel (“plea counsel”) answered,

“That is correct, Your Honor.” The court announced, “And release eligibility for second

degree is a hundred percent, . . . .” Plea counsel answered, “That is correct.” The court

asked Defendant if that was his understanding of the agreement, and comments were made

off the record. The court then clarified, “So it states it’s a hundred percent release

eligibility. In reality, you can earn up to fifteen percent sentence credit. Is that your

question?” Plea counsel stated that was the agreement he explained to Defendant. The

court explained that a fifteen-percent reduction was “at their discretion,” and Defendant

stated that he understood.

Upon questioning by the trial court, Defendant affirmed that plea counsel explained

the plea agreement to him and stated that he did not have any questions about it. Defendant

testified that he was twenty-three years old and that he was in his second year of college at

the time of his arrest. The trial court explained that the range of punishment for second

degree murder, a Class A felony, was fifteen to sixty years and that Defendant was pleading

guilty as a Range II multiple offender. The court explained that Defendant’s range of

punishment would be “between 25 and 40 years[,]” and Defendant stated that he

understood. The trial court explained Defendant’s rights to him and asked Defendant if he

understood those rights and wished to waive them, to which Defendant responded

affirmatively.

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Upon further questioning by the trial court, Defendant agreed with the facts as stated

by the prosecutor and affirmed that he was entering his guilty plea freely and voluntarily.

The trial court confirmed that Defendant understood he was waiving certain rights, and

Defendant stated that he was satisfied with plea counsel’s representation. The trial court

twice asked Defendant if he had any questions about the potential sentence he might

receive, and Defendant responded, “No, ma’am.”

The court set the matter for a sentencing hearing and stated, “The range of

punishment is between [twenty-five] to [forty] years. Do you understand that?” Defendant

answered, “Yes, ma’am.”

Sentencing Hearing

At the subsequent sentencing hearing, Ms. O’Hare testified that she met Defendant

while they were students at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville. Ms. O’Hare would

buy marijuana from Defendant. She met the victim, Mr. Weckman, at Defendant’s

residence when she was buying marijuana from Defendant. In May 2022, Defendant told

Ms. O’Hare that Mr. Weckman “had robbed him of about a thousand dollars’ worth of

drugs like cocaine and stuff, [] that [Defendant] knew that [Mr. Weckman] was in Alcoa,”

and that Defendant “was looking for him.” Ms. O’Hare was aware that Defendant had

purchased a gun. On the night of the shooting, Mr. Weckman called Ms. O’Hare and asked

if she had any marijuana he could buy. Ms. O’Hare called Defendant, and Defendant told

her to “keep [Mr. Weckman] on the line” and that Defendant was going to “get his [] stuff

together to go mess him up.” Ms. O’Hare, who was in Virginia at the time, determined

Mr. Weckman’s location and told Defendant. Ms. O’Hare communicated with both men

to arrange a meeting between the two. She ended her communication with Mr. Weckman

after she told him that she was in the black Nissan, and he told her that he saw the vehicle.

Defendant contacted Ms. O’Hare on Snapchat around 2:00 a.m. after the shooting and told

her he “was really sorry” and “not to contact him, that the police had come.” Ms. O’Hare

learned about the shooting “a couple of weeks later.”

Ms. Penn testified she was “best friends” with Defendant. She was with him “all

day” on the day of the shooting. They had been drinking alcohol. When Defendant learned

that Mr. Weckman was in Alcoa, Ms. Penn called Ms. Gray, her older sister, to pick them

up and drive them there because Ms. Penn “was nervous.” Ms. Penn knew that Defendant

had been robbed and that he believed Mr. Weckman was involved. She testified that she

thought they “would just go and try to beat [the victim] up or something, but [they] didn’t

have it set just exactly what [they] were gonna do[.]” Ms. Penn knew that Defendant had

a gun. They drove to the hotel where Mr. Weckman was staying. When Mr. Weckman

approached the vehicle, he first went to the driver’s side and did not see Ms. O’Hare. Mr.

Weckman was not carrying a gun and did not appear agitated. He walked around to the

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passenger side, and Defendant “got out and pulled the gun on him.” Ms. Penn said the two

men “started to fight because [Mr. Weckman] grabbed [the gun].” She then heard a

gunshot and saw Defendant run away. Ms. Penn and Ms. Gray “just kind of panicked” and

drove away.

Ms. Gray testified that she picked up Defendant and Ms. Penn at Defendant’s

residence in South Knoxville and drove to the M Star Hotel in Alcoa. She testified, “The

reason [they went] was because [Mr. Weckman] had robbed [Defendant] previously.

[Defendant] wanted to get revenge on [Mr. Weckman] or do the same to him. That’s why

we were on the way there.” After they parked, Mr. Weckman “eventually came outside

[and] walked up to the car.” He approached Ms. Gray’s side of the vehicle, and she cracked

the window. Mr. Weckman did not appear to be carrying any weapons, and he did not

make any threats or seem agitated. He walked around the car, and Defendant got out of

the vehicle and shot Mr. Weckman in the chest. Defendant then ran away, and Ms. Gray

left.

Sergeant Jeff Parsons was a detective with the Alcoa Police Department at the time

of the shooting. He said the shooting occurred at approximately 10:44 p.m., and he arrived

at the scene at 11:07 p.m. Sergeant Parsons observed “a large amount of blood” in the

parking lot, and the victim’s cell phone was on the ground and still receiving text messages

and phone calls. Sergeant Parsons found a shell casing and a ten- and twenty-dollar bill.

He discovered that several witnesses in the balcony area of the hotel had observed the

incident and saw which direction Defendant ran. He collected surveillance video footage

of the incident and identified the vehicle driven by Ms. Gray. Sergeant Parsons interviewed

Ms. Gray and Ms. Penn, and police and prosecutors decided to use them as cooperating

witnesses against Defendant. Investigators located Ms. O’Hare through the victim’s cell

phone records, and she was also utilized as a cooperating witness.

In determining the length of Defendant’s sentence, the trial court considered the

evidence presented at the plea hearing and the sentencing hearing, the presentence report

and both parties’ sentencing memorandums, the principles of sentencing, the arguments of

counsel, the nature and characteristics of the criminal conduct involved, any applicable

mitigating and enhancement factors, and statistical information provided by the

Administrative Office of the Courts as to sentencing practices for similar offenses.

The court found that Defendant had no history of criminal convictions, which the

court weighed in Defendant’s favor; however, the court found that Defendant had a history

of criminal behavior, “that of engaging in the sale of illegal narcotics[,]” which the court

noted were “substantial” quantities. The court found that “criminal activity is what led to

this event,” and the court placed “great weight” on that factor. The court discussed whether

Defendant was a leader in the commission of the offense involving two or more criminal

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actors. The court noted its “disgust” at the “reprehensible” actions of the other individuals

involved but concluded, “at the end of the day it was [Defendant]’s decision” to procure a

weapon and exact revenge on the victim; however, the court gave it little weight as an

enhancement factor. The court noted that the use of a firearm was not an element of second

degree murder and found that Defendant possessed or employed a firearm during the

commission of the offense. The court also found that “[t]here were a lot of people around”

at the time of the offense, noting that the video showed people on the hotel balcony, and

concluded that the risk to human life was high.

The trial court gave mitigating weight to Defendant’s youth and his lacking

substantial judgment, but the court expressed its frustration that Defendant had “significant

resources” at his disposal, including a supportive family, church, school, and work, yet he

chose to commit murder. The court noted that it was “hard to balance.” The court also

gave some mitigating weight to Defendant’s drug and alcohol use.

The court found that the applicable enhancement factors “far outweigh[ed]” the

applicable mitigating factors and imposed a sentence of thirty-eight years’ incarceration to

be served at 100 percent.

Judgments of conviction were entered on December 16, 2024. On January 15, 2025,

plea counsel filed a motion to withdraw from representing Defendant, stating that

Defendant did not wish to proceed with counsel. On the same day, Defendant filed a pro

se notice of appeal in this Court and a pro se “Motion to Reconsider” his sentence in the

trial court. By order dated July 8, 2025,1 the trial court granted plea counsel’s motion to

withdraw and appointed new counsel to represent Defendant. On July 18, 2025, newly

appointed counsel filed an “Amended Motion to Reconsider Now Requesting to Withdraw

Guilty Plea” pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(f).

Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea

At the hearing on Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Defendant

testified that his plea counsel told him his plea agreement included a sentencing range of

twenty-five to thirty years to be served at eighty-five percent. Defendant testified, “And it

wasn’t until I got sentenced to thirty-eight years that I realized that [] was not the deal that

1

We are cognizant that orders were entered by this Court on August 6, 2025, staying Defendant’s

appeal, and on September 22, 2025, lifting the stay, which both stated that the trial court granted plea

counsel’s motion to withdraw on January 15, 2025. However, the record, which had not been transmitted

at the time this Court’s orders were entered, does not support this statement. This Court’s April 15, 2025

Defect Notice states that the record was “still void of the ORDERS on the motion to reconsider and the

motion to withdraw filed on January 15, 2025.” In fact, no such orders had been entered. Rather, the record

shows that an order granting counsel’s motion to withdraw was not entered until July 8, 2025.

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. . . I agreed to, that he had filled out [] paperwork for a different deal and had been

miscommunicating that deal with me.” Defendant said he only saw the last page of the

plea agreement and that it had a “sticky note that said twenty-five to thirty” on it. During

the plea submission hearing, Defendant heard the trial court state that he could be sentenced

as a Range II offender to twenty-five to forty years. Defendant asked plea counsel about

it, and plea counsel told him he was “gonna be okay.” Defendant testified that he would

not have pled guilty had he known his sentencing range would be twenty-five to forty years.

He said he would have gone to trial instead to preserve his right to appeal.

Regarding pretrial motions, Defendant “didn’t understand how motions were

supposed to work.” Defendant asked plea counsel “to put in motions to suppress[] due to

multiple people changing their statements multiple times[.]” Defendant asked plea counsel

about filing a motion to suppress, and plea counsel told him “that those all had been denied,

that it’s either trial or a plea deal.”

On cross-examination, Defendant admitted that he shot and killed Mr. Weckman.

He testified that he understood he would face a charge of first degree murder if he was

allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant agreed that that the trial court went over

the plea agreement, including the sentencing range, during the plea colloquy, but Defendant

said he “was really just intimidated by the whole event.”

Defendant’s father, also named Michael Anthony Huerta, testified that he sold his

house in order to hire plea counsel to represent Defendant. Mr. Huerta said Defendant was

originally offered a plea deal of twenty-five to forty years, and the family “flat-out denied

it right off the bat. We wouldn’t even consider it.” Defendant was offered a second plea

deal of twenty-five to thirty years, and plea counsel advised Mr. Huerta that Defendant

would “only have to do nineteen more years because of eighty-five percent good behavior

and the two years[’ credit for time] served.” Mr. Huerta believed “this was a self-defense

case” and that a sentence of twenty-five years “would be extremely high[,]” but he

understood that it was Defendant’s decision whether or not to accept the plea.

The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court

stated that it had reviewed the transcripts of the plea hearing and sentencing hearing. The

court found that it had announced the out-of-range sentencing range and release eligibility

and that Defendant indicated that he understood. The court noted that Defendant had

“multiple opportunities” to object or ask questions. The court stated, “At every turn --

every single turn -- it was twenty-five to forty.” The court characterized Defendant’s

motion as “a change of heart” and concluded that Defendant entered “an informed,

intelligent, knowing, voluntary plea, and it [wa]s gone over multiple different ways,

including ask[ing] if [Defendant wa]s satisfied with his representation.”

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The trial court’s written order denying Defendant’s motion was entered on

September 10, 2025. Through counsel, Defendant filed a notice of appeal on September

18, 2025.

Analysis

We begin our analysis with an examination of the procedural history and the

timeliness of Defendant’s appeal.2 A notice of appeal must be filed “within 30 days after

the date of entry of the judgment appealed from.” Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a). The judgment in

this case was entered on December 16, 2024. Defendant filed a timely pro se notice of

appeal on January 15, 2025. Additionally, that same day, Defendant filed a motion to

reconsider his sentence. However, Defendant was still represented by counsel at the time

of the filings. Although Defendant’s plea counsel filed a motion to withdraw

simultaneously, no order granting the motion to withdraw was entered until July 8, 2025.

Because Defendant was still represented by counsel, both of his pro se filings are legal

nullities. See State v. Swann, No. E2025-00975-CCA-R3-CD, 2026 WL 973489, at *1

(Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 10, 2026) (“Generally, a defendant may not proceed pro se while

represented by counsel.”) (citing State v. Smith, 492 S.W.3d 224, 242 (Tenn. 2016)), no

perm. app. filed; see also State v. Hester, 324 S.W.3d 1, 33-34 (Tenn. 2010) (holding that

a represented defendant cannot simultaneously exercise the right to self-representation).

Having concluded that Defendant’s pro se notice of appeal failed to confer

jurisdiction on this Court, we now address Defendant’s Rule 32(f) motion to withdraw his

guilty plea filed through appointed counsel. Rule 32(f) only permits withdrawal of a guilty

plea before the judgment becomes final. The judgment in this case became final on January

15, 2025. By the time appointed counsel filed the Amended Motion to Reconsider Now

Requesting to Withdraw Guilty Plea on July 18, 2025, the judgment had been final for six

months. Therefore, the trial court was without jurisdiction to rule on the motion. See State

v. Lowe-Kelley, 380 S.W.3d 30, 34 (Tenn. 2012) (“A trial court cannot rule on the merits

of a late-filed motion for new trial because the judgment has become final and the trial

court no longer has jurisdiction over the case.”).

Finally, a valid but untimely notice of appeal was filed on September 18, 2025, nine

months after the judgment was entered. As we have recognized, “[a]n untimely notice of

2

Although neither party challenges the timeliness of Defendant’s notice of appeal, jurisdiction is a

threshold question. Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 13(b) provides that “[t]he appellate court shall

also consider whether the trial and appellate court have jurisdiction over the subject matter, whether or not

presented for review.” See State v. Bristol, 654 S.W.3d 917, 926 (Tenn. 2022) (“It is well settled that an

appellate court must consider subject-matter jurisdiction, regardless of whether that issue was presented by

the parties or addressed below.”) (citation omitted).

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appeal can, and often does, result in a dismissal of the appeal.” State v. Manning, No.

E2022-01715-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 7439203, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 9, 2023),

perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 16, 2024). In criminal cases, however, the requirement of

a timely filed notice of appeal is not jurisdictional, and it “may be waived in the interest of

justice.” Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a). The appealing party, though, “bears the responsibility to

properly perfect his [or her] appeal or to demonstrate that the ‘interests of justice’ merit

waiver of an untimely filed notice of appeal.” State v. Thomas, No. W2022-00109-CCA-

R3-CD, 2023 WL 328337, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 20, 2023), perm. app. denied

(Tenn. June 7, 2023); Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a).

“If this Court were to summarily grant a waiver whenever confronted with untimely

notices, the thirty-day requirement of Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) would

be rendered a legal fiction.” State v. Rockwell, 280 S.W.3d 212, 214 (Tenn. Crim. App.

2007). When deciding whether to waive an untimely notice of appeal, this Court has

considered “the nature of the issues presented for review, the reasons for and the length of

the delay in seeking relief, and any other relevant factors presented in the particular case.”

Id. Recognizing the unusual circumstances present in this case, we will examine each of

these factors.

The first Rockwell factor, the nature of the issues raised in the appeal, invites at least

a preliminary review of the merits of the issues presented. Regarding his sentencing issue,

Defendant challenges the trial court’s application of three enhancement factors.3 This

Court reviews the trial court’s sentencing determination under an abuse of discretion

standard accompanied by a presumption of reasonableness. State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682,

707 (Tenn. 2012). If a trial court misapplies an enhancing or mitigating factor in passing

sentence, said error will not remove the presumption of reasonableness from its sentencing

determination. Id. at 709. This Court will uphold the trial court’s sentencing decision “so

long as it is within the appropriate range and the record demonstrates that the sentence is

otherwise in compliance with the purposes and principles listed by statute.” Id. at 709-10.

The trial court made extensive findings on the record explaining its reasons for the

imposition of a within-range sentence of thirty-eight years. Moreover, Defendant concedes

that the trial court properly applied as an enhancement factor that Defendant possessed or

employed a firearm during the commission of the offense. See T.C.A. § 40-35-114(9);

State v. Hampton, 24 S.W.3d 823, 832 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) (holding that application

of this factor is proper because “[t]he use of a gun is neither an element of second degree

murder nor inherent in the offense.”). We note that application of this factor alone could

3

Importantly, Defendant’s argument on this issue relies on long-outdated law and ignores that the

2005 amendments to the Sentencing Act abandoned presumptive sentences and rendered enhancement

factors advisory only. See T.C.A. §§ 40-35-114, -210(c).

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support Defendant’s sentence. See State v. Ambrose, No. M2023-00097-CCA-R3-CD,

2024 WL 3596231, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 31, 2024) (citing State v. Dotson, 450

S.W.3d 1, 103 (Tenn. 2014)) (noting that “the application of a single enhancement factor

supports an enhanced sentence”), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 20, 2025). Furthermore,

the “misapplication of an enhancement factor or mitigating factor does not invalidate the

sentence imposed unless the trial court wholly departed from the 1989 Act.” Bise, 380

S.W.3d at 706.

Turning to Defendant’s second issue, the voluntariness of his guilty plea, Defendant

did not seek withdrawal of his guilty plea until six months after the judgment became final.

See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(f) (“After a sentence is imposed but before the judgment becomes

final, the court may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to

withdraw the plea to correct manifest injustice.” (Emphasis added)). He argues that his

plea counsel misinformed him of the applicable sentencing range; however, the record

belies this assertion. The transcript of the plea submission hearing reflects that the trial

court engaged in the appropriate colloquy, advising Defendant throughout the proceeding

of the applicable sentencing range of twenty-five to forty years. The plea agreement signed

by Defendant states that Defendant would be sentenced as a Range II offender to a term of

twenty-five to forty years. Despite Defendant’s claim that he saw only the last page of the

plea agreement, the trial court explicitly asked Defendant, “Did you go over this plea

agreement with your attorney?” Defendant responded, “Yes, ma’am.” The court then

asked, “And did he explain this document to you?” Defendant responded, “Yes. Yes, he

did, Your Honor.” The court then asked, “Do you have any questions about this

document?” Defendant responded, “Not at the moment, no.” Each time he was questioned

about his understanding of the plea agreement and potential sentence, Defendant responded

that he understood and had no questions.

As to the length of the delay in filing a notice of appeal and the reasons for the delay,

as we noted, the circumstances in this case are unusual. Defendant’s pro se notice of appeal

was timely filed but, as we determined, a legal nullity. Defendant’s newly appointed

counsel filed the amended motion under Rule 32(f) only ten days after having been

appointed, and he filed a notice of appeal only eight days after the trial court entered its

order denying the motion. Additionally, orders of this Court were entered apparently

recognizing the pro se notice of appeal as valid. While these factors weigh in Defendant’s

favor, we ultimately conclude that the interest of justice does not require us to waive the

untimely filed notice of appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

CONCLUSION

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Based on the foregoing, this appeal is dismissed.

S/Timothy L. Easter

TIMOTHY L. EASTER, JUDGE

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