Maciejewski

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

EUGENE DIVISION

JOSHUA MATTHEW MACIEJEWSKI, Case No. 6:25-cv-00509-MC

Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER

v.

OFC. JULIO GARCIA-CASH,

OFC. CONNER O’LEARY,

Defendants.

MCSHANE, Judge:

Plaintiff Joshua Maciejewski brings this action against Defendants Officer Julia Garcia-

Cash and Officer Conner O’Leary, asserting several § 1983 claims for unlawful search and seizure

and excessive force. Am. Compl. 3–4, ECF No. 20. Defendants move for Summary Judgment.

Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 29. Genuine disputes of material fact preclude summary judgment.

Additionally, those disputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, mean that

Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion DENIED.

BACKGROUND

Defendants were assigned to a City of Springfield Police Department operation to prevent

retail theft. Cash Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 29-1; O’Leary Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 29-2. In this task force,

officers communicated with asset protection teams of several retail stores. On August 30, 2024,

members of the Asset Protection Team of a Springfield Target store informed Defendants that

Plaintiff exhibited behavior indicating that he could be engaging in theft-related activities. Cash

Decl. ¶ 7. Such behavior included picking items up and setting them down “so rapidly that it

became hard for members of the team to keep track of the items that Plaintiff had actually put

back,” remaining in the store for “an unusually prolonged period of time,” and exiting the store

after abandoning a filled shopping basket. Id. Defendants recognized these behaviors as similar to

those exhibited by people stealing from retail stores. Cash Decl. ¶ 10. Defendants also observed

Plaintiff leave the store “without completing a purchase and passing through all points of sale,”

which Defendants recognized as consistent with one who is stealing from a retail store. Cash Decl.

¶ 1.

Defendants stopped Plaintiff outside the store to investigate whether Plaintiff had stolen

anything. Cash Decl. ¶ 11. They identified themselves as Springfield Police Department officers,

provided their names, and informed Plaintiff that their contact was being recorded. Cash Decl. ¶12;

O’Leary Decl. ¶ 13. Defendant Cash inquired as to whether Plaintiff stole anything inside of Target

and Plaintiff answered in the negative; explaining that because of his OCD, he could not decide

what he wanted to buy. Dec. O’Leary Ex. 2; 1:18-1:40. Defendant O’Leary then questioned

Plaintiff as to whether he smoked methamphetamine that day, or whether Plaintiff had stolen

property on his person. Exhibit 2; 1:45-2:02. After stating that he had neither smoked

methamphetamine nor stolen anything, Plaintiff offered to empty his pockets. Defendants

informed Plaintiff that he needed to prove that he had not, in fact, stolen anything and asked for

Plaintiff’s identification. After Plaintiff (correctly) informed the Defendants that because he was

not under arrest, he did not have to identify himself, Defendants immediately told Plaintiff to place

his hands behind his back. Defendants handcuffed Plaintiff just under two minutes from their initial

contact with Plaintiff.

The parties spent the next several minutes arguing about whether Plaintiff had to identify

himself. Again, Plaintiff correctly informed the officers that because he was not under arrest, he

did not have to identify himself under Oregon law. At one point, Defendants informed Plaintiff

that if he had driven through a stop sign without stopping, they could detain Plaintiff until Plaintiff

identified himself. To which Plaintiff noted, “I haven’t run a stop sign.” Defendants then reached

into Plaintiff’s pocket and retrieved his wallet. Plaintiff informed the officers that they were

violating his rights and that he did not consent to this search. As Defendants rifled through

Plaintiff’s wallet, they confirmed that they were looking for his identification. After O’Leary found

Plaintiff’s identification, he put Plaintiff’s wallet back in Plaintiff’s pocket, stating that he had

found what he was looking for.

O’Leary Decl. Ex. 2; 2:03-6:38.

After finding Plaintiff’s identification, O’Leary called in Plaintiff’s name to dispatch. Upon

learning that Plaintiff had outstanding warrants for his arrest, O’Leary placed Plaintiff under arrest.

O’Leary Decl. ¶ 15. Upon searching Plaintiff pursuant to the arrest, Defendants did not find any

Target merchandise on Plaintiff.

LEGAL STANDARD

The court must grant summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact and

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue is

“genuine” if a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party. Rivera v.

Phillip Morris, Inc., 395 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A fact is “material” if it could affect the outcome of the case. Id. When

the moving party has met its burden, the non-moving party must present “specific facts showing

that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.

574, 586–87 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).

DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because they (1) had

reasonable suspicion to believe that Plaintiff was engaged in theft, (2) handcuffed Plaintiff “for

officer safety and to maintain control of the situation,” (3) were justified in searching Plaintiff in

order to identify him, and (4) did not use excessive force in handcuffing Plaintiff. Defs.’ Mot. 9–

16. In the alternative, Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualify immunity. Defs’. Mot. 16.

I. Section 1983 Claims

Plaintiff brings his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 claims require “(1) that a

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of State law.” Benavidez v. Cnty. of S.

D., 993 F.3d 1134, 1144 (9th Cir. 2021). Here, only the first element—whether Defendants

violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights—is at issue.

A. Reasonable Suspicion

Plaintiff argues that the communications between Defendants and Target’s Asset

Protection Team, in addition to other reported observations, fail to provide reasonable suspicion

that he engaged in theft. Pl.’s Resp. 6. The Court disagrees.

First, a seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and

asks a few questions. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991). A consensual encounter with

a police officer only ripens into a seizure when, under “all the circumstances surrounding the

encounter,” the “police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person

was not free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.” Id. at 439.

Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), an officer may briefly detain an individual based on

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and take reasonable steps to investigate that suspicion.

Such a stop must be “justified at its inception” and “reasonably related in scope to the

circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S.

675, 682 (1985). “The reasonable suspicion standard is not a particularly high threshold to reach.”

United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002).

Here, Defendants received information regarding Plaintiff’s behavior in Target—including

staying in the store an unreasonably long time and “repeatedly picking up and putting down

items”—from Target’s Asset Protection Team. Cash Decl. ¶ 8. This contemporaneous

information, provided not by an anonymous source but with individuals known to, and working

with, the officers, “lends significant support to the tip’s reliability.” Navarette v. California, 572

U.S. 393, 399 (2014). The asset protection team also sent Defendants pictures of Plaintiff. Cash

Decl. ¶ 8. Additionally, Defendants observed Plaintiff put down a basket filled with items before

exiting the store “without completing a purchase and passing through all points of sale.” Cash

Decl. ¶¶ 10–11. Defendants presented evidence that such behavior is consistent with individuals

attempting to steal from a retail store. Cash Decl. ¶ 10

Plaintiff submits no evidence in response, arguing only that the messages between Target

employees and Defendants were not submitted as evidence. Pl.’s Resp. 5. Each officer, however,

submitted a declaration, signed under threat of perjury, that they received the above information

from Target’s Asset Protection Team before stopping Plaintiff outside the store. Cash Decl. ¶ 8;

O’Leary Decl. ¶ 8. This information, supported by both the officers’ own observations and their

training and experience regarding retail store theft, provided the Defendants with reasonable

suspicion to conduct an investigatory Terry stop to determine whether Plaintiff had committed the

crime of theft. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273–74 (although an officer’s “hunch” of criminal activity does

not justify a stop, officers may rely on their training and experience to support inferences of

criminal activity). That Defendants ultimately determined that Plaintiff had not, in fact stolen from

Target does not somehow extinguish their reasonable suspicion at the time of the stop. Likewise,

that there could be perfectly innocent reasons for Plaintiff’s behavior does not deprive the officers

of reasonable suspicion to believe Plaintiff was engaged in theft. Navarette, 572 U.S. at 403.

B. Unlawful Search & Seizure

Plaintiff raises two arguments regarding unlawful seizure: (1) that any investigatory stop

turned into a de facto arrest when Defendants handcuffed Plaintiff, and (2) that Defendants’ search

of Plaintiff’s wallet was an unlawful search.

a. De Facto Arrest

The totality of the circumstances determines whether and when a mere investigatory stop

becomes an arrest. See Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir.1996) (noting each

case is fact-specific because there “is no bright-line rule to determine when an investigatory stop

becomes an arrest”). In looking at the totality of the circumstances, the Ninth Circuit examines

“two main components of the detention.” United States v. Edwards, 761 F.3d 977, 981 (9th Cir.

2014). First, courts consider the intrusiveness of the officer’s methods, judged by whether a

reasonable person would have felt the ability to leave after answering a few questions. Edwards,

761 F.3d at 981. Next, courts consider “the justification for the use of such tactics,” that is, whether

reasonable law enforcement officer would have “had sufficient basis to fear for his safety to

warrant the intrusiveness of the action taken.” Id. (quoting Lambert, 98 F.3d at 1185).

Here, Plaintiff’s liberty was not meaningfully restricted until he was handcuffed.

Generally, although handcuffing “substantially aggravates the intrusiveness of an otherwise

routine investigatory detention and is not part of a typical Terry stop,” the relevant inquiry remains

one of reasonableness under the circumstances. United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1289

(9th Cir.1982); but see Lambert, 98 F.3d at 1186 (“because we consider both the inherent danger

of the situation and the intrusiveness of the police action, . . . pointing a weapon at a suspect and

handcuffing him, or ordering him to lie on the ground, or placing him in a police car will not

automatically convert an investigatory stop into an arrest that requires probable cause”). In the

Ninth Circuit, “the use of especially intrusive means,” such as handcuffs, are only allowed “in

special circumstances” before turning a Terry stop into an arrest. Lambert, 98 F.3d at 1189.

Here, there is—at the very least—a genuine dispute of material fact whether legitimate

officer safety concerns justified Defendants’ decision to handcuff Plaintiff. There is no indication

that Plaintiff was a flight risk. The suspected crime of shoplifting from Target is not a violent

crime. Defendants had little reason to believe that Plaintiff was armed. These are all factors to be

considered in judging the reasonableness of an officer’s decision to handcuff a suspect during a

Terry stop. Id. The encounter occurred not in a dark alley, but in a well-lit area in front of a busy

retail store. The officers were not outnumbered and, despite disagreeing with Defendants’

recitations of Oregon law, a reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff posed no threat to Defendants.

Additionally, the declarations provided by Cash and O’Leary indicate that Defendants

handcuffed Plaintiff simply because they wanted to identify him (and not for any specific threat of

harm). Cash Decl. ¶ 14 (“Plaintiff refused to identify himself despite attempting to explain to him

the basis for our reasonable suspicion and need for his identity and as a result, Plaintiff was placed

in handcuffs to assist in our investigation.”); O’Leary Decl. ¶ 14 (same). Finally, the recording of

the encounter depicts a brief discussion where Defendants immediately handcuffed Plaintiff after

Plaintiff stated that he did not have to show Defendants his identification. Again, there is a question

over whether Defendants had any legitimate reason for handcuffing Plaintiff that would justify the

use of handcuffs in this situation.

b. Unlawful Search

Because Defendants do not—and could not—argue that they had probable cause to arrest

Plaintiff for the crime of theft, Defendants’ search of Plaintiff’s wallet was unlawful. This is so

because Oregon has no “stop and identify” law when officers only have reasonable suspicion.

Within the Terry framework, the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that

an officer’s request for identification does not, by itself, constitute a seizure under the Fourth

Amendment. Immigr. Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984). In fact, when an

officer has reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a Terry stop, the officer may ask questions

and take additional steps reasonably related to the investigation. Id. That said, “the Fourth

Amendment itself cannot require a suspect to answer questions.” Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of

Nevada, Humboldt Cnty., 542 U.S. 177, 187 (2004); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,

439 (1984) (noting that although an officer may ask a suspect questions regarding his identity

during a Terry stop, the suspect “is not obliged to respond.”); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 34 (White,

J., concurring) (noting that during Terry stop, suspect may be asked questions but “is not obliged

to answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest”);

see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 365 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) (Terry stops are

limited and “most importantly, the suspect must be free to leave after a short time and to decline

to answer the questions put to him”).

Although the Fourth Amendment does not allow an officer to require a suspect to identify

oneself, state law may require a suspect to identify themself during a valid Terry stop (because

such a request is reasonably related to the stop’s purpose, rationale, and practical demands). Hiibel,

542 U.S. at 187–88 (2004); Thus, any legal obligation to compel a suspect to identify oneself arises

from state law, not the Fourth Amendment itself. Id.

While many states have “stop and identify laws” permitting an officer to require a suspect

to disclose their identity under penalty of arrest, Oregon has no general “stop and identify” statute.

In Oregon, the duty to identify oneself (absent probable cause) generally arises only in the context

of traffic violations. However, Oregon declines to impose any stop and identify obligation for those

who, like Plaintiff, were not driving a vehicle.

ORS § 131.615 specifically outlines what conduct is permissible under a Terry stop in

Oregon. Pursuant to ORS § 131.615(1), the officer may stop the suspect and “make a reasonable

inquiry” for “a reasonable time.” Oregon’s law is analogous to Terry, limiting the stop to the

“immediate circumstances that aroused the officer’s suspicion,” things the officer learns during

the initial questioning, and any issues related to the safety of the officer or the public. Id.

Conspicuously absent from the statute is anything requiring a suspect to identify themself.

Although nothing prevents law enforcement officers from asking for identification, Oregon

law does not allow law enforcement to perform a search during a Terry stop unless the officer has

reasonable suspicion to believe the suspect is carrying a weapon. ORS § 131.625. Audio and video

of the encounter, along with the transcript, indicates that Defendants specifically sought out

Plaintiff’s wallet not because they believed it was a weapon, but because they wanted Plaintiff’s

identification card. For example, after handcuffing Plaintiff, the parties continued arguing over

whether Plaintiff had to identify himself. But Cash then starts looking for Plaintiff’s identification

and Plaintiff says “hang on. I don’t give you consent to search.” Tr. Ex. 3, 12; ECF No. 29-3. And

Cash replied, “That’s fine. I’m looking for your identity.” Tr. 12. Plaintiff protested, “You don’t

need my identity. So, listen, this is illegal. . . . I’m voicing this now. This is an illegal search of my

person.” Tr. 12–13. In a concise summary of the applicable law, Plaintiff then informs the

Defendants: “you have the right to remove anything that may be subject as a weapon or that you

may feel is a weapon.” Tr. 15. After Plaintiff again (correctly) warns O’Leary that O’Leary does

not have the right to remove his wallet, O’Leary reaches into Plaintiff’s pocket, removes the wallet

and states, “That’s fine. Do you have an ID in here? There we go. I’m going to put this back in

your pocket, because I found what I’m looking for.” Tr. 15. O’Leary then immediately relayed

Plaintiff’s name to dispatch. It appears that Defendants removed Plaintiff’s wallet not because they

viewed it as a potential weapon, but because they wanted to identify Plaintiff. Defendants do not

present any evidence, or even attempt to argue, otherwise.

Neither ORS § 131.615, nor § 131.625 permits law enforcement to require a suspect to

identify themselves or produce identification. Rather, the only Oregon statute that allows an officer

to do so absent probable cause is ORS § 810.410, which states that a police officer “may stop and

detain a person for a traffic violation for the purposes of investigation reasonably related to the

traffic violation, identification and issuance of citation.”1 ORS § 810.410(3)(b) (emphasis added).

Here, Plaintiff was not stopped pursuant to a traffic violation under ORS § 810.410, but for

suspicion of theft under ORS § 131.655. Accordingly, Defendants were not permitted to require

Plaintiff to identify himself or produce identification. Additionally, as demonstrated above, there

is evidence indicating that Defendants searched Plaintiff’s wallet not for any legitimate safety

concern, but for the sole purpose of identifying Plaintiff. Neither the Fourth Amendment nor any

Oregon law would authorized such a search.

C. Excessive Force

“The Fourth Amendment requires police officers making an arrest to use only an amount

of force that is objectively reasonable in light of the circumstances facing them.” Blankenhorn v.

City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 477 (9th Cir. 2007). “Determining whether the force used to affect

1 In fact, as noted above, O’Leary explained that if Plaintiff had run a stop sign, O’Leary could detain Plaintiff until

O’Leary identified Plaintiff. Tr. 10. To which Plaintiff responded, “I haven’t run a stop sign.” Tr. 10.

a particular seizure is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of

‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests’ against

the countervailing governmental interests at stake. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)

(quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)). When evaluating the government’s interest

in using force, the Court must consider “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect

poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting

arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. at 396. Ultimately, the issue is whether the totality

of the circumstances justified the force used. Id.

Under most valid seizures, such a minimal use of force (like handcuffing) would not rise

to the level of a constitutional violation. See Williamson v. City of Nat'l City, 23 F.4th 1146, 1152

(9th Cir. 2022) (“’yanking, pulling, jerking, and twisting’ a person whose legs are pinned

underneath a car seat” or lifting someone constitutes only a ‘minimal’ use of force, even where the

arrestee suffered injuries because of the force). There is no indication, at all, that the officers acted

with any intent to apply wanton or gratuitous levels of force. They did not yank Plaintiff’s limbs,

push him down, or aggressively wrestle him to the floor. In fact, even after being handcuffed, the

Parties continued to converse for several minutes without Plaintiff mentioning that he was in pain

or even uncomfortable in the slightest degree. However, there is an argument to be made that if

the search was not lawful, and if there was no threat to officer safety, then any amount of force

could be unreasonable. Therefore, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

excessive force claim.

II. Qualified Immunity

In the alternative, Defendants argue that even assuming that they violated any of Plaintiff’s

Constitutional rights, they are entitled to qualified immunity. Defs.’ Mot. 16.

“Qualified immunity attaches when an official’s conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Garza v. City of Salem, 690 F. Supp. 3d 1188, 1203 (D. Or. 2023). In resolving questions of

qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage, a court must undertake an individualized, two-

pronged inquiry. See Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1282 (9th Cir. 2000). The first prong

asks whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting injury, show that the

officer's conduct violated a constitutional right. See Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 655–56 (2014).

The second prong asks whether the right in question was “clearly established” at the time of the

violation. Id. at 656.

As demonstrated above, police officers around the country have been on fair notice, for

decades, that nothing in the Fourth Amendment requires a suspect to identify themselves during a

Terry stop. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 187; Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439; Terry, 392 U.S. at 34 (White, J.,

concurring); Kolender, 461 U.S. at 365 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring). Additionally, police

officers are expected to know of, and abide by, state laws. Therefore, any Oregon police officer

should know that (1) Oregon has no general “stop and identify” law and (2) ORS 131.615, which

outlines actions allowed during a Terry stop in Oregon, does not allow an officer to search for a

suspect’s identification absent probable cause.

Regarding the handcuffing of Plaintiff, there is a genuine dispute regarding whether

Defendants had any legitimate safety concern for handcuffing Plaintiff. If they lacked such

concerns, many cases, for decades, provided Defendants fair warning that the Fourth Amendment

prohibits “especially intrusive means” (i.e., using handcuffs) to physically restrict Plaintiff’s

liberty. Lambert, 98 F.3d at 1188–89. Additionally, there is a genuine dispute regarding whether

any use of force here, however minimal, was reasonable under these circumstances.

CONCLUSION

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 29, is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 12th day of May 2026.

_s/Michael J. McShane__________

Michael McShane

United States District Judge