BOODOO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ANDREW BOODOO )

)

Plaintiff, ) Civil Action No. 24-1056

)

v. ) District Judge Nora Barry Fischer

)

AMP HOME CARE LLC )

doing business as AMP )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE

I. INTRODUCTION

As noted in this Court’s Memorandum Opinion denying Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (ECF No. 41), this civil action arises from Plaintiff Andrew Boodoo’s (“Plaintiff” or

“Boodoo”) employment and subsequent termination from Defendant AMP Home Care LLC, doing

business as AMP (“Defendant” or “AMP”). Plaintiff alleges religious discrimination, failure to

accommodate and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”)

(Count I); sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII (Count II); and religious

discrimination, failure to accommodate, sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of the

Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”) (Count IV). (Amended Complaint, ECF No. 26).

Presently before the Court are the parties’ Motions in Limine, their responsive briefings,

and supportive exhibits. (ECF Nos. 68-69, 71-72, 77-80). Said motions having been fully briefed,

the Court having heard Oral Argument on April 8, 2026, and after having received and reviewed

the transcript of Oral Argument (ECF No. 85), the motions will be granted, in part, and denied, in

part, as discussed herein.

II. FACTUAL HISTORY

The factual history of this litigation has been presented in the parties’ prior filings and this

Court’s Opinion on Summary Judgment (ECF No. 41). As such, the Court highlights those facts

pertinent to the instant Motions in Limine. The subject claims arise from Plaintiff’s employment

with Defendant AMP, a licensed provider of residential and supportive services for individuals

with intellectual disabilities, operating under the oversight of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

(ECF No. 41 at 2). Plaintiff began his employment with AMP in December 2023 as a Team Lead.

(Id. at 3). He was assigned to work the 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. shift, Monday through Friday. (Id.).

At AMP’s Liberto Site, Plaintiff was responsible for providing services to two adult residents with

intellectual disabilities. (Id. at 4). He was trained on the rights of individuals receiving services,

on prevention of neglect, and on procedures related to emergency shift coverage. (Id.). According

to AMP management and other employees, Plaintiff was qualified for his job and performed it

well. (Id. at 5).

Plaintiff testified that throughout his employment from early December 2023 until his

termination near the end of February 2024, he was the victim of Tarashae Butler’s (“Butler”)

sexual harassment. (Id.). Butler’s sexual comments and conduct were also witnessed by other

employees. (Id. at 6). In response to Butler’s sexual advances, Plaintiff told her to stop but she

failed to do so. (Id. at 7). Despite his complaints to management, nothing changed, and Butler’s

behavior continued. (Id. at 8).

Plaintiff identifies his religion as Santeria. (Id. at 8). In his religion, a full moon is

significant because it is a time to communicate with spirits and provide certain offerings for

blessings and release trauma from ancestors. (Id.). Prior to the events leading to his termination,

Plaintiff informed Butler about his religion. (Id.). These events are described in the Court’s

Summary Judgment Opinion as follows:

On February 23, 2024, Plaintiff was scheduled to work the 8:00 a.m. to 4:00

p.m. shift. Butler contacted Plaintiff and requested that he work the following shift,

which was 4:00 p.m. to 12:00 a.m. . . . Butler told Plaintiff that if he did not stay

and work the 4:00 p.m. to 12:00 a.m. shift, she would no longer give him extra

shifts. Plaintiff initially told Butler he could not do so because he had religious

obligations that night. After Butler kept asking him, he agreed to work the 4:00

p.m. to 12:00 a.m. shift because Defendant was short-staffed. Plaintiff needed to

leave by 12:00 a.m., however, because it was a full moon on February 24, 2024,

and he needed to be home to engage in his religious practices . . . .

Throughout the afternoon shift on February 23, 2024, Butler repeatedly

reached out to Plaintiff and asked if he could stay and work the 12:00 a.m. to 10:00

a.m. shift, for which he was not scheduled. Butler then told Plaintiff that she was

supposed to work the 12:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. shift but that she didn’t want to work

that shift because she “wanted to get drunk” that night. During a phone call with

Butler at approximately 5:00 p.m. on February 23, 2024, Plaintiff informed Butler

that he could not work the overnight shift because of his religious beliefs. Plaintiff

also sent text messages to Butler indicating his inability to work the overnight shift

because of his religious obligations. Butler responded to Plaintiff’s text message

stating that she was mandating him to stay. Plaintiff replied that he was going to

contact HR or [his supervisor] Ireland.

Plaintiff then reached out to Ireland and explained that he had previously

told Butler he could not work the overnight shift “due to religious practices,” that

his “religious practices conflict with work,” and that he had already worked 24-

hours straight, including agreeing to help out by working the 4:00 p.m. to 12:00

a.m. shift (at Butler’s request), despite that he was not scheduled for the shift.

Ireland responded that he should not be contacting her, that he was acting

inappropriately and that, if he leaves, she will contact the police. In addition to

sending her text messages, Plaintiff also called Ireland several times, but Ireland

did not answer or return his calls. Butler then told Plaintiff that she was mandating

that he stay for the 12:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. shift. During these events, Butler was

the on-call supervisor and responsible for ensuring coverage at each of the six

houses she oversees. If she cannot find coverage, she is responsible for covering

the shift.

At 11:18 p.m., Plaintiff texted Butler to inform her that he would wait until

12:15 a.m. for coverage to arrive and would text her at that time if coverage did not

arrive. At 11:28 p.m., Butler texted Plaintiff that if he leaves his clients alone, AMP

is required to call the police and he would be terminated. Butler arranged for an

individual to relieve Plaintiff and followed up with Plaintiff at 11:40 p.m. indicating

that his relief was coming from New Kensington but would not arrive until 12:30

a.m. At 12:15 p.m. Plaintiff texted Butler that coverage had not arrived. Plaintiff

left the Site at 12:15 a.m. His replacement arrived at 12:17 a.m.

AMP issued a termination letter to Plaintiff dated Monday, February 26,

2024, citing neglect under state regulations because he left two intellectually

disabled adult individuals alone.

(ECF No. 41 at 9-11).

III. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD

Evidence is “relevant” if it has any tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less

probable than it would be without the evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 401. And relevant evidence is

admissible unless the Constitution, a federal statute, another Rule of Evidence, or another rule of

the Supreme Court provides otherwise. Fed. R. Evid. 402. Moreover, the “definition of relevant

evidence is very broad.” Gibson v. Mayor & Council of Wilmington, 355 F.3d at 215, 232 (3d Cir.

2004). “Because the rule makes evidence relevant ‘if it has any tendency to prove a consequential

fact, it follows that evidence is irrelevant only when it has no tendency to prove the fact.’” Blancha

v. Raymark Industries, 972 F.2d 507, 514 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting 22 Charles A. Wright & Kenneth

W. Graham, r., Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 5166, at 74 n.47 (1978)).

A court may, however, “exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially

outweighed by a danger of … unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury …” Fed.

R. Evid. 403. Evidence is “unfairly prejudicial if it ‘appeals to the jury’s sympathies, arouses its

sense of horror, provokes its instinct to punish, or otherwise ‘may cause a jury to base its decision

on something other than the established propositions in the case.’” Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961,

972 (3d Cir. 1980). The regard for potential prejudice is tempered by the observation that

“probative evidence of discriminatory intent will necessarily prejudice the defendant’s case. . . .

[T]he question is whether it will do so unfairly.” Pleasants v. Allbaugh, 285 F. Supp. 2d 53, 55

(D.D.C. 2003); see also Advisory Committee Note, Fed. R. Evid. 403 (1972) (“A great deal of

evidence is prejudicial to one side or the other. . . . ‘Unfair prejudice’ means ‘an undue tendency

to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one’”).

As further noted by the Advisory Committee, “[t]he question is whether the probative value of the

evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Id. (emphasis added).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Motions in Limine

1. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Reference to Plaintiff’s Withdrawn

Claim of Retaliation in Violation of the Adult Protective Services Act (“APSA”)

(ECF No. 68).

Plaintiff seeks to exclude Defendant’s attempt at trial to reference Plaintiff’s withdrawn

claim of retaliation in violation of the Adult Protective Services Act (“APSA”), and any reference

showing that Plaintiff made post-termination complaints to the Pennsylvania Department of Health

about Defendant’s alleged abuse of residents. He contends that such evidence is irrelevant and

will only confuse the jury. (ECF No. 68). Defendant responds that such evidence is necessary to

present a comprehensive picture of the facts for the jury’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s claims. (ECF

No. 78).

At oral argument, Plaintiff’s Counsel emphasized that Plaintiff is not claiming he was

terminated because he made these reports to the Department of Health and so they are irrelevant

to the trial of this action. (ECF No. 85 at 5-6). He adds that if such evidence were to come in, it

would be extremely prejudicial in that the jury may conclude that Plaintiff’s other claims are also

without merit and that Plaintiff is a litigious individual. (Id.) AMP’s Counsel argued that

Plaintiff’s Complaint makes much of the fact that he had become vocal in his last month of

employment and shared with AMP’s management that he believed there were significant problems

at AMP, including issues with understaffing and documentation, among others, and therefore,

these complaints go directly to Plaintiff’s credibility, and not to direct reports to any state agency.

According to AMP, without such evidence, the jury would hear an incomplete set of facts. (Id. at

7-9).

The Court agrees with Plaintiff that his post-termination complaints to the Department of

Health are not relevant to any issues in the case and that the probative value of introducing these

reports is substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice to the Plaintiff, conveying a

message to the jury that he is highly vindictive and a “complainer.” In effect, with the withdrawal

of his claim under the APSA, Plaintiff has effectively amended his Complaint which makes any

evidence related to reports to the Department of Health, the State, or any other entity, entirely

irrelevant. See Snyder v. Pascack Valley Hosp., 303 F3d 271,276 (3d Cir. 2002) (“An amended

complaint supersedes the original version in providing the blueprint for the future course of a

lawsuit.”). As such, and as clarified by Plaintiff at the conclusion of the hearing, all complaints

whether made post-termination or during his employment concerning abuse and neglect at AMP,

are no longer relevant to any remaining claim for trial and will be excluded. See ECF No. 85 at

36-37.

Accordingly, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Reference to

Plaintiff’s Withdrawn APSA claim and any other evidence concerning Plaintiff’s complaints about

abuse and neglect while employed by AMP.

2. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Reference to Allegations, EEOC

Charges, and/or Lawsuits Against Other Entities (ECF No. 69).

Next, Plaintiff seeks to exclude evidence relating to EEOC charges, other lawsuits filed

against other entities, and that Plaintiff was separated from employment from another entity. (ECF

No. 69). Plaintiff submits that this evidence is entirely irrelevant to the case at bar. It involved

unrelated employers and he is not alleging that anything that happened at AMP was in any way

related to what happened at his previous employer. (ECF No.69 at 2-3, 4-5). Plaintiff further

argues that such evidence would be extremely prejudicial in that a jury will likely conclude that

Plaintiff is a “serial plaintiff.” (Id. at 5). Again, Defendant responds that such evidence is

necessary for the jury’s proper evaluation of Plaintiff’s claims and bears directly on his credibility

and motive and is therefore admissible for permissible purposes pursuant to Federal Rule of

Evidence 404(b). (ECF No. 77 at 4). AMP also emphasizes that such evidence is proper

impeachment evidence as it demonstrates how Plaintiff’s narrative has developed over time which

necessarily relates to his credibility. (Id. at 5).

At the outset, the parties agreed at oral argument that any reference to EEOC proceedings

in this case or any other should be excluded. (ECF No. 85 at 12-13). To this end, the Court entered

an Order excluding this evidence from trial. (ECF No. 82).

As to any mention of Plaintiff’s lawsuit with The Honorable W. Scott Hardy in the Western

District of Pennsylvania at Civil Action No. 2:24-451, Plaintiff argued at the hearing that this

lawsuit is against a different employer, has nothing to do with AMP, and therefore has no relevancy

to the case at bar, and that any probative value is substantially outweighed by undue prejudice to

the Plaintiff. (ECF No. 85 at 10). Defendant’s counsel responded that he wants the opportunity

to mention the overlap between the two cases and to use this evidence to impeach Plaintiff’s

credibility, which AMP contends is a central issue in the case. (Id. at 13). Defendant suggested a

limiting instruction so that the evidence may be used for impeachment purposes. (Id. at 14).

Plaintiff insisted, however, that a limiting instruction will not remedy the prejudice because there

is no relevant factual overlap. (Id. at 15).

The Court finds that pursuant to Rule 403, any probative value of this evidence is

substantially outweighed by the possibility of confusing the issues and misleading the jury such

that their understanding of the evidence’s significance would require a “mini-trial.” The Court

agrees with Plaintiff that a limiting instruction will not remedy the prejudice to Plaintiff if evidence

of his other lawsuit is admitted. This prejudice includes confusing the jury and their prejudicial

conclusion that Plaintiff is a litigious individual. See Allen v. Peake, No. 08cv1055, 2009 WL

1362635, at *1 (W.D. Pa. May 14, 2009) (evidence of plaintiff’s previous whistle blower claim

and Merit Selection Protection Board litigation excluded as not relevant to plaintiff’s Title VII

retaliation claims); Moore v. University of Pittsburgh, Civil Action No. 02-1734, 2005 WL

8165154, at **1-2 (W.D. Pa. March 11, 2005) (evidence of prior litigation excluded as unduly

prejudicial because of possibility that jury will decide case on evidence not before it).

To this end, Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Plaintiff’s Lawsuits

against any other entities and that Plaintiff was separated from employment from another entity

will be granted.

B. Defendant’s Motions in Limine

1. Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Tarashae Butler’s

Personal Conduct (ECF No. 71).

AMP moves to exclude evidence of Butler’s personal conduct including her alleged

intoxication, interpersonal and workplace disputes, and alleged conduct toward clients, arguing

that this personal conduct is unrelated to Plaintiff, his employment, or AMP’s decision-making.

(ECF No. 71 at 3). Plaintiff responds that such evidence is extremely relevant as it relates to the

elements of Plaintiff’s claims, including pretext. (ECF No. 80 at 4-6).

At oral argument, Defendant contended that the introduction of evidence such as Butler’s

alleged intoxication, interpersonal conflicts, and her treatment of AMP’s clients is irrelevant

because there is no evidence that AMP’s decisionmakers relied on Butler’s conduct when

terminating Plaintiff, and because she is not a viable comparator. (ECF No. 85 at 18-19). Plaintiff

counters that this evidence is highly relevant because it shows that AMP failed to take prompt

remedial action when it learned of Butler’s inappropriate workplace conduct, and that record

evidence reflects that AMP had notice of her behavior as reported by Plaintiff and other AMP

employees. (Id. at 21-22). Plaintiff added that Butler’s workplace conduct goes to establishing

pretext via comparator evidence and that she is, in fact, an appropriate comparator. (Id. at 22-23).

Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that AMP didn’t follow policy as to Butler, but as it concerns

Plaintiff, AMP contends that it was following policy as its legitimate business reason for his

termination. (Id. at 23).

The Court agrees with Plaintiff. Evidence of Butler’s workplace conduct is highly relevant

as it relates to pretext/comparator evidence. Specifically, Butler’s many infractions of company

policy, including theft of client’s money, coming to work drunk and other abuses of residents did

not result in her termination. (ECF No. 41 at 18). Yet even though Plaintiff was held in high regard

such that he was awarded employee of the month (id. at 5), he was terminated for his one infraction

of leaving residents alone for two minutes. The relevancy of this evidence to the key issues in the

case far outweighs any prejudice to AMP.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the challenged evidence clearly meets the threshold of

relevance and Defendant has failed to show its probative value is substantially outweighed by the

danger of unfair prejudice or of confusing or misleading the jury. See Fed. R. Evid. 401(a) & 403.

Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Tarashae Butler’s Personal Conduct will

therefore be denied.

2. Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Butler’s Sexual Conduct

with Third Parties (ECF No. 72).

Similarly, AMP seeks to exclude evidence of Butler’s sexual conduct with third parties,

including sexual relationships, alleged flirtations or sexually suggestive discussions or references

to her sexual behavior, arguing that it is irrelevant as it does not concern Plaintiff. (ECF No. 72 at

6). Plaintiff responds that evidence of an employer’s culture may provide circumstantial evidence

of discrimination such that its asserted legitimate reasons for termination were merely pretext.

(ECF No. 79 at 4-5). Plaintiff further argues that this evidence provides compelling comparator

evidence because although Butler violated company policy and abused residents, she was not

terminated as was Plaintiff for allegedly violating policy in abandoning a client for two (2) minutes

while they slept. (Id. at 6).

At oral argument, Plaintiff emphasized that such evidence was relevant to Plaintiff’s sexual

harassment claim because a jury could infer that Butler was attempting to control Boodoo “and

have him under her thumb” for her own benefit. (ECF No. 85 at 31). Defendant argued that it is

irrelevant that Butler had sexual intercourse with other employees, turning the trial into a

referendum on Butler’s character, again engendering “a trial within a trial,” and evoking an

emotional reaction. (Id. at 28-29). Defendant concedes that any evidence related to Boodoo is

relevant, but evidence as to third parties is not. (Id. at 29).

The Court agrees that evidence of Butler’s sexual conduct with third parties that was

tolerated by AMP goes directly to Plaintiff’s claims of sexual harassment, and as evidence of

pretext. That is, evidence of an employer’s culture may provide circumstantial evidence of

discrimination. See Antol v. Perry, 82 F.3d 1291, 1302 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Ezold v. Wolf,

Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 546 (3d Cir. 1992) (“‘proof of a discriminatory

atmosphere may be relevant in proving pretext since such evidence does tend to add color to the

employer's decisionmaking processes and to the influences behind the actions taken with respect

to the individual plaintiff.’”)). This highly relevant evidence is not substantially outweighed by

any prejudice to Defendant.

Again, the Court finds that the challenged evidence clearly meets the threshold of relevance

and Defendant has failed to show its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of

unfair prejudice or of confusing or misleading the jury. See Fed. R. Evid. 401(a) & 403.

Defendant’s Motion in Limine will therefore be denied. An appropriate Order follows below.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 11th day of May 2026, for the reasons discussed above,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Reference to

Plaintiff’s Withdrawn Claim of Retaliation in Violation of the Adult Protective Services Act

(“APSA”) (ECF No. 68) is GRANTED. All evidence, including testimony, documents and

argument as to Plaintiff’s complaints concerning AMP’s neglect or abuse of residents during or

after his employment shall be excluded from the trial of this civil action.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Reference to

Allegations, EEOC Charges, and/or Lawsuits Against Other Entities (ECF No. 69) is GRANTED.

All evidence, including testimony, documents and argument relating to Plaintiff’s other lawsuits

or Plaintiff’s termination from another entity shall be excluded from the trial.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of

Tarashae Butler’s Personal Conduct (ECF No. 71) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of

Butler’s Sexual Conduct with Third Parties (ECF No. 72) is DENIED.

FINALLY, IT IS ORDERED that counsel for the parties shall meet and confer and file a

Joint Status Report by May 18, 2026, advising if they agree to (a) refer this matter back to ADR;

(b) request judicial settlement assistance in the form of a conference with the below-signed Judge,

or (c) continue to meet and confer toward settlement between themselves.

s/Nora Barry Fischer

Nora Barry Fischer

U.S. Senior District Judge

cc/ecf: All counsel of record