Parker

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

FELISHA PARKER and LARESHA )

PARKER, as Next of Kin to ISACC )

D’WAYNE PARKER, Deceased, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) Case No. CIV-24-00178-JD

)

CITY OF LAWTON, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

The Court has referred this matter to United States Magistrate Judge Shon T.

Erwin for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)–(C). [Doc. No. 3].

Before the Court is the Report and Recommendation (“R. & R.”) of Judge Erwin [Doc.

No. 103], recommending that the Court deny Defendant John Ratliff’s Motion for Partial

Dismissal [Doc. No. 95]. Ratliff filed timely objections. [Doc. No. 106]. For the reasons

outlined below, the Court accepts the R. & R.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of the death of Isacc D’Wayne Parker while he was in custody

at the Lawton City Jail. Felisha and Laresha Parker brought claims relating to his death

against the City of Lawton and various City employees, including Ratliff, the Lawton

City Manager. Plaintiffs assert a state law negligence claim against Ratliff in his

individual capacity for failing to provide necessary medical care to Parker while detained

in Lawton City Jail. [Doc. No. 1 at 25–26]. Ratliff moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ state law

negligence claim against him because he is immune from suit under the Oklahoma

Governmental Tort Claims Act (“OGTCA”), specifically, Okla. Stat. tit. 51 §§ 153(C),

163(C), and 155(25). [Doc. No. 95 at 4–8]. Plaintiffs responded, and Ratliff replied.

[Doc. Nos. 98, 100].

Concerning Ratliff’s claim that he is immune from suit under the OGTCA, the R.

& R. concluded that Plaintiffs alternatively pled that Ratliff acted both within the scope

of his employment and outside the scope of his employment. [Doc. No. 103 at 6–7]. The

R. & R. found that Plaintiffs’ allegations that Ratliff “act[ed] with reckless or callous

indifference to Mr. Parker’s protected rights” were sufficient to allege Ratliff was acting

outside the scope of his employment and that the OGTCA does not provide immunity to

such claims. [Id.]. Specifically, the R. & R. concluded that whether an employee is acting

within the scope of his employment is an issue properly resolved upon summary

judgment, rather than upon a motion to dismiss. [Id. at 7].

Regarding Ratliff’s claim that he is immune to suit under Okla. Stat. tit. 51,

§ 155(25), the R. & R. concluded that “the Court should not definitively apply the

exception when the question remains, at this stage, regarding whether Defendant Ratliff

had acted within or outside of the scope of his employment.” [Id. at 8].

Judge Erwin advised the parties of their right to object to the R. & R. by filing an

objection with the Clerk of Court by November 13, 2025, and explained that failure to

timely object to the Report and Recommendation waives appellate review of the

recommended ruling. [Id. at 9]. See 28 U.S.C. § 636; Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

Ratliff objected to the R. & R. First, Ratliff objected to the conclusion that he is

not entitled to immunity under the OGTCA because he argues the Complaint does not

plausibly allege facts that he acted outside the scope of his employment. [Doc. No. 106 at

4–6]. Ratliff also disagrees with the R. & R.’s conclusion that the Court should not decide

whether he acted within the scope of his employment at this stage of the litigation. [Id. at

3]. Second, Ratliff asserts that Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 155(25) operates to exempt Ratliff

from Plaintiffs’ claims regardless of whether he was acting within the scope of his

employment. [Id. at 7–8].

II. DISCUSSION

When a magistrate judge has entered a recommended disposition of a matter, the

Court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified

proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made,” and the Court “may

accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by

the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). “De novo review requires the district court

to consider relevant evidence of record and not merely review the magistrate judge’s

recommendation.” In re Griego, 64 F.3d 580, 584 (10th Cir. 1995).

“[A] party’s objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation must

be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the district court or

for appellate review.” United States v. 2121 E. 30th St., 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir.

1996). The Tenth Circuit has “adopted a firm waiver rule when a party fails to object to

the findings and recommendations of the magistrate [judge].” Moore v. United States, 950

F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991). Under this rule, “the failure to make timely objection to

the magistrate[] [judge’s] findings or recommendations waives appellate review of both

factual and legal questions.” Id.

Accordingly, the Court conducts a de novo review of the objected to portions of

the R. & R., through the lens of the standards governing motions to dismiss as outlined in

the R. & R. [See Doc. No. 103 at 1–3].

A. The Court agrees with the R. & R.’s conclusion regarding Ratliff’s

immunity under the OGTCA.

As outlined in the R. & R., the OGTCA provides immunity for government

employees as follows:

In no instance in any such action shall an employee of the state or of a

political subdivision of the state acting within the scope of employment be

named as defendant; provided, however, such person may be named as

defendant under alternative allegations that such person did not act within

the scope of employment.

. . .

Suits instituted pursuant to the provisions of this act shall name as

defendant the state or the political subdivision against which liability is

sought to be established. In no instance shall an employee of the state or

political subdivision acting within the scope of his employment be named

as defendant with the exception that suits based on the conduct of resident

physicians and interns shall be made against the individual consistent with

the provisions of Title 12 of the Oklahoma Statutes.

[Id. at 3–4 (citing Okla. Stat. tit. 51, §§ 153(C) & 163(C) (emphasis omitted))].

Accordingly, immunity under the above provisions of the OGTCA hinges upon whether

Plaintiffs allege that Ratliff was acting within the scope of his employment. Plaintiffs

allege both that Ratliff was acting within the scope of his employment and also that

“individual Defendants were acting outside the scope of their employment, as

Defendants’ conduct, acts, and omissions alleged herein constitute reckless or callous

indifference to Mr. Parker’s protected rights.” [Doc. No. 1 at 26]. The R. & R. concluded

that, based upon the latter allegation, Plaintiffs alternatively pled that Ratliff acted outside

the scope of his employment. [Doc. No. 103 at 6–7].

Ratliff objects to this conclusion because he argues that reckless disregard for the

rights of others is not a sufficient basis for determining an employee acted outside the

scope of his employment. [Doc. No. 106 at 5–6]. Ratliff states that “[a]s the Oklahoma

Supreme Court has made clear, ‘reckless disregard’ for the rights of others is not

sufficient for the conduct of an officer to be deemed outside the scope of employment.”

[Id. at 5]. However, the very case cited by Ratliff in support of this statement belies that

reckless disregard cannot serve as a basis for inferring a finding of malice or bad faith:

It is apparent that “reckless disregard” is distinguishable from acts that

clearly show malice or bad faith. Acts performed with “reckless disregard”

do not automatically rise to a level constituting malice or bad faith. That is

not to say that malice or bad faith can never be inferred from conduct

exhibiting reckless disregard for the rights of others. Such determination,

however, shall be made on a case-by-case basis.

Gowens v. Barstow, 2015 OK 85, ¶ 21, 364 P.3d 644, 652. Accordingly, although the

standard for determining whether an employee acted outside the scope of his employment

for purposes of the OGTCA is whether that employee acted with bad faith or malice,

Ratliff has not cited the Court to any precedent stating that the factfinder cannot infer

such conduct from acts showing reckless disregard. See Mustain v. Grand River Dam

Auth., 2003 OK 43, ¶ 21, 68 P.3d 991, 999, as corrected (Apr. 23, 2003), as corrected

(May 7, 2003) (“An employee whose acts are malicious, willful, wanton and in bad faith

is not acting in the scope of his employment.”). Accordingly, at this pleading stage, the

Court agrees with the R. & R. that Plaintiffs have adequately alternatively pled that

Ratliff acted outside the scope of his employment.

The Court also agrees with the R. & R.’s assessment that the scope of employment

issue is properly decided at the summary judgment stage rather than upon a motion to

dismiss. [See Doc. No. 103 at 7]. Plaintiff objects to the R. & R.’s assessment “that scope

of employment issues can never be determined at the motion to dismiss stage” as

unsupported by Tenth Circuit authority. [Doc. No. 106 at 3 (emphasis omitted)].

However, Oklahoma caselaw, which applies to Plaintiffs’ negligence claim, supports the

conclusion that “[e]xcept in cases where only one reasonable conclusion can be drawn,

the question of whether an employee has acted within the scope of employment at any

given time is a question for the trier of fact.” Tuffy’s, Inc. v. City of Okla. City, 2009 OK

4, ¶ 8, 212 P.3d 1158, 1163.

To that end, Ratliff also asserts that Plaintiffs have alleged no facts that support

that Ratliff was acting outside the scope of his employment. [Doc. No. 106 at 6].

However, allegations of failing to adequately train and supervise staff and employees

have been held to raise an inference of bad faith for purposes of the OGTCA. See Doe v.

Oologah-Talala Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 21-CV-240-TCK-SH, 2022 WL 17406372, at *11

(N.D. Okla. Dec. 2, 2022). Plaintiffs’ Complaint includes similar allegations against

Ratliff: “Defendants Lawton, Smith, Sellers, and Ratliff are responsible for an absolute

failure in adequately training and supervising the arresting officers in this case that so

clearly were ignorant to their own policies and procedures regarding how to handle a

person demonstrating clear and obvious signs of mental illness.” [See, e.g., Doc. No. 1

¶¶ 81, 125]. Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that Ratliff failed to provide necessary medical

care to Parker, and the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals has stated that “acts contrary to

the interests of the employer are not within the scope of employment.” Shephard v.

CompSource Okla., 2009 OK 25, ¶ 16, 209 P.3d 288, 293. Accordingly, at this pleading

stage, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts that support that

Ratliff was acting outside the scope of his employment and therefore agrees with the

conclusion of the R. & R.

B. The Court agrees with the R. & R.’s conclusion regarding immunity

under Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 155(25).

As outlined in the R. & R., Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 155(25) provides that “[t]he state

or a political subdivision shall not be liable if a loss or claim results from . . . [the]

[p]rovision, equipping, operation or maintenance of any prison, jail or correctional

facility[.]” [Doc. No. 103 at 8]. The R. & R. declined to apply the exemption because a

question of fact exists regarding whether Ratliff was acting in or outside the scope of his

employment. [Id. (citing Garland v. Okla. ex rel. Okla. Dep’t of Corr., No. CIV-20-306-

RAW, 2021 WL 1857408, at *2 (E.D. Okla. May 10, 2021))].

As this exemption also applies to actions performed by employees within the

scope of their employment, the Court agrees with the R. & R. that determination of

whether it applies is premature. See Rowell v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Muskogee Cnty.,

2021 OK CIV APP 7, ¶¶ 18–19, 485 P.3d 879, 883–84 (discussing that section 155(25)

applies “quite broadly” to exempt state subdivisions from “tort liability for loss resulting

from the functions of the officers and employees” done within the scope of employment).

“In fact, § 155(25) may be read so broadly as to mean jail staff ‘are expressly immunized

from liability while acting within the scope of their employment.’” Chiles v. Pontotoc

Cnty. Sheriff's Dep t, No. CIV-12-341-FHS-SPS, 2013 WL 5447876, at *2 (E.D. Okla.

Sept. 30, 2013) (quoting Washington v. Barry, 2002 OK 45, 9 8, 55 P.3d 1036, 1039). The

Court, therefore, agrees with the conclusion of the R. & R.

Il. CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, the Court ACCEPTS the R. & R. [Doc. No. 103]

and DENIES Ratliff’s Partial Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 95]. This action remains

referred to Judge Erwin.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 4th day of May 2026.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE