Alderman

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF OREGON

JUSTIN ALDERMAN, Case No. 6:26-cv-00952-MTK

Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER

v.

ALFALFA FIRE DISTRICT, et al.,

Defendants.

KASUBHAI, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Justin Alderman, a Prineville journalist, brings a series of pro se claims under

the First Amendment against the Alfalfa Fire District (“District”), several of its officers, and

several of its board members. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 2, 7-13; 26-35, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants violated his First Amendment rights by, among other things, excluding his in-person

attendance of the District’s public meetings, limiting his and others’ access to the Distrct’s

facilities, and retaliated against him for reporting on the District. Compl., 26-35. Plaintiff filed an

Emergency Ex Parte Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order to restore his access to the

meetings and the premises. For the reasons below, Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary

Restraining Order is granted in part. The Court does not reach Plaintiff’s Motion for a

Preliminary Injunction, filed in the same brief as the Temporary Restraining Order, to allow

Defendant an opportunity to respond.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges the following facts. Plaintiff investigates the District and attends public

meetings at the District’s fire station. E.g., Compl. 4-6, 8. Plaintiff attended the District’s April 8,

2026, public meeting. See Compl. ¶¶ 45-51. In that meeting, the District adopted a public

meeting and facility security policy (“Policy”). Compl. ¶ 46, Ex. 1 (“Resolution 2026-4”) ECF

No. 1-1. The Policy allows public access to District facilities during public meetings but limits

access to the duration of public meetings. Resolution 2026-4. After the public meeting ends,

“individuals must promptly exit interior facilities and any restricted operational areas.”

Resolution 2026-4. The policy also limits access to exterior areas like parking lots and access

routes “as necessary to ensure safe operations.” Resolution 2026-4. If an individual violating the

Policy refuses to leave after being directed to leave, they may be subject to trespass enforcement.

Resolution 2026-4.

After the meeting ended, Plaintiff sought comment from District board members relating

to his investigations of the District. Compl. ¶ 48. District officials ordered Plaintiff to leave, and

he exited the building where the meeting took place. Compl. ¶¶ 48-51. Plaintiff then discussed

the District’s activities with a member of the public. Compl. ¶¶ 51, 53. A District official ordered

Plaintiff to move outside of the fire station property if they wanted to continue their

conversation. Compl. ¶ 55. Plaintiff moved near two parked vehicles and continued his

conversation with the member of the public until a District official warned the District would

enforce its newly adopted Policy if needed. Compl. ¶¶ 56-64. The member of the public left, but

Plaintiff remained, believing he was in a publicly accessible space and not interfering with the

District. Compl. ¶ 65-66. A second District official told Plaintiff that he would call law

enforcement if Plaintiff did not leave. Compl. ¶ 68. Plaintiff remained, and law enforcement

officials arrived, stating that they were going through the process to issue a trespass to Plaintiff.

Compl. ¶¶ 70-74. After Plaintiff refused to leave, A law enforcement official told Plaintiff that

he would be arrested if he did not leave. Compl. ¶ 74. Plaintiff then left. Compl. ¶ 75.

Plaintiff returned to the fire station on April 9th, 2026, to research and seek comments

from District officials regarding his investigation into allegations of the District’s nepotism and

misuse of funds. Compl. ¶ 82. District officials refused to speak with Plaintiff and demanded that

he leave. Compl. ¶¶ 83-84. Plaintiff left briefly but returned to record who was coming and going

from the station. Compl. ¶¶ 87-89. Plaintiff eventually left the fire station later that day. Compl. ¶

90

Plaintiff continued to investigate and report on the District, publishing an article

discussing the District’s alleged violation of election law on April 24, 2026. Compl. ¶¶ 92-99.

On April 27, Plaintiff filed a complaint in Deschutes County Circuit Court alleging that the

District violated Oregon’s public meeting laws. Compl. ¶ 102.

On the same day, an attorney representing the District sent Plaintiff a “FORMAL

NOTICE OF TRESPASS” citing Plaintiff’s alleged violation of the Policy. Compl. Ex. 2

(“Trespass Notice”) ECF No. 1-2. The Notice prohibits Plaintiff from being on the District’s

premises and warns that Plaintiff would face criminal trespass charges if he entered the District’s

premises. Trespass Notice.

Plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining order preventing the District from enforcing the

challenged policy, generally, and, specifically, the formal notice of trespass against Plaintiff.

STANDARDS

In deciding whether to grant a motion for temporary restraining order, courts look to

substantially the same factors that apply to a court’s decision on whether to issue a preliminary

injunction. See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th

Cir. 2001). A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon

a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Defense Council,

Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction generally must show

that: (1) he or she is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) he or she is likely to suffer irreparable

harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in his or her favor; and

(4) that an injunction is in the public interest. Id. at 20 (rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s earlier rule

that the mere “possibility” of irreparable harm, as opposed to its likelihood, was sufficient, in

some circumstances, to justify a preliminary injunction).

The Supreme Court’s decision in Winter, however, did not disturb the Ninth Circuit’s

alternative “serious questions” test. All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131-32

(9th Cir. 2011). Under this test, “‘serious questions going to the merits’ and a hardship balance

that tips sharply toward the plaintiff can support issuance of an injunction, assuming the other

two elements of the Winter test are also met.” Id. at 1132. Thus, a preliminary injunction may be

granted “if there is a likelihood of irreparable injury to plaintiff; there are serious questions going

to the merits; the balance of hardships tips sharply in favor of the plaintiff; and the injunction is

in the public interest.” M.R. v. Dreyfus, 697 F.3d 706, 725 (9th Cir. 2012).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff brings his First Amendment claims under Section 1983 against the District and

seven of its individual officers and board members in their individual capacity. Compl. ¶¶ 6-12.

The Court considers only Plaintiff’s claim against the District for purposes of the Temporary

Restraining Order because the relief plaintiff seeks flows from that claim. Plaintiff alleges that

the Policy and its enforcement against him result from official practices and decisions of the

District, and that District acted under color of state law. Compl. ¶¶ 184, 185. Plaintiff seeks a

temporary restraining order to allow his attendance at the May 13, 2026, public meeting set for

5:00 PM.

I. Balance of Hardships and the Public Interest

The Court finds that the imminent violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights

constitutes irreparable injury. Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (“It is

well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights ‘unquestionably constitutes

irreparable injury.’”) (citation omitted). The Court further finds that the balance of equities and

the public interest weigh in Plaintiff’s favor considering the importance of Plaintiff’s free speech

and free press rights and the comparable lack of injury to Defendants. See also id. “[I]t is always

in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.” (citation omitted).

The Court applies the serious questions test because the balance of hardships and the public

interest tip sharply in Plaintiff’s favor.

II. Serious Questions

For purposes of the temporary restraining order, Plaintiff challenges the constitutionality

of the Policy, arguing it (1) restricts access of public areas outside the fire station, restricts post-

meeting activities, and retaliates against him in violation of the First Amendment and (2)

unconstitutionally bans him from attending the District’s public meetings. The Court finds that

Plaintiff’s challenges relating to areas outside the fire station, post-meeting activities, and

retaliation require further record development and therefore declines to address it in this Order.

A. Freedom of Speech

Courts assess a government’s restriction on speech by examining whether the speech is

protected, whether the speech occurs in a public or non-public forum, and whether the restriction

satisfies the requisite standards. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S.

788, 797 (1985). A journalist’s participation in public meetings is likely protected speech. See

White v. City of Norwalk, 900 F.2d 1421, 1425 (9th Cir. 1990) (recognizing citizens “enormous

first amendment interest in directing speech about public issues”).

First Amendment protections are strongest in designated public forums, such as a public

park, because those places have been designated for public assembly and debate. Cornelius, 473

U.S. at 802. First Amendment protections are less robust in a limited public forum, which is a

public area “limited to use by certain groups or dedicated solely to the discussion of certain

subjects.” Reza v. Pearce, 806 F.3d 497, 503 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Pleasant Grove City, Utah

v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009)). Public meetings of public bodies are generally limited

public forums. See, e.g., White, 900 F.2d at 1425 (holding a city council meeting was a limited

public forum); Reza, 806 F.3d at 503 (holding state senate hearing was a limited public forum).

For purposes of this Order, the Court considers the District’s public meetings a limited public

forum because they occur inside the fire station, an area seemingly opened specifically for the

limited purpose to allow the public’s participation in the District’s business, much like a city

council meeting.

In a limited public forum, public bodies may “regulate not only the time, place, and

manner of speech . . . , but also the content of speech—as long as content-based regulations are

viewpoint neutral and enforced that way.” Norse v. City of Santa Cruz, 629 F.3d 966, 975 (9th

Cir. 2010). Restrictions must “comport with the definition of the forum,” be “reasonable in light

of the purpose of the forum,” and “not discriminate by viewpoint.” OSU Student All. v. Ray, 699

F.3d 1053, 1062 (9th Cir. 2012).

B. Prohibiting Plaintiff’s Attendance at Public Meetings

The District may reasonably restrict speech in its meetings to achieve legitimate goals

such as minimizing disruption in the meetings or addressing safety concerns. A categorical

exclusion from any public meeting based on isolated past incidents of investigation after past

meetings have concluded are unrelated to those goals. Nor may the District exclude Plaintiff

from public meetings for hypothetical disruptions or violations of this Policy based solely on this

past conduct. See Norse, 629 F.3d at 976 (stating “[a]ctual disruption means actual disruption”

when finding an exclusion from a limited public forum based on hypothetical disruption

unlawful); Walsh v. Enge, 154 F. Supp. 3d 1113, 1131-32 (D. Or. 2015) (finding prospective

exclusion from city council meetings based on allegations of past disruption unconstitutional).

The restriction on Plaintiff’s ability to attend public meetings is unreasonable in light of the

purpose of the public meetings (ostensibly, to facilitate public discourse and awareness of

District activity). See Reza, 806 F.3d at 505 (finding “imposing a complete bar on . . . entry into

[a limited public forum], clearly exceeds the bounds of reasonableness”). For the same reasons,

the District may not exclude Plaintiff from the access points and other areas as necessary to come

and go from the District’s public meetings.

The fact that Plaintiff may attend the District’s public meetings via video conference does

not cure the prohibition because it is insufficient to accomplish the public discourse encouraged

by the public meetings. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 516 (1981); see

also Walsh, 154 F. Supp. 3d at 1132-33 (explaining why teleconference access to city council

meetings was an insufficient alternative to attending them in-person).

Plaintiff has therefore shown serious questions that the District’s efforts to prohibit him

from public meetings at the fire station violate his rights under the First Amendment.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. The Alfalfa Fire District and any officials are enjoined from enforcing the Formal

Notice of Trespass against Plaintiff to exclude him from public meetings or other

District facilities used to come and go from the District’s public meetings within

thirty minutes prior to the beginning and after the end of any Public Meeting.

2. Plaintiff shall serve this Order and the underlying motion on the Defendants

forthwith upon entry.

3. No security is required under Rule 65(c) because “there is no realistic likelihood

of harm to the defendant from enjoining [its] conduct.” Jorgensen v. Cassiday,

320 F.3d 906, 919 (9th Cir. 2003).

4. A hearing on a preliminary injunction will be held on May 26, 2026, at 9:30 AM,

at the Wayne L. Morse U.S. Courthouse, 405 East Eighth Avenue, Eugene,

Oregon 97401 in Courtroom 1. Defendants may appear and move to dissolve or

modify this Order on two days’ notice or such shorter notice as the Court may

set.

5. This Order shall remain in effect for fourteen days from entry, unless extended

for good cause shown or by consent of the adverse party.

DATED this 13th day of May 2026.

s/ Mustafa T. Kasubhai

MUSTAFA T. KASUBHAI (he/him)

United States District Judge