People v. Lynon

2026 IL App (1st) 242141-U

Fourth Division

Filed May 21, 2026

No. 1-24-2141

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent

except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

)

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appeal from the

)

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of Cook County

)

v. No. 19 CR 0248401

)

ERIC LYNON, ) The Honorable Margaret M. Ogarek,

) Judge, presiding.

Defendant-Appellant.

)

JUSTICE OCASIO delivered the judgment of the court.

Presiding Justice Navarro and Justice Quish concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The defendant’s petition for relief from judgment was properly dismissed where his

petition was legally insufficient to state a claim for relief under section 2-1401 of the

Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2024)) and where the trial court’s

alleged procedural errors did not require reversal.

¶2 This case is before us on appeal from the dismissal of a petition for relief from judgment

under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2024)). Finding

that the judgment of dismissal was both correct on the merits and not accompanied by any

procedural errors that would require reversal, we affirm.

No. 1-24-2141

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 The defendant, Eric Lynon, was convicted in 2022 of criminal sexual abuse and sentenced to

serve seven years’ imprisonment. We affirmed his conviction on direct appeal. People v. Lynon,

2024 IL App (1st) 221573-U. A separate appeal from the denial of his postconviction petition is

pending. See People v. Lynon, 2025 IL App (1st) 231422-U, pet. for leave to appeal granted, No.

132043 (Ill. Nov. 26, 2025).

¶5 The facts of the case, as established by the evidence at trial, are detailed in our decision on

direct appeal. See Lynon, 2024 IL App (1st) 221573-U, ¶¶ 5-21. In summary, the evidence showed

that, on the night of January 11, 2019, Lynon and K.B.R., a 22-year-old woman he had connected

with on a dating app, met up at a Bedford Park hotel where Lynon had rented a room. When Lynon

tried to have sex with her, she told him to stop, but he pinned her down on the bed and then, after

they rolled off of it, to the floor. At one point during the struggle, he took her phone from her hand

and tossed it away. When he allowed her to get up, she ran from the room with her pants still

halfway down her legs screaming for help, and hotel employees called the police. Responding

officers searched the room for Lynon, but he had already fled through a side entrance. The next

day, the victim identified Lynon in a photo array, and he was eventually arrested.

¶6 Lynon was found guilty after a jury trial, and he appealed from his conviction. He also filed

a pro se petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2024)),

which was dismissed, and he appealed from that judgment as well.

¶7 In 2024, while his direct appeal and collateral appeal were still pending, Lynon filed two pro

se petitions for relief from judgment. The first petition, filed January 24, 2024, appears to be

directed against various orders entered during proceedings on his postconviction petition. This

appeal concerns the second petition, which he filed on March 22, 2024, and amended on July 18,

2024. That petition alleged, in summary, that (1) the police fraudulently concealed from the

defense various violations of the fourth amendment and departmental policies; (2) the police

obtained search warrants by withholding exonerating facts and relying on illegally obtained

evidence; (3) a prosecutor obtained a grand jury indictment through similar means; (4) K.B.R.

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No. 1-24-2141

testified falsely at trial about certain details; (5) the state police laboratory analysts failed to

disclose that they had not tested everything, misled the jury about the DNA test results, and

concealed that their equipment was not all in proper working order; (6) evidence of official

misconduct was not elicited at trial because the State, the court, and defense counsel colluded to

exclude it; and (7) the indictment was void because it was not adequately supported by evidence

establishing probable cause. Many of these allegations were based on documents Lynon had

obtained through public-records requests from various law enforcement agencies that worked on

the case. The petition also alleged that Lynon had exercised due diligence but had not discovered

the above evidence sooner because it had been fraudulently concealed by the police, the

prosecutors, and defense counsel.

¶8 The State moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that none of Lynon’s claims were cognizable

under section 2-1401 and that, in any event, the petition was filed outside the applicable limitations

period. The court rejected the State’s timeliness argument, noting that sentence was imposed on

April 29, 2022, less than two years before Lynon filed his petition, but it agreed that the petition’s

claims were not properly brought under section 2-1401. After declining to recharacterize the

section 2-1401 petition as a postconviction petition, the court dismissed it.

¶9 Lynon filed a motion to reconsider arguing, in essence, that all of his claims amounted to

claims of fraudulent concealment or perjury, which rendered his conviction void. He also asserted

that he had not been given an opportunity to cure deficiencies in the petition. He did not articulate

what amendments he would make if given the opportunity. The court denied the motion to

reconsider after a hearing.

¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 11 On appeal, Lynon asks us to reverse the dismissal of his petition for relief from judgment.

Lynon is representing himself on appeal, and his arguments have a tendency to conflate different

principles of law that, while relevant and often related, are conceptually distinct. Broadly speaking,

however, his brief challenges the circuit court’s judgment in two ways. Primarily, on the merits, he

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No. 1-24-2141

argues that his petition should not have been dismissed. He also alleges a handful of procedural

errors.

¶ 12 A. The Adequacy of the Petition and its Claims

¶ 13 We begin with the merits. Section 2-1401 creates a statutory procedure for obtaining relief

from final orders and judgments more than 30 days after their entry. Price v. Philip Morris, Inc.,

2015 IL 117687, ¶ 22. Although the petition is filed in the same proceeding as the judgment or

order being challenged, it is not a continuation of the underlying action but an initial pleading

commencing a new cause of action. Id. ¶ 23. That new action is civil in nature, but it can be used

to obtain relief from judgments in criminal cases. People v. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d 1, 8 (2007).

Proceedings on a section 2-1401 petition are governed by the ordinary rules of civil practice, with

the petition being treated as a complaint that invites responsive pleadings. Id. Petitions are

therefore subject to dismissal for legal insufficiency, either on the responding party’s motion or,

when it is clear that the petitioner is not entitled to relief as a matter of law, by the court on its own

motion. Id. at 8, 12. Our review is de novo. In re Marriage of Van Ert, 2016 IL App (3d) 150433,

¶ 14.

¶ 14 At we have noted, the precise legal nature of Lynon’s claims are not clear from his briefs, but

his arguments all seem to revolve around one of three types of claims that would be cognizable

under section 2-1401. First, section 2-1401 can be “used to bring facts to the attention of the trial

court which, if known at the time of judgment, would have precluded its entry.” Paul v. Gerald

Adelman & Associates, Ltd., 223 Ill. 2d 85, 94 (2006). Second, in criminal cases, what are usually

termed “actual innocence” claims can be raised via section 2-1401. See People v. Boclair, 202 Ill.

2d 89, 102 (2002). Third, a section 2-1401 petition can challenge a judgment as void. Sarkissian

v. Chicago Board of Education, 201 Ill. 2d 95, 104-05 (2002). We examine each possibility in turn.

¶ 15 1. New Facts

¶ 16 The typical purpose of a section 2-1401 petition for relief from judgment is “to bring facts to

the attention of the trial court which, if known at the time of judgment, would have precluded its

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entry.” Paul, 223 Ill. 2d at 94. To state this type of “new facts” claim, “the petition must set forth

allegations supporting the existence of a meritorious claim or defense; due diligence in presenting

the claim or defense to the circuit court in the original action; and due diligence in filing the section

2-1401 petition.” Id.

¶ 17 Here, Lynon’s petition does not state a legally sufficient “new facts” claim because it fails to

establish due diligence in presenting any of those “new facts” at trial. His petition contains a

cursory allegation that the State tried to conceal the various facts alleged in his petition, but the

thrust of his diligence theory is that defense counsel concealed these facts from him and did not

use them at trial. That is fatal to his claim here because “[t]he general rule in Illinois is that a client

is bound by the acts or omissions of his lawyer-agent.” People v. Bowman, 138 Ill. 2d 131, 141

(1990). “Thus, the affirmative acts of a defendant’s counsel cannot be separated from the

defendant’s own acts.” Id. This means that, for the purposes of section 2-1401, counsel’s failure to

use the facts alleged in Lynon’s petition at trial is attributable to Lynon. See La Rabida Children’s

Hospital & Research Center v. Harrison, 263 Ill. App. 3d 790, 796 (1994) (“Section 2-1401 does

not afford a remedy to relieve a litigant of the consequences of *** his counsel's negligence.”).

¶ 18 Lynon is not entirely without recourse. His attorney’s alleged conduct might support a claim

that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. But Lynon did not raise an

ineffective-assistance claim and, in any event, such a claim would have to be brought through a

petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2024)), not a

section 2-1401 petition for relief from judgment. See People v. Pinkonsly, 207 Ill. 2d 555, 567

(2003).

¶ 19 2. Actual Innocence

¶ 20 We next consider whether Lynon’s petition pleaded a legally sufficient claim of actual

innocence. An actual innocence claim requires the defendant to “present new, material,

noncumulative evidence that is so conclusive it would probably change the result on retrial.”

People v. Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 96. In this context, new evidence is “evidence that was

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No. 1-24-2141

unavailable at trial and could not have been discovered sooner through due diligence.” People v.

Harris, 206 Ill. 2d 293, 301 (2002). So once again, the claim is foreclosed by Lynon’s own

allegations that it was his attorney’s lack of diligence—or outright malfeasance—that stopped

these facts from coming to light before trial, which means that they could have been discovered at

the time of trial through due diligence. That means, again, that Lynon’s recourse is an ineffective-

assistance claim, not an actual innocence claim. Cf. People v. Flournoy, 2024 IL 129353, ¶ 73

(explaining that evidence that establishes a claim of constitutional trial error by definition cannot

qualify as the kind of new evidence needed to establish an actual innocence claim).

¶ 21 3. Voidness

¶ 22 Lynon also asserts that his petition presents a cognizable claim that his conviction is void.

Lynon’s theory of voidness, according to his briefs, is that his indictment and his conviction were

procured through fraud and perjury. He alleged in his petition that numerous individuals—police

officers, prosecutors, forensic analysts, the victim, and even defense counsel—either concealed

material facts or committed perjury to procure a search warrant, an indictment, and, ultimately, a

conviction.

¶ 23 The flaw in Lynon’s argument is that what renders a judgment void is not the fraud itself but

the fact that, in certain situations, fraud can lead to the court proceeding without actually having

jurisdiction to do so. See American Advisors Group v. Cockrell, 2020 IL App (1st) 190623, ¶ 24

(citing Vulcan Materials Co. v. Bee Construction, 96 Ill. 2d 159, 165 (1983)). This kind of fraud,

which is referred to as extrinsic fraud, is “fraud that occurs in situations where an unsuccessful

party has been prevented from fully exhibiting his case by being kept away from the court or is

kept from gaining knowledge of the suit.” In re Adoption of E.L., 315 Ill. App. 3d 137, 154 (2000).

Extrinsic fraud renders a judgment void because it either “prevented a court from acquiring

jurisdiction or merely gave the court colorable jurisdiction.” American Advisors Group, 2020 IL

App (1st) 190623, ¶ 24. But “once a court acquires jurisdiction, subsequent fraud, concealment, or

perjury will not render its order void.” Vulcan Materials, 96 Ill. 2d at 165.

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No. 1-24-2141

¶ 24 None of the conduct alleged in Lynon’s petition establishes the kind of extrinsic fraud that

would have effectively deprived the court of jurisdiction. There are two elements to jurisdiction:

subject-matter jurisdiction, which is the court’s jurisdiction to hear and decide the kind of case in

front of it, and personal jurisdiction, which is the court’s jurisdiction over the parties to the case.

People v. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 12. The court unquestionably had personal jurisdiction

over Lynon when it entered the judgment. See People v. Abtahi, 2020 IL App (1st) 181631, ¶ 18

(“A trial court acquires personal jurisdiction over a criminal defendant when he appears personally

before it.”). Its subject-matter jurisdiction arose when the case was put before it regardless of any

defects in the indictment. See People v. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶ 28. At most, any of the alleged

fraud might render the conviction voidable, not void. Id. ¶ 29.

¶ 25 B. Procedural Arguments

¶ 26 That brings us to the various procedural challenges Lynon raises in his brief.

¶ 27 1. Comingled Motion to Dismiss

¶ 28 Lynon argues that the State improperly brought a motion to dismiss that included grounds for

dismissal under both section 2-615 and section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS

5/2-615, 2-619 (West 2024)). Actually, the statutes governing civil practice expressly allow

combined motions to dismiss. See id. § 2-619.1. The only requirement is that the motion clearly

designate the statute under which each ground for dismissal is being brought. Id. Here, the State

clearly divided its motion to dismiss into two parts, one under section 2-615 and the other under

section 2-619. There was no improper comingling.

¶ 29 2. Misinterpretation of Claims

¶ 30 Lynon argues, in summary, that both the State and the circuit court misunderstood or distorted

the precise nature of his claims. That may (or may not) be true, but it makes no difference. As an

appellate court, we review the circuit court’s judgment, not whatever the court said while rendering

that judgment. Ultsch v. Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 226 Ill. 2d 169, 192 (2007). We can

uphold the judgment if the record shows that it was correct, even if the grounds the circuit court

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relied on were not. Id. In this case, our review is de novo, which means we decide for ourselves

whether the petition should have been dismissed. See Freeburg Community Consolidated School

Dist. No. 70 v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 2021 IL App (5th) 190098, ¶ 80. As the appellant,

Lynon has the burden of persuading us that the judgment of dismissal was erroneous. Insurance

Benefit Group, Inc., v. Guarantee Trust Life Insurance Co., 2017 IL App (1st) 162808, ¶ 44. In

other words, it is not enough for Lynon to show us that the circuit court dismissed for the wrong

reason. He must convince us that the motion to dismiss should have been denied. His argument

that the circuit court misapprehended his claims does not call for reversal.

¶ 31 3. No Opportunity to Cure

¶ 32 Lynon argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by dismissing the petition without

giving him an opportunity to cure its defects by amendment. But although Lynon complained in

his motion to reconsider that he was not given leave to amend his petition, the record shows that

he never actually sought to amend his petition after the court granted the motion to dismiss. “The

general rule is that where a trial court dismisses a complaint and plaintiff does not seek leave to

amend, the cause of action must stand or fall on the sufficiency of the stricken pleading.” Bajwa v.

Metro. Life Ins. Co., 208 Ill. 2d 414, 435 (2004). Where Lynon did not seek leave to amend his

petition after the motion to dismiss was granted, we will not find that the trial court abused its

discretion.

¶ 33 4. Counsel

¶ 34 Under a section of his brief entitled “Unfair Hearing on Substitution of Judge,” Lynon argues

that the court abused its discretion by not appointing counsel to represent him. He acknowledges,

correctly, that section 2-1401 does not require the appointment of counsel. People v. Stoecker,

2020 IL 124807, ¶ 36. However, circuit courts have discretion to appoint counsel anyway (id.),

and Lynon contends that the court should have appointed counsel to represent him due to the

Illinois Department of Corrections denying him access to the courts and due to a “lack of

notification and ex parte rulings.” The record, however, shows that, whatever difficulties he may

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have faced at various points while he was still incarcerated, Lynon was able to file detailed

pleadings, motions, and responses to the State’s own filings. He was also able to attend court and

argue his position, and he was present and active at the hearing on the State’s motion to dismiss

and his own motion to reconsider dismissal. We fail to see how he was deprived of access to the

courts. His vague references to a lack of notification and supposed ex parte rulings are insufficient

to bring any error to our attention where he neither specifies what he did not receive notice of nor

identifies any supposed ex parte orders. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020)

(“Argument *** shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor.”). We find

no abuse of discretion.

¶ 35 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 36 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Lynon’s petition for relief from judgment did not raise

any legally sufficient claims under section 2-1401 and that none of his claims of procedural error

require reversal or remand. The dismissal of the petition is therefore affirmed.

¶ 37 Affirmed.

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