S.W. v. Commonwealth

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SJC-13785

S.W. vs. COMMONWEALTH.

Suffolk. January 7, 2026. - May 21, 2026.

Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, Georges, Dewar,

& Wolohojian, JJ.

Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Due

Process of Law, Substantive rights, Competency to stand

trial, Pretrial detainees, Commitment. Practice, Criminal,

Competency to stand trial, Defendant's competency. Bail.

Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for

the county of Suffolk on June 5, 2025.

The case was heard by Wendlandt, J.

Michaela R. Martin Strout, Committee for Public Counsel

Services, for the petitioner.

Jocelyn A. McGrath, Assistant District Attorney, for the

Commonwealth.

Tatum A. Pritchard, Justin M. Woolf, Deborah A. Dorfman,

Jennifer Honig, Steven Schwartz, & Kathryn Rucker, for

Disability Law Center, Inc., & others, amici curiae, submitted a

brief.

GEORGES, J. This case, together with a companion case also

decided today, R.D. v. Commonwealth, 497 Mass. (2026),

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concerns the lawfulness of detaining a criminal defendant1

without bail pending the availability of a hospital bed to

effectuate a competency evaluation pursuant to G. L. c. 123,

§ 15 (b) (§ 15 [b]). In addition, the case implicates the

underlying order requiring the defendant's hospitalization for

that evaluation (commitment order). Because no bed was

available at the facility designated to conduct the evaluation,

a judge ordered the defendant detained without bail until a bed

became available (detention order). The defendant challenged

both orders by filing a petition in the county court pursuant to

G. L. c. 211, § 3. The single justice vacated the detention

order, concluding that no statutory or common-law authority

permits detention without bail to facilitate a competency

evaluation pursuant to § 15 (b), but denied relief as to the

commitment order. The defendant appealed.

We first decide, in the exercise of our discretion, to

reach the merits of the detention order, as it presents an

important question that implicates a fundamental liberty

interest and that may generate confusion in the trial courts.

Second, although the defendant's challenge to the commitment

order ordinarily would not be before us -- given the available

1 Although this appeal stems from S.W.'s G. L. c. 211, § 3,

petition in the county court, for ease of reference, we refer to

her as the defendant.

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review in the Appellate Division of the District Court

(Appellate Division) -- we likewise exercise our discretion to

reach its merits. Finally, we conclude that the single justice

neither erred nor abused her discretion in vacating the

detention order and in denying relief from the commitment order.

Accordingly, we affirm.2

Background. We summarize the relevant facts, reserving

additional detail for discussion of the specific issues.

On June 2, 2025, a criminal complaint issued in the

Pittsfield Division of the District Court Department charging

the defendant with one count of assault, in violation of G. L.

c. 265, § 13A (a). At arraignment that same day, a judge

ordered the defendant to undergo a competency evaluation,

pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 15 (a) (§ 15 [a]), with a court

clinician.

Later that day, the judge held a hearing on the results of

that evaluation. At the hearing, the clinician opined that the

defendant, suffering from "severe" untreated mental illness, was

not fully aware of the criminal charge against her or its legal

consequences. According to the clinician, the defendant

2 We acknowledge the amicus brief in support of the

defendant submitted by the Disability Law Center, Inc., the

Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee, the Center for Public

Representation, and the Massachusetts Association for Mental

Health.

4

expressed the delusional belief that she was "married to King

Charles" and that because she was the "Queen of England," she

was "not supposed to be . . . in Court." The clinician also

observed significant delays in the defendant's responses,

suggesting she was experiencing internal stimuli such as

auditory hallucinations. Although the defendant reported having

a psychiatrist at a local mental health facility, the clinician

noted that the identified provider had not worked there for

years. The defendant also told the clinician that she was

receiving counselling from her "husband's people," referring to

King Charles. The defendant, previously diagnosed with bipolar

disorder, did not appear to be taking any prescribed medications

to treat her symptoms.

Based on these observations, the clinician did not "believe

[the defendant] demonstrate[d] the skills necessary for

competence to stand [t]rial" and recommended hospitalization

pursuant to § 15 (b). The clinician further informed the judge

that no hospital beds were available and that one likely would

not be available for "several weeks."

The judge ordered the defendant committed pursuant to

§ 15 (b), expressly finding that "hospitalization for

observation and examination [was] necessary and the least

restrictive means of determining the [d]efendant's competence to

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stand [t]rial." The judge further ordered that the defendant be

detained without bail "until a bed [became] available."

Three days later, the defendant filed a petition in the

county court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, seeking review of

both the commitment and detention orders. A single justice

allowed the petition in part and denied it in part. Exercising

her discretion to reach the merits, the single justice concluded

that the judge did not err in ordering a competency evaluation

pursuant to § 15 (b), but that the detention order was unlawful.

This appeal followed.3

Discussion. A single justice considering a petition under

G. L. c. 211, § 3, undertakes a two-step analysis. See

Commonwealth v. Fontanez, 482 Mass. 22, 24, 28 (2019). At the

first step, the single justice determines, in the exercise of

discretion, whether review of the petition's substantive merits

is warranted. See id. at 24. At this threshold stage, the

3 While the petition was pending, a different District Court

judge ordered the defendant released on personal recognizance

but left the commitment order in place. Following oral argument

in this appeal, the underlying criminal charge was dismissed.

Assuming these developments render the defendant's challenge to

the detention order moot, we nonetheless exercise our discretion

to decide the issue, as it presents a question of public

importance that is capable of repetition while evading review.

See, e.g., Agostini v. Commonwealth, 497 Mass. 242, 244 (2026).

By contrast, the challenge to the commitment order is not moot

because "the defendant has a surviving personal interest in

adjudicating whether the nature of her confinement [under

§ 15 (b)] was wrongful." Commonwealth v. A.Z., 493 Mass. 427,

430 (2024).

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single justice may deny relief without reaching the merits if

the petitioner "has an adequate alternative remedy" or if the

matter is not sufficiently important and extraordinary to

warrant the exercise of our general superintendence. Id. at 24-

25. Even where review of the petition's merits is not

warranted, however, the single justice retains discretion to

proceed to the second step. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Clark,

454 Mass. 1001, 1002 (2009). At the second step, the single

justice considers the merits to determine whether to grant

relief. See Fontanez, supra at 28.

On appeal, we review a single justice's decision for clear

error of law or abuse of discretion. See Vasquez v.

Commonwealth, 481 Mass. 747, 751 (2019). We therefore consider

the single justice's decisions at each step of the G. L. c. 211,

§ 3, framework.

1. First step. At the first step, the single justice

concluded that review under G. L. c. 211, § 3, was appropriate

because the right "to be free from physical restraint" is a

"paradigmatic fundamental right." Commonwealth v. A.Z., 493

Mass. 427, 431-432 (2024), quoting Garcia v. Commonwealth, 487

Mass. 97, 102-103 (2021). Although the single justice did not

address whether the defendant had any adequate alternative

remedies, the Commonwealth now contends that relief under G. L.

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c. 211, § 3, was inappropriate because the defendant had

adequate alternative means to obtain review of both orders.

We need not resolve the Commonwealth's adequate alternative

remedy argument as to the detention order.4 Like the single

justice, we retain discretion to reach the merits even where an

adequate alternative remedy may exist. See Garcia, 487 Mass. at

101 n.9 (declining to address whether defendant had adequate

alternative remedy where, in part, "the single justice exercised

his discretion to reach the merits of the petition"); Vaccari,

petitioner, 460 Mass. 756, 759 (2011) (addressing merits,

notwithstanding that adequate alternative remedy existed, where

single justice reached merits).

Exercising our discretion to reach the merits of the

detention order is appropriate. As the single justice

recognized, the order implicates a fundamental liberty interest.

See Fontanez, 482 Mass. at 28 (importance of "fundamental

constitutional concerns" weighed in favor of reviewing

petition's merits). Further, the question whether a judge may

detain a defendant without bail pending the availability of a

hospital bed for a § 15 (b) evaluation is a matter of public

importance likely to recur and capable of causing uncertainty in

4 The Commonwealth argues that the detention order could

have been reviewed by the Superior Court under G. L. c. 276,

§ 58, seventh par., or by the Appellate Division under G. L.

c. 123, § 9 (a).

8

the trial courts. See Commonwealth v. Ware, 471 Mass. 85, 93

(2015) ("we have exercised our general superintendence powers to

resolve . . . matter[s] of public interest that may cause

further uncertainty within the courts" [quotation and citation

omitted]).

As for the commitment order, we agree with the Commonwealth

that the defendant had an adequate alternative remedy: an

appeal to the Appellate Division. General Laws c. 123, § 9 (a),

provides that "[m]atters of law arising in commitment hearings

. . . or incompetency for trial proceedings in a district court

may be reviewed by the appellate division of the district

courts." We have previously held that an appeal pursuant to

G. L. c. 123, § 9 (a), is an adequate alternative means of

remedying an allegedly unlawful § 15 (b) commitment order. See

Matter of an Impounded Case (No. 1), 493 Mass. 1001, 1002

(2023).5 Accordingly, relief from the commitment order

ordinarily would be denied on this ground. See McMenimen v.

Passatempo, 452 Mass. 178, 185 (2008), S.C., 458 Mass. 1007

(2010) and 461 Mass. 279 (2012) (our jurisprudence "consistently

reinforces the principle . . . that the extraordinary remedy of

5 Because we decline the defendant's invitation to revisit

or overrule Matter of an Impounded Case (No. 1), and because we

exercise our discretion to reach the merits of the commitment

order, we need not address the defendant's additional arguments

as to why review in the Appellate Division is inadequate.

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general superintendence is meant for situations where a litigant

has no adequate alternative remedy").

Nonetheless, as with the detention order, we conclude that,

in the circumstances presented, it is appropriate to exercise

our discretion to reach the merits of the commitment order,

especially where the single justice exercised her discretion to

do so. See N.M. v. Commonwealth, 478 Mass. 89, 93 (2017)

("Although we now have concluded that there is no right to

review as a matter of law, . . . we exercise our discretion to

reach the merits in this case"). See also Garcia, 487 Mass. at

101 n.9; Vaccari, petitioner, 460 Mass. at 759.

2. Second step. In assessing the single justice's ruling

on the merits, "we must, in effect, address the same legal

issue[s] presented to the single justice" (quotation and

citation omitted), Trustees of Boston Univ. v. Clerk-Magistrate

of the Cambridge Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't, 495 Mass. 56, 62

(2024) -- namely, the propriety of the detention and commitment

orders. We begin with the detention order.

a. The detention order.6 Whether a judge has the authority

to order the detention of a criminal defendant pending the

6 Although no party raises the issue, it is not clear

whether the defendant can challenge the detention order in this

court, as she was not aggrieved by that portion of the single

justice's judgment. See G. L. c. 231, § 114. Indeed, the

defendant prevailed before the single justice on the lawfulness

of the detention order. Nonetheless, for the reasons we set

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availability of a hospital bed to complete a competency

evaluation under § 15 (b) presents a question of law and

statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. See Garcia,

487 Mass. at 101. We begin, as we must, with the plain language

of G. L. c. 123, § 15. "Where the language of a statute is

clear, . . . courts must give effect to its plain and ordinary

meaning and . . . need not look beyond the words of the statute

itself" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Rossetti, 489 Mass.

589, 593 (2022).

The single justice concluded, and we agree, that there is

no statutory authority for the detention order. General Laws

c. 123, § 15, does not authorize pretrial detention of a

criminal defendant in aid of a competency evaluation under

§ 15 (b). Nothing in the statutory text contemplates, expressly

or implicitly, the detention of a defendant solely because the

resources necessary to conduct the evaluation are unavailable.

Nor does any other statute confer such authority. For example,

G. L. c. 276, § 58, does not permit detention based on the

unavailability of hospital beds or delays in conducting a

forth in greater detail in R.D., 497 Mass. , we exercise our

discretion to address the issue, even though it is "not strictly

before us" (citation omitted). This is appropriate where, as

here, "the case has been fully briefed on the merits, . . .

there is a public interest in obtaining a prompt answer to the

question, and . . . the answer to be given is reasonably clear."

Brown v. Guerrier, 390 Mass. 631, 632 (1983).

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competency evaluation. See Commonwealth v. Vieira, 483 Mass.

417, 420–421 (2019) (describing circumstances in which

functional equivalent of pretrial detention may be imposed under

G. L. c. 276, § 58).

The judge was likewise without inherent authority to issue

the detention order. The judiciary's inherent authority extends

only to those powers necessary "to allow judges to perform core

functions necessary for the proper administration of justice"

(citation omitted). Makis M. v. Commonwealth, 494 Mass. 23, 33

(2024). The power to detain defendants pretrial while they

await hospitalization under § 15 (b) is not among those

functions. Such detention does not advance adjudication but

instead operates as a judicial response to the Commonwealth's

inability to implement the statutory commitment scheme.

Addressing that problem requires "a level of policy-making

typically reserved for the Legislature." Id. at 34. Cf. id. at

33 (establishment of pretrial remediation programming for

incompetent juveniles is beyond scope of court's inherent

authority); Department of Mental Retardation v. Kendrew, 418

Mass. 50, 54–55 (1994) (order placing intellectually impaired

criminal defendant in long-term residential program was not

within District Court judge's inherent authority).

Indeed, the circumstances in which a judge may order

pretrial detention are "limited," Brangan v. Commonwealth, 477

12

Mass. 691, 703, S.C., 478 Mass. 361 (2017), and this is not one

of them. Here, the defendant was deprived of liberty not on any

statutorily recognized ground, or any proper exercise of

inherent judicial authority, but solely because no hospital bed

was available. Even if this circumstance reflects a "gap" in

the governing statutory schemes, the judge was not empowered to

"take matters into [her] own hands in the name of resolving [the

defendant's] criminal case[] efficiently." Makis M., 494 Mass.

at 34.

In short, no matter how well intentioned, a judge may not

detain a criminal defendant without bail solely because a

hospital bed is unavailable to conduct a competency evaluation.

The detention order was therefore unlawful, and the single

justice correctly vacated it.

b. The commitment order. Generally, we review a judge's

decision to order a competency evaluation under § 15 (b) for an

abuse of discretion. See G. L. c. 123, § 15 (b) (judge "may"

order defendant's hospitalization). Cf. Commonwealth v. Carson

C., 489 Mass. 54, 58 (2022) (noting discretion provided by use

of "may" in § 15 [a]). However, "[w]here the sufficiency of the

evidence at an evidentiary hearing is challenged, we scrutinize

without deference the propriety of the legal criteria employed

. . . and the manner in which those criteria were applied to the

facts" (quotation and citation omitted). Matter of J.P., 494

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Mass. 654, 668 (2024). We also review de novo a defendant's

constitutional challenge to a § 15 (b) order. Cf. Matter of

F.A., 494 Mass. 673, 676 (2024). Thus, while the ultimate

decision to order hospitalization is reviewed for abuse of

discretion, the governing legal standards and constitutional

requirements are subject to independent review. As for the

underlying factual findings, we accept them unless clearly

erroneous, recognizing that the judge "is in the best position

to weigh the evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses, and

make findings of fact." Matter of a Minor, 484 Mass. 295, 302

(2020).

On appeal, the defendant first challenges the judge's

determination that hospitalization under § 15 (b) was the least

restrictive means of assessing competency. She next argues that

the judge lacked authority to order a further competency

evaluation under § 15 (b). We address these arguments in turn,

beginning with the governing legal framework.

i. Legal framework. To be competent to stand trial, "a

criminal defendant must have sufficient ability to consult with

his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding

and a rational as well as factual understanding of the

proceedings against him" (quotations and citation omitted).

Makis M., 494 Mass. at 29. Where a defendant's competency is in

doubt, "a judge may order that the defendant be [initially]

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examined by a qualified psychologist or physician." Id., citing

G. L. c. 123, § 15 (a). If the judge has reason to believe that

further examination and observation are necessary, the judge

"may order that the person be hospitalized at a facility" for no

more than twenty days.7 G. L. c. 123, § 15 (b). At the

conclusion of that period, the examiner must provide a report

setting forth "the clinical findings bearing on the issue of

competence." G. L. c. 123, § 15 (c). If the defendant is found

competent, the case proceeds; if not, the proceedings are stayed

"unless the case is dismissed." G. L. c. 123, § 15 (d).

Beyond the statutory framework, a judge's § 15 (b)

commitment order constitutes a significant deprivation of

liberty and therefore must comport with substantive due process.

See A.Z., 493 Mass. at 427-428, 431-432. Accordingly, a judge

must find, "by clear and convincing evidence, that

hospitalization is the least restrictive means available to

determine adequately a criminal defendant's competency to stand

trial." Id. at 428. The Commonwealth bears the burden of that

showing. Id. at 432. Expert testimony may be used to

demonstrate the need, for example, that "long-term observation

7 This twenty-day period may be extended for up to an

additional twenty days if "an examining qualified physician or

an examining qualified psychologist believes that observation

for more than twenty days is necessary." G. L. c. 123,

§ 15 (b).

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in a hospital setting as opposed to sporadic outpatient

examinations is necessary to adequately determine whether a

defendant is competent." Id. at 433. However, expert or

clinical evidence is not required, see Matter of J.P., 494 Mass.

at 666–667, as "other types of evidence," such as the

defendant's "fail[ure] to comply with mental health counselling"

or "a history of not appearing in court or for various treatment

programs," may be used, A.Z., supra.

ii. Least restrictive means. The judge concluded, by

clear and convincing evidence, that hospitalization for

observation and further examination was "the least restrictive

means of determining the [d]efendant's competence to stand

[t]rial." The record supports that determination. The

clinician described the defendant as suffering from severe,

untreated mental illness, marked by delusional beliefs and

diminished ability to understand the nature and legal

consequences of the charge against her. The defendant was not

engaged in treatment, was not taking medication, and expressed

beliefs indicating that she did not recognize either the need

for care or the legitimacy of the proceedings. On this record,

the judge concluded that an outpatient evaluation was not

feasible and that further observation in a secured, structured

setting was necessary to assess competency.

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The defendant's contrary arguments do not undermine that

conclusion. The judge did not clearly err in any of her factual

findings, or rely on any single factor. Rather, she considered

the totality of the circumstances, including the defendant's

mental health condition, her lack of treatment, and her

inability or unwillingness to engage meaningfully in the

evaluation process. In these circumstances, the judge did not

err in determining that hospitalization pursuant to § 15 (b) was

the least restrictive means of assessing competency.

Accordingly, the single justice did not err or abuse her

discretion in denying relief from the commitment order.8

iii. Authority for § 15 (b) evaluation. The defendant

further contends that the judge lacked authority to order a

further competency evaluation under § 15 (b) because the court

clinician had already opined, following a brief initial

evaluation under § 15 (a), that the defendant was not competent

8 The defendant raises several additional arguments

concerning the least restrictive means analysis, none of which

requires extended discussion. Her reliance on Garcia, 487 Mass.

at 105, which concerns the "likelihood of serious harm"

standard, is misplaced, as that case does not govern competency

determinations under § 15 (b). Nor is there merit to her

contention that the judge impermissibly shifted the burden of

proof; the Commonwealth may satisfy its burden through testimony

of a court clinician, and it did so here. See A.Z., 493 Mass.

at 433. Finally, to the extent that the defendant challenges

the weight given to her lack of treatment, that factor is

properly considered as part of the over-all assessment whether

outpatient evaluation is a viable option.

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to stand trial.9 This argument misconstrues the statutory

scheme.

The statute expressly contemplates that further examination

may be ordered where the court has reason to believe that

additional observation is necessary. Just as an initial

examination of the defendant "does not preclude his being

examined again by a different expert" under § 15 (a), Vuthy Seng

v. Commonwealth, 445 Mass. 536, 541 (2005), S.C., 456 Mass. 490

(2010), the fact that a defendant has already been examined

under § 15 (a) does not, by itself, preclude further examination

under § 15 (b). To the contrary, § 15 (b), expressly authorizes

"further" examination. G. L. c. 123, § 15 (b). The statutory

framework thus establishes complementary, sequential procedures

9 The court clinician recommended that the defendant be

hospitalized under § 15 (b) both to further evaluate her

competency and to allow her to receive psychiatric treatment.

As to the latter reason, the defendant argues, and the

Commonwealth does not dispute, that a § 15 (b) evaluation cannot

be based "simply upon the fact that a defendant is experiencing

symptoms of psychosis and might benefit from inpatient

treatment." We agree that "the function of G. L. c. 123, § 15,

is to provide procedures to determine a person's competency --

not to remediate incompetency" or to otherwise provide a

criminal defendant with mental health treatment. Makis M., 494

Mass. at 31. Here, the judge's findings were not based on

whether the defendant would benefit from inpatient treatment;

rather, she found that "hospitalization for observation and

examination [was] necessary and the least restrictive means of

determining the [d]efendant's competence to stand [t]rial."

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for assessing competency, rather than mutually exclusive

alternatives.

Moreover, at every stage of this process, the determination

of competency is "a legal, not a medical, judgment" entrusted to

the judge. Commonwealth v. Jones, 479 Mass. 1, 14 (2018). "The

law should not, and does not, give the opinions of experts . . .

the benefit of conclusiveness" (citation omitted). Id.

Accordingly, the clinician's initial opinion did not foreclose

the judge's independent determination that further evaluation

was warranted. The judge therefore had statutory authority to

order a further competency evaluation under § 15 (b).

Conclusion. For the reasons stated, we conclude that the

judge did not err in ordering the defendant's competency

evaluation pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 15 (b), but that the

detention order was unlawful. Accordingly, the single justice

did not abuse her discretion or commit a clear error of law in

vacating the detention order and declining to disturb the

§ 15 (b) commitment order.

Judgment affirmed.