concluding that a single instance of discrimination does not state a claim of hostile work environment
How later courts described this case
- concluding that a single instance of discrimination does not state a claim of hostile work environment
- “[S]parse and vague allegations are insufficient to state a 3 claim for discrimination under Title VII.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CESAR TERAN-SANCHEZ,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 23-03189 (AHA)
v.
STREAM REALTY PARTNERS,
Defendant.
Memorandum Opinion
Cesar Teran-Sanchez sues his former employer, Stream Realty Partners, and appears to
assert claims of race and sexual orientation discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation,
and breach of confidentiality. Teran-Sanchez asks for damages and reinstatement. Stream Realty
moves to dismiss the amended complaint, arguing the claims are untimely and that Teran-Sanchez
fails to state a claim. For the reasons below, the court grants the motion.
I. Background1
Teran-Sanchez worked at Stream Realty from December 2018 until October 2022. ECF
No. 22 at 9. The amended complaint appears to focus on two incidents at the company. First, in
February 2022, Teran-Sanchez asked a human resources manager about the company’s policy on
payouts for vacation days upon resignation, and the manager forwarded the question to a company
director, who then asked Teran-Sanchez about his career plans. See id. at 10, 15. Second, in April
2022, Teran-Sanchez expressed interest in relocating from Dallas to Chicago, but was convinced
1
As required at this stage, the court accepts the amended complaint’s well-pled factual
allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in Teran-Sanchez’s favor. Banneker
Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 798 F.3d 1119, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
to transfer to Washington, D.C. instead, partly due to promises of financial assistance for the
relocation. Id. at 9–11. Teran-Sanchez signed an official transfer agreement, which scheduled him
to start in D.C. in May 2022. Id. at 11. He traveled to D.C. around that time but never received any
reimbursements for travel or temporary housing. Id. Teran-Sanchez also alleges he was excluded
from work events, that he was not provided the necessary resources for his job, and that when he
raised concerns, he was ignored. Id. at 6, 16–18.
Teran-Sanchez sued Stream Realty, asserting race and sex discrimination, and retaliation
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. ECF No. 1. Stream Realty moved to dismiss the
complaint, and the court dismissed the complaint without prejudice. ECF No. 12.2 Teran-Sanchez
amended his complaint, reasserting his discrimination and retaliation claims, and adding claims
for hostile work environment and breach of confidentiality. ECF No. 22. Stream Realty moves to
dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). ECF No. 24.
II. Discussion
The court concludes the amended complaint fails to plausibly allege any claim. To survive
dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The court “must take all the factual allegations in
2
This case was initially assigned to the Honorable Dabney L. Friedrich, who granted Stream
Realty’s motion to dismiss, and was reassigned to the Honorable Amir H. Ali on November 27,
2024.
2
the complaint as true,” though it is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
In cases like this involving an unrepresented or “pro se” litigant, the court is careful to give
extra leeway. The court evaluates the complaint “in light of all filings, including filings responsive
to a motion to dismiss.” Ho v. Garland, 106 F.4th 47, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). Of
course, an unrepresented plaintiff still “must plead factual matter that permits the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Jones v. Horne, 634 F.3d 588, 596 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(quotation marks omitted) (quoting Atherton v. District of Columbia, 567 F.3d 672, 681–82 (D.C.
Cir. 2009)). While “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary, the plaintiff must furnish “more
than labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
The amended complaint does not plausibly allege claims of discrimination, hostile work
environment, or retaliation under Title VII. To state a claim of discrimination under Title VII, a
plaintiff must plausibly allege he suffered an adverse employment action because of a protected
trait. Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1196 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Although Teran-Sanchez
describes general workplace difficulties like an uncompensated location transfer, being excluded
from work events, not being provided necessary resources, and having his concerns ignored, he
does not allege facts suggesting that these actions were taken because of his protected traits,
namely his race or sexual orientation. See ECF No. 22 at 9–11, 16–18. At most, he alleges that one
co-worker made “[r]acial & homophobic remarks,” but this single, vague allegation is insufficient
to support a reasonable inference of discrimination. Id. at 6; see King v. Pierce Assocs., Inc., 601
F. Supp. 2d 245, 249 (D.D.C. 2009) (“[S]parse and vague allegations are insufficient to state a
3
claim for discrimination under Title VII.”). Similarly, because he does not allege his workplace
difficulties were due to his protected traits and does not allege “discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule, and insult” that is “severe or pervasive,” Teran-Sanchez does not state a hostile work
environment claim. Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1201 (citation omitted); see also King, 601 F. Supp. 2d at
248 (concluding that a single instance of discrimination does not state a claim of hostile work
environment). Additionally, the amended complaint does not allege any of the elements of a
retaliation claim, which requires that the plaintiff “opposed a practice made unlawful by Title VII,”
and suffered a “materially adverse action” as a result. McGrath v. Clinton, 666 F.3d 1377, 1380
(D.C. Cir. 2012). Thus, the amended complaint does not plausibly allege any claim under Title
VII.3
Teran-Sanchez’s “breach of confidentiality” claim must also be dismissed. According to
Teran-Sanchez, Stream Realty’s human resources manager breached a duty of confidentiality by
revealing that Teran-Sanchez had asked about the company’s vacation payout policy. ECF No. 22
at 10, 12. But Teran-Sanchez does not identify any legal duty of confidentiality in that context,
and he does not identify a cause of action for breach of such a duty.4
3
To the extent Teran-Sanchez asserts his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 or the D.C. Human
Rights Act, he fails to state a claim for the same reasons. See Ruifang Hu v. K4 Solutions, Inc., No.
18-cv-1240, 2020 WL 1189297, at *5 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2020) (“Title VII, DCHRA, and § 1981
discrimination and retaliation claims are analyzed under the same legal standard.”).
4
It is not clear whether Teran-Sanchez also asserts a promissory estoppel claim, but, if he does,
the court must dismiss it too. Teran-Sanchez alleges that Stream Realty broke a promise to provide
relocation assistance for his transfer to D.C., but also that he signed an “official transfer agreement
on April 19, 2022.” ECF No. 22 at 11. The existence of an express contract generally forecloses a
theory of promissory estoppel. See Plesha v. Ferguson, 725 F. Supp. 2d 106, 112 (D.D.C. 2010)
(recognizing that because promissory estoppel assumes “an express, enforceable contract is absent,
District of Columbia courts generally prohibit litigants from asserting these claims when there is
an express contract that governs the parties’ conduct” (citing Vila v. Inter-Am. Inv., Corp., 570
F.3d 274, 279 (D.C. Cir. 2009))).
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III. Conclusion
For these reasons, the court grants the motion to dismiss and this action is dismissed
without prejudice. A separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.
AMIR H. ALI
United States District Judge
Date: May 26, 2026
Although the amended complaint mentions the Texas Labor Code, Teran-Sanchez does not
assert any basis for relief under it.
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