Orr

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

CHRISTY ORR.,

Plaintiff, Case No. 2:26-cv-95

v. District Judge Edmund A. Sargus

Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson

JOSEPH ORR, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER AND REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Undersigned for consideration of Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed in

forma pauperis (Doc. 1), and the initial screen of her Amended Complaint (Doc. 4) under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 1) is GRANTED. All

judicial officers who render services in this action shall do so as if the costs had been prepaid.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). After conducting the required initial screen, the Undersigned

RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 4) be DISMISSED.

I. BACKGROUND

To start, Plaintiff filed an original complaint on January 23, 2026. (Doc. 1-1). On February

25, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, which adds new claims while keeping only some of her

original claims the same. (See generally Doc. 4). Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint supersedes her

original complaint, so the Undersigned considers the claims in the second complaint only. See

Calhoun v. Bergh, 769 F.3d 409, 410 (6th Cir. 2014) (“An amended complaint supersedes an

earlier complaint for all purposes.”) (quotation and citation omitted). Still, the Undersigned will

sometimes cite to Plaintiff’s initial complaint to provide additional context when describing her

claims. See Stewart v. Wayne Cnty. Prob. Ct., No. CV 23-12296, 2025 WL 699701, at *2 n. 3

(E.D. Mich. Feb. 10, 2025) (“[W]hile Stewart’s amended complaint in ECF No. 37 is the operative

complaint, the Court will sometimes cite to Stewart’s initial complaint to provide additional

context when explaining her claims”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:23-CV-12296,

2025 WL 698703 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 4, 2025).

Looking at those claims now, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint concerns two underlying

state court cases. The first is Plaintiff’s 2021 criminal case. She alleges that on December 12,

2021, her then husband, Joseph Orr, called the Morrow County Sherriff’s Office and filed a false

report against her. (Doc. 4 at 5). Based on Defendant Orr’s statements, Plaintiff was arrested for

domestic violence. (Id.). According to Plaintiff, Lieutenant Brian Newsome “approved the arrest

despite a personal conflict of interest.” (Id.). Plaintiff asserts a Fourth Amendment claim for

wrongful arrest against Defendants Orr and Newsome. (Id.). She seeks monetary damages. (Id.

at 11).

Once detained, Plaintiff says, she was “subjected to searches and detention procedures at

Morrow County Jail” including a full body x-ray, a mandatory shower in front of an officer, and

“issuance of jail clothing and placement in a cell.” (Id. at 5). For these actions, she alleges

violations of the Fourth Amendment due to unreasonable searches and conditions of confinement.

(Id.).

The second underlying case concerns Plaintiff’s divorce. On January 24, 2022, Defendant

Orr filed for divorce against Plaintiff. (Doc. 1-1 at 15). Magistrate Judge Celeste Brammer and

Judge Robert Hickson presided over the case. Relevant here, the Orrs hotly contested custody of

their children. (Id. at 15). According to Plaintiff, the custody dispute proceeded largely as follows.

Plaintiff underwent a psychological evaluation in February 2022, and the evaluator noted Plaintiff

had no history of alcohol and drug abuse, and that her post traumatic stress disorder should not

interfere with her ability to be a parent. (Id. at 17). Toward the end of 2022, Magistrate Brammer

ordered Plaintiff and Defendant Orr to sit for a psychological evaluation under O.R.C. § 3109.04.

(Id. at 8, 15–16). Plaintiff does not attach the results of her second evaluation. To help resolve

the custody dispute, the court appointed Stephanie Kreisher to act as guardian ad litem (“GAL”)

and represent the children’s best interests. (Id. at 8). At some point in the case, the GAL testified

on behalf of Defendant Orr. (Id.). Eventually, Magistrate Brammer awarded full custody to

Defendant Orr. (Id.).

Now, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from the actors involved in her custody battle.

(Doc. 4 at 5). Specifically, she sues the GAL for First Amendment retaliation for recommending

termination of Plaintiff’s visitation; and for Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process

violations for “maintain[ing] a dual role by serving as [GAL] while also acting as Director of the

. . . facility where supervised visitation occurred.” (Doc. 4 at 7–9). She asserts the same claim

against Magistrate Brammer for depriving her of her liberty interest in caring for her children. (Id.

at 7). She also asserts a Procedural Due Process claim against Magistrate Brammer for entering

inaccurate information in the divorce decree and inaccurately calculating child support obligations.

(Id.). She also sues Magistrate Brammer and Judge Hickson for Fourteenth Amendment “Judicial

Bias and Equal Protection” violations because they “demonstrated bias in proceedings involving

custody and protection orders.” (Id.).

For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint should be dismissed in its

entirety.

II. STANDARD

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must dismiss the Complaint,

or any portion of it, that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2). Pro se litigants’ complaints are to be construed liberally and held to less stringent

standards than those prepared by attorneys. Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004).

But this leniency is not boundless, and “it is not within the purview of the district court to conjure

up claims never presented.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 977 (6th Cir. 2012). At

bottom, “basic pleading essentials” are still required, regardless of whether an individual proceeds

pro se. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).

These essentials are not onerous or overly burdensome. A complaint must contain “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” see Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2), and provide the defendant with “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon

which it rests,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation omitted).

In reviewing Plaintiff’s Complaint at this stage, the Court must construe it in her favor, accept all

well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and evaluate whether it contains “enough facts to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Although this standard does not require “detailed factual

allegations, . . . [a] pleading that offers labels and conclusions” is insufficient. Id. at 678 (internal

quotation and quotation marks removed). In the end, the Court must dismiss the Complaint “if it

tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (internal quotation and

quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Having reviewed the Complaint, the Undersigned notes that many of the claims overlap.

Still, the Undersigned will address each.

A. Defendants Kreisher, Brammer, and Hickson

As an initial matter, Defendants Kreisher, Brammer, and Hickson should be dismissed.

Plaintiff sues these Defendants, two judges and a GAL, for monetary damages related to the acts

they allegedly committed in Plaintiff’s custody dispute. (Doc. 4 at 7). Judges and GALs are

entitled to absolute immunity from suit regarding actions committed in their official capacities.

Downing v. Rumer, 875 F.2d 863, 863 (6th Cir. 1989) (“Judges may not be sued for monetary

damages for acts relating to their official duties. It is well established that judges are absolutely

immune from suit.”); Kinter v. Boltz, No. 3:12-CV-85, 2012 WL 2871623, at *6 (S.D. Ohio July

12, 2012) (“Like judges, guardian[s] ad litem[] acting in their official capacities as advocates for

children are integral to the judicial proceedings and therefore entitled to absolute immunity.”).

Though Plaintiff sues Defendants Kreisher, Brammer, and Hickson in their individual and official

capacities (Doc. 4 at 11), it is clear that Plaintiff complains about actions that these Defendants

committed in their official capacities. Therefore, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that they be

DISMISSED.

B. Fourth Amendment False Arrest and Unreasonable Seizure

Turning now to Plaintiff’s other claims. The crux of the Amended Complaint is Plaintiff’s

Fourth Amendment claim for false arrest and unreasonable seizure, asserted under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. (Doc. 4 at 5). As best the Undersigned can tell, Plaintiff brings this cause of action against

Defendant Orr and Lieutenant Brian Newsome. (Id.). Her claims ultimately should not go through

as applied to any of these Defendants. The Undersigned analyzes each in turn.

1. Defendant Joseph Orr

Plaintiff first asserts that Defendant Orr violated her Fourth Amendment rights when he

“called the Morrow County Sheriff’s Office and filed a false report causing me to be arrested.”

(Id.). It is well-established that plaintiffs may not assert § 1983 claims against private individuals

acting as private individuals. Eubanks v. Brickstone Props., LLC, No. 1:14-CV-754, 2014 WL

5662434, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 4, 2014) (“Suit against a private actor may not be maintained

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”). Moreover, individuals who report crimes or call the police cannot be

held liable for the constitutional violations of the arrestee. See, e.g., Moldowan v. City of Warren,

578 F.3d 351, 399 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Providing information to the police . . . does not expose a

private individual to liability for actions taken under color of law.”); Leta v. Hamilton Cnty. Dep’t

of Job & Fam. Servs., 668 F. Supp. 3d 724 (S.D. Ohio 2023) (citing e.g., Fisk v. Letterman, 401 F.

Supp. 2d 362, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding “a private party who calls police officers for

assistance” cannot be held liable under § 1983 “unless the police officers were improperly

influenced or controlled by the private party”)), aff’d sub nom. Leta v. TriHealth, Inc., No. 23-

3406, 2024 WL 229563 (6th Cir. Jan. 22, 2024). These rules apply, even where a plaintiff alleges

that the statements an individual made to police were false. Carranza v. Cnty. of Cassopolis, Mich.,

No. 1:14-CV-887, 2014 WL 7051684, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2014) (dismissing constitutional

claims against private citizens because “the Tisers were acting merely as private individuals” when

they allegedly “made false statements to the police that resulted in her arrest and prosecution.”).

Here, Plaintiff sues her ex-husband, a private individual, for calling the police and filing a

false report that led to her arrest. (Doc. 4 at 5). Like in Carranza, nothing in Plaintiff’s complaint

indicates that Defendant Orr acted as an agent of the state in doing so. Carranza, 2014 WL

7051684, at *2. Nor does she allege that Defendant Orr committed any other act besides providing

information to the police. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot assert a wrongful arrest claim against her

ex-husband for calling the police and filing a report, regardless of the report’s veracity. The

Undersigned RECOMMENDS this claim be DISMISSED against Defendant Orr.

2. Defendant Lieutenant Brian

Next, Plaintiff asserts her false arrest claim Lieutenant Brian Newsome for “approv[ing]

the arrest, despite a personal conflict of interest.” (Doc. 4 at 5). Defendant Brian is a state actor,

but Plaintiff’s claims against him are nevertheless time-barred.

In Ohio, § 1983 claims have a two-year statute of limitations. Lee v. Underwood, No. 1:23-

CV-01716, 2025 WL 296026, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 24, 2025). And the statute of limitations for

a false arrest and unreasonable seizure of persons claim accrues “at the time the claimant becomes

detained pursuant to legal process.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 397, (2007). Spencer v. Adams,

No. 1:19-CV-873, 2019 WL 5956803, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 13, 2019) (interpreting Wallace to

apply in the context of unreasonable seizure claims).

Here, Plaintiff alleges she was arrested and detained for domestic violence on December

12, 2021. (Doc. 4 at 5). Thus, Plaintiff needed to file her Complaint no later than December 12,

2023. Lee, 2025 WL 296026, at *3; Fleet, 2016 WL 1241540, at *8. Because she did not file this

claim until January 23, 2026, Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment wrongful arrest claim is untimely.

The Undersigned RECOMMENDS this claim be DISMISSED.

C. Fourth Amendment Unreasonable Search and Conditions of Detention

Plaintiff makes another Fourth Amendment claim, this time arguing she was subjected to

an unreasonable search of her person and unreasonable detention procedures when she had to

undergo a full body x-ray and take a mandatory shower in front of an officer, upon her booking to

Morrow County Jail. (Doc. 4 at 5). She also claims that she was unreasonably forced to undergo

a drug test and psychiatric evaluation in February 2022. (Id.). Fatally, Plaintiff does not state

against whom she asserts these claims. “Since Plaintiff does not identify a Defendant against

whom he alleges this claim, the claim fails to state claim and will be dismissed.” Zain v. Osborne,

No. 4:10CV-P109-M, 2012 WL 435582, at *12 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 9, 2012) (citing Rizzo v. Goode,

423 U.S. 362, 375–76, (1976) (noting that to state a claim for relief, Plaintiff must show how each

Defendant is accountable because the Defendant was personally involved in the acts about which

he complains.))). Even if the Undersigned were to construe named Defendants here, Plaintiff’s

claims are also untimely.

Like seizures, the two-year statute of limitations for a Fourth Amendment unreasonable

search claim begins to run at the time Plaintiff knows or has reason to know about the occurrence

of the unconstitutional search. Codrington v. Dolak, 142 F.4th 884 (6th Cir. 2025). Plaintiff was

arrested December 12, 2021, and she was released from Morrow County Jail the next day. (Doc.

4 at 5). Because the alleged searches of her person occurred in the jail and “[f]ollowing the arrest”

(id.), the latest Plaintiff could have incurred a known injury was December 13, 2021. Thus, her

deadline to timely file this complaint was at the latest December 13, 2023. Because she failed to

do so by the deadline, her claim is again time-barred.

Her Fourth Amendment claim as applied to her drug test and psychiatric evaluation are

also untimely, for the same reasons. Plaintiff alleges she was forced to undergo these tests on

February 16, 2022. (Id.). Her deadline to file this claim was February 16, 2024. She again missed

this deadline, and this claim is again untimely.

So too is Plaintiff’s “unreasonable conditions of detention” claim, which she brings under

the same facts as her unreasonable search claim. The statute of limitations for this claim—oft

understood as an excessive force claim—accrues from the time the constitutional injury occurred.

Hodge v. City of Elyria, 126 Fed. Appx. 222, 224 (6th Cir. 2005). Again, Plaintiff’s injuries (i.e.,

enduring the conditions of detention) occurred on December 13, 2021, at the latest. She failed to

bring her claim by December 13, 2023, so this claim is time-barred.

For these reasons, Plaintiff’s second set of Fourth Amendment claims should be dismissed.

D. First Amendment Retaliation

Finally, Plaintiff brings a First Amendment retaliation claim against the GAL and

Defendant Orr. (Doc. 4 at 7). Because the Undersigned previously recommended dismissal of the

GAL on the basis of absolute immunity, the Undersigned need not evaluate the validity of this

claim as applied to her. As for Defendant Orr, Plaintiff says he “engaged in retaliatory conduct in

response to Plaintiff’s exercise of her First Amendment right to petition.” (Id.). Plaintiff does not

specify the “retaliatory conduct” her ex-husband allegedly committed (id.). At best, Plaintiff says

she “has been denied visitation with her son, and her access to her other children has been restricted

or terminated.” (Id.). Even assuming she attributes this conduct to Defendant Orr, he is still a

private actor. Tidik v. Ritsema, 938 F. Supp. 416, 425 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (“Defendant Tidik, as a

private litigant in a divorce proceeding, was clearly a private actor.”). To the extent Defendant

Orr kept Plaintiff from seeing the children, this is private conduct. Cf. id. (holding that private

actors denying visitation is private conduct). Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim is therefore

inactionable under § 1983. Bardwell v. Clarion Pointe Hotel, No. 5:23-CV-91-CRS, 2023 WL

8439772, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 5, 2023) (“As such, [the plaintiff's] Complaint fails to assert a First

Amendment retaliation claim as it complains of private conduct by private actors. These

allegations cannot, as a matter of law, state a cognizable § 1983 claim.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

First Amendment claim must be dismissed.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s

Complaint be DISMISSED.

Date: March 9, 2026 /s/ Kimberly A. Jolson

KIMBERLY A. JOLSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Procedure on Objections

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific

proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting

authority for the objection(s). A Judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination of those

portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is

made. Upon proper objections, a Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in

part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further evidence, or may

recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report

and Recommendation de novo and operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of the

District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).