Orlonzo Hedrington v. United States

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ORLONZO HEDRINGTON, No. 23-15191

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.

2:18-cv-02333-

and KJM-DB

PETER L. FEAR, in his capacity as

the Trustee of the Chapter 7 OPINION

Bankruptcy Estate of Orlonzo

Hedrington,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Kimberly J. Mueller, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 27, 2025

San Francisco, California

Filed May 22, 2026

2 HEDRINGTON V. USA

Before: Michelle T. Friedland, Mark J. Bennett, and

Gabriel P. Sanchez, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Bennett

SUMMARY *

Federal Tort Claims Act

Reversing the district court’s summary judgment in

favor of the United States in Orlonzo Hedrington’s suit

under the Federal Tort Claims Act alleging negligence

(“Hedrington I”), the panel held that Hedrington I was not

barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion.

After timely filing suit in Hedrington I, Hedrington filed

a second suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act raising

similar factual allegations and negligence claims

(“Hedrington II”). The district court dismissed Hedrington

II as untimely. Based on the doctrine of claim preclusion,

the district court concluded that Hedrington’s timely claim

in Hedrington I was precluded by the final judgment in

Hedrington II.

The panel held that it was bound by Filice v. United

States, 271 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1959), which held that the law

of the State where the act or omission occurred controls the

claim preclusive effect of a Federal Tort Claims Act

judgment. Because Hedrington alleged that the tortious acts

*

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

HEDRINGTON V. USA 3

occurred in California, the panel applied California’s

doctrine of claim preclusion. The Hedrington II judgment

did not trigger California’s doctrine of claim preclusion

because, under California law, a prior judgment of dismissal

based on the statute of limitations lacks claim preclusive

effect. In any event, the district court’s decision to apply

claim preclusion based on the Hedrington II judgment—

despite its knowledge of and jurisdiction over

Hedrington I—resulted in manifest injustice sufficient to

trigger the public policy exception under California law.

Accordingly, the panel reversed the district court’s grant

of summary judgment to the United States in Hedrington I

and remanded for further proceedings.

The panel addressed additional issues in a concurrently

filed memorandum disposition.

COUNSEL

Orlonzo Hedrington, Pro Se, Fresno, California, for

Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Joseph B. Frueh (argued), Assistant United States Attorney;

Michele Beckwith, Acting United States Attorney; Phillip A.

Talbert, United States Attorney; Office of the United States

Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Sacramento,

California; for Defendant-Appellee.

4 HEDRINGTON V. USA

OPINION

BENNETT, Circuit Judge:

Orlonzo Hedrington timely filed suit. He then sued

again—but the second time, too late. In the second suit, the

district court granted summary judgment against him on

untimeliness grounds. Then, based on the doctrine of claim

preclusion, 1 the district court concluded that his timely claim

in the first suit was precluded by the final judgment in the

second suit.

Both times, Hedrington sued under the Federal Tort

Claims Act (FTCA), which “allows plaintiffs to seek

damages from the United States for certain torts committed

by federal employees.” Simmons v. Himmelreich, 578 U.S.

621, 623 (2016). Of note here, the FTCA also “requires

application of the whole law of the State where the act or

omission occurred.” Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1,

11 (1962). While federal district courts have “exclusive

jurisdiction” over FTCA actions, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), the

Act generally directs federal courts to apply state law, see

Richards, 369 U.S. at 11.

The fate of Hedrington’s first suit turns largely on

whether the FTCA’s directive to apply state law includes

state claim preclusion law. We have answered that question

before, in the affirmative. In Filice v. United States, we

1

The doctrine of claim preclusion has sometimes been known as “res

judicata.” But that usage has fallen out of favor. See 18 Wright &

Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure § 4402 (3d. ed. 2025). In modern

usage, the term “res judicata” refers collectively to the separate but

related doctrines of claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Taylor v.

Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008).

HEDRINGTON V. USA 5

applied the law of the State where the act or omission

occurred in determining the claim preclusive effect of a prior

FTCA judgment. 271 F.2d 782, 783–84 (9th Cir. 1959) (per

curiam). We have found no intervening higher authority

“clearly irreconcilable” with this circuit precedent, so we as

a three-judge panel remain bound by Filice. See Miller v.

Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

Because Hedrington alleges that the tortious acts

occurred in California, we must apply California’s doctrine

of claim preclusion. See Filice, 271 F.2d at 783–84. Under

California law, the judgment dismissing Hedrington’s

second suit based on untimeliness did not have claim

preclusive effect. Koch v. Rodlin Enters., 273 Cal. Rptr.

438, 441 (Ct. App. 1990). Furthermore, California’s public

policy exception to claim preclusion applies on these facts.

See Panos v. Great W. Packing Co., 134 P.2d 242, 243 (Cal.

1943) (in bank). We therefore hold that the judgment

dismissing Hedrington’s second suit did not bar his timely

filed first suit. Thus, we reverse and remand. 2

I

Hedrington underwent heart surgery and post-surgery

rehabilitation at David Grant Medical Center (“DGMC”), a

medical center operated by the Veterans Administration and

located at Travis Air Force Base in Fairfield, California.

According to Hedrington, on January 22, 2016, the day of

his discharge, he was transported to a secluded area of the

hospital, left unattended for twenty minutes, and, after

2

In a concurrently filed memorandum disposition, we address the merits

of Hedrington’s negligence claim—an independent ground on which the

district court granted summary judgment for the United States. In that

disposition, we also hold that the United States was not entitled to

summary judgment.

6 HEDRINGTON V. USA

complaining of chest pain, injected in the arm with a drug

that rendered him unconscious. When he awoke, he noticed

that his clothes were twisted, he felt pressure in his rectal

area, and he discovered semen in his buttocks.

Hedrington filed an FTCA administrative tort claim with

the Department of Veterans Affairs, alleging “[s]exual

assault and battery by nursing staff while hospitalized,” as

well as “deception and administering of drugs to disguise the

assault and tortious behavior.” The claim was received on

August 28, 2017, and denied on February 27, 2018.

A

On August 24, 2018, Hedrington, represented by

counsel, timely filed an FTCA action for negligence in the

U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California

(“Hedrington I”). The United States moved for summary

judgment, arguing that judicial estoppel barred Hedrington

from litigating the case because, while filing for Chapter 7

bankruptcy in April 2017, he had represented to the

bankruptcy court and his creditors that he had no potential

lawsuits or claims. The United States also contended that

Hedrington lacked prudential standing because claims not

disclosed during bankruptcy proceedings remained the

property of the bankruptcy estate.

Hedrington agreed with the trustee of his bankruptcy

estate, Peter Fear, to split any recovery from the case and to

substitute Fear as plaintiff in the action, represented by the

same counsel. Hedrington’s counsel notified the district

court of the agreement, and the district court substituted Fear

as plaintiff. The district court then denied as moot the United

States’s motion for summary judgment.

HEDRINGTON V. USA 7

B

On January 13, 2020, unbeknownst to his counsel in

Hedrington I, Hedrington sued pro se in California Superior

Court (“Hedrington II”). The operative complaint in

Hedrington II made factual allegations similar to those made

in Hedrington I and brought similar negligence claims. But

the Hedrington II complaint named multiple other

defendants, including DGMC, DGMC employees, the

Fairfield Police Department, and the County of Solano.

The United States removed Hedrington II, and the case

was assigned to the same district judge hearing Hedrington I.

The United States substituted itself for the federal-employee

defendants and notified the district court of Hedrington I.

On the same day, the United States filed a similar notice in

Hedrington I to notify the district court of Hedrington II.

The United States and DGMC moved for summary

judgment in Hedrington II, arguing first that any claim

against DGMC was barred by sovereign immunity, and

second that any claim against the United States was time-

barred because the action had not been filed within six

months of the February 27, 2018 denial of Hedrington’s

administrative tort claim, as required by the FTCA. Finding

under Local Rule 123(a) that “both actions involve[d]

similar questions of fact and the same question of law,” the

district court related Hedrington I and Hedrington II. The

assigned magistrate judge recommended granting the

motion for summary judgment in Hedrington II. The

magistrate judge’s report concluded that “plaintiff’s claim

for the negligent or wrongful conduct of a government

employee must be brought against the United States, and not

DGMC,” “plaintiff’s claim against the United States is time-

barred,” and “plaintiff has failed to present any facts or

8 HEDRINGTON V. USA

argument that would satisfy the requirements for equitable

tolling.” The magistrate judge’s report acknowledged in a

footnote that “this action was related to an earlier filed

action, [Hedrington I].”

The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report

and recommendations and granted summary judgment to the

United States and DGMC. The district court then entered

judgment for the United States and dismissed the claims

against DGMC without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.

Then, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

the remaining state law claims against the state defendants,

the district court remanded the case to state court.

C

About nine months after the district court’s summary

judgment in Hedrington II, the United States moved to

dismiss Hedrington I for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

or, in the alternative, for summary judgment on two

independent grounds: claim preclusion based on the final

judgment in Hedrington II, and insufficient evidence to

support the negligence claim. The district court denied the

United States’s motion to dismiss but granted its motion for

summary judgment on both grounds—claim preclusion and

insufficient evidence.

The bankruptcy trustee then abandoned Hedrington I.

Hedrington, however, timely appealed the judgment against

him in Hedrington I. Though he was represented by counsel

in the district court, Hedrington has proceeded pro se on

appeal.

II

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

“review de novo whether preclusion applies” and “review de

HEDRINGTON V. USA 9

novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment.” Bahra

v. County of San Bernardino, 945 F.3d 1231, 1234 (9th

Cir. 2019). “We must determine, viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, whether

genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the district

court correctly applied the relevant substantive law.” United

States v. Washington, 928 F.3d 783, 790 (9th Cir. 2019).

III

In determining the effect of the Hedrington II judgment,

we face a threshold question: Which body of law—state or

federal—governs the judgment’s claim preclusive effect?

The United States argues that the district court correctly

applied federal law, under which a dismissal for

untimeliness carries claim preclusive effect. Hedrington

disagrees, and argues that under the applicable state law, the

Hedrington II judgment did not have claim preclusive effect.

In Filice v. United States, we held that the law of the

State where the act or omission occurred controls the claim

preclusive effect of a FTCA judgment. 271 F.2d at 783–84.

Under Miller v. Gammie, we are bound by Filice unless the

Supreme Court “ha[s] undercut the theory or reasoning

underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way that the

cases are clearly irreconcilable.” 335 F.3d at 900. Because

Filice is not clearly irreconcilable with later Supreme Court

decisions, we conclude that California preclusion law

governs the claim preclusive effect of the Hedrington II

judgment.

A

The FTCA contains “a formal expression of the will of

Congress” on “the issue of the applicable law.” Richards,

369 U.S. at 7. The statute directly incorporates “the law of

10 HEDRINGTON V. USA

the place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1346(b)(1). The Supreme Court has interpreted this to

“require[] application of the whole law of the State where

the act or omission occurred,” including that State’s

conflict-of-laws rule. Richards, 369 U.S. at 11. In

determining whether the “whole law of the State” includes

principles of res judicata, however, circuit courts have split,

as part of a larger debate over whether the law of preclusion

is substantive or procedural. See Jean F. Rydstrom, Federal

or State Law as Governing in Matters of Res Judicata and

Collateral Estoppel in Federal Tort Claims Act Suit § 4, 49

A.L.R. Fed. 326 (1980) (collecting cases); see also

Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 87 cmt. b

(A.L.I. 1982).

We most recently addressed this issue in Filice. 271 F.2d

at 783. There, Frank Filice had sued the United States under

the FTCA and won a $15,000 judgment. Id. at 782–83. But

he later sought unsuccessfully to vacate the judgment,

because he believed that $15,000 “was grossly inadequate in

view of the permanent nature of his injuries.” Id. at 783.

After those efforts failed, he sued again, “based upon the

same original cause of action, . . . claiming that the $15,000

judgment covered damages only to the date of the original

trial.” Id. at 783–84. Filice believed “that he should further

recover for permanent injuries, additional damages from the

date of the original trial.” Id. at 784. The district court

dismissed the later-filed complaint, and Filice appealed. Id.

We affirmed. Id. We reasoned that “[u]nder the law of

California, which is applicable here, the [United States], if a

private employer, would have had a defense of [claim

preclusion].” Id. at 783. And because Filice’s claims for

“damages resulting from the negligent acts” had “merged”

into his final judgment under California law, all he could “do

HEDRINGTON V. USA 11

is to sue on the judgment.” Id. (first citing Restatement

(First) of Judgments § 47 and cmts. (1942); and then citing

id. § 62 cmt. d). So we held that California’s doctrine of

claim preclusion required the district court “to dismiss the

[later filed] complaint with prejudice.” Id. at 784. In sum,

we applied the claim preclusion law of California, the State

where the act or omission occurred, to determine the

preclusive effect of Filice’s prior FTCA judgment. See id.

at 783–84.

B

As a three-judge panel, we remain bound by Filice unless

the Supreme Court has “undercut the theory or reasoning

underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way that the

cases are clearly irreconcilable.” Miller, 335 F.3d at 900.

There are two Supreme Court decisions to consider.

Addressing each in turn, we conclude that neither is

irreconcilable with Filice.

First Richards. There, the Court explained that the

FTCA “requires application of the whole law of the State

where the act or omission occurred.” 369 U.S. at 11.

Following Congress’s clear intent, the Court found it

appropriate to disregard “the conflict-of-laws rule applied in

suits where federal jurisdiction rests upon diversity of

citizenship.” Id. at 7 (citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg.

Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941)). The Court held instead that the

FTCA requires district courts to apply the choice-of-law rule

of the State where the act or omission occurred. Id. at 11–

13. That, the Court reasoned, would “enable[] the federal

courts to treat the United States as a ‘private individual under

like circumstances.’” Id. at 11 (quoting 28 U.S.C.§ 2674).

The Court further explained that doing so would “provide[]

a degree of flexibility to the law to be applied in federal

12 HEDRINGTON V. USA

courts,” consistent “with the character of the legislation and

with the purpose of the Act considered as a whole.” Id. at

12–13.

The Court’s reasoning in Richards aligns with our

reasoning in Filice. Understanding the FTCA’s directive to

apply the State’s whole law as incorporating the State’s law

of claim preclusion likewise furthers the statutory goal of

“treat[ing] the United States as a ‘private individual under

like circumstances.’” See id. at 11 (quoting 28 U.S.C.

§ 2674) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)). As in Richards,

“where the forum State is the same as the one in which the

act or omission occurred, our interpretation will enable the

federal courts to treat the United States as an individual

would be treated under like circumstances.” See id.

at 12 & n.25. Incorporating the State’s claim preclusion law

also “provides a degree of flexibility to the law to be applied

in federal courts.” See id. at 12–13. Following Richards,

“we should not, particularly in the type of interstitial

legislation involved here, assume that” Congress has enacted

“for litigation of this type a federal [claim preclusion] rule

independent of the States’ development of such rules.” See

id. at 13. Richards is therefore consistent with Filice.

The second decision is Semtek International Inc. v.

Lockheed Martin Corp., where the Court addressed the claim

preclusive effect of federal diversity judgments. 531 U.S.

497, 499 (2001). There, a federal district court sitting in

diversity in California dismissed Semtek’s claims against

Lockheed Martin “as barred by California’s [two]–year

statute of limitations.” Id. Afterward, Semtek sued

Lockheed Martin again in Maryland state court, “alleging

the same causes of action, which were not time barred under

Maryland’s [three]-year statute of limitations.” Id.

Applying federal claim preclusion law, which treats statute

HEDRINGTON V. USA 13

of limitations dismissals as preclusive, the Maryland state

court dismissed the claims as barred by the California federal

court judgment. Id. at 500.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether

the claim preclusive effect of a federal diversity judgment

“is determined by the law of the State in which the federal

court sits.” Id. at 499–500. Because no “federal textual

provision” addressed the claim preclusive effect of a federal

diversity judgment, the Court determined that “federal

common law governs the claim-preclusive effect of a

dismissal by a federal court sitting in diversity.” Id. at 506–

08. In “determin[ing] the appropriate federal rule,” the

Court “adopt[ed], as the federally prescribed rule of

decision, the law that would be applied by state courts in the

State in which the federal diversity court sits,” subject to an

exception for “situations in which the state law is

incompatible with federal interests.” Id. at 508–09. The

Court accordingly reversed the Maryland state court’s

decision, explaining that “the claim-preclusive effect of the

California federal court’s dismissal . . . is governed by a

federal rule that in turn incorporates” California claim

preclusion law—which was “the law that would be applied

by state courts in” California, “the State in which the federal

diversity court” sat. Id.

Semtek did not undercut Filice. If anything, Semtek

supports Filice because the Court suggested there that a

“federal textual provision” could prescribe the preclusive

effect of federal court judgments. See id. at 507. 3 And as

3

It is unclear whether Congress or the Supreme Court is the ultimate

source for the preclusive effect of federal court judgments. See Ronan

E. Degnan, Federalized Res Judicata, 85 Yale L.J. 741, 744–45, 747–

49, 748 n.31, 768–69 (1976) (suggesting that the “clearly established rule

14 HEDRINGTON V. USA

discussed, the FTCA’s command to apply “the whole law of

the State where the act or omission occurred,” Richards, 369

U.S. at 11, can be understood as including a directive to

apply that State’s claim preclusion law. 4 Filice, in turn, can

be understood as having followed that congressional

directive. See 271 F.2d at 783–84.

that state courts must give full faith and credit to the proceedings of

federal courts” derives from Article III and the Supremacy Clause);

David L. Shapiro, Civil Procedure: Preclusion in Civil Actions 145

(2001) (explaining that the federal common law of preclusion “is binding

on the states through the Supremacy Clause”); William Baude, The

Judgment Power, 96 Geo. L.J. 1807, 1847 (2008) (noting that “a great

deal more research and analysis would be necessary to untangle the

interaction between” the different sources of res judicata); Kevin Song,

Note, Preclusive Jurisdictional Dismissals, 119 Nw. U. L.R. 1703, 1707

n.7 (2025) (noting that “the source of federal-state res judicata is

unclear”). But “the reasoning or theory” of Semtek, see Miller, 335 F.3d

at 893, cannot have been that the claim preclusive effect of federal

judgments is determined by federal common law to the exclusion of

federal statutory law. If that were the theory of Semtek, the Court would

have had to re-examine Dupasseur v. Rochereau, which had held that the

res judicata effect of federal diversity judgments “is such as would

belong to judgments of the State courts rendered under similar

circumstances.” See 21 Wall. 130, 135 (1874). But in Semtek, the Court

merely distinguished Dupasseur as decided under a statute no longer in

effect. See 531 U.S. at 501 (“While we agree that this would be the result

demanded by Dupasseur, the case is not dispositive because it was

decided under the Conformity Act of 1872 . . . .”); id. at 506 (explaining

that “the claim-preclusive effect” of the “California federal diversity

judgment” is not “dictated” by Dupasseur).

4

The Fifth Circuit has held to the contrary. See Johnson v. United States,

576 F.2d 606, 612 (5th Cir. 1978) (“[U]nder the [FTCA] a federal court

should apply federal principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel in

considering the preclusive effect of a prior federal judgment”). But

Johnson is not an “intervening higher authority” which could have

“effectively overruled” Filice. See Miller, 335 F.3d at 893.

HEDRINGTON V. USA 15

The United States argues that we should nonetheless

apply federal claim preclusion law because, “[i]n an action

under the FTCA, a court must apply the law the state courts

would apply in the analogous tort action, including federal

law.” This argument builds on the correct observation that,

when presented with a valid federal judgment, California

courts generally apply “federal claim preclusion

law . . . without reference to California law.” See Guerrero

v. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 239 Cal. Rptr. 3d 726, 733 (Ct.

App. 2018); see also Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 488

n.9 (1994) (“State courts are bound to apply federal rules in

determining the preclusive effect of federal-court decisions

on issues of federal law.”). But in this Circuit, the claim

preclusive effect of a FTCA judgment is determined by

Filice—under which federal law incorporates the claim

preclusion rule of the State where the act or omission

occurred. See Filice, 271 F.2d at 783–84.

In sum, as a three-judge panel, we remain bound by

Filice. See Miller, 335 F.3d at 893. Under Filice, we apply

the claim preclusion law of the State where the act or

omission occurred—here, California. See 271 F.2d at 783–

84.

IV

Applying California law, we determine that the

Hedrington II judgment did not have claim preclusive effect.

And even if it did, we alternatively conclude that

California’s public policy exception to claim preclusion

would apply.

A

The Hedrington II judgment did not trigger California’s

doctrine of claim preclusion. California courts have held

16 HEDRINGTON V. USA

that “a prior judgment based on the statute of limitations

ordinarily is not on the merits.” Boyd v. Freeman, 227 Cal.

Rptr. 3d 164, 171 (Ct. App. 2017). This is because

California courts deem “[t]ermination of an action by a

statute of limitations” a “technical or procedural, rather than

a substantive, termination.” Koch, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 441. So

under California law, a prior judgment of dismissal based on

the statute of limitations lacks claim preclusive effect. Boyd,

227 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 171. Because Hedrington II was

dismissed as time-barred, the district court erred by giving

claim preclusive effect to a judgment that, under the

applicable law, did not have such effect.

B

In any event, the district court’s decision to apply claim

preclusion based on the Hedrington II judgment—despite its

knowledge of and jurisdiction over Hedrington I—resulted

in manifest injustice sufficient to trigger the public policy

exception under California law. This is because Hedrington,

“the party to be affected,” did not have “an opportunity to

litigate the same matter in [Hedrington II].” See Panos, 134

P.2d at 243.

“California courts routinely turn to the Restatement

Second of Judgments for guidance.” 5th & LA v. W.

Waterproofing Co., 303 Cal. Rptr. 3d 855, 861 (Ct. App.

2023). The Restatement acknowledges that “[w]ithin the

constitutional limits [of due process], the contours of res

judicata are determined by the particulars of the opportunity

to litigate afforded by the system of procedure in question.”

Restatement (Second) of Judgments ch. 1 pg. 7 (A.L.I.

1982). “A just system of justice,” the Restatement

continues, “requires alertness to the possibility of failure of

justice in an individual case, corresponding to alertness to

HEDRINGTON V. USA 17

the possibility of injustice in the law itself.” Id. at 12. “The

law of res judicata,” the Restatement urges, “therefore must

provide some leeway for reexamination of judgments.” Id.

Doing so promotes not only “fairness” but also “efficiency.”

Id.

California has implemented the Restatement (Second) of

Judgments principles by recognizing a flexible but seldom

applied public policy exception to claim preclusion. Under

California law, “a final judgment may be denied claim

preclusive effect when [giving the judgment such effect]

would result in manifest injustice.” F.E.V. v. City of

Anaheim, 223 Cal. Rptr. 3d 213, 216–17 (Ct. App. 2017)

(denying claim preclusive effect to a prior judgment that was

“based entirely” on a panel decision since overturned by this

Court on rehearing en banc); City of Sacramento v.

California, 785 P.2d 522, 528–29, 529 n.8 (Cal. 1990)

(denying claim preclusive effect to the prior judgment

because of “overriding public-interest issues”). This

exception applies “[i]n rare circumstances” when “the

policies underlying claim preclusion . . . would be defeated

rather than advanced by according preclusive effect to the

judgment”—especially if doing so would “only erode public

confidence in judicial decisions.” F.E.V., 223 Cal. Rptr. 3d

at 216–17.

The principal policy underlying California’s doctrine of

claim preclusion is finality. See id. at 217, 225. Because

“the party to be affected” has actually litigated or “had an

opportunity to litigate the same matter in a former action in

a court of competent jurisdiction,” that same party (or

someone in privity with that party) “should not be permitted

to litigate it again to the harassment and vexation of [the

party’s] opponent.” Panos, 134 P.2d at 243. This finality

principle, however, presupposes fairness; it assumes that the

18 HEDRINGTON V. USA

party to be affected “had an opportunity to litigate the same

matter in [the] former action.” See id. (emphasis added). So

when giving preclusive effect to the prior judgment would

result in manifest injustice and harm to “the integrity of the

judicial system,” California courts apply the public policy

exception and decline to give the prior judgment preclusive

effect. See F.E.V., 223 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 225–26.

Here, Hedrington “seek[s] adjudication of claims that

have never been properly resolved on the merits.” See id. at

225 (emphasis added). And as to the merits, Hedrington has

not “litigated, or had an opportunity to litigate the same

matter in a former action in a court of competent

jurisdiction.” See Panos, 134 P.2d at 243. Thus, to further

“the policies underlying [California’s] claim preclusion”

doctrine, we conclude that the Hedrington II judgment

should not apply on these facts to foreclose Hedrington’s

ability to litigate the merits of his case. See F.E.V.,

223 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 216–17, 225–26.

In sum, under California law, the Hedrington II

judgment did not have claim preclusive effect and, in any

case, the public policy exception to claim preclusion applies.

Claim preclusion thus does not bar Hedrington’s timely

FTCA claim.

V

For these reasons, we reverse the district court’s grant of

summary judgment in Hedrington I, which dismissed

Hedrington’s claim against the United States based on claim

preclusion. We remand for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion and with the accompanying memorandum

disposition.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.