Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’

Case No. 8:25-cv-01743-CAS-ADSx Date January 26, 2026

Title Erick Gallardo v. County of Orange et al.

Present: The Honorable CHRISTINA A. SNYDER

Catherine Jeang Laura Elias N/A

Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder Tape No.

Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Attorneys Present for Defendants:

Araksya Boyadzhyan Jesse Cox

Tanner Petchul

Proceedings: COUNTY OF ORANGE’S MOTION TO DISMISS

PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT (Dkt. 19,

filed on December 4, 2025)

I. INTRODUCTION

On August 7, 2025, plaintiff Erick Gallardo (“Plaintiff”’ or “Gallardo”) filed this

action against defendants County of Orange (the “County”’), Orange County Sheriff's

Department (“OCSD”), and Does 1 to 10. Plaintiff's complaint alleges three claims for

relief against all defendants: (1) violations of the Fourth Amendment pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983; (2) Assault and Battery; and (3) Negligence. Dkt. 1 (“Compl”).

On October 3, 2025, the County and OCSD (collectively, “County defendants”)

filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint. Dkt. 13 (“Mot.”). On October 20, 2025,

plaintiff filed a first amended complaint. Dkt. 14 (“FAC”). On October 24, 2025, the

Court denied as moot County defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint. Dkt.

15.

Following the parties’ stipulation, dkt. 16, on November 13, 2025, plaintiff filed

his operative second amended complaint, alleging three claims for relief against the

County and Does | to 10 (collectively, “Defendants”): (1) violations of the Fourth

Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) Assault and Battery; and (3) Negligence.

Dkt. 18 (“SAC”).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’

Case No. 8:25-cv-01743-CAS-ADSx Date January 26, 2026

Title Erick Gallardo v. County of Orange et al.

On December 4, 2025, the County filed the instant motion to dismiss plaintiffs

SAC. Dkt. 19 (“Mot.”). On December 29, 2025, plaintiff filed an opposition. Dkt. 20

(“Opp.”). On January 12, 2026, the County filed a reply. Dkt. 24 (“Reply”).

On January 26, 2026, the Court held a hearing. Having carefully considered the

parties’ arguments and submissions, the Court finds and concludes as follows.

I. BACKROUND

Plaintiff alleges that on or about August 10, 2024, he was a pedestrian walking

near Ladera Ranch in Orange County, California, when without warning or explanation,

officer or deputies with the defendant, herein identified as DOES | to 5, released a K9

canine upon plaintiff, resulting in serious injury to him, including but not limited to

wounds and bites on his arm that required staples and resulted in grave personal injuries

(hereinafter the “subject incident”). Compl. § 14.

Plaintiff alleges that at all relevant times, he posed no threat to DOES 1 to 5 or the

public; instead, plaintiff was merely a pedestrian going about his own day. Id. { 15.

Plaintiff alleges that he was not even privy to the existence of officers or deputies

at the time of the subject incident, and that DOES 1 to 5 released the canine when

plaintiff had his back towards them. Id. § 16.

Plaintiff alleges that he was unarmed, was not resisting, and was not utilizing any

force against anyone at the time the canine was released upon him. Id. § 17.

Plaintiff alleges that DOES 1 to 5’s actions releasing the canine upon plaintiff were

unreasonable, excessive, and conducted without provocation. Id. 18-19.

Plaintiff alleges that DOES 1 to 5 acted willfully, wantonly, knowingly, with

reckless disregard and deliberate indifference to the known consequences of their acts

and omissions, and purposefully with the intent to deprive plaintiff of his federally

protected nghts and privileges, and that they did in fact violate those rights and

privileges. Id. § 45.

Plaintiff alleges that the County is liable under Monell because the injuries

inflicted by the Orange County Sheriff's Department canine unit were the direct result of

the County’s longstanding customs, and practices regarding the deployment, training, and

supervision of K-9 teams. Plaintiff alleges that OCSD has for years maintained a pattern

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’

Case No. 8:25-cv-01743-CAS-ADSx Date January 26, 2026

Title Erick Gallardo v. County of Orange et al.

of unconstitutional K-9 apprehension practices, including releasing canines in

circumstances where no immediate threat existed or for apprehension, failing to provide

adequate warnings, permitting dogs to bite for prolonged durations, and allowing canines

to engage individuals who were not resisting, were already contained, or were not

suspects at all. Plaintiff alleges that “despite repeated incidents—such as the well-

publicized August 29, 2018 mauling of a County employee during an OCSD K-9

“building search’ training exercise—the County failed to implement corrective measures,

retraining, or discipline.” Id. § 26.

Plaintiff alleges that OCSD’s own policies mandate documentation and review of

every K-9 bite or injury, placing the County on actual notice of the dangerous practices of

its K-9 unit; however, the County remained deliberately indifferent to the constitutional

rights and physical safety of individuals with whom its deputies came into contact.

Plaintiff alleges that this deliberate indifference, failure to train, failure to supervise, and

failure to correct known unconstitutional practices was the moving force behind the

injuries suffered by plaintiff. Id. 4 26.

Plaintiff alleges that the County has a policy regarding use of canines; specifically,

“section 4D states “Canine Deployment will not be used to apprehend with contact, but

may be used to LOCATE the following.’” Id. § 31. Plaintiff further alleges that “Section

4 D also states that “Canines will not be utilized to apprehend with contact subjects who

are not presenting active physical resistance unless the subject is armed with a weapon

likely to cause death or serious injury or, attempting to evade arrest by concealing

himself.’”

Plaintiff alleges that despite the existence of this policy, the County failed to train

their officers and the continued custom of utilizing canines not consistent with their own

policies. Id. § 33.

Plaintiff alleges that there is a history of Officers in Orange County using

Canine/K-9 units to apprehend individuals who pose no threat to officers, and/or

dangerous use of force by these canines. See id. § 34-35 (citing

https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-In-dog-attack-20180905-story.html?).

Plaintiff alleges that DOES 6 to 10 are other municipalities, entities, and agencies

who employed DOES 1 to 5. Id. § 8.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘Oo’

Case No. 8:25-cv-01743-CAS-ADSx Date January 26, 2026

Title Erick Gallardo v. County of Orange et al.

Plaintiff alleges that despite that the County and DOES 6 to 10 knew or should

have known of the fact that these acts, omissions, decisions, practices, customs, both

formal and informal, were being carried out by its agents and employees, they have taken

no steps to prevent this course of conduct and have failed to take any disciplinary action

whatsoever against any of its employees or agents. Id. 4 56.

Il. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of the claims asserted in a complaint. Under this Rule, a district court

properly dismisses a claim if “there is a ‘lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence

of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.”” Conservation Force v.

Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t,

901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to

provide the ‘grounds’ of his “entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not

do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[F]actual allegations

must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.

In considering a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept as true all

material allegations in the complaint, as well as all reasonable inferences to be drawn

from them. Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). The complaint must be

read in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Sprewell v. Golden State

Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). However, “a court considering a motion to

dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than

conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can

provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual

allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009); see Moss v. United States

Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[F]or a complaint to survive a motion

to dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that

content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to

relief.”). Ultimately, “[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for

relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its

judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’

Case No. 8:25-cv-01743-CAS-ADSx Date January 26, 2026

Title Erick Gallardo v. County of Orange et al.

Unless a court converts a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary

judgment, a court cannot consider material outside of the complaint (e.g., facts presented

in briefs, affidavits, or discovery materials). In re American Cont’] Corp./Lincoln Sav. &

Loan Sec. Litig., 102 F.3d 1524, 1537 (9th Cir. 1996), rev’d on other grounds sub nom.

Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998). A court

may, however, consider exhibits submitted with or alleged in the complaint and matters

that may be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. In re Silicon

Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 986 (9th Cir. 1999); see Lee v. City of Los

Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001).

As a general rule, leave to amend a complaint which has been dismissed should be

freely granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). However, leave to amend may be denied when “the

court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading

could not possibly cure the deficiency.” Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture

Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986).

IV. DISCUSSION

The County moves to dismiss plaintiffs first cause of action against it under

Section 1983 for failure to state a claim. Mot. at 2.

First, the County argues that plaintiff fails to plead a Section 1983 Monell claim

because “Plaintiff's First Cause of Action again fails to allege facts even plausibly

suggesting that an actionable County “policy,” “practice,” or “custom” was the “moving

force” behind any constitutional violation.” Id. at 15. The County argues that “not once

does Plaintiff identify a single actual policy by name or number, nor does he discuss the

content of any purported policy. Instead, Plaintiff resorts to conclusory buzz-phrases and

empty rhetoric.” Id. (citing cases). Moreover, the County argues that plaintiff fails to

show that any unconstitutional custom or practice was so “persistent and widespread” as

to amount to an unconstitutional “policy,” and that “an isolated incident” alleged by

plaintiff is insufficient to support any municipal liability claim. Id. at 17-18. (citing

cases). The County argues that apart from the alleged incident involving plaintiff, the

SAC does not allege any specific facts showing that the County had an ongoing practice

or custom resulting in factually similar instances of violations of constitutional rights. Id.

at 19-20 (explaining that “a single, unrelated incident from 2018 in which a police K9 bit

a County employee during a training exercise” “bears no resemblance to Plaintiff's

allegations, which concern an on-scene detainment of a private individual.”). Id. at 20.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘Oo’

Case No. 8:25-cv-01743-CAS-ADSx Date January 26, 2026

Title Erick Gallardo v. County of Orange et al.

Second, as to plaintiff's claim of Monell liability under a failure to train theory, the

County argues that the claim is “supported by nothing more than vague and conclusory

allegations that never once inch close to factual allegations demonstrating how or why

County or OCSD training was inadequate” because plaintiff fails to “identify the

problematic training; to explain why it is inadequate; and to factually connect the

improper or inadequate training to Plaintiffs claimed constitutional injury.” Id. at 22

(citing cases). Moreover, the County argues that plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege facts

showing the County was “deliberately indifferent” to the rights of persons that officers

were likely to encounter. Id. at 23. Finally, the County argues that plaintiff fails to plead

sufficient facts demonstrating that “deficient training” caused other, similar incidents. Id.

at 23-24 (citing cases).

Finally, the County argues that plaintiff's motion should be dismissed with

prejudice because “Plaintiff has had three full and fair opportunities to plead his case” but

“has not come forward with the facts and theories necessary to maintain his Section 1983

Monell claim.” Id. at 25.

In opposition, plaintiff argues that his SAC adequately states a Section 1983

Monell claim. First, plaintiff argues that the SAC “identif]ies] a policy by the Orange

County Sheriff's Department, and identifies how despite such a policy, the County of

Orange tolerated a custom inconsistent with its own policies, reinforcing deliberate

indifference. (See SAC 429, 931-35).” Opp. at 4. Plaintiff contends that his SAC

“explains how those policies were routinely ignored in practice, and identifies a prior

incident and documented K-9 bite reports that placed the County on actual notice of

unconstitutional conduct. These allegations plausibly establish that the County’s failures

were the moving force behind Plaintiffs injuries. (SAC 935).” Id. at 6.

Second, plaintiff argues that his SAC adequately alleges a Monell claim under a

failure to train theory of liability because it states that the County had “a pattern of

unconstitutional K-9 apprehension practices, including ... failing to provide adequate

warnings, permitting dogs to bite for prolonged durations, and allowing canines to the

repeated use of the canines to engage individuals who were not resisting, were already

contained, or were not suspects at all.” Id. at 7 (citing cases).

In reply, the County argues that, with respect to plaintiff's claim of Monell liability

under an unconstitutional custom, policy, or practice theory, plaintiff may not rely on

anticipated discovery cure a facially insufficient pleading. Reply at 8 (citing cases).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘Oo’

Case No. 8:25-cv-01743-CAS-ADSx Date January 26, 2026

Title Erick Gallardo v. County of Orange et al.

With respect to plaintiff's Monell claim under a failure to train theory, the County argues

that “Plaintiff's theory is not supported by factual allegations that demonstrate how or

why County or OCSD training was inadequate, or that such inadequacies amounted to

“deliberate indifference.’” Id. at 10. Moreover, the County argues that plaintiff's “vague

allegations about training and alleging that officers did not adhere to it, or that officers

did not properly supervise other officers to ensure their adherence to training, is a far cry

from describing inadequate training in enough detail to indicate with certainty that it

actually exists, its substance, that it was the moving force behind a constitutional

violation, or that the need for more or different training was so obvious as to amount to

“deliberate indifference.’” Id. at 11 (emphasis in original).

Section 1983 provides for a claim for relief against a person who, acting under

color of state law, deprives another of rights guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution. “To

prove a case under § 1983, the plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the action occurred

“under color of state law’ and (2) the action resulted in the deprivation of a constitutional

right or federal statutory right.” Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).

Local government entities may be sued directly under § 1983. Monell v. Dep't of

Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). However, a municipal

defendant cannot be held liable for a Section 1983 violation caused by an individual

employee’s actions on a respondeat superior theory. Id. at 694; see also Board of County

Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (“We have consistently refused to hold

municipalities liable under a theory of respondeat superior”). Rather, under Monell,

municipal liability must be based on enforcement of a municipal policy or custom that

causes a plaintiff to be deprived of a constitutional right, not merely on the municipality's

employment of a constitutional tortfeasor. 436 U.S. at 691.

Generally, a plaintiff can demonstrate municipal lability for a constitutional

violation in one of three ways. First, he can show that a person or entity with final

decision-or policy-making authority within the municipality expressly adopted or

executed an unconstitutional policy or gave an unconstitutional order. See id. at 694:

Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986). Second, a plaintiff can prove

that his injury was the result of a municipal custom, 1.e., a practice “so permanent and

settled” as to constitute a “custom or usage” of the municipal defendant. See Monell, 436

US. at 691; see also Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481-82 n.10. Third, a local governmental

body may be liable if its failure to train employees has caused a constitutional violation

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘Oo’

Case No. 8:25-cv-01743-CAS-ADSx Date January 26, 2026

Title Erick Gallardo v. County of Orange et al.

and the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the nights of individuals with

whom those employees come into contact. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,

388-89 (1989). In order to withstand a motion to dismiss, a Monell claim must consist of

more than mere “formulaic recitations of the existence of unlawful policies, customs, or

habits.” Warner v. Cty. of San Diego, No. 10CV1057 BTM BLM, 2011 WL 662993, at

*4 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2011).

The Court finds that plaintiff sufficiently states a Section 1983 claim against the

County under Monell.

First, to establish a “custom or policy” for purposes of municipal liability, a

plaintiff must show that the municipal practice is “so pervasive as to have the force of

law.” Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443-44 (9th Cir. 1989); see

also Lopez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 2015 WL 3913263, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Jun. 25, 2015)

(“Only ‘a longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the “standard operating

procedure” of the local government entity’ will support the imposition of municipal

liability based on custom.) (quoting Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1147 (9th

Cir. 2005)). Plaintiffs SAC—detailing a police canine attack resulting from plaintiffs

own encounter with DOES | to 5 as well as an incident from 2018 in which a police

canine attacked a County employee during a “building search” training exercise—

sufficiently alleges that that the County tolerated or practiced an unconstitutional custom

inconsistent with its official policy on canine use.’ Although there are factual differences

between plaintiff's alleged encounter with DOES | to 5 and the 2018 incident, these

instances are sufficiently similar to constitute a pattern of constitutional violations arising

from canine attacks and such that the County has sufficient notice of plaintiff's Monell

claim under a “custom or policy” theory of liability. See Estate of Luna v. Orange

County Sheriff's Department, 2024 WL 3218649, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 2024) (“[F]Jor prior

instances to constitute a pattern, they must be sufficiently similar to the present

1 SAC 4 31 (“[S]ection 4D states ‘Canine Deployment will not be used to apprehend with

contact, but may be used to LOCATE the following.””; “Section [4D] also states that

“Canines will not be utilized to apprehend with contact subjects who are not presenting

active physical resistance unless the subject is armed with a weapon likely to cause death

or serious injury or, attempting to evade arrest by concealing himself.’” ).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘Oo’

Case No. 8:25-cv-01743-CAS-ADSx Date January 26, 2026

Title Erick Gallardo v. County of Orange et al.

deprivation such that the [public entity’s] failure to act to address the previous violations

constitutes a deliberate decision to deny the plaintiff constitutional rights.”).

Second, to state a claim for Monell liability based on a municipality’s failure to

train, a plaintiff “must identify the ... failure to train, explain why it is deficient, and state

how it harmed plaintiff.” Lopez, 2015 WL 3913263, at *7. A plaintiff must allege that

“in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees the need for more or

different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of

constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been

deliberately indifferent to the need.” Cty. of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).

Moreover, “[a] ‘pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is

ordinarily necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to

train,’ though there exists a ‘narrow range of circumstances [in which] a pattern of

similar violations might not be necessary to show deliberate indifference.’”* Flores v.

Cnty. of Los Angeles, 758 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). As

explained, because the SAC alleges at least two sufficiently related incidents of

wrongdoing by County officials, it puts the County on notice that its policy regarding use

of canines? is deficient and alleges that the County acted with “deliberate indifference”

with respect to such deficiencies. See Lopez, 2015 WL 3913263, at *7. While these

incidents may be insufficient to establish the County’s liability under Monell as a matter

? The Ninth Circuit referred to the “‘hypothetical example of a city that arms its police

force with firearms and deploys the armed officers into the public to capture fleeing

felons without training the officers in the constitutional limitation on the use of deadly

Flores v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 758 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation

omitted). This hypothetical recognizes “‘the possibility, however rare, that the

unconstitutional consequences of failing to train could be so patently obvious that a city

could be liable under § 1983 without proof of a pre-existing pattern of violations.’” Id.

Here, plaintiff sufficiently alleges that the consequences of failing to train officers’ use of

canines 1s “so patently obvious that [the County] could be liable under § 1983 without

proof of a pre-existing pattern of violations.” Flores, 758 F.3d at 1159. This is because

the failure to train officers on the use of canines is analogous to the failure to train

officers on the use of deadly force, both of which can result in life-threatening and

unconstitutional deprivations of rights.

3 See SAC 9 31.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘Oo’

Case No. 8:25-cv-01743-CAS-ADSx Date January 26, 2026

Title Erick Gallardo v. County of Orange et al.

of law, the Court finds that these matters are better decided on a more complete record on

a motion for summary judgment.

Accordingly, plaintiff adequately states a Section 1983 Monell claim against the

County under either a “custom or policy” or “failure to train” theory of liability.

V. CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, the Court DENIES the County’s motion to

dismiss.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

00 : 10

Initials of Preparer CMJ