CAMPBELL

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

MICAH CAMPBELL, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH )

CAROLINA AT GREENSBORO, ) 1:24CV948

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH )

CAROLINA BOARD OF )

GOVERNORS, TINE E. VIRES, )

in her individual capacity, SUSAN )

WISE, in her individual capacity, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

The plaintiff, Micah Campbell, is a violated federal and state law during

Black man who attended the his time on campus.

University of North Carolina at

Greensboro in 2024. Campbell, who The defendants have moved to

suffers from Post-Traumatic Stress dismiss the Second Amended

Disorder, had a service dog named Complaint. Because the facts as pled,

Aspen who accompanied him taken in the light most favorable to

everywhere on campus. At various Campbell, do not support relief, the

times, university employees and Court should grant the defendants’

students made comments to motion and dismiss this matter with

Campbell questioning his need for prejudice, as set forth below.

Aspen, or interacted directly with

Aspen, both of which caused I. FACTS

Campbell emotional distress.

Campbell advised University Because all well-pled facts are

personnel about these incidents, and accepted as true and considered in the

they did not take the corrective action light most favorable to the plaintiff,

he requested. Based on this, Campbell what follows are the facts as Campbell

alleges that the defendants variously has alleged in the Second Amended

Complaint, Docket Entry 14. See and students asked him questions

Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. about Aspen. On January 5, 2024, he

Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d was trying to find a bathroom in the

250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009). Elliot University Center Building on

campus. Id. ¶ 17. Aspen was with

In 2019, Campbell was diagnosed Campbell and wearing a “clearly

with post-traumatic stress disorder visible harness identifying her as a

(“PTSD”). Second Am. Compl. ¶ 9. service animal.” Id. An employee

When he experiences an episode stationed at the Information Desk

related to his PTSD, he may “accosted” Campbell “and demanded

experience tension in his body, to know what specific tasks Aspen,

detachment from reality (including [Campbell’s] service dog, was trained

time and space), inability to hear to perform.” Id. Campbell

other people, and increased experienced “immediate and severe

irritability or aggression. Id. ¶ 10. anxiety, rendering him temporarily

Campbell’s PSTD affects his ability to unable to respond.” Id. ¶ 18.

learn, read, concentrate, think, and

communicate. Id. ¶ 11. Aspen is The employee continued, “‘A lot of

Campbell’s service dog who is trained people pretend that they have a

to detect a PTSD episode, warn disability and that their dog is a

Campbell, help him cope, and assist service animal when the dog is not

him in a quick and safe recovery. Id. trained, and the individual does not

¶ 12. have the need for the animal.’” Id. “‘If

your dog is not actually a service

Campbell was accepted to the animal, we will have to shut all the

University of North Carolina at food facilities down because of your

Greensboro (“UNCG” or “University”) animal.’” Id. She asked, “‘You can

and began taking classes in the Spring understand why I stopped you?’” Id.

of 2024. Id. ¶¶ 13, 15. After his Once Campbell overcame his anxiety,

acceptance, he contacted UNCG’s he responded and explained that

Office of Accessibility Resources and Aspen was a service dog trained to

Services (“OARS”) about his diagnosis assist him with PTSD. Id. ¶ 19.

and his need for Aspen to be on

campus with him. Id. ¶¶ 5, 14, 15. The University’s Animals on Campus

UNCG approved Campbell’s request Policy directed students to report a

and allowed Aspen to live in student concern about disability

housing and accompany Campbell in discrimination or harassment. Id.

and around campus. Id. ¶ 16. ¶ 22 n.2. Having experienced

“significant emotional distress” from

A. January 5, 2024 incident the interaction with the employee at

the Information Desk, Campbell

Shortly after Campbell began reported the incident that evening to

attending UNCG, though, employees Susan Wise, the Assistant Director of

OARS. Id. ¶¶ 21, 22. Wise Campbell a specific timeline or any

“acknowledged the seriousness of Mr. further details. Id.

Campbell’s concerns and agreed to

investigate the matter.” Id. ¶ 22. C. January 25, 2024 incident

Campbell emailed Wise additional

details and requested a formal On January 25, 2024, while Campbell

response from the University about and Aspen were at the “Pita Pit” on

the employee’s conduct.1 Id. The campus, a University employee who

University took no immediate was returning to work stopped and

remedial action. Id. began talking to Aspen while

Campbell was getting a drink. Id. ¶ 29.

B. January 16, 2024 incident This interaction distracted Aspen

from her duties and created a

On January 16, 2024, while Campbell potential risk to Campbell’s health

was on campus with Aspen, a and safety. Id.

University employee approached and

questioned him about the necessity of As he had done before, Campbell

Aspen. Id. ¶ 23. Simultaneously, a reported this incident to Wise and

student attempted to distract Aspen expressed concern that it was at least

by calling out to her and trying to pet the third incident in the past few

her. Id. ¶ 24. At the time, Aspen was weeks. Id. ¶ 30. He “explicitly

wearing her “garments” identifying requested” that Wise follow up with

her as a working service animal who him, “but no meaningful resolution

should not be disturbed. Id. These was provided.” Id. Campbell

interactions triggered Campbell’s continued to email Wise, telling her

PTSD, and he immediately that “the repeated harassment about

experienced “heightened anxiety, Aspen” was causing him “frustration,

difficulty concentrating, and physical stress, embarrassment, and

manifestations of stress.” Id. ¶ 25. emotional distress” and that he was

concerned that Aspen’s ability to

Campbell reported to Wise “the attend to his medical needs could be

ongoing issues he was experiencing.” compromised. Id. ¶ 31.

Id. ¶ 28. She told him that “UNCG

would work on training school staff In response, Wise told Campbell that

and students on service animal the University “was working on

policies, procedures, and best retraining staff in the food areas and

practices.” Id. But Wise did not give that flyers had been posted around

campus to educate students about

appropriate interactions with service

animals.” Id. ¶ 32. But Campbell saw

1 Campbell first refers to this employee as Am. Compl. ¶ 17, but later refers to her as

stationed at the Information Desk of the a bookstore employee, id. ¶ 22.

Elliot University Center Building, Second

“no noticeable improvement.” Id. and investigating the complaint, Wise

Wise also asked Campbell to speak suggested that Campbell contact the

with the manager of dining services security guard’s employer. Id. ¶ 39.

about his experiences, but Campbell

declined due to his coursework and E. March 27, 2024 incident

exams. Id. ¶ 33. Instead, he asked

Wise to share his emails with the On March 27, 2024, Campbell was

appropriate people, and she agreed to ordering lunch in the Elliot University

do so. Id. Campbell told her that he Center when an employee asked if

would be willing to talk with Aspen was a seeing eye dog. Id. ¶ 40.

individuals if the incidents continued. Aspen was “wearing garments

Id. identifying her as a service animal.”

Id. Campbell told the employee that

D. February 16, 2024 incident Aspen was his service dog. Id. The

employee continued, “‘Which type is

Several weeks later, on February 16, she?’” Id. Campbell told the employee

2024, Campbell, a friend, and Aspen that Aspen assisted with his PTSD. Id.

attended a baseball game on campus. Then the employee announced to his

Id. ¶ 34. Upon their arrival, a security coworkers and Campbell that he

guard followed them and, in a “loud, hated dogs and did not understand

dismissive, and aggressive tone,” why they were allowed in the building.

asked about Aspen’s status as a Id. One of those coworkers who

service animal. Id. ¶¶ 34, 35, 39. He appeared embarrassed “immediately

erroneously concluded that Aspen corrected his behavior.” Id.

was an “‘emotional support animal’”

and claimed Campbell brought Aspen Campbell contacted Justin Meadows2

so he could “‘hang out with [his] little about the incident. Id. ¶ 41.

buddy.’” Id. ¶ 36 (alteration in Interrupting Campbell’s breakfast to

original). Meanwhile, at least three provide his business card and contact

white individuals with dogs were also information, Meadows assured

at the game but no one subjected Campbell he would be treated lawfully

them to the same treatment as going forward and “insisted that Mr.

Campbell. Id. ¶ 37. Campbell immediately contact him if

another incident occurred.” Id. ¶¶ 41,

As the University’s Events 44. Meadows also suggested

Accessibility Policy instructed, Campbell speak with the dining

Campbell emailed Wise about “his services management. Id. ¶ 41.

inability to access the baseball game

free from discrimination and Campbell called Meadows, but he

harassment.” Id. ¶¶ 38 n.3, 39. never answered the calls or responded

Instead of following University policy to the voicemails. Id. ¶ 42. “As a

2 Campbell does not provide any he worked, his role, or why Campbell

information about Meadows – for whom contacted him.

result, Mr. Campbell notified Mr. employees on the two questions they

Meadows that he did not want to were permitted to ask under the ADA

speak to the management team.” Id. and to dispel the misconception that

¶ 43. Having to reiterate his all service animals are ‘seeing eye

complaints despite following dogs.’” Id. ¶ 47. She told Campbell

University policy “further “she was working to have flyers placed

exacerbated his PTSD symptoms, around campus to increase

anxiety, and inability to access . . . awareness,” but she took no concrete

UNCG’s programs and services free actions “to address the systemic

from discrimination.” Id. issues.” Id. ¶ 48. Upon Campbell’s

information and belief, “UNCG took

Campbell emailed Wise and Tina no further action to address” the

Vires, the Director of OARS, and reported incidents. Id. ¶ 50.

expressed his belief that UNCG’s

efforts to address the discrimination As a result of all of these incidents,

were insufficient. Id. ¶ 45. He shared Campbell “significantly reduced or

his frustration that the information eliminated his use of the privileges

Wise and Meadows gave him and benefits of the university.” Id.

conflicted with the information dining ¶ 51.3 On campus, he only went to

services employees and supervisors class and to his room. Id. He stopped

were giving him. Id. The employees dining on campus. Id. He only

and supervisors were telling him that attended sporting events if his father

“‘there were no discussions or or girlfriend went with him. Id. He

training being conducted’” associated “benched himself” from participating

with his complaints. Id. in UNCG’s Esports CS2 team. Id. ¶ 52.

He “took deliberate steps to minimize

These were not the only employees his visibility and potential exposure”

talking with Campbell. See id. ¶ 46. to additional incidents. Id.

Campbell also told Wise and Vires Ultimately, he moved off campus. Id.

that other employees told him the ¶ 54. He was then ineligible for

University was not taking his student health insurance and could

complaints seriously and was, not access his mental health provider.

instead, checking security camera Id.; see also id. ¶ 53.

footage first to see if Campbell was

“‘fabricating another incident.’” Id. II. PROCEDURAL POSTURE

This information “further

exacerbated Mr. Campbell’s On November 14, 2024, Campbell

emotional distress.” Id. filed suit in this District against the

defendants. Compl., Docket Entry 1.

Vires responded and said that “OARS He amended the Complaint twice, see

was working to train university First Amended Complaint, Docket

3 Campbell does not allege when he took

any of these actions.

Entry 8, and filed the operative defendants collectively moved to

Second Amended Complaint on dismiss the Second Amended

March 28, 2025. Complaint in its entirety for failure to

state a claim. See Mot. to Dismiss,

He alleges that UNCG and the Docket Entry 16.

University of North Carolina Board of

Governors (“Board of Governors”) III. DISCUSSION

violated the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Section “To survive a motion to dismiss, a

504 of the Rehabilitation Act complaint must contain sufficient

(“Section 504”). Second Am. Compl. factual matter, accepted as true, to

¶¶ 55-83 (ADA claim against UNCG), ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible

¶¶ 84-99 (ADA claim against the on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

Board of Governors); ¶¶ 100-26 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell

(Section 504 claim against UNCG and Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

the Board of Governors). 570 (2007)). Legal conclusions “must

be supported by factual allegations”

He also alleges that UNCG and the that amount to more than

Board of Governors violated Title VI “unadorned, the-defendant-

of the Civil Rights Act by unlawfully-harmed-me

discriminating against him on the accusation[s].” Id. (citing Twombly,

basis his race. Id. ¶¶ 127-37. 550 U.S. at 555). In other words, “a

plaintiff’s obligation to provide the

Campbell brings a claim of supervisor ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to

liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 relief’ requires more than labels and

against Wise and Vires. Id. ¶¶ 90- conclusions, and a formulaic

100.4 recitation of the elements of a cause of

action will not do.” Twombly, 550

He also alleges Wise and Vires U.S. at 555-56.

intentionally, or in the alternative

negligently, inflicted emotional Courts have long recognized that a

distress in violation of North Carolina plaintiff does not need to plead a

common law. Id. ¶¶ 138-62.5 prima facie case of discrimination at

the motion to dismiss stage. See, e.g.,

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Finn v. Humane Soc. of the U.S., 160

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the F.4th 92, 97 (4th Cir. 2025) (citing

4 The paragraph numbering in the

Second Amended Complaint is not 5 Although the supervisor liability claim

always sequential. The Title VI claim ends with paragraph 100, the intentional

ends with paragraph 137. But the infliction of emotional distress claim

numbering of the paragraphs reverts to begins at paragraph 138.

paragraph 90 at the start of the § 1983

supervisor liability claim.

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. true ‘legal conclusions drawn from the

506, 510 (2002)). “That is because facts’ or any other ‘unwarranted

the McDonnell Douglas6 framework’s inferences, unreasonable conclusions,

prima facie case ‘is an evidentiary or arguments.’” Just Puppies, Inc. v.

standard, not a pleading standard.’” Brown, 123 F.4th 652, 660 (4th Cir.

Barbour v. Garland, 105 F.4th 579, 2024) (quoting Giarratano v.

590 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir.

Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510). “[A] 2008)).

plaintiff is nonetheless ‘required to

allege facts to satisfy the elements of a A. The ADA and Section 504

cause of action created by [the claims fail as a matter of law.

relevant] statute’ in compliance with

Iqbal.’” Woods v. City of Greensboro, Campbell alleges that UNCG and the

855 F.3d 639, 648 (4th Cir. 2017) Board of Governors violated the ADA

(quoting McCleary-Evans v. Md. and Section 504. See Second Am.

Dep’t of Transp., 780 F.3d 582, 585 Compl. Counts I and II. He claims

(4th Cir. 2015)). that, despite his reports to “the

appropriate University officials on

In other words, a plaintiff is not multiple occasions,” “University

required to prove his case in the employees and agents repeatedly

complaint, see, e.g., Robertson v. Sea failed to permit Aspen to accompany

Pines Real Est. Cos., 679 F.3d 278, [him] in areas of the University where

291 (4th Cir. 2012); Scott v. City of other students were allowed to go

Durham, No. 1:20-CV-558, 2021 WL without interference or forced

3856168, at *2 (M.D.N.C. August 27, negative interactions” and “University

2021), but the complaint’s allegations staff and agents” asked “intrusive”

should “allow ‘the court to draw a questions about his disability and

reasonable inference that the implied that Aspen should be

defendant is liable for the misconduct removed from the facilities. Id. ¶¶ 71,

alleged,’” Int’l Refugee Assistance 73; see also id. ¶¶ 120-23.

Project v. Trump, 961 F.3d 635, 648

(4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Iqbal, 556 He focuses on the “[r]epeated

U.S. at 678). questions by University employees

about the necessity of Aspen as a

On a motion to dismiss, courts view service animal,” “comments made by

the allegations in the complaint as University staff, including

true, drawing all inferences in the accusations that [he] was fabricating

plaintiff’s favor. See Twombly, 550 at his need for a service animal,”

555–56 (2007); Langford v. Joyner, “[f]ailure to prevent students and staff

62 F.4th 122, 124 (4th Cir. 2023). But from distracting Aspen,” and

courts are not required to “accept as “[f]ailure to adequately train

6 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411

U.S. 792 (1973).

University employees and students” motivating factor” in the adverse

on these issues. Id. ¶ 77. As a result of action; whereas, Section 504 requires

these “[p]ervasive” “discriminatory that the disability be the sole reason

actions,” Campbell “was no longer for the adverse action. Baird ex rel.

able to receive the full benefits of Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 468-70

being enrolled at the University, living (4th Cir. 1999).

on campus, and having a meal plan.”

Id. ¶ 76. “In general, a plaintiff seeking

recovery for violation of either statute

“To the extent possible, [courts] must allege that (1) [he] has a

construe the ADA and Rehabilitation disability, (2) [he] is otherwise

Act to impose similar requirements.” qualified to receive the benefits of a

Halpern v. Wake Forest Univ. Health public service, program, or activity,

Sci., 669 F.3d 454, 461 (4th Cir. 2012). and (3) [he] was excluded from

Title II of the ADA directs that “no participation or denied the benefits of

qualified individual with a disability such service, program, or activity, or

shall, by reason of such disability, be otherwise discriminated against, on

excluded from participation in or be the basis of [his] disability.”

denied the benefits of the services, Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of

programs, or activities of a public George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474,

entity, or be subjected to 498 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Baird, 192

discrimination by any such entity.” 42 F.3d at 467-70 and Doe v. Univ. of

U.S.C. § 12132. Compare id. with 29 Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261,

U.S.C. § 794(a) (providing similar 1264-65 & n.9 (4th Cir. 1995)). See

protection under Section 504 of the also Halpern, 669 F.3d at 461-62.

Rehabilitation Act). A “public entity”

includes “any department, agency, . . . The University and the Board of

or other instrumentality of a State.” Governors argue that Campbell fails

42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(B). And a to allege facts that support the third

“program of activity,” referred to in prong: that is, exclusion from

Section 504, “means all of the participation or denial of benefits of

operations of . . . a college, university, any program or service. Mem. in

or other postsecondary institution, or Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 7, Docket

a public system of higher education.” Entry 17 (“Mem. in Supp.”). They

29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(2)(A). further argue that he, by his own

“affirmative action,” excluded himself

Although “[t]he ADA and from campus activities.

Rehabilitation Act generally are

construed to impose the same Campbell correctly argues that the

requirements due to the similarity of law prohibits more than outright

the language of the two acts,” a exclusion from public programs.

violation of the ADA requires that an Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot.

individual’s disability be “a to Dismiss Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. at

5, Docket Entry 19 (“Mem. in access. Id. at 72 (quoting Dean v.

Opp’n”).7 The law also requires Univ. at Buffalo Sch. Of Med. &

meaningful access to those programs. Biomedical Scis., 804 F.3d 178, 189

Id. (citing Alexander v. Choate, 469 (2d Cir. 2015)), cited in Koon, 50

U.S. 287, 301 (1985)). Indeed, F.4th at 406; see also Gustafson v. Bi-

“Congress has told us that disability State Dev. Agency, 29 F.4th 406, 412

‘discrimination’ includes not just (8th Cir. 2022) (“Under the

‘outright intentional exclusion’ but meaningful access standard, services

also lesser injustices like ‘failure to ‘are not required to produce the

make modifications to existing identical result or level of

facilities and practices’ and ‘relegation achievement for handicapped and

to lesser services, programs, nonhandicapped persons, but must

activities, benefits, jobs, or other afford handicapped persons equal

opportunities.’” Koon v. North opportunity to . . . gain the same

Carolina, 50 F.4th 398, 405 (4th Cir. benefit.’”) (quoting Alexander, 469

2022) (quoting 42 U.S.C. U.S. at 305).

§ 12101(a)(5)).

As is relevant here, the law generally

Thus, “we ask whether a disabled requires a public entity to allow an

[person] was denied ‘meaningful individual with a disability to use a

access’ to the benefit.” Id. at 406 service animal, even if that requires

(quoting Alexander, 469 U.S. at 301 modification of policies, practices, or

and noting that Alexander discusses procedures. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.136(a).

“nearly identical language in § 504 of And the service animal must be able

the Rehabilitation Act”). “[T]o assure to accompany the individual with a

meaningful access, reasonable disability “in all areas of a public

accommodations in the . . . program entity’s facilities where members of

or benefit may have to be made.” the public, participants in services,

Alexander, 469 U.S. at 301. An programs, or activities, or invitees . . .

accommodation that “is so are allowed to go.” 28 C.F.R.

inadequate that it deters the plaintiff § 35.136(g). While a public entity’s

from attempting to access the services staff are not permitted to ask all

otherwise available to him” is “not [a] manner of questions about the service

plainly reasonable” accommodation. animal, they are permitted to ask two

Wright v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corrs., questions to determine if the animal

831 F.3d 64, 73 (2d Cir. 2016), cited in is, indeed, a service animal: (1) is the

Koon, 50 F.4th at 406. animal required because of a

disability and (2) what work or task is

Meaningful access does not require

perfect access, but it must be effective

7 Campbell also correctly notes that he v. N.C. Dep’t of Safety, No. 1:18CV914,

does not have to plead discriminatory 2019 WL 3798457, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Aug.

animus. Mem. in Opp’n at 7 (citing Smith 12, 2019)).

the animal trained to perform. 28 (acknowledging a hostile

C.F.R. § 35-136(f). environment theory under the ADA)).

The University and the Board of Indeed, the University and the Board

Governors contend that Campbell has of Governors contend that, at best,

not sufficiently alleged discrimination Campbell’s allegations are “analogous

on the basis of his disability. Mem. in to a constructive discharge claim.”

Supp. at 7-9 (addressing allegations of Mem. in Supp. at 8 (citing Evans v.

mere “discomfort, frustration, [and] Int’l Paper Co., 936 F.3d 183, 193 (4th

disappointment”8 and failure to allege Cir. 2019) (providing the elements of

he was treated differently than a constructive discharge claim in the

similarly situated individuals because employment context). Even so, they

of his disability). argue, he has not plausibly alleged

such a claim. Mem. in Supp. at 8-9.

Campbell concedes he has not

sufficiently alleged a Section 504 Several courts have recognized the

claim or disparate treatment based on concept of constructive exclusion in

his disability. See Mem. in Opp’n at 4- the context of a public entity’s

5 (discussing the ADA’s requirement disability discrimination, but they

that disability be only a motivating have not analyzed it robustly. See,

factor in discrimination), 5 (stating e.g., Krist v. Kolombos Rest. Inc., 688

that the law also prohibits F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2012); Q.C. v.

“discrimination through denial of Winston-Salem/Forsyth Cnty. Schs.

reasonable modifications or creation Bd. of Educ., No. 1:19CV1152, 2022

of a hostile environment”). Instead, WL 1686905 (M.D.N.C. May 26,

he maintains that he has plausibly 2022). In Krist, the court affirmed

alleged a hostile environment where the trial court’s finding that Krist was

the University was deliberately not constructively excluded when the

indifferent, resulting in constructive court assessed the frequency and

discharge from the use and benefits of character (outrageous or demeaning)

the University’s services, programs, of the conduct, the impact of the

and activities. Id. at 6-7 (citing Rohan conduct on Krist’s behavior, and

v. Networks Presentations LLC, 375 whether the conduct was designed to

F.3d 266 (4th Cir. 2004) drive Krist from the restaurant. 688

F.3d at 96-97.

However, courts’ assessments of a

hostile environment and constructive

8 Notwithstanding that emotional 546-47 (4th Cir. 2003); Mem. in Opp’n at

distress may help to support the award of 7, Campbell’s alleged frustration and

compensatory damages in a anxiety were responses to lawful conduct

discrimination claim, see Bryant v. so they are of no help here.

Aiken Reg’l Med. Ctrs. Inc., 333 F.3d 536,

discharge based on a hostile offhand comments, jokes related to a

environment in the employment protected status, [] isolated incidents

context are instructive. To state a (unless extremely serious),” and

claim for hostile work environment, a “mere rude or insensitive treatment”

plaintiff must plausibly allege that he are insufficient to state a hostile

is disabled and was subject to environment. Id. (citing Burlington

unwelcome harassment based on his N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548

disability that was sufficiently severe U.S. 53, 68-69 (2006); Clark Cnty.

or pervasive that it altered a condition Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268,

or the privilege of his employment. 270-71 (2001); Faragher, 524 U.S. at

Manning v. N.C. State Univ., 724 F. 788; Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore

Supp. 3d 438, 458 (E.D.N.C. 2024) Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82

(quoting Fox v. Gen. Motors Corp., (1998); Baqir v. Prinicipi, 434 F.3d

247 F.3d 169, 177 (4th Cir. 2001)). 733, 746-47 (4th Cir. 2006),

abrogated in part on other grounds,

“The severe or pervasive element has Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557

both a subjective and objective U.S. 167, 177-80 (2009)).

component.” Perkins v. Int’l Paper

Co., 936 F3d 196, 208 (4th Cir. 2019). On the other hand, an environment of

To determine if a reasonable person “constant[] berate[ment] and

would find the harassment harass[ment] [of the employee with a

sufficiently severe or pervasive, courts disability] and other disabled

analyze “the frequency of the workers” “in vulgar and profane

discriminatory conduct; its severity; language” “at least weekly” and the

whether it is physically threatening or “encourage[ment] of other employees

humiliating, or a mere offensive to ostracize the disabled workers,”

utterance; and whether it refusal “to give them necessary

unreasonably interferes with an materials” to do their job, and causing

employee’s work performance.” the employee-plaintiff to suffer back

Manning, 724 F. Supp. 3d at 459 pain as a result of the physical work

(quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., environment is a hostile environment.

510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)); see also id. Fox, 247 F. 3d at 179 (affirming the

(reviewing case law on the objective jury verdict in favor of the employee-

assessment of the severity and plaintiff).

pervasiveness of harassment).

Under this standard, Campbell’s

“The conduct must be extreme to be claims fail. He has not alleged a lack

actionable.” Id. (citing Faragher v. of meaningful access to services,

City of Boca Raton, 54 U.S. 775, 788 programs or activities, nor a hostile

(1998); Boyer-Liberto v. environment resulting in constructive

Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, exclusion from the same. Campbell

277-78 (4th Cir. 2015)). “Simple makes sweeping accusations against

teasing, sporadic rude language, the defendants, but they are often

legal conclusions without sufficient into the service he is trained to

factual support or the result of provide).

unwarranted inferences,

unreasonable conclusions, and Campbell alleges that these

arguments. See Just Puppies, Inc., 123 employees and the security guard

F.4th at 660. And what remains are were rude and insensitive and that

the very type of sporadic incidents students and an employee interrupted

and insensitive comments that courts Aspen’s work when they tried to pet

have rejected time and again as a basis and talk to her. But, as courts have

for relief. long recognized, anti-discrimination

laws do not impose a civility code. See,

Specifically, first and foremost, the e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry.

law specifically permits an entity to Co., 548 U.S. at 68. And employees’

ask the very questions employees and and students’ alleged conduct towards

students asked Campbell: (1) is the Campbell and Aspen did “not

dog required because of a disability materially affect the actual

and (2) what work or task is the dog accommodation” of Aspen

trained to perform. See 28 C.F.R. § 35- accompanying him around campus.

136(f). See Davis v. Univ. of N.C. at

Greensboro, No. 1:19CR661, 2020

As for the first permissible question – WL 5803238, at *11 (M.D.N.C. Sept.

is the dog required because of a 29, 2020).

disability, on January 5, an employee

commented on the need to close food Campbell sufficiently alleged that he

facilities if Aspen were not a service subjectively considered the

dog (implying that Aspen must be environment hostile, but the facts as

required because of a disability); on pled, even drawing all inferences in

January 16, an employee asked about his favor therefrom, do not

the necessity of Aspen; and on sufficiently allege that a reasonable

February 16, the non-employee person faced with this conduct would

security guard asked about Aspen’s plausibly find these conditions severe

status as a service dog. or pervasive enough to cause

constructive exclusion.

As for the second permissible

question – what work or task is the And, to state a claim for constructive

dog trained to perform, on January 5, discharge based on a hostile work

the employee demanded to know environment, a plaintiff must allege

what specific tasks Aspen was trained “something more” than a hostile work

to perform and, on March 27, the environment. Decoster v. Becerra,

employee asked what type of service 119 F.4th 332, 339 (4th Cir. 2024). He

dog Aspen was (implying an inquiry must sufficiently allege that the

circumstances were “‘so intolerable

that a reasonable person would

resign,’” id. at 339-40 (quoting Equal bench himself, or move off campus.9

Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Consol See Reply Br. at 2, Docket Entry 21

Energy, Inc., 860 F.3d 131, 144-45 (stating the same and noting that

(4th Cir. 2017)), “‘and that [he] Campbell “offer[ed] no reasoned

actually resigned,’” id. at 340 (quoting rebuttal” to its argument that he failed

Evans v. Int’l Paper Co., 936 F.3d 183, to allege constructive exclusion and

193 (4th Cir. 2019)). Courts “assess citing Mem. in Opp’n at 3-7).

intolerability ‘by the objective Therefore, his constructive exclusion

standard of whether a reasonable argument fails.

person in the employee’s position

would have felt compelled to resign Campbell also argues that the

. . . that is, whether he would have had University’s response to his reports of

no choice but to resign.’” Id. (quoting discrimination “satisf[y] the

Evans, 936 F.3d at 193). “‘Difficult or ‘deliberate indifference’ standard.”10

unpleasant working conditions, Mem. in Opp’n at 6 (citing Proctor v.

without more, are not so intolerable Prince George’s Hops. Ctr., 32 F.

as to compel a reasonable person to Supp. 2d 820, 829 (D. Md. 1998)). In

resign.’” Id. (quoting Evans, 936 f.3d Koon, the Fourth Circuit Court of

at 193). Appeals recognized that “[t]he

deliberate-indifference standard is a

Here, Campbell has not plausibly common one in the law, though not

alleged “something more” than a one [it had] applied to disability

hostile environment because he has discrimination.” 50 F.4th at 404.

not sufficiently alleged a hostile After assessing the standard that

environment. Even had he done so, other circuits had used in the ADA

he has not plausibly alleged that a context, the court held that a plaintiff

reasonable person would have had no must show a violation or substantially

choice but to stop eating at the dining likely violation of the ADA, knowledge

facilities on campus, only attend of a substantial risk of the deprivation

games with his father or girlfriend, of those rights, and a failure to act to

9 Although Campbell’s cited case, Rohan, violation of the ADA or Section 504. See,

recognizes and provides the prima facie e.g., A.J.T. ex rel. A.T. v. Osseo Area

elements of a hostile environment claim Schs., 605 U.S. 335, 344-45 (2025)

under the ADA, the court did not analyze (noting that “courts of appeals generally

whether the evidence at summary agree that a plaintiff must show

judgment supported a hostile intentional discrimination” to receive

environment because the plaintiff failed compensatory damages and “a majority”

to show she was disabled. See Rohan, 375 of courts of appeals that “have weighed in

F.3d at 275-76. on the question” find that a plaintiff can

show intentional discrimination if “the

10 A plaintiff must show the defendant defendant acted with deliberate

acted with deliberate indifference to indifference”) (quotations and citations

receive compensatory damages for a omitted).

address the risk. Id. at 405. “If there professor, the dean, and other law

wasn’t any ADA violation (or any school officials. Id.

substantially likely ADA violation),

there was nothing to be deliberately Three months later, the dean agreed

indifferent about.” Id. that Constantine could take the final

exam again “sometime in June” after

That is the case here. Campbell has she finished her spring courses. Id.

not sufficiently alleged a violation or a However, on May 17, she received an

substantially likely violation of the email notifying her that she must

ADA or Section 504, for all the retake the exam on May 21. Id. She

reasons described above. His notified the dean, the law school

deliberate indifference argument registrar, and two other

necessarily fails. And even if he had administrators that she would not be

sufficiently alleged disability able to take the exam at that time

discrimination, the factual allegations because she had a conflict with

do not support a reasonable inference another class and the dean had told

that the University or Board of her she could retake it in June. Id. at

Governors failed to act. Instead, 478-79. Unmoved, the officials told

Campbell alleges Wise and Vires did her she had to take the exam on May

act, just not in ways he found 21 or forfeit her right to do so. Id. at

sufficient. 479. Constantine declined to take the

exam that day. Id. The university

Campbell’s allegations thus stand in offered to give her another chance to

marked contrast to other take the exam, but she believed they

discrimination claims advanced in an had decided to give her an F on the

academic setting. For example, the exam in retaliation for her

Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals’ complaints. Id. She took the exam and

decision in Constantine is received an F, which delayed her

instructive.11 There, Constantine, a graduation and her judicial clerkship.

law student at George Mason Id.

University, suffered from “intractable

migraine syndrome” which struck The court found that Constantine

during a final exam. 411 F.3d at 478. sufficiently alleged that the university

She alerted the test administrators “excluded her from meaningful

and requested additional time to participation in [the professor’s]

finish, but they refused. Id. She failed course or denied her the benefits of

the exam and requested a grade the course, or at least discriminated

appeal and to take the exam again, but

university officials denied those

requests. Id. She complained to the

11 Although this opinion pre-dates established. See, e.g., Davis, 2020 WL

Iqbal/Twombly, the allegations meet the 5803238, at *12 (comparing to the

pleading requirement those cases allegations in Constantine).

against her with respect to that against him with regard to the

course.” Id. at 499. prohibitive summer housing on the

basis of his disability” in violation of

Likewise, the student in Alexander v. Section 504. Id. at *6.

University of North Carolina at

Charlotte, No. 3:04CV570, 2005 WL Finally, in Alejandro v. Palm Beach

1994520, at *6 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 11, State College, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1263,

2005), sufficiently alleged that the 1270, 1272 (S.D. Fla. 2011),

college discriminated against him reconsideration denied, (S.D. Fla.

because of his disability.12 Alexander 2012), the court found the student-

suffered from cerebral palsy and plaintiff sufficiently demonstrated a

required assistance to walk to and substantial likelihood of success on

attend his daily activities. Id. at *1. the merits and granted her injunction

During his freshman year, he lived in requiring the college to allow her to

an accessible room with a large bring her service dog to all areas of

bathroom. Id. Alexander was to campus.

attend summer school and the

university planned for all students to There, after permitting Alejandro’s

live an on-campus housing complex service dog to accompany her on

that was further from the classroom campus for three semesters, college

building than Alexander’s freshman officials required voluminous

year residence; the bathroom was too documentation describing her need

small for Alexander, the desks were for the service animal, which she

not useable, and there was no curb cut provided. Id. at 1266. But officials

for him to access the sidewalk. Id. at refused to allow her to take the dog to

*1-2. class and when she continued to do

so, they escorted her off campus and

When Alexander’s mother learned of brought disciplinary hearings against

this plan, she met with university her. Id. At the end of her fourth

officials about his housing needs, who semester, when officials finally agreed

proposed another unsuitable room. to allow the dog to accompany her to

Id. at *2. Ultimately, Alexander lived class, she had missed so many classes

at home during the summer session that she had failed one of her courses

and relied on his mother for and she was still questioned about the

transportation. Id. at *3. dog, escorted out of the library, and

prohibited from bringing the dog to

The court found that Alexander the writing lab. Id.

sufficiently alleged that the university

“excluded him from campus housing, These allegations stand in contrast to

or denied him the benefits of such those Campbell advances. His claims

housing, or at least discriminated more closely track those in Davis,

12 Although this opinion pre-dates pleading standard that those cases

Iqbal/Twombly, the allegations meet the established.

wherein the court dismissed the time and a quiet testing

student’s ADA claim. Davis, who environment.” Id. at *11. Even though

suffered from ADHD, requested and she alleged that staff repeatedly

received extended time and quiet interrupted her during test-taking,

locations for taking exams to limit she did not allege when or how often

interruptions. 2020 WL 5803238, at they interrupted her, how severely

*3. However, she alleged that two they affected her quiet environment,

members of the university’s staff or how it affected her performance.

“repeatedly interrupted [her] during Id. at *12. “[T]he vague interruptions

testing,” “frequently mocked [her] alleged [were] a far cry from the

disability in front of other students[,] severity of Constantine.” Id.

and yelled at [her] prior to exams over

her requested accommodations.” Id. Davis “was not prevented from taking

Those same individuals allegedly exams, nor was she outright denied

threatened to have her dismissed extra time or quiet test-taking rooms.”

from her program if she complained. Id. In sum, she failed to allege that

Id. she “was excluded from the []

program or was even prevented from

Davis reported these incidents to advancing within it . . . because she

OARS at UNCG, and, in response, the has ADHD or because certain

university’s staff claimed she was not individuals frustrated the approved

fit for the program, fabricated accommodations.” Id. Her

documents to look like she was not allegations suggested nothing “‘more

completing her work correctly, falsely than a sheer possibility’ that

accused her of insubordination, and Defendants failed to provide

told her they would find a reason to reasonable accommodations.” Id.

“get rid of” her. Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57)).13

The court found that the mocking and

threats to dismiss Davis from the Likewise, intermittent and boorish

program did “not materially affect the questions from various individuals,

actual accommodations of extended University and otherwise, considered

13 Although outside of the education stared and growled at the dog from

context, the Second Circuit Court of behind the counter. Id. at 91-92. When

Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a she took the dog out from the under the

plaintiff’s ADA claim involving the use of table to show a customer, a restaurant

her service dog in Krist. There, Krist was owner yelled and claimed she was

a regular customer at Coopertown playing with her dog. Id. at 92. On

Restaurant which was “her primary another visit, a restaurant owner yelled at

social community.” 688 F.3d at 91. But her because the dog was beside her chair

when she began taking her service dog to rather than under the table. Id. Krist

the restaurant, employees were “very went to the restaurant less. Id. Months

cool” to her and a restaurant owner later, she stopped going altogether. Id.

in the light most favorable to Compl. ¶¶ 130, 132. He claims the

Campbell’s claims, did not prevent actions of the University and Board of

him from enjoying the benefits of Governors were “part of a broader

University facilities and activities. pattern of systemic failures” and

And so he has failed to allege a “reflect a willful disregard of [his]

plausible claim of discrimination rights under Title VI.” Id. ¶¶ 131, 136.

against UNCG or the Board of

Governors under the ADA or Section Title VI provides that “[n]o person in

504 of the Rehabilitation Act.14 the United States shall, on the ground

Therefore, the Court should dismiss of race, color, or national origin, be

Counts I and II. excluded from participation in, be

denied the benefits of, or be subjected

B. The Title VI claim fails as a to discrimination under any program

matter of law. or activity receiving Federal financial

assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.

Campbell alleges that UNCG and the

Board of Governors discriminated To state a claim for discrimination in

against him on the basis of his race in violation of Title VI, a plaintiff must

violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights allege that the defendant is a recipient

Act of 1964, as their response (or lack of federal funds and intentionally

thereof) to his report about the discriminated against him “on the

February 16, 2024 baseball game basis of race, color, or national

shows. He contends that the origin.” Lucas v. VHC Health, 128

University and Board of Governors F.4th 213, 221 (4th Cir. 2025)

“den[ied] him equal access to its (citation omitted) (applying Title VI

facilities, programs, and services” and to the plaintiff’s claim of race

“failed to implement adequate discrimination in violation of the

oversight, training, and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) where

administrative controls to ensure Section 1557 of the ACA “forbids

compliance with federal anti- excluding someone from health

discrimination laws.” Second Am.

The court described the owners’ shouting persons with disabilities”) (citation

incidences as isolated and directed omitted); Cannice v. Norwest Bank Iowa

towards moving the dog out of the way. N.A., 189 F.3d 723, 726 (8th Cir. 1999)

Id. at 96-97. The employees’ behavior (“Insensitivity alone does not amount to

was not outrageous or demeaning. Id. at harassment; the ADA, like Title VII, is

96. The court explained that “the ADA not in effect a ‘general civility code.’”)).

does not impose a civility code.” Id.

(citing Camarillo v. Carrols Corp., 518 14 Campbell did not allege, and does not

F.3d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 2008) (agreeing argue in response to the defendants’

that “the ADA cannot regulate motion, disability discrimination based

individuals’ conduct so as to ensure that on disparate treatment.

they will never be rude or insensitive to

programs based on the ‘ground present at the game” were not

prohibited under’ Title VI”). “subjected to” having the guard follow

them throughout the facility and ask

To state a claim for racial harassment about their dogs, erroneously identify

in violation of Title VI, a plaintiff must the dogs as emotional support dogs,

allege that the defendant is an and speak to them in a loud,

educational institution that receives dismissive, and aggressive tone, “the

federal funds, he was subjected to treatment [he] endured.” Id. ¶¶ 34-37.

harassment based on his race, the In sum, he argues that he was treated

harassment was sufficiently severe or differently than similarly situated

pervasive to create a hostile white attendees. And while those

environment in an educational allegations may be consistent with

program or activity, and there is a discrimination, they do not support a

basis for imputing liability to the reasonable inference of

university. See Feminist Majority discrimination. See, e.g., McCleary-

Found. v. Hurley, 911 F.3d 674, 686 Evans, 780 F.3d at 586.

(4th Cir. 2018) (determining the

sufficiency of allegations of sexual In McCleary-Evans, the plaintiff had

harassment in violation of Title IX); worked for the state of Maryland for

Ricketts v. Wake Cnty. Pub. Sch. Sys., over twenty years when she applied

125 F.4th 507, 521 (4th Cir. 2025) for two open positions in a different

(noting that “Title VI claims ‘are state division. Id. at 583. She alleged

parallel’ to Title IX claims and that she was not chosen for either

‘operate in the same manner’” and position, “[d]espite her prior work

applying the Title IX harassment experience and education.” Id.

standard to assess the sufficiency of a Instead, the state hired non-Black

Title VI claim for student-on-student candidates for those positions. Id.

racial harassment) (citation omitted). McCleary-Evans argued this

constituted gender and race

To hold an institution liable for the discrimination. Id. She alleged that

conduct of its employees, the plaintiff her applications were “‘subject to a

“must plausibly plead that [the review panel significantly influenced

institution] acted with deliberate and controlled by . . . a White male in

indifference to the intentional the Office of Environmental Design

discrimination of its agents.” Lucas, (‘OED’) who worked under the

128 F.4th at 221-22. supervision of . . . a non-Black

woman.’” Id. (quoting the complaint).

Here, the only allegations of race “During the course of her interview,

discrimination involve the security and based upon the history of hires

guard at the February 16, 2024 within OED, . . . both [individuals]

baseball game on campus. Campbell predetermined to select for both

alleges that the “three white positions a White male or female

individuals with dogs [who] were also candidate.” Id. She also alleged that

they “‘overlooked the African Court’s command that a complaint

American candidates to select White must allege “more than a sheer

male, preferably, and White female possibility that a defendant has acted

candidates’” “‘for reasons of race and unlawfully.” Id. at 588 (quoting Iqbal,

gender.’” Id. at 583-84 (quoting the 556 U.S. at 678).

complaint).

Likewise, the allegations in the

The court affirmed the district court’s Complaint raise only a “sheer

dismissal of the complaint. “While possibility” that anyone acted

[McCleary-Evans] did allege that the unlawfully at the baseball game.

Highway Administration failed to hire Compare with McCarter v. Univ. of

her, she did not allege facts sufficient N.C. at Chapel Hill, No. 1:20-CV-

to claim that the reason it failed to 1050, 2021 WL 4482983, at *11 (Sept.

hire her was because of her race or 30, 2021) (finding sufficient

sex.” Id. at 585. “[S]he repeatedly allegations of Title VI racial

alleged that the Highway harassment where University

Administration did not select her personnel “delayed [the plaintiff’s]

because of the relevant graduation, removed him from a

decisionmakers’ bias against African longstanding research project,

American women,” “[b]ut those refused to publish his manuscript,

‘naked’ allegations – a ‘formulaic and plagiarized his work,” and he was

recitation’ of the necessary elements – the only student in his section subject

‘are no more than conclusions’ and to this treatment and indeed, the only

therefore do not suffice.” Id. (quoting African-American, raising the

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79). The court “inference that Plaintiff was singled

explained that McCleary-Evans’ out for mistreatment by [specified

allegations were “consistent with defendants] while members of other

discrimination,” but they did not races were not[]”). And even

“support a reasonable inference that assuming arguendo that Campbell

the decisionmakers were motivated sufficiently alleged the security guard

by bias.” Id. at 586 (emphasis in intentionally discriminated against

original). him based on his race, he has not

sufficiently alleged that the University

The court explained that the was deliberately indifferent to that

“consequence” of reversing the conduct.

district court “would be that any

qualified member of a protected class After the game, Campbell emailed

who alleges nothing more than that Wise “concerning his inability to

she was denied a position or access the baseball game free from

promotion in favor of someone discrimination and harassment,” and

outside her protected class would be Wise suggested he “contact the

able to survive a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion[,]” despite “the Supreme

security guard’s employer to express to express his concerns. Although he

additional concerns[.]” Id. ¶ 39. alleges that she should have

investigated his complaint “as

Campbell alleges that OARS “is one of required by UNCG policy,” as noted

the entities on campus responsible for above, the alleged policy covers

enforcing accessibility at campus accessibility, not race. And his belief

events, including sporting events.” that she should have responded

Second Am. Compl. ¶ 38 (noting in differently is not sufficient to allege

footnote 3 that the University’s policy deliberate indifference. Koon, 50

requires OARS to review a complaint F.4th at 406 (“It is not enough simply

about accessibility at a University to point to what could or should have

event and contact the event organizer) been done.”).

(emphases added).

Because Campbell has failed to state a

There is no allegation that Wise had claim for race discrimination or racial

any authority to remedy a complaint harassment in violation of Title VI,

about race discrimination or racial the Court should dismiss Count III.

harassment. Furthermore, there is no

allegation that the University (or C. The § 1983 supervisor liability

Wise) had authority over the security claim fails as a matter of law.

guard who was not a University

employee. Campbell asserts a claim against Wise

and Vires for supervisor liability

In addition, based on Campbell’s pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He

allegations, he reported to Wise that alleges that they “failed to take

the security guard followed him, reasonable and necessary steps to

asked about Aspen in an aggressive correct, remedy, or prevent the

tone, and was rude, but the security ongoing unlawful disability

guard did not do the same thing to the discrimination.” Second Am. Compl.

three white attendees who also had ¶ 93.

dogs. The facts do not plausibly allege

that Wise knew “of the facts from Section 1983 prohibits an individual

which a federal-rights violation could acting under color of state law from

be inferred,” much less that she made depriving a person “of any rights,

a ‘deliberate or conscious choice to privileges, or immunities secured by

ignore’” them. Koon, 50 F.4th at 406- the Constitution and laws.”

07 (citing City of Canton v. Harris,

489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989)). “In a § 1983 suit . . . the term

‘supervisor liability’ is a misnomer.”

Campbell does not even allege that Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. A supervisor

Wise ignored his complaint. Instead, can only be liable under § 1983 for

he alleges that she suggested he “their personal wrongdoing or

contact the security guard’s employer supervisory actions that violated

constitutional norms.” Timpson ex to or tacit authorization of

rel. Timpson v. Anderson Cnty. the alleged offensive

Disabilities & Special Needs Bd., 31 practices; and

F.4th 238, 257 (4th Cir. 2022)

(emphasis added). The supervisor’s (3) that there was an affirmative

“‘indifference or tacit authorization’” causal link between the

of “a constitutional violation supervisor’s inaction and

committed by a subordinate state or the particular constitutional

local government official” must be “‘a [or other legal] injury

causative factor’ in enabling the suffered by the plaintiff.

violation.” Bolick v. Anderson, 169

F.4th 528, 541 (4th Cir. 2026) Timpson ex rel. Timpson, 31 F.4th at

(quoting Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 257 (quoting Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799).15

798-99 (4th Cir. 1994)). To determine

if a supervisor is liable, courts “must Wise and Vires argue that Campbell

consider whether the supervisor’s did not allege that either of them

own ‘deliberate indifference supervised any of the individuals who

permitted the constitutional abuses to discriminated against him, or that the

continue unchecked.’” Id. (quoting conduct was widespread so as to

Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 373 provide sufficient notice, or that Wise

(4th Cir. 1984)). or Vires acted with deliberate

indifference, or that they were

A plaintiff must plausibly allege motivated by discriminatory intent.

Mem. in Supp. at 14-16. They also

(1) that the supervisor had argue that neither the ADA nor

actual or constructive Section 504 can be the basis for the

knowledge that [her] § 1983 claim. Id. at 14-15.

subordinate was engaged in

conduct that posed a Campbell contends that his

pervasive and unreasonable allegations support Wise’s and Vires’

risk of constitutional [or “tacit authorization of the

other legal] injury to citizens discriminatory practices” and they

like the plaintiff; had authority to act. Mem. in Opp’n at

9. Campbell also argues that the ADA

(2) that the supervisor’s and Section 504 can be the bases for

response to that knowledge his § 1983 claim because the “Fourth

was so inadequate as to Circuit has not categorically barred

show deliberate indifference such claims” and his “§ 1983 claim

15 While the Shaw court was considering 3d 444, 450 (E.D. Va. 2024); Armstrong

a summary judgment motion, district v. City of Greensboro, 190 F. Supp. 3d

courts in this circuit cite these elements 450, 466 (M.D.N.C. 2016); Hill v.

when discussing pleading requirements. Robeson County, 733 F. Supp. 2d 676,

See, e.g., Keeton v. Dudley, 753 F. Supp. 688 (E.D.N.C. 2010).

also rests on equal protection reports. She “acknowledged the

violations.” Id. seriousness of” and “agreed to

investigate” the January 5 incident.

Campbell bases his claim against Second Am. Compl. ¶ 22. She

Wise and Vires on violations of the “responded [to the complaint about

ADA and Section 504 (and by the January 16 incident] that

conclusory reference to the Defendant UNCG would work on

Fourteenth Amendment). See Second training school staff and students on

Am. Compl. ¶¶ 91, 93, 95, 98, 99. But service animal policies, procedures,

because the court recommends and best practices.” Id. ¶ 28. “Wise

dismissal of the ADA and Section 504 advised that Defendant UNCG was

claims, they cannot support the claim. working on retraining staff in the food

See G.M. v. Va. Beach Sch. Bd., No. areas and that flyers had been posted

2:24-cv-59, 2025 WL 1819269, at *7 around campus to educate students”

(E.D. Va. Feb. 6, 2025) (referring to after Campbell’s report about the

its earlier dismissal of the § 504 claim January 25 episode. Id. ¶ 32. She also

supporting the § 1983 claim). “asked [Campbell] to speak with . . . a

Manager in dining services[] about

Even had those claims survived,

his experiences.” Id. ¶ 33. In response

though, “multiple district courts in

to Campbell’s report about the

the Fourth Circuit, as well as

February 16 incident, Wise suggested

numerous courts of appeals, have

that Campbell contact the security

held that § 1983 cannot vindicate

guard’s employers to express his

rights under the ADA given the ADA’s

concerns. Id. ¶ 39.

comprehensive remedial scheme.” Id.

(citing Anderson v. Sch. Bd. of After having reported the March 27

Gloucester Cnty., No. 3:18-cv-745, incident to Meadows, Campbell

2020 WL 2832475, at *21-22 (E.D. emailed Wise and Vires to tell them

Va. May 29, 2020) (collecting cases)). “his belief that the processes

See also Gatling v. Carter, No. PX 15- Defendant UNCG was purportedly

3723, 2017 WL 480756, at *6 (D. Md. utilizing to address the ongoing

Feb. 6, 2017) (addressing a discrimination were insufficient.” Id.

Rehabilitation Act-based § 1983 claim ¶ 45. Vires responded that “OARS was

and collecting cases). working to train university employees

on the two questions they were

Furthermore, even though Campbell’s

permitted to ask under the ADA and

complaints did not evince widespread

to dispel the misconception that all

discrimination despite his conclusory

service animals are ‘seeing eye dogs.’”

allegations to the contrary, neither

Id. ¶ 47. She also “indicated that she

Wise nor Vires were deliberately

was working to have flyers placed

indifferent to or tacitly authorized

around campus to increase

disability discrimination against

awareness.” Id. ¶ 48.

Campbell, as alleged. Specifically,

Wise responded to each of Campbell’s

None of these allegations plausibly towards Campbell’s report of race

claim that Wise or Vires made a discrimination.

conscious decision to ignore

Campbell has thus failed to state a

Campbell’s complaints. And

§ 1983 claim against Wise and against

Campbell did not even allege that

Vires. The Court should dismiss

Wise or Vires supervised any of the

Count IV.

alleged wrongdoers. Campbell’s

belief that their responsive efforts D. Qualified immunity would

were insufficient does not sufficiently apply.

allege deliberate indifference. See

Wise and Vires argue that, even had

Koon, 50 F.4th at 406.

Campbell sufficiently alleged a § 1983

Campbell states in response to Wise’s claim against them, qualified

and Vires’ challenge to this claim that immunity would protect them from

his Ҥ 1983 claim also rests on equal suit. Mem. in Supp. at 17-18 (citing

protection violations.” Mem. in Opp’n Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735,

at 9. To state an equal protection 741 (2011)). Citing Hope v. Pelzer,

claim without direct evidence of 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002), and 28

discrimination, a plaintiff must allege C.F.R. § 35.136(f), Campbell

“‘that he has been treated differently disagrees. Mem. in Opp’n at 10-11.

from others with whom he is similarly

“Qualified immunity shields . . . state

situated and that the unequal

officials from money damages unless

treatment was the result of

a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1)

intentional or purposeful

that the official violated a statutory or

discrimination.” Lee v. Boyd, 799 F.

constitutional right, and (2) that the

Supp. 3d 507, 511-12 (W.D. Va. 2025)

right was ‘clearly established’ at the

(quoting Morrison v. Garraghty, 239

time of the challenged conduct.”

F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001)).

Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 735.

Even assuming that Campbell

The second prong requires that, “at

sufficiently alleged these elements, he

the time of the challenged conduct,

has not plausibly alleged that Wise

the contours of a right are sufficiently

and Vires tacitly authorized or were

clear that every reasonable official

deliberately indifferent towards his

would have understood that what he

complaint about race discrimination.

is doing violates that right.” Id. at 741

As set forth earlier, see supra at 23,

(cleaned up). There need not be a case

there are no allegations that Wise and

directly on point, “but existing

Vires had any role whatsoever related

precedent must have placed the

to addressing reports of race

statutory or constitutional question

discrimination, had any authority

beyond debate.” Id. (citing Anderson

over the security guard, tacitly

v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640

authorized the race discrimination, or

(1987); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.

acted with deliberate indifference

335, 341 (1986)); see also Hope, 536

U.S. at 741 (noting that neither cases

with “fundamentally similar” facts responding as Wise and Vires did

nor “materially similar” facts are violated the law.

required; the question “is whether the

In sum, even had Campbell plausibly

state of the law [at the time of the

alleged a § 1983 claim against Wise or

conduct] gave [officials] fair warning

Vires, each would be entitled to

that their alleged treatment of [the

qualified immunity.

plaintiff] was unconstitutional”).

E. The IIED claim fails as a matter

Here, Wise and Vires frame “the

of law.

relevant legal question” as follows:

“Was it clearly established, under the Campbell alleges that Wise’s and

circumstances faced by Vires and Vires’ “failure to take affirmative

Wise, that endeavoring to educate and action” to address his “numerous

inform University staff and students complaints” of discrimination “was

about service animal policies and best extreme and outrageous, particularly

practices, and attempting to connect given their positions of authority and

Plaintiff with dining services and their duty to ensure compliance with

security providers was in violation of federal and state disability laws.”

some federal law?” Mem. in Supp. at Second Am. Compl. ¶ 139. Despite

17-18. receiving his “increasingly anxious

written communication[s] . . . asking

Campbell does not dispute this

for help [and] detail[ing] the

description of the issue, although he

emotional distress and harm” he

more generally describes “repeated

suffered, neither Wise nor Vires

interference with a service animal and

timely or meaningfully acted. Id.

failure to investigate formal

¶¶ 140-41. Instead, they “acted with

complaints” as precluding immunity

reckless disregard” and

because “[n]o reasonable official

“demonstrated callous indifference”

could believe” those actions “met the

to Campbell’s rights and emotional

requirements of the ADA and Section

harm. Id. ¶ 142; see also id. ¶¶ 143-51

504.” See Mem. in Opp’n at 10-11.16

(alleging the injuries he suffered as a

As already addressed, Campbell has result of the inaction of Wise and

not sufficiently pled that Wise or Vires Vires).

violated his statutory or

To state a claim for intentional

constitutional rights. Had he

infliction of emotional distress in

plausibly alleged a § 1983 claim, he

North Carolina, a plaintiff must

has not sufficiently pled that, at the

allege, “‘1) extreme and outrageous

time of the alleged conduct, every

conduct by the defendant 2) which is

reasonable official would believe that

intended to and does in fact cause 3)

16 Campbell initially stated in his were clearly established.” Mem. in Opp’n

response that his “right to be free from at 9. But he rests his argument on the

discrimination under the ADA, Section ADA and Section 504.

504, and the Equal Protection Clause

severe emotional distress.’” Sheaffer v. Rack Room Shoes, 912 F. Supp. 187,

v. Cnty. of Chatham, 337 F. Supp. 2d 192 (M.D.N.C. 1996). And “mere

709, 732 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (quoting insults, indignities, and threats” fall

Waddle v. Sparks, 414 S.E.2d 22, 27 short. Guthrie v. Conroy, 567 S.E.2d

(N.C. 1992)); see also Payne v. Nat’l 403, 409 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002).

Jewelry & Pawn, Inc., No. 1:25CV24,

2026 WL 705064, at *1 (M.D.N.C. By way of contrast, though, the

Feb. 18, 2026), adopted, 2026 WL following acts do constitute extreme

701391 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 12, 2026) and outrageous conduct:

(stating the same). “Conduct is

extreme and outrageous only when it • The commission of murder,

is ‘so outrageous in character, and so Eubanks v. State Farm Fire &

extreme in degree, as to go beyond all Cas. Co., 485 S.E.2d 870, 872

possible bounds of decency, and to be (N.C. Ct. App.), disc. review

regarded as atrocious, and utterly denied, 493 S.E.2d 452 (N.C.

intolerable in a civilized community.’” 1997);

Sheaffer, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 732 • Years’ long “unending barrage

(quoting Hogan v. Forsyth Country of abuse, harassment, threats,

Club Co., 340 S.E.2d 116, 123 (N.C. Ct. scorn, and derision . . . that at

App. 1986)); see also Payne, 2026 WL times spilled over into physical

705064, at *1 (stating the same). The confrontation and attack,”

assessment of whether conduct is Radcliff v. Avenel

extreme and outrageous is a question Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 789

of law. Foster v. Crandell, 638 S.E.2d S.E.2d 893, 907-08 (N.C. Ct.

526, 537 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007). App. 2016), disc. review

denied, 799 S.E.2d 42 (N.C.

And “North Carolina courts have set a 2017);

high bar with respect to what • “[W]rongfully and publicly

constitutes outrageous conduct.” Doe suggest[ing] that [the student

v. Lees-McRae College, No. plaintiff] was to blame for being

1:20CV105 MR WCM, 2021 WL raped” and then “purposefully

1096285, at *8 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 4, ‘dup[ing]’ her into withdrawing

2021), adopted, 2021 WL 1093635 from school and treat[ing] a

(Mar. 22, 2021). For example, request for temporary leave as a

requiring a pregnant employee to mechanism to permanently rid

carry heavy loads and refusing to [the school] of a student

allow her leave to go to the hospital is complaining about the

not extreme and outrageous conduct University’s response to her

for purposes of this claim. Hogan, rape,” Rouse v. Duke Univ.,

340 S.E.2d at 122-23. Neither are

“poor performance evaluations,”

failure to promote, exclusion from

training, and termination. Pardasani

869 F. Supp. 2d 674, 681-82 670-71. In addition, three of four

(M.D.N.C. 2012). professors resigned from her doctoral

committee. Id. at 671.

In the educational context, the court

in Mandsager v. University of North These allegations supported “an

Carolina at Greensboro, 269 F. Supp. inference that the defendants’

2d 662, 683 (M.D.N.C. 2003), found response to her complaints about Dr.

that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged Purkey’s conduct was extreme and

the individual defendants outrageous.” Id. at 683. She had also

intentionally inflicted emotional sufficiently alleged she suffered

harm on her.17 severe emotional distress. Id.

There, the plaintiff’s direct supervisor In McClean v. Duke University, 376

in her Ph.D program, Dr. Purkey, F. Supp. 3d 585, 613 (M.D.N.C. 2019),

sexually harassed her and directly the court found the student’s

propositioned her. Id. at 669-70. allegations sufficient. McClean, a

Mandsager notified her department student at the university’s medical

chair, who first shrugged off the and graduate schools, reported her

behavior and then “‘reminded [her] rape, but the rapist was in a

that Purkey was responsible for her relationship with the school’s

grade in that class.’” Id. at 670. At a Coordinator of Gender Violence

planned remedial discussion, the Intervention Services. The culprit

chair directed Mandsager to sit at the continued harassing McClean,

table, entered the room with Dr. threatening that his girlfriend would

Purkey and remained standing, and undermine her credibility and destroy

permitted Dr. Purkey to read a her reputation. Id. Indeed, he and his

prepared statement and leave the girlfriend made false stalking reports

room. Id. After the plaintiff to the university’s police department,

complained in writing, she was disclosed McClean’s “confidential

subject to a host of adverse actions. sexual assault report widely within

The University removed her from her the university,” caused a university

teaching assistant position “for police officer “to make a false

obvious reasons,” stripped her of her statement about her” at a hearing on

clinical supervisor role, prevented her the rapist’s detention, and

from completing her research under “compil[ed] and disseminat[ed]

the terms that accommodated her negative information about [her] to

learning disability, directed her to destroy her reputation” at the

redo work already completed, and university and within the medical

advised her to seek outside community. Id. at 595-96. The court

employment the next semester. Id. at described McClean’s allegations

17 Although this case pre-dates

Iqbal/Twombly, its allegations meet that

pleading requirement.

against the rapist as “wholly within him a duty of care but breached that

the realm of ‘extreme and outrageous duty when they failed to act or failed

conduct.’” Id. at 613. “to act appropriately.” Second Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 155-56. Their inaction or

Wise and Vires argue that Campbell improper action “was particularly

failed to allege their conduct was egregious” because they knew of

extreme and outrageous. Mem. in Campbell’s PTSD and need for Aspen

Supp. at 19 (citing Pardasani, 912 F. to mitigate his symptoms. Id. ¶ 157.

Supp. at 192; Groves v. Travelers Ins. “As a direct and foreseeable result of

Co., 552 S.E.2d 141 (N.C. 2001); [their] negligence, [his] PTSD was

Ausley v. Bishop, 515 S.E.2d 72, 80 exacerbated,” and he suffered

(N.C. Ct. App. 1999), rev’d on other “heightened anxiety, difficulty

grounds, 572 S.E.2d 153 (N.C. 2002)). concentrating, physical symptoms of

stress, . . . [and] severe emotional

Here, Campbell generally “alleges distress, requiring continued mental

sustained mistreatment that health treatment and significantly

exacerbated his known mental health altering his daily life and academic

disability.” Mem. in Opp’n at 10 experience.” Id. ¶¶ 158, 161.

(citing Waddle v. Sparks, 414 S.E.2d

22 (N.C. 1992)). He does not address To state a claim for negligent

the argument that his “sustained infliction of emotional distress, “a

mistreatment” is not extreme and plaintiff must allege that (1) the

outrageous. Although the Court could defendant negligently engaged in

consider Wise’s and Vires’ argument conduct, (2) it was reasonably

on this point uncontested, see foreseeable that such conduct would

M.D.N.C. Civ. L.R. 7.3(k) (providing cause the plaintiff severe emotional

that the court will consider and decide distress . . ., and (3) the conduct did in

a motion as uncontested when “no fact cause the plaintiff severe

response brief is filed”), review on the emotional distress.” Johnson v.

merits confirms it. Because Campbell Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology

has failed to allege that Wise or Vires Assocs., P.A., 395 S.E.2d 85, 97 (N.C.

intentionally inflicted emotional 1990). “Although an allegation of

distress, the Court should dismiss ordinary negligence will suffice, a

Count Five. plaintiff must also allege that severe

emotional distress was the

F. The NIED claim fails as a foreseeable and proximate result of

matter of law. such negligence in order to state a

claim; mere temporary fright,

As an alternative to his intentional disappointment or regret will not

infliction of emotional distress claim, suffice.” See id. “In cases involving

Campbell alleges that Wise and Vires omissions, negligence may arise

negligently inflicted emotional where a ‘special relationship’ exists

distress on him. He claims they owed between the parties.” Davidson v.

Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 543 address any case law on whether the

S.E.2d 920, 926 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001), University owed him a legal duty

disc. review denied, 550 S.E.2d 771 because of his status as a student.

(N.C. 2001).18 And while courts have found that

some circumstances do create a legal

Wise and Vires advance two

duty on the part of a college toward a

arguments undercutting the first

student, those circumstances are

element of this claim. One: Campbell

limited.

failed to allege a legal duty. Mem. in

Supp. at 21. Two: Campbell bases this The North Carolina Court of Appeals

claim on the same conduct he alleged found that a university owed a student

supported his ADA, Section 504, and cheerleader who was injured during

Title VI claims – all of which are practice a legal duty because of their

claims of “‘inherently intentional’” mutual dependence. Davidson, 543

discriminatory conduct. Id. at 22 And, S.E.2d at 927. The university

at least as this court found in Thomas “depended upon the cheerleading

v. N. Telecom, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d program for a variety of benefits,” and

627, 637 (M.D.N.C. 2000), “the cheerleaders received significant

intentional conduct cannot be the benefits from [the university] as a

basis of the negligent infliction of result of participating in the

emotional distress claim. Id. cheerleading program.” Id. The court

“also [found] it significant that [the

Campbell provides a cursory defense,

university] exerted a considerable

arguing that “[t]he University-student

degree of control over its

relationship, paired with actual

cheerleaders.” Id.

knowledge of [his] condition, creates

a duty under” Johnson. Mem. in Particularly relevant here, the court

Opp’n at 10. But Johnson does not warned that this was a factually

support this conclusion. He does not specific finding, and “should not be

18 Wise and Vires argue that Campbell is v. Carter, No. 5:24-CT-3138-FL, 2026

required to bring this claim in the North WL 820852, at *5 & n.4 (E.D.N.C. Mar.

Carolina Industrial Commission, 25, 2026) (citing Carias v. N.C. Dep’t of

pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-291(e). Pub. Safety, No. 1:24-CV-765

Mem. in Supp. at 20-21. Not only do they (RDA/JLW), 2025 WL 2404530, at *8

fail to cite any case law supporting their (M.D.N.C. Aug. 19, 2025) (collecting

position, but this court recently cases))). Further, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-

addressed a similar argument and 291(e) is inapplicable here because

recognized that “[m]ost courts have Campbell sues Wise and Vires in their

concluded, to the contrary, that the individual capacities. Campbell

statute does not preclude individual mistakenly includes this argument as

capacity negligence claims in federal part of his opposition to Wise’s and Vires’

court.” Forero v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel arguments about his intentional

Hill, No. 1:24cv930, 2026 WL 891991, at infliction of emotional distress claim.

*1 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 2026) (citing Neal Mem. in Opp’n at 10.

interpreted as finding a special “It is not clear . . . that either the

relationship to exist between a Rehabilitation Act or the ADA create

university, college, or other secondary an independent duty of care for

educational institution, and every purposes of a negligence claim.” Doe,

student attending the school, or even 2021 WL 1096285, at *7 (citing Liese

every member of a student group, v. Indian River Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 701

club, intramural team, or F.3d 334, 352-53 (11th Cir. 2012);

organization. . . . [T]he student- Strojnik v. Bakersfield Convention

university relationship, standing Hotel I, LLC, 436 F. Supp. 3d 1332,

alone, does not constitute a special 1344 (E.D. Ca. 2020). To that end,

relationship giving rise to a duty of although a violation of a safety statute

care.” Id. at 928; see also McFadyen may be negligence per se under North

v. Duke Univ., 786 F. Supp. 2d 887, Carolina law, “it is unlikely that the

996 (M.D.N.C. 2011), rev’d in part on North Carolina courts would find that

other grounds, 703 F.3d 636 (4th Cir. the ADA is a safety statute or that

2012) (citing Davidson and finding violation of the ADA constitutes

that the university had no “special negligence per se[.]” James v. Peter

relationship” with the lacrosse team Pan Transit Mgmt., Inc., No. 97-747,

members “based on their status as 1999 WL 735173, at *9 (E.D.N.C. Jan.

students”); Cash v. Lees-McRae 20, 1999). See also Cash, 2018 WL

College, Inc., No. 1:18CV52, 2018 WL 7297876, at *14 (“To the extent that

7297876, at *13 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 13, Plaintiff Cash alleges that Title IX

2018), adopted, 2019 WL 276842 supplies a duty actionable in

(Jan. 22, 2019), aff’d, 811 F. App’x 190 negligence, she cannot plead such a

(4th Cir. 2020) (citing Davidson and claim.”)). Cf. Brockman v. T&B

finding that the college “had no Concepts of Carrboro, LLC, No.

special duty of care with respect to” 1:19CV622, 2020 WL 5821169, at *26

the student). (M.D.N.C. Sept. 30, 2020) (finding

“that Plaintiff’s Title VII and ADA

Campbell has not alleged any type of

claims cannot serve as the underlying

mutual dependence between a

torts for Plaintiff’s negligent hiring,

university and a student, a linchpin of

supervision, or retention claims”).

the holdings identified above.

Therefore, his status as a student does In Doe, the student alleged that the

not impose a legal duty on Wise or defendants owed him a duty to keep

Vires. And, to the extent that “him safe from harassment, and to

Campbell argues his status as a accommodate, recognize, respect, and

student with a disability creates a care for his ADHD condition and

special relationship according to anxiety related needs,” and that

which the University owed him a legal another defendant owed him “a duty

duty, he has not cited any case law to implement policy and procedure

supporting this position. creating accommodations for

students suffering from disabilities

similar to [his], and to take action

when failures therein were damages may not be awarded in

discovered.” 2021 WL 1096285, at *6. private suits brought under Title VI of

Relying on the persuasive authority the 1964 Civil Rights Act, it follows

above, the court dismissed his that they may not be awarded in suits

negligence claim. Id. at *7.19 brought under § 202 of the ADA and

§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.”)20

This persuasive authority supports a

conclusion here that neither the ADA

Therefore, even had Campbell

nor Section 504 supplies a basis for

sufficiently alleged the University

Campbell’s negligence claim.

violated the ADA, Section 504, or Title

Therefore, his status as a student with

VI, he still could not recover punitive

a disability does not impose a legal

damages.

duty on Wise or Vires.

Because Campbell fails to state a IV. CONCLUSION

claim for negligent infliction of

emotional distress, the Court should This Complaint is Campbell’s third

dismiss Count Six. iteration, and he has failed to state a

claim against any of the defendants.

G. Punitive damages cannot be

And, in this Circuit, “district courts

awarded against the University

are not required to give plaintiffs one

for violations of the ADA,

without-prejudice ruling on the

Section 504, or Title VI.

merits before dismissing with

prejudice.” See United States ex rel.

Campbell seeks punitive damages

Nicholson v. MedCom Carolinas,

against the defendants. See Second

Inc., 42 F.4th 185, 196 (4th Cir. 2022).

Am. Compl. Prayer for Relief ¶¶ 3, 4.

Because “[d]istrict courts have

However, the Supreme Court has long

inherent power to manage their

recognized that punitive damages are

dockets with an eye toward speedy

not available in private suits alleging

and efficient resolutions” such as

violations of the ADA, Section 504, or

dismissing “plainly insufficient”

Title VI. Mem. in Supp. at 22-23

“causes of action with prejudice[,]”

(citing Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S.

181, 189 (2002) (“Because punitive

19 Wise and Vires argue that

“[i]ntentional conduct cannot form the 20 As the University recognized, see Reply

basis for a negligence claim.” McClean, at 13, Campbell failed to respond at all to

376 F. Supp. 3d at 617 (dismissing the the argument that he cannot recover

negligence claims against the individual punitive damages from the University.

defendants who allegedly intentionally Although the court can consider the

inflicted emotional distress on the University’s argument uncontested, see

plaintiff). Because Campbell did not M.D.N.C. L.R. 7.3(k), the University’s

sufficiently allege intentional conduct in challenge is legally correct.

the first place, though, this argument is

moot.

id., this Court recommends the same It is therefore RECOMMENDED

here. that the Court grant the defendants’

motion to dismiss and dismiss this

action with prejudice.

JoAnna Gibson McFadden

United States Magistrate Judge

May 22, 2026

Durham, North Carolina

31