PHILLIPS

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

DERRICK PHILLIPS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

Vv. ) 1:26CV151

)

HIGH POINT UNIVERSITY, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This case comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for

Preliminary Injunction (“PI Motion”) (Docket Entry 9) and his

Motion for Limited Expedited Discovery (“Expedited Discovery

Motion”) (Docket Entry 14). (See Docket Entry dated Apr. 13, 2026

(referring PI Motion and Expedited Discovery Motion).)' Because

+ Plaintiff filed the PI Motion on March 16, 2026 (see Docket

Entry 9 at 1 (bearing file-stamp for that date)) and the Expedited

Discovery Motion on March 17, 2026 (see Docket Entry 14 at 1

(bearing file-stamp for that date)). Defendant did not receive

service of process until March 20, 2026 (see Docket Entry 17),

after which it timely answered (see Docket Entry 18) and gave

notice (A) that “Plaintiff served the [PI Motion and Expedited

Discovery] Motion[] on counsel for Defendant on April 13, 2026”

(Docket Entry 19 at 1; see also Docket Entry 9 (lacking certificate

of service); Docket Entry 14 (same)), as well as (B) that

“Defendant intend[ed] to file its responses in opposition to [said

mjotions within the time periods established by the Court’s [L]local

[Rlules” (Docket Entry 19 at 1). The undersigned Magistrate Judge

therefore deferred consideration of the PI Motion and the Expedited

Discovery Motion until Defendant responded to them (see Docket

Entries 27, 28) and Plaintiff replied (see Docket Entries 31, 32).

As to the form that consideration now will take, by statute, absent

consent of the parties, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (1), a magistrate

judge may not “determine . . . motion for injunctive relief,” 28

(continued...)

Plaintiff has not shown that he likely will suffer irreparable harm

absent entry of the preliminary injunctive relief he has requested

and has not proposed any discovery that plausibly would alter the

Court’s analysis of irreparable harm, the Court will deny the PI

Motion and the Expedited Discovery Motion.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint (Docket

Entry 2), which he promptly amended as a matter of course by filing

a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) (Docket Entry 7). The FAC

asserts claims by Plaintiff against Defendant under “Section 504 of

the Rehabilitation Act” (id. at 3) and the “Americans with

Disabilities Act” (id. at 4). To support those claims, the FAC

alleges, in pertinent part, that:

1) “Plaintiff has a documented disability, including

Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (‘ADHD’), which

substantially limits major life activities” (id. at 1);

2) “[b]efore enrolling at [Defendant’s] School of Law [in

2025], Plaintiff received testing accommodations at Clemson

1(...continued)

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), but may “submit . . . recommendations for

the disposition, by a [district] judge of the court, of any [such]

motion,” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). On consent of the parties (see

Docket Entry 34 at 4), Chief United States District Judge Catherine

C. Eagles has referred this case to the undersigned Magistrate

Judge for all proceedings (see Docket Entry 36 at 1). Accordingly,

the undersigned Magistrate Judge will resolve the PI Motion and the

Expedited Discovery Motion by order (rather than recommendation).

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University” (id.; see also id. (“Plaintiff also later received

accommodations on the LSAT.”));

3) “[o]n or about September 23, 2025, Plaintiff formally

notified [Defendant’s] Office of Accessibility Resources and

Services (‘OARS’) of his disability and requested reasonable

accommodations for law-school testing” (id.; see also id.

(“Plaintiff submitted medical documentation from his treating

provider on September 23, 2025.%));

4) ‘“[a]fter submitting his written request and supporting

documentation, Plaintiff attempted to complete the OARS intake

process” (id.), by “schedul[ing] an intake meeting for a thirty-

minute block shortly before class” (id. at 1-2);

5) “[d]Juring that meeting, Plaintiff was informed that the

intake interview would require approximately one hour to complete”

(id. at 2);

6) “[bJecause Plaintiff had class and could not miss it, the

intake process was not completed that day and had to be

rescheduled” (id.);

7) “[d]lue to available appointment slots conflicting with

Plaintiff’s class schedule, the intake process was not completed

until November 18, 2025” (id.);

8) “fo]n November 20, 2025, OARS sent Plaintiff a

determination letter acknowledging that Plaintiff qualified as an

individual with a disability under the ADA[, i.e., the Americans

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with Disabilities Act,] but stating that the documentation on file

did not show supporting data sufficient to justify extended [test-

taking] time, a distraction-reduced testing environment, or reader

assistive technology” (id.; see also id. at 1 (alleging that

Plaintiff requested those accommodations, as well as “permission to

complete examinations using pen-and-paper”), 2 (“OARS further

stated that a psychoeducational evaluation would likely show that

information and attached a list of local agencies for additional

testing.”));

9) that “determination came immediately before Thanksgiving

break and less than two weeks before final examinations, leaving

Plaintiff no realistic opportunity to obtain a psychoeducational

evaluation before finals” (id. at 2);

10) “Plaintiff was therefore required to take multiple high-

stakes final examinations without the requested accommodations”

(id.);

11) “[a]s a direct and foreseeable result, Plaintiff was able

to complete objective portions of certain examinations but was

unable to complete substantial essay-based portions that were most

affected by time constraints and the absence of his requested

accommodations” (id.), culminating in his receipt of final course

grades of C+, D+, and D, in Contracts, Civil Procedure, and Torts,

respectively (see id. at 2-3); and

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12) “[t]hese academic outcomes resulted in Plaintiff’s

academic dismissal” (id. at 3).°

As relief, the FAC demands, inter alia, “compensatory damages”

(id. at 4) and “appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief

requiring Defendant to provide Plaintiff meaningful access to its

educational program” (id.; see also id. at 3 (alleging that

Plaintiff’s “dismissal is causing continuing and ongoing harm to

[his] legal education, academic record, financial circumstances,

and ability to move forward in law school admissions and

professional planning,” describing “irreparable harm [to Plaintiff

as] including delay in his legal education, damage to his academic

record, disruption of his ability to continue his legal studies,

and harm to his future professional opportunities,” and insisting

that “[m]onetary damages alone cannot remedy the loss of

educational opportunity and the interruption of Plaintiff’s legal

education”)). Of particular salience to the matters presently

before the Court, the FAC expressly requests entry of a

“preliminary injunction requiring Defendant to immediately

reinstate Plaintiff to [its] School of Law with reasonable

accommodations pending final resolution of this action[.]” (Id. at

* Plaintiff did not verify the FAC (see Docket Entry 7 at 1-

4), but did later submit three declarations under penalty of

perjury that largely align with the FAC’s above-quoted factual

allegations. (Compare id. at 1-3, with Docket Entry 11 at 1-2,

Docket Entry 13 at 1, and Docket Entry 31-1 at 1-2.)

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4; see also id. at 3 (“Immediate injunctive relief, including

reinstatement with appropriate accommodations pending the

resolution of this case, is necessary to prevent further harm.”).)

The PI Motion develops that request by asking the Court (A) to

“[o]rder[] Defendant to permit Plaintiff to register and

participate in coursework on the same basis as similarly situated

students, subject to academic requirements not inconsistent with

this Court’s order” (Docket Entry 9 at 2), and (B) to “[o]rder[]

Defendant to provide . . . effective testing accommodations for

future examinations while this case remains pending” (id.). “[I]n

the alternative, [the PI Motion proposes that the Court order

Defendant] to permit Plaintiff to retake the affected Fall 2025

final examinations in Contracts, Civil Procedure, and Torts with

accommodations supported by Plaintiff’s medical documentation and

prior request, including double-time testing and pen-and-paper

testing” (id.), “and to recalculate Plaintiff’s academic standing

based on those retake results under ordinarily applicable academic

standards” (id.). The PI Motion also proffers these additional

facts not mentioned in the FAC:

Plaintiff was dismissed [from Defendant’s School of Law]

effective January 2, 2026. The dismissal letter states

that Plaintiff is no longer eligible to continue in

classes and may not petition for reinstatement until nine

months after dismissal. The attached handbook excerpt

further states that such petitions generally are not

granted and must be supported by clear and convincing

evidence.

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After Plaintiff disclosed his academic dismissal to

[three other law schools], those schools denied

admission. Plaintiff was also informed by telephone by

[a fourth law school] that, because of his dismissal, his

application had to be withdrawn and he would not be

eligible for admission until two years had elapsed.

These events have caused ongoing and present harm to

Plaintiff’s legal education, admissions prospects,

academic record, and professional trajectory.

(Id. (internal paragraph numbers omitted);3 see also id.

(“Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law for the ongoing

interruption of his legal education. Money damages cannot restore

lost educational opportunity, repair admissions-cycle harm in real

time, or eliminate the continuing impact of an active academic

dismissal while this action is pending.”); Docket Entry 11 at 2

(setting out Plaintiff’s averment that he “need[s] relief now

because waiting until final judgment will not restore the lost time

in [his] legal education or the opportunities [he is] losing while

the dismissal [by Defendant] remains active”).)

Along with the PI Motion, Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in

Support (“PI Brief”) (Docket Entry 10) and these documents:

3 Plaintiff did not verify the PI Motion (see Docket Entry 9

at 1-3), but (with it) did file a declaration under penalty of

perjury that contains averments generally matching the above-quoted

allegations from the PI Motion (except as to the handbook excerpt)

(compare id. at 2, with Docket Entry 11 at 2), as well as a copy of

the handbook excerpt confirming his account (see Docket Entry 10-1

at 16-17). In addition, Plaintiff filed a Supplement (Docket Entry

12) and a Supplemental Declaration (Docket Entry 13), “to clarify

. . . why [he] did not specifically request a pen-and-paper

accommodation during the OARS intake interview” (Docket Entry 12 at

1), to wit, “because [he] reasonably believed that examinations

could generally be written by hand” (Docket Entry 13 at 1).

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(1) the 2025-26 academic calendar for Defendant’s School of Law

(Docket Entry 10-1 at 14); (2) Plaintiff’s original accommodation

request (id. at 2-3, 5); (3) documentation supporting that request

(id. at 9-13); (4) an e-mail from OARS transmitting the

accommodation denial letter (id. at 6-8); (5) the dismissal letter

(id. at 15); (6) the handbook excerpt for academic dismissals (id.

at 16-17); and (7) rejection notices Plaintiff received from three

other law schools in 2026 (id. at 18-20). Per that calendar, the

“[f]lirst day of [the 2025 flall semester” (id. at 14) fell on

“August 18°°” (id.), i.e., more than a month before Plaintiff e-

mailed OARS on September 23, 2025 (see id. at 2, 5), “request[ing]

consideration for the following accommodations” (id. at 5):

“1. Extended time on examinations (e.9., time-and-a-half).

2. Reduced-distraction testing environment to minimize external

interruptions. 3. Permission to use a laptop with approved

software for note-taking and exam_writing. 4. Access to lecture

recordings or outlines when available, to reinforce comprehension.”

(Id. (bold font omitted) (underscoring added) .)

The documentation Plaintiff submitted to OARS to support that

accommodation request consists of a letter from a family nurse

practitioner (“FNP”) dated September 27, 2023 (see id. at 9), as

well as an e-mail from an office at Clemson dated March 13, 2024

(see id. at 10-11; see also id. at 12-13 (letter from Law School

Admission Council (“LSAC”) dated March 4, 2025, which record does

-~g-

not show Plaintiff submitted to OARS)). The FNP’s letter states

(A) that Plaintiff “ha[d] been under the care of [the FNP’s] office

Since 09-21-2023” (id. at 9), (B) that Plaintiff had completed an

“Adult ADHD Self-Report Assessment Scale” (id.), (C) that Plaintiff

“ha[d] expressed difficulty with Generalized Anxiety Disorder,

ADHD-combined type” (id. (internal colon and hyphen omitted)}, and

(D) that the FNP held the “professional opinion that [Plaintiff]

does meet the criteria of an academic accommodation” (id.; see also

id. (“[Plaintiff] has shown improvement while being under the care

of our office ... . However, there are still functional

limitations ... . As such, it is my professional recommendation

that [he] be granted fitting accommodations, including but not

strictly limited to . . . extended testing time (double time).

Also allow [him] to use pen and paper.”)). The Clemson e-mail

approved Plaintiff for “[e]xtended time on exams/tests (1.5x).”

(Id. at 10 (bold font omitted).)?*

After filing the PI Motion, Plaintiff requested and received

leave to file a Supplemental Memorandum (Docket Entry 22-1) and

additional documents showing his interactions with OARS in the fall

“ The LSAC letter “automatically approved [Plaintiff] to

receive the same accommodations on the LSAT that [he] wl[as]

approved to receive on [his] last registration for the test”

(Docket Entry 10-1 at 12), which took the form of “100%

[a]Jdditional [t]Jest time on multiple choice sections” (id.), as

well as use of “paper and pencil [on those sections]” (id. (all-

caps font omitted)), and “100% [a]dditional [t]Jest time for [the

alrgumentative [w]riting [section]” (id. at 13).

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of 2025 (see Docket Entry 22-2). (See First Text Order dated May

8, 2026 (“granting [Plaintiff’s] Motion for Leave to File

Supplemental Memorandum and Exhibits, and [] accepting [Docket

Entries 22-1 and 22-2] for consideration in relation to [PI]

Motion”).)° And - after Defendant responded in opposition to the

PI Motion (see Docket Entry 28) - Plaintiff replied (see Docket

Entry 31), including therewith a declaration (Docket Entry 31-1),

as well as various documents (some of which he previously had

filed) (see Docket Entry 31-2 at 1 (describing Docket Entries 31-3,

31-4, 31-5, and 31-6)). Those materials establish this time-line:

1) fall semester classes at Defendant’s School of Law began on

August 18, 2025 (see Docket Entry 31-3 at 2; accord Docket Entry

10-1 at 14);

2) more than a month later, “[o]n or about September 23, 2025,

[Plaintiff] submitted [his] accommodation request and supporting

medical documentation to OARS” (Docket Entry 31-1 at 1);

° Plaintiff also requested and received permission to file a

revised, proposed order as to the PI Motion. (See Second Text

Order dated May 8, 2026 (“granting [Plaintiff’s] Motion for Leave

to File Revised Proposed Order, and [] accepting [Plaintiff’s]

Revised Proposed Order for consideration in relation to [PI]

Motion”).) The Revised Proposed Order essentially tracks the PI

Motion’s alternative relief proposal, by requiring Defendant first

(A) to permit Plaintiff to retake his final examinations from the

2025 fall semester with accommodations, and then (B) to reassess

his dismissal based on the results of those (retaken) examinations

(rather than simply requiring his immediate reinstatement).

(Compare Docket Entry 9 at 2, with Docket Entry 26-1 at 1.)

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3) Plaintiff then “request[ed ] an [intake] appointment with

[OARS] at 9:00 am on October 01, 2025” (Docket Entry 22-2 at 2),

which, via email dated September 30, 2025, OARS “approved” (id.);

4) “[Plaintiff] attended [that] intake-related meeting with

OARS on or about October 1, 2025” (Docket Entry 31-1 at 1),

whereupon he learned “that the intake process would take longer

than thirty minutes” (id.);

5) “[b]ecause the intake would take longer than the time

available before [Plaintiff’s next] class, the full intake process

was not completed during the October 1 meeting” (id.);

6) more than a month later, “[o]n or about November 4, 2025,

[Plaintiff] requested or attempted to schedule a meeting with OARS”

(id.); more specifically, as evidenced by a response e-mail an

Assistant Director of OARS “[s]ent[ to Plaintiff on] November 4,

2025 [at] 8:16:27 AM” (Docket Entry 31-5 at 8 (bold font omitted)),

at some time early in the morning on November 4, 2025, Plaintiff

“request[ed] to meet” (id.) with OARS that day at “9:00am” (id.);

7) that response e-mail (A) states that the Assistant

Director’s “schedule conflict[ed] with 9:00am, but [that she was]

free after 10:00 and most of the afternoon” (id.), and (B) asks if

“there [was] another time [Plaintiff was] available” (id.);

8) as evidenced by another e-mail to Plaintiff from OARS on

November 4, 2025, Plaintiff did not pursue a meeting at some other

time that day, but instead “request[ed ] an appointment with [OARS]

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at 9:00 am on November 06, 2025, [which was] declined” (Docket

Entry 22-2 at 3), with a directive for Plaintiff to “[p]lease

contact OARS to reschedule [his] appointment” (id.);

9) nine days thereafter, via e-mail “[s]lent[ on] Thursday,

November 13, 2025 [at] 8:14:16 AM” (Docket Entry 31-5 at 2 (bold

font omitted)), Plaintiff asked the Assistant Director if she was

“available next week” (id.), before immediately sending a second e-

mail asking if she “could [] meet on zoom tomorrow” (id.);

10) within seven minutes, the Assistant Director responded

that, “[w]hile in person is preferred for initial meetings, [she]

c[ould] also do a virtual meeting tomorrow between 9:30 and 11:00

or between 2:30 and 4:00” (id. at 3);

11) later that morning, (A) Plaintiff replied by asking if the

Assistant Director could “do Tuesday at 8am” (id. at 4), (B) she

promptly rejoined that she “ha[d] something until 8:30” (id. at 7),

but that she could meet at “8:30 or 9:00” (id.), and (C) Plaintiff

stated “8:30 will work” (id.) “[o]n Tuesday” (id.; see also Docket

Entry 22-2 at 4 (stating, in e-mail sent by OARS to Plaintiff on

November 13, 2025, that his “request for an appointment .. . at

8:30 am on November 18, 2025 ha[d] been approved”));

12) “the full intake meeting occurred on or about November 18,

2025” (Docket Entry 31-1 at 2);

13) “f[o]ln or about November 20, 2025, [OARS] issued its

accommodation determination” (id.; see also Docket Entry 31-4 at 2-

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4 (additional copy of e-mail from OARS transmitting accommodation

denial letter, “[s]ent[ to Plaintiff on] Thursday, November 20,

2025 [at] 9:30:59 AM” (bold font omitted))); and

14) fall semester classes at Defendant’s School of Law ended

on November 21, 2025 (see Docket Entry 31-3 at 2; accord Docket

Entry 10-1 at 14), with the next week comprised of two “[r]eading

[d]ays” (Docket Entry 31-3 at 2; accord Docket Entry 10-1 at 14)

and a break for the “Thanksgiving Holiday” (Docket Entry 31-3 at 2;

accord Docket Entry 10-1 at 14), followed by two weeks for “[f]inal

[e]xams” (Docket Entry 31-3 at 2; accord Docket Entry 10-1 at 14).

Turning to the contents of the accommodation denial letter,

OARS first addressed Plaintiff’s request for a “[d]istraction-

[r]educed [t]esting [e]nvironment” (Docket Entry 10-1 at 7 (bold

font omitted)):

Using [your] earplugs for your last test allowed you to

tune out distractions, and[,] as a result, you were able

to get more accomplished. We highly encourage you to

continue using the earplugs as well as positioning

yourself strategically in the classroom (e.g., at the

front or back, facing the wall) for future tests. These

steps are expected to mitigate the need for [a] separate

testing environment.

(Id. (stray comma omitted).) “Additionally, [OARS explained] that

the documentation [it] ha[d] on hand d[id] not show supporting data

indicating a substantial limitation that would justify extended

time or reader assistive technology for tests at th[at] time.”

(Id.; see also id. (reminding Plaintiff of “discuss[ion] in the

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intake meeting” of “psychoeducational evaluation [as means that]

would likely show this information” and “attaching a list of local

agencies which [could] give [Plaintiff] guidance on next steps”).)

The accommodation denial letter then advises Plaintiff that,

if he “disagree[d] with the [denial of] identified accommodations”

(id.), “OARS provides a process for prompt review and resolution”

(id.; see also id. at 7-8 (describing option to “file an appeal

through the ADA/504 Appeal Process” by sending an “email . . .

within ten (10) working days of receiving the [accommodation

denial] letter,” after which “[t]he 504 Coordinator will be in

contact with [Plaintiff] within seven (7) working days” and “will

make a final decision on the appeal and will provide [Plaintiff]

with a written decision via [] email within five (5) working days

of communicating with [Plaintiff]” (bold font omitted))). Lastly,

the accommodation denial letter notes that Plaintiff “may also file

a complaint with the U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Civil

Rights at any time before, during, or after [Defendant’s] 504

grievance process.” (Id. at 8 (hyper-linking omitted).)

As a final matter (as articulated in the Expedited Discovery

Motion’s supporting brief (Docket Entry 15)), Plaintiff has

“request[ed] leave to serve a short set of requests for production,

and [to take] a limited [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure]

30(b)(6) deposition or [to obtain a] declaration [as an]

alternative, confined to the following categories” (id. at 1):

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1. Plaintiff’s examination records for the Fall 2025

Contracts, Civil Procedure, and Torts final examinations,

including answer files, upload records, completion

records, and any documents showing whether portions were

left incomplete;

2. Documents sufficient to show the grading structure,

point allocation, or rubric for the Fall 2025 Contracts,

Civil Procedure, and Torts final examinations;

3. Documents sufficient to show when and how the Torts

examination format requirement was communicated,

including whether the examination was required to be

typed and whether pen-and-paper or blue books were

prohibited;

4. Plaintiff’s OARS file, including intake notes,

determination materials, internal communications, and

documents reflecting the handling of Plaintiff’s

accommodation request;

5. Documents sufficient to show whether any interim or

partial testing accommodations were considered for

Plaintiff before finals;

6. To the extent such materials exist and can be produced

in anonymized or otherwise lawful form, documents

sufficient to show whether Defendant provided other law

students with interim testing-format or location

adjustments during the same term.

(Id. at 2.) Defendant has responded in opposition to the Expedited

Discovery Motion (see Docket Entry 27), and Plaintiff has replied

(see Docket Entry 32).

DISCUSSION

“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy intended

to protect the status quo and prevent irreparable harm during the

pendency of a lawsuit.” Di Biase v. SPX Corp., 872 F.3d 224, 230

(4th Cir. 2017) (emphasis added). As such, a preliminary

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injunction “should only be granted in limited circumstances.” Bach

v. Law School Admission Council, Inc., No. 1:13CV888, 2014 WL

12987279, at *1 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 4, 2014) (unpublished) (Eagles, J.).

“Because mandatory - rather than prohibitory - preliminary

injunctions generally do not preserve the status quo, they are

granted even more sparingly.” Id. (citing Pashby v. Delia, 709

F.3d 307, 319 (4th Cir. 2013)). As documented in the Introduction,

the PI Motion (even if limited only to the alternative relief

requested therein) seeks mandatory (not prohibitory) injunctive

relief against Defendant that would alter (not preserve) the status

quo. “The ([C]lourt will only grant a mandatory preliminary

injunction if it is necessary both to protect against irreparable

harm in a deteriorating circumstance created by the defendant and

to preserve the [C]lourt’s ability to enter ultimate relief on the

merits of the same kind.” Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation

marks omitted). For the reasons that follow, the record (detailed

in the Introduction) establishes no such necessity in this case.

En route to that conclusion, the Court notes that “[al]

plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate ‘that

he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer

irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the

balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in

the public interest.’” Di Biase, 872 F.3d at 230 (emphasis added)

(quoting Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20

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(2008)). Significantly, “Winter made clear that each of these four

factors must be satisfied to obtain preliminary injunctive relief.”

Henderson v. Bluefield Hosp. Co., LLC, 902 F.3d 432, 439 (4th Cir.

2018) (emphasis in original). “And, even more relevant to the

[resolution of the PI Motion], the [Winter] Court indicated that it

was unnecessary to address all four factors when one or more had

not been satisfied.” Id. In other words, “[g]ranting a

preliminary injunction requires analysis of each Winter factor,”

Frazier v. Prince George’s Cnty., 86 F.4th 537, 544 (4th Cir.

2023), but “denying a preliminary injunction only takes the

rejection of a single factor,” id. (emphasis in original); see also

Henderson, 902 F.3d at 439 (“In light of Winter, the [] argument

that district courts must consider all four factors and their

impact upon one another before denying preliminary injunctive

relief is clearly misplaced.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Here, the Court will deny the PI Motion because Plaintiff has

not satisfied the second Winter factor, i.e., he has not shown that

“he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of

preliminary relief,” Di Biase, 872 F.3d at 230 (emphasis added)

(internal quotation marks omitted).°® Importantly:

° Although second in Winter’s list of factors, the irreparable

harm factor addresses a matter of primary concern in this context,

as the United States Supreme Court long ago “stated that ‘the basis

of injunctive relief in the federal courts has always been

irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal remedies,’” Sampson v.

(continued...)

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[P]laintiff must demonstrate more than just a possibility

of irreparable harm. “Issuing a preliminary injunction

based only on a possibility of irreparable harm is

inconsistent with [the Winter Court’s] characterization

of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that may

only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff

is entitled to [such] relief.” “Mere injuries, however

substantial, in terms of money, time and energy

necessarily expended in the absence of [preliminary

injunctive relief] are not enough. The possibility that

adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will be

available at a later date weighs heavily against a claim

of irreparable harm.”

Id. (emphasis added) (internal citation, ellipsis, and some

quotation marks omitted) (first quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 22; and

then quoting Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974)).

The PI Brief presents this argument for the Court to find that

“Plaintiff has shown likely irreparable harm absent relief” (Docket

Entry 10 at 3 (all-caps, bold, and enlarged font omitted)):

The dismissal letter itself establishes present and

continuing harm. Plaintiff is no longer eligible to

continue in classes, his spring tuition and aid were

canceled, and he may not petition for reinstatement until

at least nine months after dismissal. The attached

handbook excerpt goes further and states that

reinstatement petitions generally are not granted. That

internal process is therefore not a timely or adequate

remedy for a student seeking to preserve a current

admissions cycle and prevent ongoing interruption of

legal education.

Plaintiff has already received admissions denials from

[three law schools] after disclosing his academic

dismissal. Plaintiff was also informed by telephone by

[a fourth law school] that, because of the dismissal, his

6(...continued)

Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 88 (1974) (internal bracket omitted) (quoting

Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506-07 (1959)).

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application had to be withdrawn and he would not be

eligible for admission until two years had elapsed.

Those admissions consequences support irreparable harm by

showing real-time damage to admissions prospects and

educational continuity. The active dismissal itself is

causing delay in Plaintiff’s legal education and

continuing harm to his academic record and professional

trajectory. Monetary damages alone cannot fully repair

the lost opportunity to remain on track in law school or

the real-time effect of an active dismissal during

ongoing admissions cycles.

(Id.; see also Docket Entry 22-1 at 3 (“Without preliminary relief,

Plaintiff remains dismissed and unable to continue Plaintiff’s

legal education while the accommodation dispute remains unresolved.

Plaintiff therefore contends that the interruption to Plaintiff’s

legal education and professional trajectory constitutes irreparable

harm.”).) After a thorough review of the record, the Court has

determined, as Defendant has argued in response to the PI Motion,

that “none of Plaintiff’s alleged harms are actually irreparable”

(Docket Entry 28 at 9).

For example, “[i]f Plaintiff is successful in his suit, the

Court may order [Defendant] to readmit him, in which case his lost

educational opportunity harm will be remedied.” (Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted).) Plaintiff’s “readmission will also mean

that his admissions-cycle harm will have been remedied because he

will be back in school at [Defendant’s School of Law] and hence

need not participate in any admission-cycle at all.” (Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted).) “Finally, his readmission

will also eliminate the impact of an active academic dismissal

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because Plaintiff will no longer be academically dismissed.” (Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted).)7

Defendant’s position on this front finds support in numerous

decisions from courts around the country confronted with similar

scenarios. See, e.g., Howell v. Pepperdine Univ., No. 2:24CV6332,

2025 WL 819593, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2025) (unpublished)

(“[The p]laintiff has not demonstrated that her cause will be

irreparably prejudiced . . . . Simply put, [the p]laintiff’s

missing law school classes is not irreparable harm.”); Daniels v.

University of Notre Dame, No. 1:22CV698, 2024 WL 413828, at *2

(N.D. Ind. Feb. 5, 2024) (unpublished) (“[The plaintiff] predicates

his claim of irreparable harm on the interruption of his education

and the stigma of his record reflecting an involuntary dismissal.

That gap in [his] education has already occurred and cannot be

precluded by the injunction he requests. In such circumstances,

many courts have held that an educational gap does not constitute

7 Defendant also correctly “noted that it is unclear that

Plaintiff’s applications to other law schools are being denied

because of his dismissal from [Defendant’s] law school.” (Docket

Entry 28 at 9; see also id. at 9-10 (“A review of Plaintiff’s

provided denial letters reveals that none of those denial letters

reflect that he is being denied because of his dismissal. [One]

denial letter explicitly suggests that Plaintiff was denied

admission because of a low LSAT score, not his dismissal . . . .”

(internal citation omitted) (citing Docket Entry 10-1 at 18-20)).)

In reply, Plaintiff neither contested that point nor meaningfully

challenged Defendant’s above-quoted contentions about the adequacy

of final injunctive relief rescinding Plaintiff’s dismissal as a

remedy for the harms identified in the PI Brief. (See Docket Entry

31 at 5-6 (discussing irreparable harm).)

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irreparable harm. As these and other courts have concluded, if a

student ultimately prevails in a challenge to expulsion, the

interruption in his education can be remedied by money damages.

Any speculation about lasting damage to [the plaintiff’s]

reputation or career prospects is too speculative to satisfy the

irreparable harm requirement.” (internal citations and quotation

marks omitted) (collecting cases)); Garfield v. Middle Tenn. State

Univ., No. 3:21CV613, 2021 WL 9979155, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 1,

2021) (unpublished) (“[The p]laintiff argues that, should the

[c]ourt not intervene, she will be unable to progress in the

program with her classmates and that she will forever lose this

learning experience. The [c]ourt finds that [the p]laintiff has

failed to demonstrate that she will suffer irreparable harm absent

the injunction. . . . [C]ourts have regularly found that

interruptions or delays of educational programs are not irreparable

harm.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (collecting

cases)); Doe v. Trustees of Ind. Univ., No. 1:20CV2006, 2020 WL

7028030, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 30, 2020) (unpublished) (“While

expulsion from medical school is serious and perhaps even

devastating for an individual aspiring to become a doctor, it is

unclear how that fact . . . show[s] irreparable harm here because

[the plaintiff] has an opportunity to complete his medical

education at [the defendant’s medical school] should he win on the

merits in this case.”); Oser v. Capital Univ. Law Sch., No.

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2:09CV709, 2009 WL 2913919, at *11 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 8, 2009)

(unpublished) (“[I]f the [c]ourt were ultimately to find that [the

defendant] had failed reasonably to accommodate [the plaintiff],

[the court] could then order [the defendant] to readmit [the

plaintiff] so that he could complete his legal education. Any

delay in his degree conferral, as well as his pain and suffering in

the interim[,] could be adequately compensated by monetary damages.

Therefore, [the plaintiff] has not established a substantial

likelihood that he will suffer irreparable harm.”); Baer v.

National Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 392 F. Supp. 2d 42, 49 (D. Mass.

2005) (“[The plaintiff’s] inability to continue as a medical

student without interruption at [her medical school], while

desirable, is not a harm that is irreparable to [her] potential

medical career.”); see also Bach, 2014 WL 12987279, at *3

(“[S]hould [the plaintiff] succeed on the merits, he will be able

to take another exam with the requested accommodations. Though a

later test may not allow him to enter law school in the fall of

this year, . . . delayed entry to law school is not the kind of

harm that warrants mandatory injunctive relief.”).

In the face of Defendant’s arguments, which (like the

foregoing rulings) undermine the PI Motion’s contentions about

irreparable harm, Plaintiff’s reply recasts “[t]he harm [at issue

a]s the loss of a specific academic opportunity to demonstrate

performance on Fall 2025 final examinations under lawful testing

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conditions when those examinations determined academic standing.”

(Docket Entry 31 at 5.) Per Plaintiff: “That opportunity cannot

be fully recreated later. Academic sequencing, access to course

materials, preparation posture, exam conditions, grading context,

transcript consequences, and academic-standing decisions continue

moving while litigation proceeds. A later merits judgment cannot

perfectly restore the same exam opportunity.” (Id.) Plaintiff,

however, has not provided any evidence (or even argument) showing

that a court order issued now requiring Defendant to permit

Plaintiff to retake his fall 2025 final examinations in Contracts,

Civil Procedure, and Torts with accommodations would “perfectly

restore the same exam opportunity” (id.), but an identical court

order issued at the end of this case would not. (See id.)

Under these circumstances, the Court concludes that

“Plaintiff’s allegations of irreparable harm are vague, conclusory,

and unsupported by the specific demonstrations of fact necessary to

obtain preliminary injunctive relief.” Martin v. Birkhead, No.

1:24CV165, 2025 WL 2325087, at *10 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 25, 2025)

(unpublished) (Webster, M.J.), recommendation adopted, slip op.

(M.D.N.C. Mar. 28, 2025) (Biggs, S.J.); see also Williams Ohio

Valley Midstream, LLC v. Kittle, No. 23-2185, 2024 WL 3325532, at

*5 (4th Cir. July 8, 2024) (unpublished) (reversing preliminary

injunction due to district court’s “adopt[ion of the plaintiff’s]

assertions of irreparable harm that [we]re speculative and

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unsupported by evidence”); EZ-Ink, Inc. v. Brother Indus., Ltd.,

No. 2:21CV564, 2021 WL 7909312, at *9 (E.D. Va. Dec. 9, 2021)

(unpublished) (“The party [seeking a preliminary injunction] must

show the likelihood of irreparable harm with concrete evidence.

Speculations or conclusory statements concerning alleged harm(s)

will not satisfy the irreparable harm requirement.” (internal

citation omitted)). “Furthermore, to the extent Plaintiff is

relying on [the FAC] and [his other] filings . . ., they do not

clearly show that he will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of

preliminary relief. At most, Plaintiff is speculating as to future

injury.” Martin, 2025 WL 2325087, at *10 (internal citation

omitted). “Similarly, Plaintiff’s conclusory assertion regarding

the inadequacy of other remedies is patently inadequate to meet

Plaintiff’s burden.” Smith v. Charleston Police Dep’t, No.

2:25CV131, 2025 WL 2304945, at *5 (S.D. W. Va. July 14, 2025)

(unpublished), recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 2301380 (S.D. W. Va.

Aug. 8, 2025) (unpublished).

“Moreover, any deteriorating circumstance surrounding [the]

delay[ in Plaintiff taking these examinations with accommodations]

was created in large part by [Plaintiff], not [Defendant].” Bach,

2014 WL 12987279, at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted). That

consideration further supports denial of the PI Motion because, in

addressing the irreparable harm factor, the Fourth Circuit has held

that “a preliminary injunction is not warranted where, as here, the

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moving parties have not shown that they availed themselves of

opportunities to avoid the injuries of which they now complain.”

Di Biase, 872 F.3d at 235. Along that same line, the Fourth

Circuit (like many other courts) have acknowledged that “some forms

of ‘self-inflicted’ harm may be discounted or ignored altogether in

the preliminary-injunction analysis.” Mountain Valley Pipeline,

LLC v. 6.56 Acres of Land, Owned by Sandra Townes Powell, 915 F.3d

197, 219 (4th Cir. 2019); see also, e.g., Second City Music, Inc.

v. City of Chicago, 333 F.3d 846, 850 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[S]elf-

inflicted wounds are not irreparable injury.”); Moore v.

Williamsburg Reg’l Hosp., C.A. No. 4:05-2940, 2006 WL 8438614, at

*4 (D.S.C. Aug. 21, 2006) (unpublished) (“A preliminary injunction

movant does not satisfy the irreparable harm criterion when the

alleged harm is self-inflicted.”).

In particular (as argued by Defendant and as shown by record

evidence recounted in the Introduction), “any ‘irreparable harm’

Plaintiff is allegedly facing is, in no small part, of Plaintiff’s

own making. Plaintiff failed to timely engage in the disability

accommodations request process with OARS, instead waiting until

shortly before his final examinations to meaningfully participate

in that process.” (Docket Entry 28 at 8.) As such, “Plaintiff

failed to take reasonable steps to avoid the harm he now comes to

the Court claiming is irreparable.” (Id. at 9.) To recap:

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1) classes in the fall of 2025 at Defendant’s School of Law

started on Monday, August 18, 2025, and ended 13 weeks later on

Friday, November 21, 2025 (see Docket Entry 10-1 at 14);

2) Plaintiff waited until Tuesday, September 23, 2025, i.e.,

more than five weeks into the semester, to reguest disability

accommodations (see id. at 2-3, 5; Docket Entry 11 at 1; Docket

Entry 31-1 at 1), in the form of “[e]xtended time on examinations

(e.g., time-and-a-half)” (Docket Entry 10-1 at 5 (bold font

omitted)), “[r]educed-distraction testing environment” (id. (bold

font omitted)), “[p]lermission to use a laptop with approved

software for note-taking and exam writing” (id. (bold font

omitted)), and “[a]lccess to lecture recordings or outlines when

available” (id. (bold font omitted));

3) the only medical documentation Plaintiff submitted to

support those requests consisted of a nearly two-year-old letter

(see id. at 9), with recommendations for “extended testing time

(double time)” and “use [of] pen and paper” (id.), from an FNP

whose office (at the time of the letter’s writing) had treated

Plaintiff for less than a week (see id.), during which period he

completed an “Adult ADHD Self-Report Assessment Scale” (id.),

“expressed difficulty with[] Generalized Anxiety Disorder, ADHD-

combined type” (id. (hypen used for bulleting omitted)), and

“show[ed] improvement” (id.; see also id. at 1 (describing FNP’s

letter as “[t]reating-provider accommodation letter and supporting

-~26-

medical documentation submitted to [Defendant]”), 10-13 (attaching

e-mail from Clemson’s accessibility services office dated March 13,

2024, approving Plaintiff for “[e]xtended time on exams/tests

(1.5x),” and letter from LSAC dated March 4, 2025, extending prior

approval of double test-time for multiple-choice and essay portions

of exam, as well as use of paper and pencil for multiple-choice

portion, neither of which describes basis/support for

accommodations (bold font omitted)));

4) in conjunction with the foregoing accommodations request,

Plaintiff “request[ed ] an [intake] appointment with [OARS] at 9:00

am on October 01, 2025” (Docket Entry 22-2 at 2), which, via email

dated September 30, 2025, OARS “approved” (id.);

5) “[Plaintiff] attended [that] intake-related meeting with

OARS on or about October 1, 2025” (Docket Entry 31-1 at 1),

whereupon he learned “that the intake process would take longer

than thirty minutes” (id.);

6) “[b]ecause the intake would take longer than the time

available before [Plaintiff’s next] class, the full intake process

was not completed during the October 1 meeting” (id.);

7) five weeks later, on November 4, 2025, with only 17 days

left until classes ended for the semester, “[Plaintiff] requested

or attempted to schedule a meeting with [an Assistant Director of]

OARS” (id.), for 9:00 a.m. that day (see Docket Entry 31-5 at 8);

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8) the Assistant Director promptly responded that her

“schedule conflict[ed] with 9:00am, but [that she was] free after

10:00 and most of the afternoon” (id.), and asked if “there [was]

another time [Plaintiff was] available” (id.);

9) Plaintiff did not pursue a meeting at some other time that

day, but instead “request[ed ] an appointment with [OARS] at 9:00

am on November 06, 2025[, which was] declined” (Docket Entry 22-2

at 3), with a directive for Plaintiff to “[p]lease contact OARS to

reschedule [his] appointment” (id.);

10) more than a week later (and now only eight days before

classes ended for the semester), via e-mails “[s]ent[ early on]

Thursday, November 13, 2025” (Docket Entry 31-5 at 2 (bold font

omitted)), Plaintiff asked the Assistant Director for her

“availab[ility] next week” (id.) or “on zoom tomorrow” (id.);

11) the Assistant Director immediately responded that,

“[w]hile in person is preferred for initial meetings, [she] c[ould]

also do a virtual meeting tomorrow between 9:30 and 11:00 or

between 2:30 and 4:00” (id. at 3);

12) later that morning, Plaintiff asked if the Assistant

Director could meet on November 18, 2025, i.e., the following

“Tuesday at 8am” (id. at 4), and they agreed to meet at 8:30 a.m.

on November 18, 2025 (see id. at 7), at which time “the full intake

meeting occurred” (Docket Entry 31-1 at 2);

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13) two days later, on the morning of November 20, 2026,

“[TOARS] issued its accommodation determination” (id.; see also

Docket Entry 10-1 at 6-8 (e-mail from OARS to Plaintiff “[slent[

on] Thursday, November 20, 2025 [at] 9:30:59 AM” transmitting

accommodation denial letter));

14) the accommodation denial letter (A) details the

alternative solutions Plaintiff could employ “to mitigate the need

for [a] separate testing environment” (id. at 7), (B) explains

“that the documentation [OARS] hal[d] on hand does not show

supporting data indicating a substantial limitation that would

justify extended time or reader assistive technology for tests at

th[at] time” (id.), (C) identifies a psychoeducational evaluation

as a potential means for Plaintiff to obtain such data (see id.),

and (D) advises Plaintiff of his options for internal appeal and

external administrative complaint (see id. at 7-8);

15) beginning on Monday, November 24, 2025, Defendant’s School

of Law held two “[rleading [dJays” (id. at 14), before taking the

remainder of that week off for the “Thanksgiving Holiday” (id.),

and then resuming with two weeks of “[f]inal [e]xams” (id.), from

Monday, December 1, 2025, through December 12, 2025 (see id.);°

® Plaintiff devoted a substantial part of his reply in support

of the PI Motion to arguments that, due to the constraints of the

academic calendar, he could not obtain a psychoeducational

evaluation and/or complete the appeal process in time to secure

accommodations for his final examinations. (See Docket Entry 31 at

(continued...)

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16) Plaintiff took his Contracts, Civil Procedure, and Torts

final examinations without accommodations and earned final grades

in those courses of C+, D+, and D, respectively (see Docket Entry

11 at 1-2; Docket Entry 13 at 1);

17) by e-mailed letter dated January 2, 2026, Defendant

“inform[ed Plaintiff] that [his] cumulative grade point average for

the fall 2025 semester [wa]s below the [level] needed in order for

[him] to remain in good academic standing” (Docket Entry 10-1 at

15) and that he “therefore [was] dismissed” (id.); and

8(...continued)

2-4.) In doing so, Plaintiff argued that “Defendant identifie[d]

no mechanism by which that [time] sequence could produce a

psychoeducational evaluation, institutional review, completed

appeal, final decision, and implemented exam accommodations before

December 1.” (Id. at 3; see also id. (“The appeal process was

illusory on its face for imminent final-exam access because, as

written, it used sequential working-day intervals, included an

investigation step of uncertain duration, and contained no

emergency deadline requiring completion before final

examinations.”).) This argument not only ignores Plaintiff’s

responsibility for creating the time-crunch but also improperly

places the burden on Defendant to show that Plaintiff could have

made meaningful use of the options identified in the accommodation

denial letter on November 20, 2025, when – as the party seeking

extraordinary relief – Plaintiff bears the burden of showing that

he lacked viable options. And Plaintiff has not carried that

burden, as (A) he has not shown that he made any effort to schedule

a psychoeducational evaluation at that time, (B) he has not cited

any evidence to support the inference that OARS would have taken

the maximum amount of time allowed under its policy to resolve any

appeal, and (C) he has not even disclosed when, within the two-

week, final-examination period ending on December 12, 2025, he took

the examinations at issue. (See id.) In sum, the Court rejects

Plaintiff’s characterization of the options presented in the

accommodation denial letter as “unavailable remed[ies that]

bec[a]me a basis for blaming Plaintiff” (id. at 4).

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18) Plaintiff commenced this action on February 9, 2026 (see

Docket Entry 2 at 1), filed the PI Motion on March 16, 2026 (see

Docket Entry 9 at 1), supplemented the PI Motion on April 15, 2026

(see Docket Entry 22 at 1), revised his injunctive relief request

on May 4, 2026 (see Docket Entry 26 at 1), and reported, in

conjunction with his reply filed on May 6, 2026 (see Docket Entry

31 at 1), that he “ha[s] scheduled a psychoeducational evaluation

for June 22, 2026” (Docket Entry 31-1 at 3).?°

The foregoing facts show (A) that Plaintiff initially delayed

until more than five weeks of the 13 weeks of classes in the fall

2025 semester had passed before he requested accommodations,

(B) that, with said request, Plaintiff included as medical

documentation only a dated letter based on minimal interaction with

no supporting data regarding the severity of his disability or the

basis for the endorsed accommodations (which did not include a

distraction-free test environment, as Plaintiff requested, but did

° “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) (2) requires that,

when ‘granting or refusing’ a preliminary injunction, a district

court ‘state the findings of fact and conclusions of law that

support its action.’” Frazier, 86 F.4th at 544 (internal brackets

omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(2)); see also id.

(“[Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 52(a)(2)’s burden is not

Herculean. It does not require a tome that memorializes all

factual minutiae or responds to every legal assertion.”). The 18-

item list above states the Court’s findings of fact for resolution

of the PI Motion and the analysis in this Discussion section

constitutes the Court’s corresponding conclusions of law. See id.

(“[A] district court denying a preliminary injunction may satisfy

[Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 52(a) (2) by stating the facts

and legal conclusions about a single [Winter] factor.”).

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include use of pen and paper for tests, whereas Plaintiff asked for

computerized test-taking), (C) that Plaintiff scheduled an

accommodation intake meeting another week into the semester and

allotted only 30 minutes for that meeting when the intake process

required an hour, (D) that Plaintiff next delayed for another five

weeks before trying to reschedule the intake meeting and proposed

only two times on two dates despite offers of wide, immediate

availability from OARS, (E) that Plaintiff thereafter delayed for

more than another week before soliciting dates during the last week

of classes for the intake meeting, (F) that OARS issued its

accommodation denial letter within 48 hours of Plaintiff finally

completing the intake process, noting specific deficiencies in his

support materials and providing information about avenues he could

pursue if he disputed that result, and (G) that, having eschewed

those options and fallen short of achieving the grades needed to

avoid dismissal, Plaintiff waited for more than a month after his

dismissal to file suit, delayed for more than another month to move

for preliminary injunctive relief, and then spent another month and

a half fine-tuning his relief request and scheduling an evaluation

he had known he needed for six months.

Given that course of conduct, “the Court finds [that

Plaintiff’s] purported need for emergency relief is substantially,

if not entirely, the result of poor planning and procrastination

[on his part]. And, as [other c]ourt[s have] found in [other

-32-

cases], poor planning does not justify emergency relief.” Pure

Aqua, Inc. v. Envitec Corp., No. SACV 12-1936, 2013 WL 12114610, at

*1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2013) (unpublished); see also Baer, 392

F. Supp. 2d at 49 (recognizing that, where the plaintiff failed to

act in timely fashion, “any consequent time binds she faces are

self-inflicted”). Based on that consideration and the availability

at the conclusion of this litigation of both injunctive relief and

damages to remedy any harm Plaintiff can prove Defendant caused by

failing to provide reasonable accommodations due him, no basis

exists for a “finding by the [C]ourt that [Plaintiff] would suffer

irreparable damage or that []he has no adequate remedy at law in

the event the [PI Motion] should be denied,” Alberti v. Cruise, 383

F.2d 268, 272 (4th Cir. 1967). And the denial of the PI Motion for

failure to show a likelihood of irreparable harm warrants denial of

the Expedited Discovery Motion as well, because (as documented in

the Introduction) the areas of inquiry proposed by Plaintiff for

discovery in aid of the PI Motion focus on the merits of his

underlying claims (not the existence of irreparable harm absent

preliminary injunctive relief). (See Docket Entry 15 at 2.)

CONCLUSION

The findings of fact and conclusions of law in the preceding

section establish that Plaintiff has failed to show a likelihood of

irreparable harm absent entry of the preliminary injunctive relief

he has requested. Nor would Plaintiff’s proposed discovery alter

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the analysis of irreparable harm. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot

obtain preliminary injunctive relief or expedited discovery.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the PI Motion (Docket Entry 9)

and the Expedited Discovery Motion (Docket Entry 14) are DENIED.

/s/ L. Patrick Auld

L. Patrick Auld

United States Magistrate Judge

May 21, 2026

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