Gaddy

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT CHATTANOOGA

CAROL GADDY, et al., )

) Case No. 1:25-cv-226

Plaintiffs, )

) Judge Travis R. McDonough

v. )

) Magistrate Judge Christopher H. Steger

MAZEN SOUKIEH, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Before the Court are motions to dismiss filed by: (1) Defendant Chancellor Pamela

Fleenor (Doc. 39); (2) Defendants Harolda Bryson and Phillip Noblett (collectively, “City

Defendants”) (Doc. 36); and (3) Defendants Robin Miller, James Davey, Bill Hullander, and

Shannon Gupta (collectively, “County Defendants”) (Doc. 44). Also before the Court is

Plaintiffs Carol Gaddy and Kelly Gaddy’s motion for emergency injunction (Doc. 48). For the

reasons below, the Court will grant Defendant Chancellor Fleenor, City Defendants, and County

Defendants’ motions to dismiss and will deny Plaintiffs’ motion for emergency injunction.

I. BACKGROUND

This suit arises from a state-court action that placed Plaintiffs’ homes on a tax-auction

list. (Doc. 35, at 8.) Although Plaintiffs received a summons for the state-court proceeding, they

allege that Defendant James Davey (“Davey”) refused to provide them with a complaint, and that

Defendant Bill Hullander (“Hullander”) was present during this interaction.1 (Id. at 9–10, 11.)

1 Based on Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint, it appears that both Davey and Hullander are

government employees for Hamilton County, Tennessee, but their exact positions are unclear

from the second amended complaint. (See Doc. 35, at 9–11.)

Plaintiffs allege that during these proceedings Chancellor Fleenor, the presiding judge,

“[l]aughed” at one of the Plaintiffs and informed her “that there would be No [sic] court record

for her[.]” (Id. at 8.) Plaintiffs then attempted to pay the amount owed to redeem their property

to the Hamilton County Clerk and Master2 but were asked to leave by police officers. (Id. at 11–

12.) Plaintiffs also allege that Mazen Soukieh and Abdon Vazquez, the individuals who

purchased Plaintiffs’ homes from the tax auction, trespassed on Plaintiffs’ properties. (See Doc.

35, at 13–14; Doc. 48-1, at 3.) Plaintiffs allege that one of their homes was burglarized by two

unknown individuals, and that the “city Attorneys [sic] office” would not give Plaintiff Carol

Gaddy information about the police report.3 (Doc. 35, at 12.)

On July 14, 2025, Plaintiffs, proceeding pro se, filed their initial complaint (Doc. 1).

Chancellor Fleenor filed a motion to dismiss the initial complaint on August 6, 2025 (Doc. 12).

On August 7, 2025, Plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint (Doc. 15). City Defendants

then filed a motion for a more definite statement (Doc. 27), and County Defendants filed a

motion to dismiss (Doc. 25). The Court granted City Defendants’ motion for a more definite

statement, ordered Plaintiffs to file a second amended complaint, and denied Chancellor Fleenor

and City Defendants’ motions to dismiss with leave to refile. (Doc. 31.) Plaintiffs subsequently

filed their second amended complaint (Doc. 35). In Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint, the

Plaintiffs assert that they are entitled to a default judgment against Defendant Vazquez and also

2 Based on Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint, it appears that Defendants Robin Miller

(“Miller”) and Shannon Gupta (“Gupta”) are government employees for Hamilton County Clerk

& Master, but it is unclear from the second amended complaint what positions Miller and Gupta

hold in that office. (See Doc. 35, at 11–12.)

3 Based on Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint, it appears that Defendants Phillip Noblett and

Harolda Bryson are employees for the City of Chattanooga, Tennessee, but it is unclear from the

second amended complaint what positions they hold. (See Doc. 35, at 12–13.)

request an emergency injunction. (Id. at 5.) City Defendants, Chancellor Fleenor, and County

Defendants filed motions to dismiss (Docs. 36, 39, 44). Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition

to the motions to dismiss (Doc. 49) and a motion for emergency injunction (Doc. 48).

Defendants’ motions to dismiss and Plaintiffs’ motion for emergency injunction are ripe.

II. MOTION TO DISMISS

A. Standard of Law

According to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff’s complaint must

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Though the statement need not contain detailed factual allegations, it

must contain “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

Rule 8 “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”

Id.

A defendant may obtain dismissal of a claim that fails to satisfy Rule 8 by filing a motion

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court considers not whether the

plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the facts permit the court to infer “more than the

mere possibility of misconduct.” Id. at 679. For purposes of this determination, the Court

construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and assumes the veracity of all

well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint. Thurman v. Pfizer, Inc., 484 F.3d 855, 859

(6th Cir. 2007). This assumption of veracity, however, does not extend to bare assertions of

legal conclusions, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, nor is the Court “bound to accept as true a legal

conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).

After sorting the factual allegations from the legal conclusions, the Court next considers

whether the factual allegations, if true, would support a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.

Thurman, 484 F.3d at 859. This factual matter must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Plausibility “is not akin to a

‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the

well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,

the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at

679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).

The Court is mindful that pro se complaints “are liberally construed and are held to less

stringent standards than the formal pleadings prepared by attorneys.” Bridge v. Ocwen Fed.

Bank, 681 F.3d 355, 358 (6th Cir. 2012). However, the Court is “not required to either guess the

nature of or create a litigant’s claim.” Leeds v. City of Muldraugh, 174 F. App’x 251, 255 (6th

Cir. 2006). Likewise, “liberal treatment of pro se pleadings does not require lenient treatment of

substantive law,” and ultimately, those who proceed without counsel must still comply with the

procedural rules that govern civil cases, including the pleading standards set forth in Rule 8(a) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Durante v. Fairlane Town Ctr., 201 F. App’x 338, 344

(6th Cir. 2006); Whitson v. Union Boiler Co., 47 F. App’x 757, 759 (6th Cir. 2002); Kafele v.

Lerner, Sampson, Rothfuss, L.P.A., 161 F. App’x 487, 491 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[P]ro se litigants are

not relieved of the duty to develop claims with an appropriate degree of specificity.”). Thus,

although the standard of review for pro se litigants is liberal, it requires more than the bare

assertion of legal conclusions. See Lillard v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726 (6th

Cir. 1996).

B. Analysis

1. Chancellor Fleenor

In their second amended complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Chancellor Fleenor has: (1)

violated the Tennessee “State Property Statute;” (2) violated Tennessee Code § 39-16-403 by

committing “official oppression”; (3) engaged in tax conspiracy; and (4) violated “the

Separation of Powers Doctrine” by putting Plaintiffs’ “homes on [a] tax auction list[.]” (Doc. 35,

at 7–9.) “It is well-established that judges enjoy judicial immunity from suits arising out of the

performance of their judicial functions.” Brookings v. Clunk, 389 F.3d 614, 617 (6th Cir. 2004)

(citations omitted). “[S]tate judges are absolutely immune from liability under 42 U.S.C

§ 1983.” Id. (citing Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 334 (1983)). Judicial immunity applies

even when judicial acts are “performed maliciously and corruptly[,]” “in bad faith[,] or with

malice[.]” Id. (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)). There are, however, two

circumstances where judicial immunity does not attach: (1) “a judge is not immune from

liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity[;]” and (2)

“a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in [] complete absence of all

jurisdiction.” Leech v. DeWeese, 689 F.3d 538, 542 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Mireles v. Waco,

502 U.S. 9, 11–12 (1991)).

Here, Plaintiffs’ allegations against Chancellor Fleenor stem from acts she took in her

judicial capacity, and their complaint expressly requests that this Court reverse Chancellor

Fleenor’s orders and judgments.4 (Doc. 35, at 8–9.) Plaintiffs claim Chancellor Fleenor ordered

4 Plaintiffs’ request that this Court reverse Chancellor Fleenor’s orders and judgments is a request

for this Court to act as an appellate court to the state court. (Doc. 35, at 8–9.) However, the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine “bars [federal district courts] from conducting appellate review of final

state-court judgments because 28 U.S.C. § 1257 vests sole jurisdiction to review such claims in

the Supreme Court.” Berry v. Schmitt, 688 F.3d 290, 298 (6th Cir. 2012).

their homes be put on a “tax sale list,” which violated the “Tenn[essee] State Property Statute,”

the Plaintiffs’ “due process rights,” and “the “Separation of Powers Doctrine . . . .” (Id.) They

also allege that Chancellor Fleenor’s “orders against State property tax Statute is central to this

tax Conspiracy.” (Id. at 9.) Additionally, they allege that Chancellor Fleenor violated

Tennessee’s “Oppression Statute” because, while on the bench, Chancellor Fleenor “[l]aughed”

at one of the Plaintiffs and informed her “that there would be No court record for her[.]” (Id. at

8.) All these allegations relate to actions Chancellor Fleenor took in her judicial capacity.

Plaintiffs have not alleged that Chancellor Fleenor’s actions were either nonjudicial actions or

that, though the acts were judicial in nature, they were taken in complete absence of all

jurisdiction. See Leech, 689 F.3d at 542. Furthermore, although Plaintiffs allege that Chancellor

Fleenor participated in a “tax conspiracy,” their allegations are legal conclusions without any

supporting factual allegations to support such a claim. Therefore, Chancellor Fleenor is entitled

to judicial immunity, and her motion to dismiss is granted.

2. Davey

Plaintiffs assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant James Davey, a

Hamilton County employee, in his individual capacity for: (1) violating Plaintiffs’ due process

rights by not serving them a complaint in the state lawsuit; and (2) adding “[u]nfunded

[m]andates” to Plaintiffs’ tax bill without their permission.5 (Doc. 35, at 4, 9–10.)

5 Additionally, in opposing Davey’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs attempt to assert new claims,

including claims based on violations of their Fourth and Seventh Amendment rights. (Doc. 49,

at 4.) However, “a court considering a motion to dismiss ‘must focus only on the allegations in

the pleadings.’” Waskul v. Washtenaw Cnty. Cmty. Mental Health, 979 F.3d 426, 440 (6th Cir.

2020) (quoting Bates v. Green Farms Condo. Ass’n, 958 F.3d 470, 483 (6th Cir. 2020)).

Plaintiffs “cannot amend their complaint in an opposition brief or ask the court to consider new

allegations (or evidence) not contained in the complaint.” Id. (citation modified). Therefore,

Plaintiffs’ new causes of action asserted in their opposition to the motion to dismiss will not be

Plaintiffs allege they received a summons from Davey “weeks earlier” to the deadline to

respond to the state court proceeding, but failed to receive a complaint, which they contend

violated their due process rights. (Id. at 9) Under the Tennessee Code, in a tax lien proceeding,

“[i]f process is to be served upon a defendant, the defendant does not have to receive a copy of

the complaint or exhibits.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-2415(d) (emphasis added). As a result,

under Tennessee law, Davey was not required to provide Plaintiffs with the complaint. Id.

Therefore, Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts that their due process rights were violated.

Plaintiffs next allege that Davey violated Plaintiffs’ “civil rights” by adding unfunded

mandates to Plaintiffs’ tax bill without their permission. (Doc. 35, at 10.) The Tax Injunction

Act, provides that “district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or

collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in

the courts of such State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1341. Tennessee provides a plain, speedy, and efficient

remedy for property owners who believe their property taxes have an error—Tennessee Code

§ 67-5-509. Plaintiffs seek to have $40,000 recovered based on their alleged erroneous property

tax bill. (Doc. 35, at 15.) However, since Tennessee provides a procedure for property owners

to dispute their property taxes, this Court lacks jurisdiction.6 Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims

against Davey are dismissed.7

considered. Even if the Court did consider these new causes of action, Plaintiffs fail to support

such causes of action with factual allegations sufficient to show they have a plausible claim.

6 Furthermore, if Plaintiffs are attempting to assert that specific taxes on their property tax bill are

unconstitutional, “[t]he [Tax Injunction] Act also prohibits [federal district] courts from issuing

declaratory judgments holding state tax laws unconstitutional.” Conely v. Township of York, 76

Fed. App’x. 49, 51 (6th Cir. 2003); see also California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393,

408 (1982).

7 In the second amended complaint’s section about Davey, Plaintiffs also assert that they “intend

to prove [the] murder of Mr. Gibson.” (Doc. 35, at 10.) However, Plaintiffs do not allege any

3. Hullander

Plaintiffs assert § 1983 claims against Hullander, a Hamilton County, Tennessee

employee, in his individual capacity for: (1) discrimination; and (2) obstructing Plaintiff Carol

Gaddy’s due process rights.8 Plaintiffs also assert that Hullander should be prosecuted under

18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242. As the Court discussed in its November 19, 2025 order, there is no

private right of action for either 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 or 242 (See Doc. 31, at 7–8). Therefore, the

18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 claims are dismissed.

As to Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims, Plaintiffs fail to allege any facts to plausible state a claim.

The only facts Plaintiffs allege regarding Hullander is that he “was in the same office with

Attorney Daveys [sic] the day of Carol Gaddys [sic] 2nd trip to the Hamilton County Court

house[] to get a copy of the complaint filed against her.” (Doc. 35, at 11.) Plaintiffs do not

provide factual allegations specifying how Hullander allegedly discriminated against them or

otherwise obstructed Carol Gaddy’s due process rights. The only allegation in the second

amended complaint regarding Hullander is that he was present when Carol Gaddy sought a copy

of a complaint, but such an allegation is insufficient to support a claim for discrimination or due

process violations.9 Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims against Hullander are dismissed.

facts that connect Davey to any such allegations. (See id. at 10, 15.) Therefore, such claims are

dismissed.

8 Plaintiffs’ opposition to Hullander’s motion to dismiss includes additional allegations and

claims. (See Doc. 49, at 4.) As discussed above, this Court cannot consider new allegations in

an oppositional brief but rather must focus on the allegations in the pleadings. Waskul, 979 F.3d

at 440. Even if the Court were to consider the allegations in Plaintiffs’ opposition, Plaintiffs still

do not allege facts to support claims for conspiracy, violations of Plaintiffs’ rights under the

Fourth or Seventh Amendment, discrimination, or obstruction of Plaintiffs’ due process rights.

9 Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ claims against Hullander in their second amended complaint is

word-for-word identical to their claims against Hullander in their amended complaint (see Docs.

15, 35)—failing to comply with the Court’s November 19, 2025 Order (Doc. 31). The Court

identified issues with Plaintiffs’ amended complaint and ordered the Plaintiffs to file a second

4. Defendant Miller and Gupta

Plaintiffs’ only allegation regarding Miller and Gupta, Hamilton County, Tennessee

government employees, is that they “both should be arrested and prosecuted under U.S. Code

Title 18 , [sic] 241 and 242….[sic] Currently violating Real Estate Law and Laws regarding

Finance, Usury/Interest, Forced Extortion money to their investor.” (Doc. 35, at 12.) As

discussed earlier in Section II.B.3, Plaintiffs do not have a private right of action under

18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242, and, therefore, those claims are dismissed.

Furthermore, this Court told Plaintiffs that allegations that Miller and Gupta are

“[c]urrently violating Real Estate Law and Laws regarding Finance, Usury/Interest, Forced

Extortion money to their investor[]” was a “broad reference to real estate and finance laws” that

was “too vast to provide any Defendant property notice of the claims brought against him or

her.” (Doc. 31, at 8.) The Court ordered Plaintiffs either “to amend their complaint citing the

specific laws and the factual allegations to support their theory that those laws have been

violated or remove this claim.” (Id.) Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint nonetheless asserts

the same claims—violations of “Real Estate Law and Laws regarding Finance, Usury/Interest,

Forced Extortion. (Doc. 35, at 12.) The second amended complaint fails to provide the specific

laws or factual allegations to support their theories that those laws have been violated.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims against Miller and Gupta are dismissed.10

amended complaint that addressed the issues identified by the Court. (Id.) However, Plaintiffs’

claims against Hullander did not attempt to correct any issues. Instead, Plaintiffs chose to ignore

the Court’s order and copy the identical language of their amended complaint.

10 Similar to the other defendants, Plaintiffs’ opposition to the motions to dismiss tries to bring

new claims and allege new facts against Miller and Gupta, but the Court can only consider what

is in the pleadings. However, even if the Court considered the new information and claims,

Plaintiffs still have not pled facts sufficient to sustain an action against Miller and Gupta.

5. City Defendants

Plaintiffs assert that the City Defendants violated their “civil rights” and did “not give

[Plaintiff Carol Gaddy] the information” from a police report regarding an alleged break-in.

(Doc. 35, at 12–13.) Federal courts “should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted”

even for pro se plaintiffs. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted);

see also Goodell v. Ervin, 591 F. Supp. 3d 232, 238 (E.D. Mich. 2022) (citation omitted)

(“[C]ourts may not rewrite a complaint to include claims that were never presented, nor may

courts construct the plaintiff’s legal arguments for him. Neither may the court ‘conjure up

unpled allegations,’ nor create a claim for Plaintiff.”). Plaintiffs’ claims do not cite what specific

civil rights or laws they believe have been violated by City Defendants. It is outside this Court’s

power to construct Plaintiffs’ legal arguments or create Plaintiffs’ claims—even with Plaintiffs’

pro se status. Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for relief, and therefore, Plaintiffs’ claims against

City Defendants are dismissed.

III. MOTION FOR EMERGENCY INJUNCTION

Plaintiffs request that the Court grant them an emergency injunction to enjoin all

Defendants from taking any further actions against Plaintiffs regarding their Chattanooga

homes—2605 East 45th Street and 3205 Wood Avenue—in the pending Hamilton County

General Sessions Case No. 26GS1763. (Doc. 35, at 5; Docs. 48, 48-1.) Plaintiffs are asking the

Court to halt an ongoing state proceeding. (See generally Doc. 48.) The Court lacks the power

to do so absent narrow exceptions of bad faith or harassment which Plaintiffs have not met. See

Squire v. Coughlan, 469 F.3d 551, 555 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,

53–54 (1971) (“[T]he Supreme Court [has] held that absent ‘bad faith, harassment or any other

unusual circumstance,’ federal-court abstention is appropriate where a plaintiff invokes federal

jurisdiction as a basis for obtaining injunctive relief against state-court criminal proceedings.”)).

Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ motion to enjoin the state court proceedings (Doc. 48).

IV. MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs also move for default judgment against Defendant Vazquez. (See Doc. 35, at

5.) However, Plaintiffs’ request does not comply with Rule 55 of the Federal Rules Civil

Procedure. Therefore, the Plaintiffs’ request for a default judgment against Defendant Vazquez

is denied.

V. JURISDICTION

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and only possess that power authorized

by Constitution and statute. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377

(1994). “[F]ederal courts have a duty to consider their subject matter jurisdiction in regard to

every case and may raise the issue sua sponte.” Answers in Genesis of Kentucky, Inc. v.

Creation Ministries Int'l, Ltd., 556 F.3d 459, 465 (6th Cir. 2009). It is unclear whether this Court

has subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims asserted against the remaining two defendants:

(1) Mazen Soukieh and (2) Abdon Vazquez.

Plaintiffs label their claim against Soukieh as “criminal Trespass a Federal offense.”

(Doc. 35, at 13.) However, the property at 3205 Wood Avenue, as alleged by Plaintiffs, is their

residential home and not a building covered by federal trespassing laws. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1382,

1752. Furthermore, even if Plaintiffs’ property was covered by federal trespassing laws, those

laws do not invoke a private right of action to allow Plaintiffs to bring forth such a suit. Id.

Therefore, Plaintiffs are ordered to show cause how this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction

over the claims asserted again Soukieh.

Plaintiffs’ claims against Abdon Vazquez are unclear and read more like a grievance of

Hamilton County’s property taxes. (See Doc. 35, at 13–14.) Therefore, Plaintiffs are ordered to

show cause on how this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over such claims.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendant Chancellor Fleenor, County Defendants, and

City Defendants’ motions to dismiss (Docs. 36, 39, and 44) are GRANTED and the following

defendants are DISMISSED with prejudice: Chancellor Fleenor, James Davey, Bill Hullander,

Robin Miller, Shannon Gupta, Phillip Noblett, and Harolda Bryson. Plaintiffs’ motion for an

emergency injunction (Doc. 48) is DENIED. Plaintiffs’ request for a default judgment against

Defendant Vazquez (Doc. 35, at 5) is DENIED. Plaintiffs are ORDERED to show cause how

this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims against Mazen Soukieh and Abdon

Vazquez on or before June 8, 2026. Plaintiffs are ON NOTICE that failure to comply with this

Order may result in sanctions, up to and including, dismissal of this action.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Travis R. McDonough

TRAVIS R. MCDONOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE