reciting that statutes must be read as a whole to give effect to all their provisions and avoid nullification
How later courts described this case
- reciting that statutes must be read as a whole to give effect to all their provisions and avoid nullification
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
State of California
ROB BONTA
Attorney General
_______________
:
OPINION :
: No. 25-603
of :
: May 27, 2026
ROB BONTA :
Attorney General :
:
CATHERINE BIDART :
Deputy Attorney General :
The HONORABLE JOHN-CARL VALLEJO, INYO COUNTY COUNSEL, has
requested an opinion on a question relating to county treasury deposits.
QUESTION PRESENTED AND CONCLUSION
Government Code section 27011 prohibits county officers from depositing money
into the county treasury “from any private and unofficial source,” and makes doing so a
crime. Does the deposit prohibition in that statute apply to: (a) funds from a federal or
state government grant program that is administered by a nonprofit entity that receives
the grant money from the government and then distributes the grant funds to the county
(and other grant recipients) pursuant to the terms of the grant program, or (b) gifts or
donations to a county from a nongovernmental entity or individual?
(a) No, the deposit prohibition in section 27011 does not apply to government
grant money distributed to a county through a nongovernmental intermediary that
administers the grant program. The word “source” means “originator” or “first cause,”
and under each meaning, the “source” of the money is the government: The “originator”
of the grant money is the government, and the “first cause” of that money is a
government enactment creating the grant. In circumstances where the government
distributes grant funds to a nongovernmental intermediary, which then distributes the
funds to the county as a grant recipient pursuant to the terms of the grant program, the
1
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funds are still “sourced” from the government. Because the government is a public
entity, the money for deposit is not from a “source” that is “private and unofficial.”
(b) No, the deposit prohibition in section 27011 does not apply to gifts or
donations to a county from a nongovernmental entity or individual if a county board of
supervisors (or its delegate) exercises its authority under Government Code section
25355 to accept the gift or donation, which the treasurer may then receive into the
treasury under section 27010 of that code. But if the gift or donation is not accepted
under those gift statutes, the deposit prohibition would apply.
BACKGROUND
California counties receive funding from a variety of sources. Relevant here,
counties may receive funding from federal or state grant programs. 1 As a federal
government website explains, a “grant is a way the government funds your ideas and
projects to provide public services and stimulate the economy. Grants support critical
recovery initiatives, innovative research, and many other programs . . . .” 2 California also
provides state grant opportunities. 3
Although multiple forms of grants exist, in this opinion we consider a federal or
state government-funded grant that is awarded to a county through a nongovernmental
intermediary. 4 In this scenario, the government defines the terms of the grant program
and provides the funding but does not itself determine the grant recipients. Instead, the
government partners with a nonprofit entity that administers the grant program. The
government distributes the grant money to the nonprofit, which then identifies grant
recipients based on the program’s terms and distributes the funds to those recipients, such
as the county. The nonprofit thus acts as an intermediary, facilitating grant distribution.
1
See Letter from Inyo County Counsel John-Carl Vallejo to then Senior Assistant
Attorney General Marc J. Nolan (June 10, 2025), pp. 1-4, 10 (Requestor Letter), on file.
Because the request letter poses questions concerning grant programs that have since
been defunded, our analysis is generalized and does not refer to specific grant programs.
2
Grants.gov, Grants 101, https://www.grants.gov/learn-grants/grants-101 (as of May 26,
2026).
3
See California Grants Portal, https://www.grants.ca.gov/ (as of May 26, 2026).
4
See Requestor Letter, supra, pp. 1-4, 10; Grants.gov, Grant Programs,
https://grants.gov/ (as of May 26, 2026) (“When considering grants, these programs can
be broadly categorized as those awarded by the federal government and those awarded by
non-federal entities. Within these two categories are a variety of funding sources and
program types”).
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Counties may also receive funding through gifts or donations from private parties.
Two state statutes expressly regulate a county’s acceptance of gifts. 5 Government Code
section 25355 authorizes a county to accept a gift made “for any public purpose,” if
specified requirements are satisfied. And section 27010 authorizes the treasurer to
receive an accepted gift.
The question here is whether county officers may deposit funds from these sources
into the county treasury without violating Government Code section 27011. Section
27011 prohibits county officers from depositing money into the treasury “from any
private and unofficial source,” and makes doing so a crime. 6 Part (a) of the question here
asks whether section 27011 prohibits the deposit of government-funded grants that are
distributed to the county through a nongovernmental entity. Part (b) asks whether the
statute prohibits the deposit of a gift or donation from a nongovernmental entity or
individual. We conclude that the statute permits deposits in both scenarios. 7
ANALYSIS
To answer the question before us, we must determine the meaning of a state law
enacted by the Legislature, Government Code section 27011. The Legislature has
expressly provided that the interpretation of statutes in that code is governed by “rules of
construction.” 8 Those rules instruct us to start with the statute’s words, because they are
“generally the most reliable indicator of legislation’s intended purpose.” 9 To do so,
“[w]e consider the ordinary meaning of the relevant terms, related provisions, terms used
in other parts of the statute, and the structure of the statutory scheme.” 10 If the words
may be interpreted reasonably in more than one way, we may then consider other indicia
of intent, such as legislative history and public policy. 11
The statute in question, section 27011, prohibits county officers from knowingly
accepting or allowing a deposit into the county treasury “from any private and unofficial
5
Gov. Code, §§ 25355, 27010.
6
Gov. Code, § 27011. All further statutory references are to the Government Code.
7
In this opinion, we address only a specific question interpreting Government Code
section 27011; we do not address any other circumstance involving the genesis of grant
funds, nor do we address property law questions about ownership of the funds.
8
Gov. Code, § 5.
9
Prang v. Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Bd. (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1152, 1170.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
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source.” 12 Officers who do so commit a misdemeanor and forfeit their office. 13 The
statute states:
Any county officer who knowingly accepts or allows any deposit in the
county treasury of money from any private and unofficial source is guilty of
a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment . . . or by a fine . . ., and shall
forfeit his or her office.[14]
No court or similar authority has interpreted the statute.
On its face, the statute reflects a well-established policy that public resources may
be used for public purposes only. 15 Because the county treasury is a public resource,
county officers may not use it for private purposes—such as unauthorized private
banking, bribery, or other unlawful acts. 16 Section 27011 guards against such private use
of the public purse by prohibiting deposits “from any private and unofficial source.” 17
We now turn to evaluating whether the deposit prohibition would apply to either
of the specific scenarios here: (a) government grant money distributed through
nongovernmental entities as an intermediary, or (b) gifts and donations from
nongovernmental sources. 18
The Statute Does Not Apply to Government Grant Money Distributed Through a
Nongovernmental Entity as an Intermediary Because the “Source” of the Money Is
the Government, and the Government Is Not “Private and Unofficial”
Section 27011 prohibits county treasury deposits of “money from any private and
unofficial source.” No applicable statute defines that clause or its key words, “private,”
“unofficial,” and “source.” So, to determine their meaning, we look to dictionaries, both
12
Gov. Code, § 27011; see id., § 24000 (identifying county officers).
13
Id., § 27011.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.; see, e.g., Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 6 (prohibiting gifts of public funds); Gov. Code,
§ 8314 (prohibiting use of public resources for private purposes).
16
See ante, fn. 15. Of course, public officers are generally presumed to carry out their
duties properly. (Evid. Code, § 664; Housing Authority of City of Oakland v. Forbes
(1942) 51 Cal.App.2d 1, 9.)
17
Gov. Code, § 27011.
18
The scenario in part (a) pertains only to a grant funded purely from the government,
but a “variety of funding sources and program types” exist. (Grants.gov, ante, fn. 4.) In
some cases, the structure of a particular grant (for instance, one with matching private
funds) might render the analysis in part (b) applicable.
4
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common and legal. 19 The most relevant ones are those that existed before or close to
when the Legislature enacted the language. 20
The Legislature first enacted the statute containing the deposit prohibition in
1897. As explained below, the meaning of the key words, “private,” “unofficial,” and
21
“source,” have remained the same since enactment. We start with the clause’s subject,
“source,” then turn to its descriptor, “private and unofficial.”
The meaning of “source,” summarized in a few words, is “first cause” or
“originator.” A Webster’s dictionary predating the enactment defines “source” as: “First
cause; original; that which gives rise to any thing,” or “[t]he first producer; he or that
which originates.” 22 The current Webster’s dictionary defines a “source” as “a generative
19
See Environmental Health Advocates, Inc. v. Sream, Inc. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 721,
730.
20
See ibid.; MCI Communications Services, Inc. v. California Dept. of Tax & Fee
Administration (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 635, 644.
21
When first enacted, the statute was in another code, and stated:
Any county treasurer who shall accept, or allow, any deposit in the county
treasury of moneys from any private and unofficial source, is guilty of [a]
misdemeanor, and shall be punished by imprisonment . . . or by a fine . . .,
and, in addition thereto, shall forfeit his office.
(Stats. 1897, ch. 63, § 1, p. 56 [enacting former Penal Code section 180].) The
Legislature streamlined the statute and moved it fifty years later, to state:
Any county treasurer who accepts or allows any deposit in the county
treasury of money from any private and unofficial source is guilty of a
misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment . . . or by a fine . . . and shall
forfeit his office.
(Stats. 1947, ch. 424, § 1, pp. 1152-1153 [enacting Government Code section 27011].)
The Legislature amended the statute once more, in 1994, to apply to deposits
“knowingly” made, by “any county officer.” (Stats. 1994, ch. 705, § 7, p. 3404
[amending section 27011].) That amendment reflects that officers other than the
treasurer may make deposits. (Gov. Code, §§ 24300, subds. (g)-(j) [allowing
consolidation of treasurer duties with those of tax collector, recorder, assessor, or public
administrator], 24300.5 [allowing consolidation of offices of auditor, controller, treasurer,
tax collector, and director of finance].)
22
Webster, American Dict. of the English Language (1853), p. 947,
https://tile.loc.gov/storage-
services/public/gdcmassbookdig/americandictiona00we/americandictiona00we.pdf (as of
(continued…)
5
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force,” “cause,” “point of origin or procurement,” and “beginning.” 23 And a legal
dictionary, Black’s Law Dictionary, defines “source” as “[t]he originator or primary
agent of an act, circumstance, or result.” 24
Here, we consider a county’s receipt of state or federal government grant money,
where the government has partnered with a nonprofit intermediary to administer the
program. In this scenario, the government distributes the grant funds to the nonprofit,
which then distributes the funds to the grant recipients—here, the county. We conclude
that the deposit of such grant funds from the nonprofit intermediary into the county
treasury would not violate section 27011 because the money is not from a “private and
unofficial source.” As used in section 27011, “source” means “first cause” or
“originator,” so an entity that distributes government grant money as an intermediary is
not its “source,” in either sense of the word. Neither “first cause,” nor “originator,”
describes such a distributing entity. Instead, the government is the “first cause” of the
grant money, because the grant money came into existence by the government
authorizing and funding the grant. And, under these circumstances, the government is the
“originator” of the grant money, because even when nongovernmental entities distribute
it, the money originates with the government. So, the government is the “source” of the
money: it is literally “from” government coffers and figuratively “from” the
government’s act creating the grant. 25
May 26, 2026). For all definitions we cite in this opinion, we skip irrelevant entries—for
example, the one defining “source” in the context of water. (See ibid.)
23
Webster’s Dict., https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/source (as of May 26,
2026).
24
Black’s Law Dict. (12th ed. 2024).
25
The Webster’s dictionary predating enactment defines “from” as having both a
figurative and literal meaning:
From: The sense of from may be expressed by the noun distance, or by the
adjective distant, or by the participle departing, removing to a distance.—
The sense of from is literal or figurative, but it is uniformly the same. . . .
Webster, American Dict. of the English Language (1853), p. 432, non-underlined italics
added, https://tile.loc.gov/storage-
services/public/gdcmassbookdig/americandictiona00we/americandictiona00we.pdf (as of
May 26, 2026).
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Having established that the “source” of the money is the state or federal
government, we next determine whether the government is a “private and unofficial”
source, such that the deposit prohibition would apply. 26 Plainly it is not.
It is axiomatic that the government is a public, not private, entity. 27 In fact,
“private” and “public” are opposites of each other. 28 Webster’s dictionary predating the
enactment defines “private” to mean “in contradistinction from public,” and “[n]ot
invested with public office or employment.” 29 Current dictionaries similarly define
“private.” For example, Webster’s defines “private” as “not related to one’s official
position.” 30 And Black’s Law Dictionary defines “private” as relating to or involving an
individual “as opposed to the public or the government.” 31 So, a “source” that is
“private” is not the government.
Turning to “unofficial,” it does not describe a government “source” either.
“Unofficial” since enactment has referred to what is not official. “Unofficial” in
Webster’s dictionary predating enactment means “[n]ot official,” “not pertaining to
office,” and “[n]ot proceeding from the proper officer or from due authority.” 32 The
current Webster’s definition is “not official,” and “not authorized or acknowledged by a
government . . . .” 33 Black’s Law Dictionary does not define “unofficial,” but defines its
26
Gov. Code, § 27011 (prohibiting the deposit of “money from any private and unofficial
source”).
27
See, e.g., id., § 811.2 (defining “public entity” for liability purposes with extensive list
of government actors).
28
See, e.g., Roman Catholic Welfare Corp. of San Francisco v. City of Piedmont (1955)
45 Cal.2d 325, 328 (stating “the term ‘public’ is the antithesis of ‘private,’” in rejecting
unconstitutional ordinance prohibiting private school construction).
29
Webster, American Dict. of the English Language (1853), p. 780, italics in original,
https://tile.loc.gov/storage-
services/public/gdcmassbookdig/americandictiona00we/americandictiona00we.pdf (as of
May 26, 2026).
30
Wester’s Dict., https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/private (as of May 26,
2026).
31
Black’s Law Dict. (12th ed. 2024).
32
Webster, American Dict. of the English Language (1853), p. 1085,
https://tile.loc.gov/storage-
services/public/gdcmassbookdig/americandictiona00we/americandictiona00we.pdf (as of
May 26, 2026).
33
Webster’s Dict., https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/unofficial (as of May
26, 2026).
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opposite, “official,” to mean “[a]uthorized or approved by a proper authority”—so,
“unofficial” must again be what is not authorized nor approved by a proper authority. 34
In short, both past and present dictionaries show “unofficial” means “not official” and
“not authorized.” As a governing authority, the government both embodies and
promulgates what is “official.” Because the government itself is “official” and its
authorized acts are “official,” a government “source” of money through a lawful grant
program for deposit cannot be “unofficial.”
Altogether, the dictionary definitions confirm the commonsense conclusion that
government grant money is not from a “source” that is either “private” or “unofficial,”
even if the funds are distributed by nongovernmental intermediaries. Because
government grants distributed through nongovernmental intermediaries are not “from [a]
private and unofficial source,” we conclude that section 27011 does not prohibit
depositing such funds in the county treasury. 35
Although our conclusion follows from section 27011’s plain text, it is also
consistent with the policy underpinning the statute: that public resources may be used
only for public purposes. 36 As explained above, government grant money that
nongovernmental entities distribute is still grant money from the government. Such
money is a public resource. As a result, its presence in the county treasury—also a public
resource—is consistent with using the treasury only for public purposes.
Keeping in mind the principles described above, we now turn to part (b). Again,
part (b) asks if section 27011’s prohibition on county treasury deposits of “money from
any private and unofficial source” applies to gifts or donations from nongovernmental
entities or individuals.
The Statute Does Not Apply to Gifts from Nongovernmental Entities If the County
Follows State Laws Governing Acceptance and Receipt of Gifted Money
Because part (b) is about gifts, the statutes governing gifts to a county—sections
25355 and 27010—are relevant. We therefore analyze those gift statutes alongside the
statute in question, using the rules of construction.
Relevant here, the rules instruct us to “read statutes as a whole,” together as one. 37
That is, “the codes are to be read together and regarded as blending into each other
34
Black’s Law Dict. (12th ed. 2024). To illustrate the meaning of “official,” Black’s
Law Dictionary refers to a “company’s official policy.” (Ibid.) Thus, an example of
“unofficial” would be a company’s unofficial policy.
35
Gov. Code, § 27011 (prohibiting deposit “from any private and unofficial source”).
36
See ante, fn. 15.
37
Jurcoane v. Superior Court (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 886, 893.
8
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thereby forming but a single statute.” 38 The Court of Appeal has explained that reading
statutes as a whole means “giving effect to all their provisions, neither reading one
section to contradict others or its overall purpose, nor reading the whole scheme to nullify
one section.” 39 And if the statutes conflict, more specific provisions take precedence
over more general ones. 40 A more specific statute is therefore interpreted as an exception
to a conflicting, more general one. 41 Finally, as the California Supreme Court has
explained, we should avoid interpretations that produce absurd results. 42
Applying these rules here, we begin by analyzing the statutes governing gifts.
Like the statute in question, there is no relevant interpretation of the gift statutes by a
court or otherwise. The first, section 25355, authorizes a county board of supervisors to
accept or reject a gift made to the county for a public purpose, placing no restriction on
the gift’s source. Specifically, it states that the board of supervisors “may accept or reject
any gift, bequest, or devise” to the county “for any public purpose.” 43 A bequest and
devise describe gifts that occur upon the death of the giver. Although the statute
mentions “gifts” and not “donations,” it is clear that the term includes donations. 44 The
statute authorizes the board to delegate its gift-accepting authority to “any county officer
or employee,” and sets forth applicable procedures if it does so. 45 The statute is silent on
whether the board may similarly delegate its gift-rejecting authority. 46
38
People v. Ashley (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 1122, 1126.
39
Jurcoane v. Superior Court, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 893.
40
Atlanta Falcons v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 1268, 1275.
41
Ibid.; Perry v. Stuart (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 472, 507.
Flannery v. Prentice (2001) 26 Cal.4th 572, 578 (“We avoid any construction that
42
would produce absurd consequences”).
43
Gov. Code, § 25355, italics added.
44
A cross-referencing statute makes it clear that a “gift” includes a “donation.” (See id.,
§ 6159, subd. (b)(8) [allowing a county to authorize use of credit cards for a “donation”
made to the county “pursuant to Section 25355”].) That comports with common usage as
well. (See, e.g., Webster’s Dict., https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/donation
(as of May 26, 2026) [defining “donation” as a “gift,” “especially” to a “public
institution”].)
45
Gov. Code, § 25355. For example, delegated officers and employees must report
quarterly on “the source and value of each gift” over ten thousand dollars or other amount
the board specifies. (Ibid.)
46
The authority to reject a gift might be implied from the authority to accept a gift; on the
other hand, the silence might intend to leave the authority to reject a gift with the board,
so that gifts (and their benefits) may not be denied without board involvement.
9
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The second gift statute, section 27010, neighbors the deposit-prohibition statute,
section 27011. Section 27010 expressly authorizes a county officer—the treasurer—to
“receive” money that is a gift to the county, again without restricting the source. 47 It
states: “The treasurer may receive any money constituting [a] gift, bequest, or devise,
and pay it out in accordance with the terms thereof, or, if none are fixed, according to
law.” 48 The statute names the treasurer alone, but a county may assign a treasurer’s
duties to certain other officers. 49
Although section 27010 does not expressly state that the gift recipient is the
county or that its repository is the county treasury, the statute’s location implies as much.
The statute is located among statutes on treasurer duties, the first of which requires the
treasurer to receive “all money belonging to the county,” revealing that the unstated
beneficiary here must be the county. 50 And, the statute is sandwiched between two that
expressly apply to the treasury, revealing that the unstated repository here must be the
treasury. 51
In sum, the first statute, section 25355, authorizes a county board of supervisors to
accept (or reject) a “gift” “for any public purpose,” while the second statute, section
27010, authorizes the treasurer to receive “any” money that is a “gift.” And neither
statute restricts the gift’s source. 52 Despite the second statute’s reference to “any”
money, we do not interpret this to mean the treasurer may receive gifted money that the
board has rejected. Instead, we interpret the board’s more specific authority to accept a
“gift” “for any public purpose” as prevailing over the general authority of the treasurer to
47
Gov. Code, § 27010; see id., § 24000, subd. (f) (treasurer is county officer).
48
Id., § 27010, italics added. For readability, we inserted the word “a,” which appears to
be missing.
49
Id., §§ 24300, subds. (g)-(j) (authorizing consolidation of treasurer duties with those of
tax collector, recorder, assessor, or public administrator), 24300.5 (authorizing
consolidation of offices of auditor, controller, treasurer, tax collector, and director of
finance).
50
Id., § 27000 et seq., italics added.
51
See, e.g., id., §§ 27009 (requiring treasurer to give receipt to any depositor into county
treasury), 27011 (prohibiting deposits of money from private and unofficial source into
county treasury).
52
Id., §§ 25355, 27010.
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receive “any” money that is “gift.” 53 Such a construction avoids the absurd result of
allowing a rejected gift into the treasury. 54
With this understanding of the gift statutes in mind, we turn back to applying
section 27011 to the county’s receipt of a gift from a nongovernmental individual or
entity. Again, the statute prohibits any county officer from depositing money into the
treasury “from any private and unofficial source.” 55 Recall that “source” in a few words
means “originator,” or “first cause,” with the full pre-enactment definition stating: “First
cause; original; that which gives rise to any thing,” or “[t]he first producer; he or that
which originates.” 56 In our view, this describes the gift giver. Although the county may
accept the gift under section 25355, we do not think that makes the county itself the
“source” of funds. 57 Rather, the giver remains the “source,” as the “first cause” and
“originator” of the gifted money. Without a proffered gift, there is nothing for the county
to accept. And even when a potential giver has made an offer to give money and the
county has used its authority to accept the offer, the giver is not required to complete the
gift, because a gift is voluntary and does not have to be fulfilled. 58 Instead, the money
still belongs to the giver until after its transfer and deposit.
Having identified the giver as the “source” of gifted funds, the next question is
whether that source is both “private” and “unofficial.” Given that the giver is a
nongovernmental individual or entity, we have no doubt that the source is “private.”
Whether the source is “unofficial” is a closer question. Assuming that the county has
accepted the gift pursuant to section 25355, the transfer of funds would be authorized by
53
See ante, fns. 40-41 and related text in the body (describing rule of construction giving
precedence to more specific statutes).
54
See ante, fn. 42 (reciting rule to avoid absurd results in construing statutes).
55
Gov. Code, § 27011.
56
See ante, fns. 22-25 and related text in the body (discussing meaning of “source”).
57
If the county’s act of acceptance were seen as the “source” of funds, then the source
would be an authorized act, and therefore not “unofficial.” The accepted gift money
would thus fall outside the deposit prohibition. (See ante, fns. 32-34 and related text in
the body [discussing meaning of “unofficial” as “not authorized,” and by contrast,
meaning of “official” as “authorized”].)
58
Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 338, 358
(gifts not complete until delivered); Tracy v. Alvord (1897) 118 Cal. 654, 655 (offer of
gift during life or upon death is unenforceable). In contrast, when a government act
requires a payment be made (such as a tax, fee, fine, or penalty), money from such
payments arguably has a “source” (as in first cause, and that which gives rise to) that is
the government law requiring payment. Such a source is authorized (not “unofficial”),
thus falling outside the prohibition. (See ante, fns. 32-34 [discussing “unofficial”].)
11
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state law. The gift could therefore be seen to originate from an “official,” as in
“authorized,” source by virtue of the county’s authorizing act. 59
But even if the source of funds were seen as “unofficial,” because the giver itself
is a nongovernmental actor, the county’s act of accepting the gift makes the source
irrelevant. If the source were indeed “private and unofficial,” the deposit-prohibition
statute and the gift statutes would then be in conflict: section 27011 would prohibit the
county from depositing the gift from a “private and unofficial source,” but the gift
statutes would authorize the county to accept and deposit the funds. When such a conflict
arises, specific statutes prevail over conflicting general ones, and here, the statutes
specifically allowing gifts (regardless of the source) would prevail over the deposit
prohibition. Both sections 25355 and 27010 expressly refer to a “gift.” 60 In contrast, the
deposit prohibition does not refer to a gift but to a “deposit,” which covers not just money
that is a gift, but any type of money. 61 As such, the gift statutes are more specific here,
and they would prevail in a conflict with the deposit prohibition. 62 So, even if a gift fell
within the deposit prohibition, a county could use its authority to accept the gift
(regardless of its source) and the deposit prohibition would not apply. 63
The correctness of this rule, giving precedence to the more specific gift statutes,
becomes apparent by applying its opposite. If instead the deposit prohibition in section
27011 prevailed, it would thwart the gift statutes, contrary to the rules of construction. 64
59
See Black’s Law Dict. (12th ed. 2024) (defining “official” to mean “[a]uthorized or
approved by a proper authority”).
60
Gov. Code, §§ 25355, 27010.
61
See id., § 27011 (referring to “deposit”).
62
See ante, fns. 40-41. One way to try to avoid any conflict would be to ask if the gifted
money from a “private and unofficial source” could simply go somewhere other than the
treasury. But we are not aware of any statute authorizing the county’s use of an
alternative repository. Nor do we see any reason why the Legislature would intend to
allow the deposit of such money only outside the treasury and all its safeguards. (See,
e.g., Gov. Code, § 27000.3 [applying fiduciary standard to county treasury funds]; see
also id., § 53636 [deeming specified invested funds of county as money in county
treasury].) If the Legislature had intended as much, surely it would have specified where
to deposit the money instead.
63
Similarly, if required tax payments and the like were somehow viewed as money from
a “private and unofficial source,” the specific laws requiring payment would prevail over
the general deposit prohibition. (See ante, fns. 40-41.)
64
Jurcoane v. Superior Court, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 893 (reciting that statutes must
be read as a whole to give effect to all their provisions and avoid nullification); Kleitman
(continued…)
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Recall that section 27010 authorizes the treasurer—a county officer—to receive money
from a gift, bequest, or devise that a county has accepted under section 25355. 65 So, if a
county accepts a bequest or devise (gifts from deceased individuals—so, a private and
unofficial source) but the deposit prohibition on county officers prevailed, the prohibition
would nullify exactly what section 27010 authorizes the treasurer (a county officer) to do
with the accepted gift (to receive it into the treasury). 66 The nullification illustrates why
more specific provisions prevail, not the other way around.
The nullification may not be avoided by reading the deposit prohibition in section
27011 to apply to “any county officer” except the treasurer, because such a reading is
wholly unsupported by the statute and its history. 67 The statute unambiguously refers to
any county officer, and the treasurer is not only a county officer, but also holds a special
place in the statute’s history. As originally enacted in 1897, the statute applied only to
the treasurer. 68 Nearly one hundred years later, the Legislature expanded the statute to
apply to “any county officer.” 69 If, for the first time in the statute’s long history, the
Legislature intended to reverse course and exempt the treasurer—the officer most likely
to be depositing funds into the treasury—we think the statute would expressly say so.
We also think such a reversal would appear in the legislative record, but it does not. 70
v. Superior Court (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 324, 334 (stating rule against reading into
statutes “an exception, qualification, or modification that will nullify a clear provision”).
65
Gov. Code, § 27010 (referring to “gift, bequest, or devise”); see id., § 24000, subd. (f)
(treasurer is county officer).
66
Id., §§ 27010 (authorizing treasurer to receive “gift, bequest, or devise”), 27011
(prohibiting officers from depositing “money from any private and unofficial source”),
24000, subd. (f) (treasurer is county officer).
67
See id., § 24000, subd. (f) (treasurer is county officer). To avoid the nullification, any
officer assigned duties of treasurer would also have to be read out of the prohibition.
(See ante, fn. 49 [referring to statutory authority to transfer treasurer duties to other
officers and consolidate office of treasurer with other specified offices].)
68
The original enactment of the statute in question stated, “Any county treasurer who
shall accept, or allow, any deposit in the county treasury of moneys, from any private and
unofficial source, is guilty of [a] misdemeanor, and shall be punished by imprisonment
. . . or by a fine . . ., and, . . ., shall forfeit his office.” (Stats. 1897, ch. 63, § 1, p. 56.)
69
Stats. 1994, ch. 705, § 7, p. 3404 (amending section 27011 to its current form).
70
For example, a digest that accompanied the bill through its passage merely explains
that the statute applied to the treasurer, and would expand to apply to any county officer.
(Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 1804, as introduced [1993-1994 Reg. Sess.]; Legis.
Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 1804, 705 Stats. 1994 [1993-1994 Reg. Sess.], Summary
(continued…)
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For these reasons, when a county exercises its authority under the gift statutes to
accept a gift, even from a private individual or entity, section 27011 does not apply, and
an officer may deposit the accepted gift money without violating the prohibition. 71
However, when a county does not so accept a gift (either by passive non-acceptance or
affirmative rejection), the gift would be from a “private and unofficial source,” so section
27011 would prohibit deposit of the proffered gift into the county treasury.
Finally, our conclusion is consistent with the statute’s policy that public resources,
such as the treasury and money it holds, may be used only for public purposes. 72 Again,
it is only “for any public purpose” that a county may accept gifts through its board of
supervisors or delegates. 73 So, without a public purpose, gifted money will not enter into
the treasury, preserving the treasury and the money in it for public purposes. And if a
county chooses not to accept a gift from a “private and unofficial source,” then the
deposit prohibition remains applicable, safeguarding the treasury against use as a
repository for unauthorized private funds.
Dig., p. 268.) As the Court of Appeal has explained, the “Legislative Counsel’s digest is
the official summary of the legal effect of a bill and is relied upon by the Legislature
throughout the legislative process.” (Joannou v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes (2013) 219
Cal.App.4th 746, 759.) As such, “the digest is entitled to great weight, but is not
binding.” (Ibid.) Moreover, none of the committee analyses even mention the change.
(See, e.g., Sen. Rev. & Tax Com., Analysis of Sen. Bill. No. 1804 [1993-1994 Reg.
Sess.] as introduced Feb. 24, 1994, hearing date April 20, 1994.)
71
See Gov. Code, §§ 25355 (authorizing county board of supervisors to “accept” gift “for
any public purpose,” to delegate such authority, and specifying applicable procedures if it
does so), 27010 (authorizing treasurer to “receive” money comprising gift).
72
See ante, fn. 15.
73
Gov. Code, § 25355 (authorizing board and delegated officers to accept gifts to county
“for any public purpose”), italics added; see id., § 27010 (authorizing treasurer to receive
such money).
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