The opinion
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
No. 26-207C
(Filed: May 19, 2026)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
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NATRESHA T. DAWSON-PASCHALL, *
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Plaintiff, *
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v. *
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THE UNITED STATES, *
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Defendant. *
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OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Natresha T. Dawson-Paschall, proceeding pro se, raises various
claims against the United States and other parties. See Am. Compl. (ECF 6). She has
filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis. See App. (ECF 7). The government
opposes the application and has moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. See Mot.
(ECF 11); RCFC 12(b)(1). The motion to dismiss is fully briefed. See Resp. (ECF 12);
Reply (ECF 14). Plaintiff has filed a series of additional motions, see (ECF 10, 13, 18,
19, 23), which I have reviewed for material that may be relevant to jurisdiction. The
application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. The motion to
dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s motions are DENIED AS MOOT. The case is
DISMISSED.
This Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction — its authority to pass judgment on
the cases before it — is limited to specific types of claims, most commonly non-tort
claims for money damages under the Tucker Act. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1); see
also Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“The Court of Federal
Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction.”). Claims that are outside the Court’s
jurisdiction must be dismissed. RCFC 12(h)(3). “In determining jurisdiction, a court
must accept as true all undisputed facts asserted in the plaintiff’s complaint and draw
all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United
States, 659 F.3d 1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d
795, 797 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). “Although a pro se plaintiff’s complaint is held to a less
stringent standard than those prepared by counsel, pro se litigants are not excused
from meeting jurisdictional requirements.” Spengler v. United States, 688 F. App’x
917, 920 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citations omitted) (citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9
(1980), and Kelley v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987));
see also Howard-Pinson v. United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 551, 553 (2006) (citing Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972)) (explaining that pro se litigants are “entitled to
a liberal construction of [their] pleadings”).
Here, many of Plaintiff’s claims are directed against parties other than the
United States. Am. Compl. at 21–22 ¶¶ 41–44. This Court cannot hear claims against
defendants other than the United States. See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S.
584, 588 (1941).
Plaintiff may intend to challenge rulings by other courts. This Court does not
have authority to review decisions of other courts. Jones v. United States, 440 F. App’x
916, 918 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d 378, 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
To the extent Plaintiff’s claims are directed against the United States, most
claims in this Court are premised on (1) contracts between the plaintiff and the
United States, (2) illegal exactions of money by the United States, or (3) laws or
constitutional provisions that require the United States to pay money to the plaintiff.
Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1491(a)(1)); Spencer v. United States, 98 Fed. Cl. 349, 355 (2011). Plaintiff does not
appear to claim that she had a contract with the United States or that the United
States exacted money from her. Although she cites several statutes and constitutional
provisions that the United States allegedly violated, none supports jurisdiction here.
Plaintiff characterizes her claims as arising under the Federal Tort Claims Act
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Am. Compl. at 1. This Court has no jurisdiction over cases
that sound in tort, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), nor over Section 1983 and other civil rights
laws, see Doiban v. United States, 173 Fed. Cl. 527, 544 (2024) (citing Ganaway v.
United States, 557 F. App’x 948, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
Plaintiff’s claims appear to involve employment disputes arising from
Plaintiff’s time as a federal employee. This Court lacks jurisdiction over employment
discrimination claims, see Taylor v. United States, 310 F. App’x 390, 393 (Fed. Cir.
2009), and “claims brought by federal employees regarding adverse personnel
decisions are within the exclusive purview of” the Merit Systems Protection Board,
see Honse v. United States, 149 Fed. Cl. 792, 796 (2020) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7701 and
United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 454 (1988)). Plaintiff mentions claims for
workers compensation, which this Court has also held to be outside its jurisdiction.
See Gibson v. United States, No. 13-664, 2014 WL 1394374, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Apr. 9,
2014) (citing Gallo v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 593, 608 (2007), aff’d, 529 F.3d 1345
(Fed. Cir. 2008)).
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Plaintiff mentions various constitutional provisions, but none requires
payment of money, so they do not support jurisdiction either. United States v.
Connolly, 716 F.2d 882, 887 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (First Amendment); Brown, 105 F.3d at
623 (Fourth Amendment); Trafny v. United States, 503 F.3d 1339, 1340 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (Eighth Amendment); Greene v. United States, No. 22-1711C, 2023 WL
3454821, at *2 (Fed. Cl. May 15, 2023) (Fourteenth Amendment).
CONCLUSION
The application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF 7) is GRANTED.
Defendant’s motion to dismiss (ECF 11) is GRANTED. The remaining motions (ECF
10, 13, 18, 19, 23) are DENIED AS MOOT. The case is DISMISSED.
The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Stephen S. Schwartz
STEPHEN S. SCHWARTZ
Judge
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