Lohr

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

DANIEL LOHR, Case No.: 6:26-cv-00929-AN

Petitioner,

v. OPINION AND ORDER

STATE OF OREGON and MATTHEW

MCALPIN, in his official capacity,

Respondents.

Petitioner Daniel Lohr, who is self-represented and thus proceeding pro se,1 filed an

emergency petition for temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and writ of habeas corpus. See Pet., ECF

1. For the reasons stated below, petitioner’s request for a TRO is DENIED and the writ of habeas

corpus is DISMISSED.

Petitioner has been charged with misdemeanor violations of Oregon Revised Statutes

§ 163.750(2)(a) in Lane County Circuit Court Case No. 26CR11516, captioned State of Oregon v.

Lohr. Petitioner asserts that an “involuntary psychiatric evaluation” has been ordered in the state

court case regarding petitioner’s competency to stand trial and argues that this evaluation was ordered

in retaliation for arguments he made against his prosecution. Pet. 2. Plaintiff represents that the

evaluation was ordered over his express objection and at the behest of his court-appointed public

defender, and that it is scheduled for May 18, 2026. Id. at 2-3. Petitioner argues that the psychiatric

evaluation violates due process rights articulated in Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) and Sell v.

United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003); constitutes First Amendment retaliation; violates petitioner’s

1 Because petitioner is self-represented, the Court liberally construes petitioner’s filings and “‘afford[s] the

petitioner the benefit of any doubt.’” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bretz v.

Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc)).

speedy trial rights; and stems from the state court’s refusal to accept his pro se filings. Id. at 3-5.

Petitioner asks this Court to issue a TRO enjoining the psychiatric evaluation, order respondents to

show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue; issue a writ of habeas corpus declaring

that the involuntary psychiatric evaluation violates petitioner’s constitutional rights; enjoin

respondent from ordering any involuntary psychiatric treatment, medication, or commitment pending

resolution of the underlying criminal case; and grant any other relief the Court deems just. Id. at 6.

DISCUSSION

The Court cannot reach the merits of petitioner’s claims because they are barred by the abstention

doctrine articulated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). “Younger abstention is a common law

equitable doctrine holding that a federal court generally should refrain from interfering with a pending state

court proceeding.” Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654, 699 n.4 (9th Cir. 2004). Younger

abstention applies “when ‘(1) there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) the proceeding implicates

important state interests; (3) there is an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional

challenges; and (4) the requested relief seeks to enjoin or has the practical effect of enjoining the ongoing

state judicial proceeding.’” Betschart v. Oregon, 103 F.4th 607, 617 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Page v. King,

932 F.3d 898, 901-02 (9th Cir. 2019)). However, even if these requirements are met, federal courts should

not abstain “if there is a ‘showing of bad faith, harassment, or some other extraordinary circumstance that

would make abstention inappropriate.’” Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 765-66 (9th Cir. 2018)

(quoting Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 435 (1982)).

Here, all four Younger factors are met. First, petitioner’s criminal prosecution in Lane County

Circuit Court was initiated months before this case was filed and is an ongoing state judicial proceeding.

See State of Oregon v. Lohr, Case No. 26CR11516 (Lane Cnty. Cir. Ct.) (filed Feb. 27, 2026). Second,

criminal prosecutions are the height of state interests that Younger abstention is designed to protect—

indeed, Younger itself concerned a state criminal prosecution. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 38-41. Third,

petitioner has adequate opportunities to raise constitutional challenges. He was able to pursue his

constitutional claims through a mandamus petition to the Oregon Supreme Court, which he filed on April

24, 2026. See State of Oregon v. Lohr, Case No. S072882 (Or. Supreme Ct.); see also Bean v. Matteucci,

986 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2021) (agreeing with district court’s conclusion that the ability to raise a

constitutional challenge through a mandamus petition to the Oregon Supreme Court satisfied the third

Younger factor even where that petition was denied). If he believes that the trial court has violated

constitutional rights that implicate the integrity of the proceedings—e.g., by not permitting self-

representation consistent with Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835-36 (1975)—he also has the right to

appeal. See Stockton v. Brown, 152 F.4th 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2025) (an appeals process “affords litigants

an ‘adequate opportunity to raise [their] constitutional claims’” (quoting Alsager v. Bd. of Osteopathic Med.

& Surgery, 573 F. App'x 619, 620-21 (9th Cir. 2014))). Fourth and finally, petitioner effectively asks the

Court to enjoin the ongoing criminal prosecution against him. See Pet. 6. A psychiatric evaluation is a

necessary precursor to determining both whether a defendant is able to aid and assist defense counsel during

trial and whether he can knowingly waive his right to counsel; enjoining such an evaluation would prevent

these critical determinations and functionally enjoin the prosecution as a whole. Cf. Bean, 986 F.3d at 1133

(agreeing with the district court’s conclusion that invalidating an involuntary medication order “would have

the practical effect of enjoining the state criminal proceeding”). Therefore, Younger abstention applies here

unless there is an “extraordinary circumstance that would make abstention inappropriate.” Middlesex Cnty.

Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. at 435.

There are no extraordinary circumstances that make Younger abstention inappropriate here. In

Bean, although the Ninth Circuit found that the Younger factors were satisfied, it “recognized an irreparable

harm exception to Younger” and applied it in the context of involuntary medication orders. Bean, 986 F.3d

at 1133-34 (citing World Famous Drinking Emporium, Inc. v. City of Tempe, 820 F.2d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir.

1987)). However, the irreparable harm is in involuntary psychiatric medication, not an involuntary

evaluation. See id. at 1134-36. This is because the “forcible injection of medication represents a

‘substantial interference with [a] person's liberty.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Riggins v. Nevada,

504 U.S. 127, 134 (1992)). The Court does not find that a psychiatric evaluation presents a similar

interference with petitioner’s liberty. Indeed, a psychiatric evaluation is core to the due process that

petitioner invokes with respect to involuntary psychiatric medication. See, eg., Sell, 539 U.S. at 179

(holding that a defendant may be involuntarily medicated to restore competence “only if the treatment is

medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the

trial, and, taking into account of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly to further important

governmental trial-related interests”—factors that often require a psychiatric evaluation). Further, the

Ninth Circuit has expressly distinguished an attempt to interfere with the state court’s Sell proceedings,

which are subject to Younger, and a petition to prevent or discontinue involuntary medication after such

proceedings were concluded, which is not. Bean, 986 F.3d at 1135-36; see also Pagtakhan vy. Foulk, No.

C 09-5495 SI (pr), 2010 WL 3769282, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2010) (concluding that Younger precludes

federal courts from interfering with a state court’s consideration of an involuntary medication petition

before it is decided). Therefore, petitioner’s claims are subject to Younger abstention and are appropriately

dismissed.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, plaintiff’s request for a temporary restraining order barring a

psychiatric evaluation, ECF 1, is DENIED. Because the possibility that petitioner may be subjected to

involuntary psychiatric medication or confinement in a manner that violates his constitutional rights is

speculative, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED. This dismissal is without prejudice to

petitioner’s ability to file a subsequent suit in federal court if cognizable constitutional issues become

concrete.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 15th day of May, 2026.

Adrienne Nelson

United States District Judge