Newport

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

CASEY NEWPORT, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 3:25-CV-499-CEA-JEM

)

STATE OF TENNESSEE, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This case is before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the Rules of this Court

on Plaintiff’s Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights [Doc. 1], the Application to Proceed in

District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs [Doc. 2], and Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint

[Doc. 7]. For the reasons more fully stated below, the undersigned GRANTS Plaintiff’s

Application [Doc. 2] but RECOMMENDS that the District Judge DISMISS the Complaint and

the Amended Complaint [Docs. 1 and 7].1

I. DETERMINATION ABOUT THE FILING FEE

Plaintiff has filed an Application [Doc. 2] with the required detailing of her financial

condition. Section 1915 allows a litigant to commence a civil or criminal action in federal court

without paying the administrative costs of the lawsuit. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 27

(1992). The Court’s review of an application to proceed without paying the administrative costs

1 Generally, when a plaintiff files an amended complaint, it supersedes the original

complaint. See Fla. Dep’t of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 702 (1982) (“[O]nce

accepted, an amended complaint replaces the original.”). But here, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint

does not restate her original claims; rather, it adds new claims and parties. In light of Plaintiff’s

pro se status, the Court therefore has screened both pleadings.

of the lawsuit is normally based solely on the affidavit of indigence. See Gibson v. R.G. Smith Co.,

915 F.2d 260, 262–63 (6th Cir. 1990) (observing that “the filing of a complaint is conditioned

solely upon a person’s demonstration of poverty in his affidavit and the question of frivolousness

is taken up thereafter”). To proceed without paying the administrative costs, the plaintiff must

show by affidavit the inability to pay court fees and costs—it is a threshold requirement. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(1). One need not be absolutely destitute, however, to enjoy the benefit of proceeding in

the manner of a pauper, or in forma pauperis. Adkins v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., Inc.,

335 U.S. 331, 342 (1948). An affidavit to proceed without paying the administrative costs is

sufficient if it states that the plaintiff cannot, because of poverty, afford to pay for the costs of

litigation and still pay for the necessities of life. Id. at 339.

The Court finds the Application is sufficient to demonstrate that Plaintiff is not currently

employed and has zero assets. Considering Plaintiff’s Application, it appears to the Court that her

economic status is such that she cannot afford to pay for the costs of litigation and still pay for the

necessities of life. The Court will allow Plaintiff to proceed in the manner of a pauper. The Court

DIRECTS the Clerk to file the Complaint in this case without payment of costs or fees. The Clerk

SHALL NOT, however, issue process at this time.

II. RECOMMENDATION AFTER SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), district courts must screen complaints

and shall, at any time, sua sponte dismiss any claims that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a

claim for relief, or are against a defendant who is immune. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2); Benson v.

O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014, 1015–16 (6th Cir. 1999).2 Courts also have a continuing duty to ensure

2 Despite the reference to prisoners, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 requires the Court to screen complaints

filed by non-prisoners seeking in forma pauperis status. McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F. 3d 601,

608 (6th Cir. 1997) (“Unlike prisoner cases, complaints by non-prisoners are not subject to

that jurisdiction exists to hear the case. Answers in Genesis, Inc. v. Creation Ministries Int’l, Ltd.,

556 F.3d 459, 465 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[F]ederal courts have a duty to consider their subject matter

jurisdiction in regard to every case and may raise the issue sua sponte.” (citations omitted)). To

survive an initial review under the PLRA, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Courts

liberally construe pro se pleadings filed in civil rights cases and hold them to a less stringent

standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).

A. Summary of the Complaint

Plaintiff names the following Defendants in this case: the State of Tennessee, FBI, Matt

Armes, Carey Newport, Sara Armes, UT Hospital, Fort Sanders Hospital, Tennova Hospital (both

locations), Amanda Hamby, Morgan County Jail, Morgan County Officers, Morgan County

Ambulance, Roane County Jail, all Covenant Hospitals, Pennisula Hospital, East TN Behavioral

Health, Moccasin Bend, TCCS Evolve – Chattanooga, Evolve – Smithville, Evolve – Knoxville,

Knox County, Knox County Officers, Halfway Houses in Knoxville, Clear Meadows, Justice &

Dignity, Open Door, Chattanooga Officers, Karm, Helen Ross McNabb 24 Hours Mental Health,

City of Chattanooga, City of Smithville, Roane County, Morgan County, and Knoxville City

[Doc. 1 p. 3; Doc. 1-1; Doc. 7 p. 1].

Plaintiff alleges that she is a “Targeted Individual” (“TI”) and that this started in March

2022 [Doc. 1 p. 3]. She claims that she is “gang stalked ever[y] place [she has] been” and that she

is “me[n]tally tortured as well as physically tortured every time” [Id.]. She contends that when she

screening process required by § 1915A. However, the district court must still screen the complaint

under § 1915(e)(2).”), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Brock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).

tells someone, she is “sent to hospitals and put in mental hospitals” and that she has “never been

in a mental hospital until this started in” March 2022 [Id. at 4]. According to Plaintiff, one of her

“gang stalkers and control[l]ers is Matt Armes which is a [Tennessee] highway patrol” [Id.]. As a

result, she alleges that “everyone seems to listen to him about not believing [her]” [Id.].

Plaintiff explains that “[t]his claim is to prove [she] is a TI and give [her] justice that [she]

deserve[s] and to help people like [her]” Id. She contends that “[t]he proof is on the paper for every

place [she has] been” and that “they follow her even now” [Id.]. Plaintiff submits that “[i]t can be

easy to prove by you” [Id.]. Further, Plaintiff alleges that she has a “device that is in [her] that [she

is] sexually assaulted with and . . . never consented to . . . and was never asked” [Id.]. Plaintiff also

claims that she has a “you tube page in [her] name with no consent that animation that was put

there by gang stalkers as well as Crunchroll that [she] never consented to that has [her] on it” [Id.].

Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, stating that “[TI] – HIPPA Law on all hospitals and

the control[l]ers” [Doc. 7 p. 1]. In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff adds Matt Armes’s wife, Sara

Armes, “to tort claim as well as lawsuit on them” [Id.].

For relief, Plaintiff asks the Court to “prove [her] case as well as justice for [herself]”

[Doc. 1 p. 5]. Plaintiff also requests “proof of being a targeted individual, HIPPA law violated by

the control[l]ers, gang stalkers letting them know [her] medical issues in this case, mental torture,

physical torture, and proving a device that is inside [her] that [she] get[s] sexual assault 24/7 in

State of Tennessee publicly happening present time” [Doc. 7 p. 5].

B. Screening of the Complaint and Amended Complaint

Plaintiff utilizes the form for Complaint of Violation of Civil Rights under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) a deprivation of rights secured

by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States and (2) that a defendant caused harm while

acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).

To begin, Plaintiff names several private actors who cannot be held liable under § 1983.

See Rangel v. Rios, No. 1:14-cv-61, 2014 WL 713032, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 24, 2024) (“Plaintiff

may not proceed under section 1983 against a private party, ‘no matter how discriminatory or

wrongful the parties conduct.’” (quoting Tahfs v. Procter, 316 F.3d 583, 590 (6th Cir. 2003)).

Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that a private actor acted under the color of state law to be

considered a state actor and held liable under § 1983. HealthCall of Detroit, Inc. v. State Farm

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 22-10797, 2022 WL 3153780, at *13 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 8, 2022) (citation

omitted). Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint and Amended Complaint contain no allegations sufficient to

establish that any private actors named as a defendant acted under color of state law.

Moreover, “[t]o hold an individual defendant liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege

‘personal involvement’ in the alleged unconstitutional conduct.” Peace v. Carter,

No. 2:24-CV-4237, 2025 WL 3763825, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 30, 2025) (citation omitted). Plaintiff

has failed to assert allegations of personal involvement against any defendants, other than

Defendant Armes, who she alleges is a “gang stalker and control[l]er” [Doc. 1 p. 4].

Turning to Plaintiff’s claims, she has not alleged deprivation of her constitutional rights.

Instead, she makes vague assertions that she is a targeted individual and that she is being mentally

and physically tortured at every place she goes. Plaintiff contends that she is sent to a mental

hospital when she tells people about this. Plaintiff also claims that she has a device inside of her

that she never consented to that sexually assaults her.

The Court need not credit these allegations. See Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1199

(6th Cir. 1990) (“The standard is not whether or not the district court believes the [plaintiff]—

rather, it is whether the facts are rational.”). A frivolous claim is one that is based on “an

indisputably meritless legal theory,” or on allegations of “infringement of a legal interest which

clearly does not exist.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). “A complaint is frivolous

only if the plaintiff fails to present a claim with an ‘arguable basis either in law or in fact.’” Brand

v. Motley, 526 F.3d 921, 923 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325). A complaint is

legally frivolous “when ‘indisputably meritless’ legal theories underlie the complaint,” and the

complaint is factually frivolous “when it relies on ‘fantastic or delusional’

allegations.” Id. (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325).

Courts in this circuit have dismissed allegations similar to those alleged here as frivolous.

See Sorezo v. Smith, No. 2:22-CV-12489, 2023 WL 162196, at *1–2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 11,

2023) (dismissing as frivolous the plaintiff’s claim that NASA “invaded his privacy using space

technology”); Krusell v. Biden, No. 1:21-cv-484, 2021 WL 3489613, at *1–2 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 9,

2021) (dismissing as frivolous the plaintiff’s allegation of medical problems caused by Nazis and

a “fungal nanotech virus from DARPA”); Valadez v. Whipple, No. 7:20-mc-1220,

2021 WL 8016842, *2 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 12, 2021) (allegations that DEA agents used “Direct Energy

Weapons” against the plaintiff were delusional and subject to dismissal); Dorr v. Unknown Agent

of Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. 17-cv-12974, 2018 WL 4214402, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 15,

2018) (dismissing as frivolous the plaintiff’s allegation that federal agencies intercepted his cell

phone, causing him mental distress); Bartlett v. Kalamazoo Cnty. Cmty. Mental Health Bd.,

No. 18-219, 2018 WL 4492496, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 22, 2018) (affirming dismissal of allegations

that plaintiff was raped, molested, tortured, and subjected to “biomedical treatments” and “severe

radiation” in a mental health facility); see also Valadez, 2021 WL 8016482, at *2 (“Although these

allegations may be real to Plaintiff, a reasonable person would find them to be so delusional as to

be wholly incredible.” (citations omitted)).

Finally, Plaintiff claims that the gang stalkers and controllers who “let[] them know [her]

medical issues in this case” violated HIPAA [Doc. 7 p. 5]. “HIPAA generally provides for

confidentiality of medical records.” Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569, 571 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing

42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-1 to d-7). “[P]rivate citizens have no standing to sue a covered entity for

a violation of HIPAA.” Smith v. Louisville Metro Police Jail, No. 3:21-CV-P533,

2022 WL 1306743, at *4 (W.D. Ky. May 2, 2022) (citations omitted). “Rather, an individual’s

‘only redress for an alleged HIPPA violation is to lodge a written complaint with the Secretary of

Health and Human Services, through the Office for Civil Rights, which has the discretion to

investigate the complaint and impose sanctions, both civil and criminal.’” Brown v. Hill,

174 F. Supp. 3d 66, 71 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Johnson v. Kuehne & Nagel Inc., No. 11-cv-02317,

2012 WL 1022939, at *5 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 26, 2012)). Plaintiff has therefore not stated a claim of

relief under HIPAA.

C. Amending the Complaint

The undersigned has considered whether to allow Plaintiff to amend her pleadings. Justice

does not require an opportunity to amend because Plaintiff’s factual allegations are frivolous and

her remaining HIPAA claim is barred as a matter of law.

Wl. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, the undersigned GRANTS Plaintiff’s Application to

Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs [Doc. 2] > but RECOMMENDS‘ that

the District Judge DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint [Doc. 1] and Amended Complaint [Doc. 7] with

prejudice.

Respectfully,

i E. McCook

United States Magistrate Judge

3 This matter is to be presented to the District Judge pursuant to this Report and

Recommendation under the authority of Gibson v. R.G. Smith Co., 915 F.2d 260, 263 (6th Cir.

1990), wherein the Court of Appeals states that such matters proceed automatically to a district

judge for examination of the complaint after a magistrate judge has granted the petition to proceed

without prepayment of costs.

4 Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be served and filed within

fourteen (14) days after service of a copy of this recommended disposition on the objecting party.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Such objections must conform to the requirements of Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 72(b). Failure to file objections within the time specified waives the right to appeal

the District Court’s order. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 153-54 (1985). “[T]he district court need

not provide de novo review where objections [to the Report and Recommendation] are ‘[f]rivolous,

conclusive or general.’” Mira v. Marshall, 806 F.2d 636, 637 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 n.8 (Sth Cir. 1982)). Only specific objections are reserved for

appellate review. Smith v. Detroit Fed. of Tchrs., 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987).