Oskina

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MONROE DIVISION

TATIANA OSKINA #A221-389-591 CASE NO. 3:26-CV-01208 SEC P

VERSUS JUDGE JAMES D. CAIN, JR.

WARDEN LASALLE I C E PROCESSING MAG. JUDGE KAYLA D. MCCLUSKY

CENTER ET AL

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Before the Court is an Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and

Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 2) wherein Petitioner, Tatiana Oskina, requests an order from

the Court to immediately release her from custody, or in the alternative, order Respondents

to provide Petitioner an individualized bond hearing before an Immigration Judge, enjoin

Respondents from removing Petitioner to any third country unless and until (1) valid travel

documents are secured, (2) the receiving country formally accepts Petitioner, (3) Petitioner

is provided advance written notice, and (4) Petitioner is afforded a meaningful opportunity

to respond and contest such removal. Petitioner further requests that Respondents show

cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is a native of Russia. She alleges that she fled Russian after experiencing

persecution, violence and government targeting based on her perceived political views,

associations, and family background. Petitioner informs the Court that her stepfather, who

is partially Ukrainian, became the target of repeated harassment and abuse, which

eventually escalated into direct physical violence against her. Petitioner reported these

incidents to law enforcement who refused to intervene or provide protection, which she

contends demonstrates anti-Ukrainian hostility.

Petitioner further informs the Court that her other associations also encourage a

government interest in her. Specifically, she alleges that her boyfriend who had ties to

Ukraine was interrogated, and that the interrogators requested that he provide them her

personal information, including her phone number and residency. As such, Petitioner

suggests that this placed her under active government scrutiny. Petitioner comments that

her uncle, a lawyer in Russia, warned her that the police had her under surveillance.

Petitioner was arrested in Russia on October 6, 2024, by the authorities and detained

for about 15 days, wherein she was continuously interrogated, her phone was searched, and

she was accused of assisting Ukrainian families and following opposition content.

Additionally, she was denied necessary medical care following surgery and she was held

in harsh and degrading conditions. Petitioner believes she was under ongoing surveillance

and at risk of re-arrest.

Petitioner left Russia in December 2024, and fled to Turkey; she remarks that after

leaving Russia, police officers searched for her at the family residence causing her to leave

Turkey and go to Mexico. In Mexico, she was attacked and robbed, which prompted her

to leave immediately to come to the United States. Petitioner arrived in the United States

on December 30, 2024, and applied for asylum and related relief. The Immigration Judge

denied her application; Petitioner appealed the denial, which is currently pending.1

Petitioner remarks that the Immigration Judge found that her testimony was

consistent and she would more likely than not be arrested if returned to Russia. Petitioner

argues that if she is returned to Russia, she will be harmed. She complains that since her

arrival, she has been continuously detained for more than one year, and that her detention

has occurred without any individualized determination that justifies continued confinement

and without evidence that she poses a flight risk.

Petitioner appeared before an Immigration Judge for a bond hearing on May 2025,

but the Immigration Judge stated that it did not have authority to grant bond in her case,

and that if she continued to pursue bond, the request would be denied. Petitioner informs

the Court that she has no history of violence or criminal conduct. She is actively pursuing

asylum due to her associations with Ukraine, Russian law enforcement’s continued pursuit

of her whereabouts, and lack of protection for her safety.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Petitioner argues that her continued detention violates the United States’

Constitution and laws of the United States—specifically, the Due Process Clause of the

Fifth Amendment and the statutory framework governing civil immigration detention.

1 According to the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR)

https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/, the Department of Homeland Security filed their brief on

February 18, 2026, and Petitioner filed her appellant brief on February 25, 2026.

An applicant for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) or preliminary injunction

must demonstrate each of the following: (1) a substantial likelihood that his cause will

succeed on the merits, (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is not

granted, (3) that the threatened injury outweighs the threatened harm that the injunction

might do to the opposing party, and (4) that granting the injunction will not disserve the

public interest. Misquitta v. Warden Pine Prairie ICE Processing Ctr., 353 F.Supp.3d 518,

521 (W.D. La. 2018) (citing Piedmont Heights Civic Club, Inc. v. Moreland, 637 F.2d 430

(5th Cir. 1981)). The decision of whether to grant or deny a TRO lies in the district court's

discretion. Moore v. Brown, 868 F.3d 398, 402 (5th Cir. 2017). Courts should deny such

motions more often than not. Albright v. City of New Orleans, 46 F.Supp.2d 523, 532 (E.D.

La. 1999) (explaining that temporary restraining orders are “extraordinary relief and rarely

issued.”); see also Suburban Propane, L.P. v. D & S GCTX LLC, 2025 WL 2429087, at *2

(W.D. Tex. 2025) (holding that the extraordinary relief under Rule 65 must be

“unequivocally show[n].”); Anderson v. Jackson, 556 F.3d 351, 355–56 (5th Cir. 2009)

(“Only under ‘extraordinary circumstances’ will this court reverse the denial of a

preliminary injunction.”).

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A), “when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney

General shall remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days (in this

section referred to as the ‘removal period’).” Under Section 1231(a)(6), “An alien ordered

removed who is inadmissible[,] . . . removable[,] . . . or who has been determined by the

Attorney General to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of

removal, may be detained beyond the removal period and, if released, shall be subject to

the terms of supervision in paragraph (3).” In Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682, the Supreme

Court construed Section 1231(a)(6) “to contain an implicit ‘reasonable time’ limitation, the

application of which is subject to federal-court review.”

“[T]he Court construed § 1231(a)(6) to mean that an alien who has been ordered

removed may not be detained beyond ‘a period reasonably necessary to secure removal,’

533 U.S., at 699, 121 S.Ct. 2491 and it further held that six months is a presumptively

reasonable period, id., at 701, 121 S.Ct. 2491. After that, the Court concluded, if the alien

‘provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the

reasonably foreseeable future,’ the Government must either rebut that showing [with

evidence] or release the alien.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 843 (2018) (quoting

Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699).5 If removal is not reasonably foreseeable, “the alien's release

may and should be conditioned on any of the various forms of supervised release that are

appropriate in the circumstances, and the alien may no doubt be returned to custody upon

a violation of those conditions.” Id. at 700. Here, the Government has not had the

opportunity to rebut any presumption because it has not been served with Petitioner’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Additionally, this Court cannot rely solely on

Petitioner’s allegations without verifiable proof of the facts alleged in the Petition.

Petitioner has not provided any evidence, such as the Immigration Judge’s ruling or any

documents to substantiate Petitioner’s factual allegations.

Be that as it may, the Fifth Circuit has held that mandatory detention of a noncitizen

pending removal is authorized under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a), and that holding is binding on

this court. Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026).

Petitioner has been held in continuous detention since December 30, 2024. The Fifth

Circuit has spoken, and this Court is bound by its decision that detention is mandatory

under the statutory text. However, the Court notes that the Buenrostro-Mendez did not

address whether or not that Petitioner’s due process rights were violated by his detention.

The issue before that court was solely the statutory question concerning 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b).

See Jose Rogelio Cumbe Lema v. Mary De Anda-Ybarra, et al, Civ. Action No. 26-cv-249

(W.D. Tex. El Paso Div., 2/9/26). While this Court is hesitant to grant Petitioner’s request

for a temporary restraining order, the Court is concerned with the length of time that

Petitioner has been detained. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining

Order and Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 2) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the matter is referred to the Magistrate Judge

for consideration on an expedited briefing schedule and to issue a report and

recommendation as to Petitioner’s allegations that her detention is in violation of her due

process rights.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk serve a summons, a copy of the

Petition and a copy of this Memorandum Order by certified mail on the Warden of

Richwood Correctional Center, DHS/ICE through its Director, the United States Attorney

General and the United States Attorney for the Western District of Louisiana.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents answer the Petition within 21 days

following the date of service and file a memorandum of law addressing the issue of

Petitioner’s allegations concerning her procedural due process rights.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED in chambers on this 17th day of April, 2026.

. JAMES D. CAIN, JR. t

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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