J. Spallone v. PSP

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jordan Spallone, : CASES CONSOLIDATED

Appellant :

:

v. :

: No. 1275 C.D. 2024

Pennsylvania State Police :

Lauren Spallone, :

Appellant :

:

v. :

: No. 1276 C.D. 2024

Pennsylvania State Police : Argued: March 4, 2026

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

HONORABLE STELLA M. TSAI, Judge

OPINION

BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: May 28, 2026

Jordan Spallone and Lauren Spallone, husband and wife, petition for

review of identical July 25, 2024, orders of the Court of Common Pleas of

Westmoreland County (trial court). The Spallones’ claims against their employer,

the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP), arose under the Pennsylvania Whistleblower

Law.1 The trial court determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the

Spallones’ claims, sustained the PSP’s preliminary objections to that effect, and

transferred the cases to this Court’s original jurisdiction. Upon review, we affirm

and direct the trial court to effectuate transfer to this Court.

1

Act of December 12, 1986, P.L. 1559, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 1421-1428.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The Spallones have been married since 2015 and both work for the PSP.

Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 5a. They initially filed their complaints with the trial

court in August 2023. Trial Ct. Order & Op. at 1. After the PSP’s initial preliminary

objections, the Spallones filed amended complaints in October 2023, which are the

basis of this matter. See id.

Mr. Spallone’s amended complaint averred as follows. He began with

the PSP in 2003 and became a sergeant in 2016. R.R. at 5a. In 2020, a superior

officer instructed him to drop charges against individuals involved in an incident and

to direct another officer to alter investigative findings regarding the incident. Id. at

6a-7a. He complied, feeling he had no other option, but subsequently reported his

concerns to higher-level PSP officials. Id. at 7a-8a. Days later, he was called to a

meeting about his report and his union representative was told to leave before the

meeting began. Id. at 8a-9a. He was then subjected to what he believed was an

improper internal affairs investigation, attempts to remove him from his field

command and transfer him to a desk job, and multiple refusals to grant him

promotions he believed he had earned based on well-established criteria. Id. at 9a-

11a.

Mrs. Spallone’s complaint averred as follows. She began with the PSP

in 2009 and became a sergeant in 2019. R.R. at 22a. Since the above-described

events regarding Mr. Spallone, she did not get promotions that she believed she had

earned based on well-established criteria. Id. at 28a. A supervisor told her it was

because she is married to Mr. Spallone. Id. at 23a.

2

The Spallones asserted that in violation of the Whistleblower Law, the

PSP retaliated against them for Mr. Spallone’s decision to report his supervisor’s

wrongdoing. R.R. at 12a-13a & 29a-30a. They claimed loss of seniority rights, loss

of higher wages from ungranted promotions, reputational damage, and mental and

other damages. Id. at 13a & 30a. They sought promotions to the rank of lieutenant,

restoration of lost pay, employment status, and rights, and money damages for each

of them in excess of $30,000. Id. The PSP filed preliminary objections asserting

that the Spallones’ amended complaints were legally insufficient because

Whistleblower Law claims against state actors and entities fall within the exclusive

original jurisdiction of this Court rather than our trial-level courts. Id. at 37a-38a &

43a-44a.

In July 2024, after briefing and argument, the trial court issued identical

orders sustaining the PSP’s preliminary objections in both cases. The trial court

concluded that although no published decisions expressly lodged jurisdiction over

Whistleblower Law claims against state entities with this Court, there is a “clear and

persuasive pattern of holdings” to that effect, which the trial court declined to

contradict. Trial Ct. Orders, July 25, 2024, at 3-4. Thus, the trial court ordered the

Spallones’ cases transferred to this Court. Id. at 4. The Spallones filed motions to

certify the trial court’s otherwise interlocutory order for appeal to this Court, which

the trial court granted. Trial Ct. Orders, Aug. 30, 2024, at 1. The Spallones then

sought this Court’s permission to appeal, which we granted; we also consolidated

their cases for purposes of this appeal. Petitions for Permission to Appeal, Sept. 27,

2024, at 1; Orders, Jan. 7, 2025. These matters have been briefed and argued en

banc and are now ripe for disposition.

3

II. Issue

The Spallones argue that Whistleblower Law claims seeking money

damages against the Commonwealth or its agencies may be brought in trial-level

courts because they are not within this Court’s original and exclusive jurisdiction as

set forth in Section 761(a)(1) of our Judicial Code.2 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1).

Spallones’ Br. at 13-16. They assert that their claims fall within the exception at

Section 761(a)(1)(v) for “actions or proceedings in the nature of trespass as to which

the Commonwealth government formerly enjoyed sovereign or other immunity and

actions or proceedings in the nature of assumpsit relating to such actions or

proceedings in the nature of trespass.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1)(v). Id.

III. Discussion

Section 761 of the Judicial Code states in relevant part:

(a) General rule.--The Commonwealth Court shall have

original jurisdiction of all civil actions or proceedings:

(1) Against the Commonwealth government,

including any officer thereof, acting in his official

capacity, except:

....

(v) actions or proceedings in the nature of

trespass as to which the Commonwealth

government formerly enjoyed sovereign or

other immunity and actions or proceedings in

the nature of assumpsit relating to such

actions or proceedings in the nature of

trespass.

42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1).

2

42 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-9913.

4

In Balshy v. Rank, 490 A.2d 415 (Pa. 1985), which concerned federal

civil rights claims arising from an allegedly wrongful arrest and prosecution, the

plaintiff sought money damages under Sections 1983 and 1985 of Title 42 of the

United States Code. Id. at 416 (analyzing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 & 1985). Our Supreme

Court characterized the plaintiff’s claims as entailing “a species of tort liability” and

concluded that such claims “are outside the original jurisdiction of Commonwealth

Court and are properly commenced in the Courts of Common Pleas.” Id. at 420-21.

Similarly, in Miles v. Beard, 847 A.2d 161 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004), an inmate sought

money damages for Section 1983 violations relating to kosher meals, which he had

received at prior correctional facilities. Id. at 163. This Court concluded that the

inmate’s allegations belonged at a trial-level court because “this Court lacks original

jurisdiction over tort actions for money damages that are premised on either common

law trespass or a civil action for deprivation of civil rights.” Id. at 164.

Money damages claims for violations of other statutory arrangements

must also be brought in our trial-level courts. In Hill v. Department of

Environmental Protection, 679 A.2d 773 (Pa. 1996), the plaintiff asserted

employment discrimination under two federal laws, the Pennsylvania Constitution,

and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA).3 Our Supreme Court

explained:

These statutory provisions permit Hill to seek monetary

damages for unlawful injuries done in the employment

context. As such, these claims are in the nature of an

action in tort. See Balshy, supra. Therefore, original

jurisdiction over Hill’s complaint rests with the Lycoming

County Court of Common Pleas.

3

Act of October 27, 1955, P.L.744, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 951-963.

5

Id. at 774. In fact, the PHRA expressly states that once certain procedural

prerequisites are met, a plaintiff “shall be able to bring an action in the courts of

common pleas of the Commonwealth based on the right to freedom from

discrimination granted by this act.” 43 P.S. § 962(c)(1).

Since Balshy and Hill, our courts have also concluded that employment-

oriented money damages claims not sounding in either federal civil rights or

statutory arrangements like the PHRA, but based on traditional common law torts,

are also properly brought within our trial-level courts. In Stackhouse v.

Commonwealth, 832 A.2d 1004 (Pa. 2003), the plaintiff claimed that the PSP, her

employer, harmed her privacy and reputational interests in the course of an internal

investigation in association with her application for a promotion. Id. at 1006. Our

Supreme Court concluded that this Court lacked jurisdiction and returned the case

to the trial-level court because the “core” of the plaintiff’s complaint sounded in

traditional tort liability for an unlawful injury and for which the Commonwealth

formerly enjoyed immunity. Id. at 1007-09 (citing Balshy); see also Lynn v. Smith,

566 A.2d 360, 362 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989) (declining jurisdiction where plaintiff

claimed wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress against

state agency in connection with employment termination). Thus, it is generally

settled that claims against state entities for money damages that are based on tort

theories or statutes that are analogous to tort law will not fall within this Court’s

original jurisdiction and must be directed to our trial-level courts.

Returning to Section 761, this Court possesses exclusive, original

jurisdiction over “all civil actions or proceedings . . . [a]gainst the Commonwealth

government[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1). With regard to the exception at Section

761(a)(1)(v), this Court does not have jurisdiction over “actions or proceedings in

6

the nature of trespass as to which the Commonwealth government formerly enjoyed

sovereign or other immunity and actions or proceedings in the nature of assumpsit

relating to such actions or proceedings in the nature of trespass.” 42 Pa.C.S. §

761(a)(1)(v). As our Supreme Court explained in Balshy, after the abrogation of

common law sovereign immunity in 1978, which “pav[ed] the way for actions for

tort liability against the Commonwealth to be brought in Commonwealth Court,” the

General Assembly “immediately took action to remove from Commonwealth Court

the responsibility for any resulting routine tort litigation”:

[E]ach time it became apparent to the General Assembly

that actions for tort liability could be maintained against

the Commonwealth or its officers in Commonwealth

Court the General Assembly amended § 761 to provide

that those actions be brought in Common Pleas Court and

not in Commonwealth Court. This leads us inescapably to

the conclusion that there exists a legislative intent that all

actions against the Commonwealth or its officers acting in

their official capacity, asserting tort liability, are outside

the original jurisdiction of Commonwealth Court.

490 A.2d at 419-20.

Accordingly, the legislature has made clear that causes of action for

money damages against the Commonwealth or its entities that are in “the nature of

trespass,” meaning that the core of the action sounds in common law torts or can be

reasonably analogized to tort liability, must be brought in our trial-level courts. See

Stackhouse, 832 A.2d at 1007 (stating that the plaintiff’s assertions of invasion of

privacy, defamation, and infliction of emotional distress “are tort claims in the nature

of trespass within the meaning of Section 761(a)(1)(v)”); Hill, 679 A.2d at 774

(concluding that the plaintiff’s claims under the PHRA and other theories “are in the

nature of an action in tort”); Balshy, 490 A.2d at 420 (describing plaintiff’s federal

civil rights claims as “a species of tort liability”).

7

In essence, “the policy consideration underlying tort law is the

protection of persons and property from losses resulting from injury to th[ose]

persons or property.” Hazleton Area Sch. Dist. v. Bosak, 671 A.2d 277, 283 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 1996) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 901 (A.L.I. 1977)). By

contrast, the Whistleblower Law has never been characterized as sounding in or

analogous to common law tort liability. In O’Rourke v. Department of Corrections,

778 A.2d 1194 (Pa. 2001), which was brought initially in this Court’s original

jurisdiction, our Supreme Court stated:

[W]e believe that the Whistleblower Law is not primarily

designed to punish an employer for harboring retaliatory

motives, but is, rather, chiefly a remedial measure

intended to enhance openness in government and compel

the government’s compliance with the law by protecting

those who inform authorities of wrongdoing. In enacting

the statute, the General Assembly aimed to effectuate such

design by ensuring that employees are not discouraged

from reporting violations of legal or ethical codes.

Additionally, recovery under the statute is proportionate to

the harm suffered, as punitive damages are not available.

Id. at 1202-03 (citations, footnote, and quotation marks omitted). The Supreme

Court added that to the extent some aspects of the Whistleblower Law can be

construed as punitive to employers, “such provisions are secondary to—and

supportive of—the primary purpose of the statute, which is to encourage employees

to come forward in good faith with information about substantial illegal or unethical

conduct.” Id. at 1203 n.11. Relatedly, in Bailets v. Pennsylvania Turnpike

Commission, 181 A.3d 324 (Pa. 2018), our Supreme Court reiterated that the aspects

of the Whistleblower Law that entail waiver of sovereign immunity, as expressed in

the Section 761(a)(1)(v) exception to this Court’s original jurisdiction, do not negate

its primarily remedial nature:

8

Although we recognize the [Whistleblower] Law’s

design perhaps entails overlapping purposes of waiving

sovereign immunity on the one hand, and of compelling

compliance by protecting those who expose wrongdoing

on the other, we cannot accept [the employer’s]

conclusion the sovereign immunity waiver aspects of the

[Whistleblower] Law override its remedial protective

aspects when it comes to determining the precise meaning

of the phrase “actual damages” under the [Whistleblower]

Law. . . . Instead, we view the immunity waiver aspect

of the [Whistleblower] Law as supportive of its primary

purpose—to protect whistleblowers who come forth with

good faith reports of wrongdoing.

Id. at 333 (citations and footnotes omitted).

Moreover, unlike most tort-oriented claims, Whistleblower Law claims

are not tried before a jury. Zenak v. Police Athletic League of Phila., 132 A.3d 541,

553-55 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). We have also held that where the Whistleblower Law

applies in the context of at-will public or governmental employment, the tort of

wrongful termination will generally not be available to the plaintiff. Javitz v.

Luzerne Cnty., 344 A.3d 505, 520-21 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2025). Thus, the basic

allegations that constitute a claim under the Whistleblower Law have been treated

as distinct from and not analogous to any tort counterpart.

Unlike the PHRA, the Whistleblower Law does not expressly direct

claims to our trial-level courts. Rather, it states: “A person who alleges a violation

of this act may bring a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction for appropriate

injunctive relief or damages, or both, within 180 days after the occurrence of the

alleged violation.” 43 P.S. § 1424(a) (emphasis added). Generally, Whistleblower

Law cases against localities and local agencies have been brought in trial-level courts

and cases against the Commonwealth or its agencies have been brought in this Court.

For example, in Carpenter v. William Penn School District, 295 A.3d 22 (Pa.

9

Cmwlth. 2023), the plaintiff brought his Whistleblower Law claims against the

school district in the county court of common pleas, whose jurisdiction over the case

was not in dispute. Id. at 25. By contrast, in Bailets, the plaintiff brought his

Whistleblower Law claims against the state agency in this Court’s original

jurisdiction, which was not in dispute. 181 A.3d at 327. See also O’Rourke, 778

A.2d at 1196 (same); Golaschevsky v. Dep’t of Env’t Res., 683 A.2d 1299, 1300 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 1996) (same).

When the issue of jurisdiction has arisen in Whistleblower Law matters

against state entities, we have maintained this distinction, albeit in unpublished

cases. In Bradley v. West Chester University (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 368 C.D. 2019, filed

Jan. 10, 2020), 2020 WL 118614 (unreported),4 the plaintiff, a budget and financial

director for the university, which is part of the Pennsylvania State System of Higher

Education (PASSHE), was terminated after challenging what she believed was a

legally and ethically questionable directive. Id., slip op. at 2, 2020 WL 118614, at

*1. She sued the university, PASSHE, and individual defendants in a trial-level

court, asserting Whistleblower Law and emotional distress claims. Id., slip op. at 3,

2020 WL 118614, at *1. Months later, that court issued a judgment of non pros and

the matter reached this Court in our appellate capacity. Id., slip op. at 4, 2020 WL

118614, at *2. Although the plaintiff brought her case in a trial-level court, she

argued on appeal that the trial-level court lacked jurisdiction over her claims and that

the judgment of non pros should be vacated and the case transferred to this Court’s

original jurisdiction. Id., slip op. at 5, 2020 WL 118614, at *2. The defendants

4

Under Section 414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, an unpublished

memorandum opinion of this Court issued after January 15, 2008, although not binding precedent,

may be cited for its persuasive value. 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).

10

agreed that this Court had jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s Whistleblower Law claims

but maintained that the trial-level court had jurisdiction over her tort claims. Id.

This Court first noted in Bradley that the plaintiff brought her

Whistleblower Law claim “against two Commonwealth entities—PASSHE and the

University—thereby bestowing on this Court exclusive, original jurisdiction over

her claim pursuant to Section 761(a)(1) of the Judicial Code[.]” Bradley, slip op. at

7, 2020 WL 118614, at *3. We then noted ancillary jurisdiction over her

Whistleblower Law claims against the individual defendants and her common law

tort claims, depriving the trial-level court of subject matter jurisdiction over the

entire case. Id., slip op. at 7-11, 2020 WL 118614, at *3-4.

In Vance v. Cheyney University of Pennsylvania (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 210

M.D. 2017, filed July 8, 2021), 2021 WL 2834612 (unreported), the plaintiff

originally filed multiple claims against another PASSHE university in a trial-level

court, which dismissed the plaintiff’s Whistleblower Law count because “the

Commonwealth Court maintain[ed] original and exclusive jurisdiction over the

whistleblower claim” against a state entity. Id., slip op. at 1 n.1, 2021 WL 2834612,

at *1. The plaintiff did not dispute the trial-level court’s actions or explanation and

refiled her claim in this Court’s original jurisdiction. Id., slip op. at 1 n.1, 2021 WL

2834612, at *1.

In Lee v. Department of Corrections (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 714 M.D. 2019,

filed July 14, 2022), 2022 WL 2720095 (unreported), the plaintiff initially sued the

state agency in a trial-level court claiming wrongful termination and Whistleblower

Law violations. Id., slip op. at 1 n.1, 2022 WL 2720095, at *1. The trial court

transferred the case to this Court because “this Court has exclusive original

jurisdiction over actions brought against Commonwealth agencies and officers.” Id.,

11

slip op. at 2, 2022 WL 2720095, at *1. As in Vance, the plaintiff in Lee did not

dispute or appeal the trial court’s actions or explanation. We note that “[e]ven where

a party fails to raise the issue, it is still the affirmative duty of [a c]ourt to consider

the issue of subject matter jurisdiction.” Martin v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of W.

Vincent, 230 A.3d 540, 544 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020) (quotation marks omitted). That

our Supreme Court has never objected to this Court assuming original and exclusive

jurisdiction over Whistleblower Law claims against state entities suggests at least an

implicit endorsement of this approach.

Here, the trial court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction

over the Spallones’ Whistleblower Law claims against the PSP. Trial Ct. Order &

Op. at 3-4. The trial court acknowledged that Bradley, Vance, and Lee are

unpublished but maintained that they “show a clear and persuasive pattern of

holdings” reflecting that this Court “considers itself to have original jurisdiction in

Whistleblower Law claims against Commonwealth entities.” Id. The trial court

declined to “contradict that practice.” Id.

The Spallones argue that money damages claims under the

Whistleblower Law are “materially indistinguishable” from employment-based

money damages claims that have been deemed suitable for origination in trial-level

courts. Spallones’ Br. at 13. The Spallones claim, for example, that no significant

difference exists between employment discrimination claims under the PHRA,

which protects a worker’s immutable traits such as race, age, or gender, and claims

under the Whistleblower Law, which protects workers who report governmental

wrongdoing. Id. at 14. They assert that any policy differences between the two

statutes are immaterial. Id. They aver that Vance and Lee, in addition to being

nonprecedential, are inapposite because jurisdiction was not directly in dispute in

12

either case. Id. at 14-15. The Spallones further assert that Bradley, where

jurisdiction was at issue, was wrongly decided because it “wandered astray in

attempting to distinguish between” the plaintiff’s Whistleblower Law and common

law tort claims, “resulting in an improper exercise” of this Court’s original

jurisdiction over the former and ancillary jurisdiction over the latter. Id. at 15.

The PSP responds that Whistleblower Law claims against state

agencies clearly fit within Section 761’s general rule that this Court has exclusive

and original jurisdiction over all actions against the Commonwealth government.

PSP’s Br. at 11. The PSP notes that in O’Rourke, which was originally brought in

this Court, our Supreme Court considered the matter in its appellate jurisdiction and

did not raise an issue of this Court’s jurisdiction, thus tacitly acknowledging the

propriety of how that case proceeded. Id. at 13. The PSP adds that reading Section

1424 of the Whistleblower Law with Section 761 of the Judicial Code reveals that

trial-level courts are “court[s] of competent jurisdiction” for claims against localities

and local agencies that do not fit within Section 761’s general rule, while this Court

is the “court of competent jurisdiction” for claims against the state and its agencies

because they do fit within Section 761’s general rule. Id. at 14. The PSP points out

that if the General Assembly wished for all Whistleblower Law claims to begin in

trial-level courts, it would have expressly said so as it did in the PHRA. Id. at 14 &

19-20. To the PSP, that the legislature did not do so demonstrates the propriety of

our courts’ longstanding practice of “splitting up” Whistleblower Law cases

depending on the nature of the defendant as either a local or state entity. Id.

The PSP adds that the Section 761(a)(1)(v) exception to this Court’s

original jurisdiction does not apply here. PSP’s Br. at 16. The PSP avers that there

is a meaningful difference between the remedial contours of the Whistleblower Law,

13

which is intended to discourage government wrongdoing, and the federal civil rights

claims in Balshy, which arose out of constitutional protections against bodily and

property harm in the form of unreasonable searches and seizures and were, as our

Supreme Court explained, a “species of tort liability.” Id. at 16-17 & 20. Similarly,

the PSP distinguishes Stackhouse, where the claims were not statutory at all, but

were standard tort allegations that fit readily within the exception. Id. at 21-22.

In their reply brief, the Spallones reiterate that their Whistleblower Law

claims are materially indistinguishable from the employment discrimination claims

in Hill that arose under the PHRA and were deemed akin to tort actions within the

jurisdiction of trial-level courts, the employment-oriented tort claims in Stackhouse,

and the general import of Balshy’s holding that money damages claims against state

agencies based on tort liability must originate in trial-level courts. Spallones’ Reply

Br. at 1-5.

As outlined above, however, the Whistleblower Law is not analogous

to tort litigation in the same way as civil rights litigation under Section 1983 or the

PHRA. See Harrison v. Health Network Laboratories Ltd. P’ships, 232 A.3d 674,

684-85 (Pa. 2020) (acknowledging that the Whistleblower Law may overlap with

but does not replicate Section 1983 and the PHRA). Contrary to the Spallones’

argument, there is a qualitative difference between these tort-adjacent categories and

the remedial Whistleblower Law. See O’Rourke, 778 A.2d at 1202-03. Moreover,

Section 1983 and PHRA claims generally address harms to individual constitutional

rights that are suited for treatment like tort claims because they are themselves “in

the nature of an action in tort” or a “species of tort liability.” See Hill, 679 A.2d at

774; Balshy, 490 A.2d at 420. Whistleblower Law plaintiffs are not entitled to

similarly heightened protection because, for the most part, employment in

14

Pennsylvania, even with a governmental entity, is not a right but an at-will

arrangement. “[T]here is no common law cause of action against an employer for

termination of an at-will employment relationship” and exceptions to this rule “have

been recognized in only the most limited of circumstances, where discharges of at-

will employees would threaten clear mandates of public policy,” such as

“infringements on statutory and constitutional rights.” Weaver v. Harpster, 975

A.2d 555, 563 (Pa. 2009).

The Spallones’ Whistleblower Law claims are solely related to their at-

will employment relationship with the PSP. These claims do not sound in common

law torts and are not analogous to Section 1983 and PHRA claims, which are

statutory in nature but grounded in personal constitutional rights, the violation of

which is suitable for tort-oriented duty-breach analysis, as recognized in the Section

761(a)(1)(v) exception to this Court’s original jurisdiction. The same is not true of

the Whistleblower Law, which the legislature created in 1986 to address

governmental wrongdoing by protecting employees who report it. See O’Rourke,

778 A.2d 1202-03 & n.11.

As such, there is no legal basis to conclude that Whistleblower Law

claims should be treated like tort-oriented claims for money damages where

jurisdiction has been reserved to our trial-level courts through the Section

761(a)(1)(v) exception to this Court’s original and exclusive jurisdiction. The trial

court correctly sustained the PSP’s preliminary objections challenging the trial

court’s subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute and transferred the Spallones’

cases to this Court’s original jurisdiction.

15

IV. Conclusion

For the above-stated reasons, the trial court’s July 25, 2024, orders in

these now-consolidated matters are affirmed and the trial court is directed to

effectuate transfer to this Court.

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

16

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jordan Spallone, : CASES CONSOLIDATED

Appellant :

:

v. :

: No. 1275 C.D. 2024

Pennsylvania State Police :

Lauren Spallone, :

Appellant :

:

v. :

: No. 1276 C.D. 2024

Pennsylvania State Police :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 28th day of May, 2026, the identical July 25, 2024,

orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County, which granted the

preliminary objections of the Pennsylvania State Police and transferred these now-

consolidated cases to be adjudicated in our original jurisdiction, are AFFIRMED.

The trial court is directed to effectuate transfer to this Court.

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge